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DOCTORAL THESIS ABSTRACT 
This is an interdisciplinary, descriptive, empirical study and analysis 
of the use of opencast mining in a complex process of commercialisation 
of the coal industry, its impact upon the environment and communities. 
Much of the initial research was undertaken during a series of public 
inquiries into opencast mining which provided the wealth of material 
contained in the thesis. The thesis advanced here is that the State has 
regulated the supply of coal through positive discrimination for 
opencast coal in the operation of the planning system and by arbitrary 
financial regulation of British Coal operations. 
The argument presented is that despite contrasting approaches and 
political processes in Scotland and North East England, opencast coal 
production has been used as a common facilitator towards the 
commercialisation of the coal industry. Descriptive analysis is given 
of the changing strategic use of opencast mining across the decades, 
from its early commercial development and the policy of dual control to 
its intensive application to assist the coal industry meet government 
financial and operational directives. The expansion of opencast mining 
can be attributed to changes in the political economy of the 1970's, the 
application of the private sector ethos of input-output ratios and 
management control, the unprecedented (mis)use of secondary planning 
legislation and the continued use of narrow accountancy procedures. 
Despite the denials of British coal, in the North East of England 
opencast coal output has supplanted deep mined capacity and has been 
maximised to the limits of the Power Generators' specifications for 
burning coal to maximise profit and provide a 'bank' of assets to 
attract private investment. The strategy in Scotland shows opencast 
mining holding the markets during radical reconstruction of the 
industry, 'hibernating' investment to make the industry attractive for 
the private sector. Both strategies have been set within a general 
'sweetening' operation of the coal industry. 
The work assesses the changing policy process of environmental planning, 
planning law and the public inquiry process in relation to opencast coal 
mining. Two major attitude surveys in Scotland and North East England 
cover the social context of environmental planning policy, each confirm 
the marginalisation of the public to decisions made in opencast 
development. Certain themes define the scope of the thesis: The State's 
approach to energy policy and planning policy. British Coal's economic 
'management' of coal production, as well as the attitudes of the public, 
public planning officials, British Coal and the National Union of 
Mineworkers in Scotland and North East England. Scrutiny of the market 
for coal and British coal's claims for the need for opencast coal are 
given full coverage in light of the effects from the expansion of 
opencast mining on employment, the environment and people. overall the 
thesis challenges accepted thinking on economic and planning policy 
aspects and technical requirements of opencast coal production in 
relation to deep mined coal. 
(vii) 
PREFACE 
This Thesis is presented in gratitute and recognition tQ_m.L 
Family, Comrades and Friends «Both sides_.si the Tweed' 
without whom little would have been possible. 
(viii) 
INTRODUCTION 
The principal aim of this thesis is to analyse, explore, explain and challenge, where 
appropriate, the reasons for the continuing expansion of opencast mining output within the 
declining market for coal in Britain. The focus is placed upon contrasting political contexts 
of coal production in Scotland and North East England so as to bring under scrutiny British 
Coal's approaches to coal production and opencast coal in particular. This aim is developed 
through a theme of the thesis that the main expansion of opencast mining followed the 
collapse of the post war 'long wave' investment boom which forced the State into a new 
relation with commodity production and exchange. Under these new conditions the State 
then went about securing surplus value in the coal industry from the expansion of opencast 
coal mining, manipulating the Planning System and regulating financial control of British Coal 
as part of the preparation of the coal industry to return to private sector operation. 
In an old house there is always listening 
and more is heard than spoken 
And what is spoken remains in the room 
waiting for the future to hear it 
And whatever happens began in the past 
and presses hard on the future 
T. S. Eliot Chorus from The Family Reunion 
This stanza aptly characterises the political development of opencast coal mining, from 
whence it was first pronounced in the House of Commons (Hansard 1407-9 17/3/1942) as a 
panacea to the ills of coal production, to its full return to the stable of the private sector. 
Ever since 1942, the spectre of the strategic expansion of opencast mining becoming a reality 
1. 
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has haunted the political corridors of power, if not the industry Only the combined lack of 
technological improvement, regressive economic conditions and political ideology prevented 
the progressive transformation from a mere small scale opportunist business to a large scale 
commercial enterprise. Now, expansionist aspirations which were sown in the 1940's to mine 
coal with the minimum of labour have come to fruition in the 1980's and 1990's. Opencast 
mining expansion as an economic imperative carries its own alien logic together with a 
double indemnity to the public through the loss of employment and environmental amenity. 
Historically, opencast coal mining has been envisaged as' coal production without the need 
for miners' (Hansard 1407-9 17/3/1942), portrayed as a 'supplement' to deep-mined output 
(CENE 1981), and justified as 'a necessary evil' (Clarke NUM, CCC, 1988). The State 
regards the appropriate level of opencast output should be determined by the market (Cmnd. 
8877) and qualifies the need 'to ma.ximise output to reduce average costs' (New Strategy for 
Coal1985) because it sees opencast coal as 'an important source oflow cost energy' to be 
expanded in the 'national interest' (Minerals Planning Guidance 3). 
Until the 1980's, the motives for opencast development had appeared to originate in the 
Houses of Parliament in 1942 (CENE 1981). Efforts to establish more plausible origins and 
motives for the development of opencast have been justified by the exposure of a more 
humble process of opportunism and commercialisation in the first third of this century. 
Following the economic pressures in the coal industry coal owners and industrialists sought 
ways to stay solvent, those having a hand in opencast mining were aided in this by 
instruments of the 193 0 Coal Act. This piece of parliamentary work facilitated the 
commercial development of opencast mining , and by design or default created conditions 
for continuity and technical progress through the demand for coal during and beyond the 
2. 
second world war. Here, under State control, opencast mining moved from being a strategic 
supplement to deep mine coal production to one of a strategic replacement on pure 
commercial grounds. Emerging from an examination of the historical context it will be seen 
that the commercial origins of opencast mining also formed the basis upon which the state 
and the private sector combined from 1943 in dual control of the opencast sector. Initially 
opencast coal was projected as a supplement to overall coal production, in reality the State 
recognised that there was always a strategic alternative to deep mine output and manpower 
with later expansion having a largely commercial rationale. 
In Scotland and North East England different means have been used to pursue parallel 
objectives - the dominance of opencast mining in coal production. These objectives stand in 
stark contrast to earlier years in coalfield communities. Where, as long as the pulley wheels 
of the local pit turned, little cognisance was taken of opencast mining and few voices were 
raised against the impact of its operations. Contradictions between opencast mining and 
deep mining never occurred to many people until the 1984-85 miners strike, despite the 
strenuous objections raised during the 1970's from environmentalists who were to form the 
backbone of opposition in the 1980's. On the back of raised political consciousness in 
mining communities in the 1980's, came public awareness of the competitive nature of 
expanded opencast coal production with its increasing intrusion into peoples lives and the 
continuing closure of deep mines. 
The opencast expansion process is recognised as being indivisible from the wider social, 
economic and environmental context. Here, the issues of State deregulation, privatisation 
and global restructuring of the energy markets were gaining dominance in the political 
3. 
economy. Evaluation and analysis of these matters has remained a central objective of the 
research, set as it is, within an historical perspective of the development of open cast mining 
and the commercialisation of the coal industry. 
Comparative political and economic approaches to opencast coal production in Scotland and 
the North East will show that the State has intervened in the supply of opencast coal in North 
East England through the operation of the planning system, with regard to opencast coal . In 
Scotland it will be shown that corporatism avoided the need for more planning legislation as 
planners regulated the planning process in the interests of British Coal themselves. This 
stands in contrast to England where a confrontational approach to opencast development 
needed the legislative intervention of the State to maintain the supply of opencast coal. 
While NCB/British Coal have been expanding opencast mining in Britain since the early 
1970's, there has been a continuous reduction in deep mined production which has shadowed 
the decline of the U.K. industrial base. The growing prominence of opencast mining shows 
pronounced regional contrasts in approaches to development, none more so than between 
Scotland and the North East of England. Unparalleled and unopposed access to reserves 
which British Coal have enjoyed in Scotland stands in stark contrast to the limitations placed 
upon their endeavours at expansion in North East England. Here, much of opencast mining 
development has encountered sustained and organised opposition. Many opencast mining 
applications have been 'called in' for a public inquiry in a concerted attempt to arrest opencast 
development for the potential impact it has upon people, their quality of life and the 
environment. Even so, many people appear marginal to the political and planning process 
despite the efforts of the people who represent and work on their behalf 
In providing a comprehensive analysis of this radical shift over time in coal production. the 
focus upon Scotland and North East England is justified upon their contrasting historical 
political, economic, social and legal situation. Approaches to opencast mining in Scotland 
and north-east England contrast markedly through political culture, planning processes and 
legislation. Because each region has developed different approaches to opencast mining 
through varying political processes and alignments, both formally and informally, in response 
to the ideology of the Conservative government there was a need to determine whether the 
outcomes would also be dissimilar. However, the central concern in North East England has 
focused upon the propensity of opencast coal production to supplant that of the deep mines, 
based upon narrow financial criteria, contributing to unemployment in mining communities. 
Critical though this would be, it had barely been allowed to surface or grasped as an issue for 
the public in Scotland, despite being raised at a seminar for Lothian Regional Council 
(Edinburgh Evening News 17/11/86). Financial regulation of the coal industry has taken 
several forms. Evidence will show that a generalised sweetening operation of the coal 
industry at the taxpayers expense has been exacerbated by the arbitrary and flawed nature of 
British Coal's accounting procedures where 'shadow pricing' mechanisms devised by British 
Coal discriminate in favour of opencast coal . In Scotland, evidence reveals an unique process 
of'hibernation of investment'; opencast coal has held the markets for coal while deep mined 
production has been phased out with substantial amounts of investment hibernating in and 
around super pits. The ideological imperatives ofprivatisation ofNIES and British Coal 
emerge from the evidence that details developments in the west of Scotland. Here the State 
chose to 'rig' the market for opencast coal against lignite in Northern Ireland to meet its 
immediate privatisation objectives in Scottish Coal and NIES. 
Another objective has been to identify the main processes in each coalfield region which. 
however different, have contributed to the present dominant situation of opencast mining. 
Management control in this process had apparently been increased through reorganisation 
across the industry to strengthen control of the labour process and increase surplus value. 
With it had come a radical shift in decision-making from the engineering to finance 
departments and use of the imperative of the market as an ultimate economic arbiter have 
been central to this strategy. In the shift to the cost/profit nexus, production units were not 
to be measured in terms of tonnage but as business units with input-output ratios. 
Equally important, against those contrasting backgrounds, has been the use in-depth analyses 
and hypothetical models to expose the processes and practices underlying the State and 
British Coal's justification for the expansion of opencast mining, given the satisfactory 
reserves of deep mined coal in the face of a declining market for coal. The issue is raised by 
an examination ofPGI markets in relation to the demand for deep mined and opencast coal. 
Interdisciplinary economic, coal technology and market analysis reveals that the technical 
suitability of many opencast coals in relation to PGI specifications denies rational reasoning. 
From an examination of the Planning System the way in which planning law, policy legislation 
and procedures. have been used to regulate the supply of open cast coal to consolidate its 
position in energy production is then carefully evaluated. Challenges have been made at 
public inquiries into opencast mining applications over the need to mine the coal at all in the 
light of the prevailing market conditions. These challenges have been singularly absent in 
Scotland. That was one reason why the survey into Scottish local authorities was 
undertaken, and equally in North East England to examine the public opposition's relationship 
to opencast development. Contrast the role of coal in previous years where economic 
recovery was ted on expanded coal production with the monetarist approach of three decades 
later; translated into specific policy form, the process has meant that: 
Coal production, like any other business, must earn a 
satisfactory return on capital while competing in the market 
place. The basic objective of British Coal must be to earn a 
satisfactory rate of return on its net assets and achieve full 
financial viability without government support. British Coal 
should maximise its long term profitability by concentrating on 
low cost production...... Either British Coal or the Government 
may propose additional objectives from time to time: 
Secretary of State for Energy, Hansard Col. ~ 11/3/87 
It has been this emphasis on low cost production to meet the objectives of the 'ultimate 
privatisation' has meant that opencast coal output continued to be expanded at a greater rate 
than before in relation to deep mined output. 
Much of the changes in the coal industry emanated from the 1973 oil crisis, the 197 6 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) monetarist impositions on the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) combined with the election of an government in 1979 which was to 
become increasingly authoritarian statist (Poulantzas 1978). These events had a profound 
and ultimate effect upon the coal industry which brought opencast mining to the fore in the 
political arena and dominate coal production. 
Politically, the most telling aspect has been the apparent manipulative instruments of the State 
(Jessop 1990 pp. 341-2) and the regulation of coal production during the transition to 
commercialisation of the public energy sector :and the coal industry in particular (Fine 1990). 
It is precisely because the State's previous concern with production has contrasted sharply 
with the radical shift to financial control of the industry post 1976 through the auspices of a 
Treasury quango where: 
An overwhelming impression of our research in the NCB was the 
way in which financial management was consciously being 
cultivated in the industry. Our observations also suggested 
that these processes were being stimulated by the State ...... . 
since the late 1970's the Treasury has made its influence felt 
through its pursuit of cash limits and the control of the 
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) ....... defined by 
private sector conceptions of input-output ratios and ·good 
management practice'. 
Hopper et. al. Management Control and Worker Resistance in the 
National Coal Board: Financial Controls in the Labour Process, 
p32-33. Occasional Paper No. 8512. UMIST. 1988 
that causes much stimulation in the development, exploration and analysis of the work. 
Drawing from these themes and issues the thesis focuses upon the way in which a prescriptive 
policy has existed for the coal industry to tum it into a commercial business for operation in 
the private sector. The States task has been to set a framework so that the market in energy 
generation was created and coal traded as a commodity in the energy sector. As a result the 
State has discriminated in favour of opencast coal mining working within a context in which 
there was a contrived need for opencast in Scotland and no technical need for opencast in the 
North East of England. From this comes the main thesis that the State has regulated, assisted 
and facilitated the expansion of opencast mining's share of total production in Scotland and 
North East England, restructuring the coal industry in the interests of private capital 
accumulation. This has been done in an dual approach by asserting control of the planning 
system and the financial regulation of British Coal (Hopper et al. 1988). In the believe that 
this has been decidedly achieved I will now proceed to give a guide to the thesis. 
Chapter One highlights the processes which shaped the structure and determined the nature 
of the coal industry to the end of the second world war with the purpose of revealing the 
development of opencast coal mining. The period was a history of struggle for miner and 
owner alike. Control of the industry and accumulation of capital were affected by the booms 
and slumps of economic cycles, as to a great degree were the responses of the working class 
(Page-Arnott 1961). Returns on deep mine production continued to be unfavourable. 
Because of this, the coal-owners, often assisted by the State, tried to control not only the 
labour process to extract surplus value, but the recording of history too; a process found 
necessary to legitimate class positions and their control over the energy industry. 
The effects of the First World War reparations, the financial crises of the 'middle twenties' 
and the meanness of the coal O'\.vners may have contributed to the beginnings of opencast 
mining production. But how passive was the State in these proceedings? It did after all 
introduce legislation to assist the coal industry including the 193O's Coal Act. The State had 
also been monitoring opencast coal production since before the Second World War and in 
addition the new opencast sector had representatives in parliament. The chapter will examine 
to what extent these factors, combined with the coming of World War Two, contributed to 
an early resolution to find an alternative mode of production - opencast mining to counter the 
problems in the industry. Using records from the Mining Engineering Institute in Newcastle -
upon - Tyne, contributions from interviews in both Scotland and the North East and works 
on history and the recording of history we try to establish that of opencast mining began on a 
commercial basis in the 1930's, supported, if not prompted by the State. From then on it is 
shown to be a response to economic conditions that continued with government support as a 
dual-controlled industry (private and State). 
Chapter Two follows the ascendancy of opencast mining during the period of nationalisation 
to circa 1979, examining the reason for its development during this critical period in the 
British economy. Particular attention is paid to the catalysts for opencast coal expansion. 
Following the fall-out after the 1973 Oil Crisis, the 1974 Coal Strike and, the 1974 Plan for 
Coal, a planned expansion which was unfulfilled except for opencast coal output. The 
Transition to post-Fordism and radical economic change in Britain was marked by the 
intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1976 followed by the rise and 
election of a conservative government with an authoritarian ideology. The Treasury then 
prepared the ground for a different rationale for coal production culminating in the 1985 New 
Strategy for Coal which determined that only the lowest cost output, especially opencast 
coal, should remain in production. 
Attention is focused on the relationship between the State and British Coal arising from these 
events so as to analyse the extent of the link between the expansion of opencast mining and 
"financial controls in the labour process" (Hopper et al. 1988). Ever since nationalisation the 
low price at which coal has been sold has taken surplus value out of mining to the benefit of 
the electricity supply industry and other purchases. The purpose of this was to provide 
industry with low cost electricity. The ·shift' from the rationale of production to financial 
targets and the commodification of coal was challenged in 1981 and 1984/5 by the miners. 
This ·shift' appears to indicate the distribution of surplus value out of the public sector energy 
industries to the private sector, and remains at the heart of a policy of cheap energy for 
industry even under privatisation. 
I o. 
Chapter Three analyses the background to the current state of energy provision in Scotland 
which has given rise to the dominance of opencast mining in coal production. Based upon 
empirical information, analysis is undertaken of British Coal's planned re-emergence for coal 
in Scotland based upon U.S. models of coal mining and the central role that opencast has 
played in this proposed new future for coal in Scotland. 
Given the history of militancy of the Scottish NUM it may come as a shock to find that the 
Scottish labour movement proceeded on the unlikely path of not opposing opencast coal 
production. At times, working with British Coal, they have actively supported such 
development in breach of N. U .M. national policy and the belief that opencast coal production 
directly substitutes the production from that of deep - mines. Nationalist tendencies 
embedded within the political context of coal production and the economy in general in 
Scotland have led the labour movement in a direction different to that in the North East; in 
comparison the Scottish NUM have much less to show for such a corporatist stance. 
As the planning process is critical for the development of opencast coal it is instructive to 
focus upon the direct influence of such corporatism between N.U.M. and British Coal as it 
permeated the district councils chambers where predominant labour members sat in office. 
This influence has been obvious in the paucity of public inquiries into opencast coal mining in 
Scotland. In their efforts to maintain a profile for coal in Scotland the coal industry has fallen 
prey to the aggressive approach of the Power Generation Industry. The Power Generation 
Industry (P.G.I.) in Scotland, under directives from government, needed to become more 
cost effective (Kerevan and Saville 198 7). Using the mechanism of' bargaining counters' it 
II . 
produced, by design or default, three processes. The first was to assist the government's 
directive to British Coal management to rationalise and reorganise their production in 
Scotland so as to maintain their markets. Secondly, by doing so the 'organisational culture' 
of British Coal changed and the industry was primed for the private sector. And thirdly, as a 
result, cheaper supplies of coal were achieved from indigenous sources. These cheaper 
sources of production were to be found from opencast coal mines and British Coal now gives 
high priority to opencast coal production in Scotland. 
With the aid of material from sources in Northern Ireland and Multinationals an analysis is 
undertaken of the claimed market for coal in the light of the plans of multinationals to 
develop the lignite reserves and the privatisation of the Northern Ireland Electricity Service 
(NIES) The NIES market for the Scottish Coal Industry and opencast mining production 
and pricing arrangements will be scrutinised. The purpose is to test the justification and 
demand for open cast expansion, the long term viability of the market for coal and the need 
for millions of pounds of road, rail and port infrastructure in the west of Scotland. Equally, 
the State's efforts to create a suitable climate for commercialisation of the energy market 
across both sides of the Irish Sea has been an important influence upon the eventual outcome. 
The coal industry in Scotland is tied closely to the markets on its doorstep. Scrutiny of the 
actual process suggests the ingenious priming of the industry in Scotland for the benefit of 
the private sector. 
The focus on the North East in the next chapter is perhaps the most important. It is here that 
the greatest struggles have taken place against the State and capital (often in the guise of 
British Coal), to extract surplus value through the expansion of opencast mining and the 
12. 
closure of less profitable output from deep mines. Examination is made of the claims for 
British Coal's case that the markets need the levels of opencast output they appear so 
determined to achieve. As the State places so much emphasis on the cost/profit nexus, the 
competing costs of mining coal are compared and scrutinised in relation to the suitability, 
quality, specification and full costs of all coals designated for the PGI market. The supply 
and markets for North East coal are assessed to test the accuracy of British Coal's claims that 
opencast coal is 'a superior product than deep mined coal for which there is a real and 
specific demand'. 
From insights into the marketing operation of British Coal through two major figures in 
marketing in the North East and Scotland (Kerry and Knox), allied to the information gleaned 
from public inquiries into opencast mining, evidence has been amassed to suggest that certain 
deceptions were perpetrated by British Coal over the qualities, costs, need and markets for 
opencast coal. 
Contrary to the claims of British Coal it is proposed that opencast coal needs deep mined 
coal to be a marketable product, not vice versa. An Analysis of coal quality alignments, to 
PGI specifications at Blyth and Thameside power stations, provides some revealing evidence. 
Such evidence de-mystifies British Coal's strategy of maximising surplus value and minimising 
costs in meeting the market for coal. The hypothesis is made in the belief that deep mined 
coal is more than an adequate fuel source in meeting PGI specification on several counts, 
while opencast coal is not. 
I 3. 
In addition, British Coal are showing every intention of holding their markets with coal 
production based upon accounting techniques that exclude marginal and social costs, despite 
having been frequently criticised for their accounting procedures (Glyn, 1984; Berry 1985) 
Furthermore, from evidence at public inquiries, not all additional costs are taken into account 
in opencast coal mining. What has happened in the North East coalfield provides a 
fundamental lesson on the State and regional energy and industrial policy. Massive increases 
in deep mine productivity brought with it over-production of coal yet the scarce resources of 
opencast mining have not been 'hibernated', but the profitable deep mines have been 
terminated. 
Because the opencast sector operates within the planning system of planning laws and 
processes such as public inquiries British Coal plans for expansion can be brought under 
public scrutiny. This process, epitomising democratic elitism, also shows the invidious 
contradictions for the State in mediating between the demands from a democratic process it 
devised in a time of consensus and the renewed pressures from capitalism operating in a 
monetarist framework at a time of crisis for capital accumulation. For this reason we explore 
the manner in which the State has managed the planning system to accommodate the 
expansion of opencast mining and the effect this has had on people and the environment. 
Attendance and recording of proceedings at public inquiries have shown that opponents to 
opencast coal mining have brought British Coal and others to book at public inquiries. Their 
challenges to the information and data upon which British Coal based their efforts to secure 
the expansion of opencast coal made serious inroads into the fabric of their case for opencast 
mining development. Public inquiries also throw up unusual alignments; in a united 
opposition they have also revealed class cleavages within and between the participants. 
However, public inquiries have their limitations; and 'instruments ofthe State' have redressed 
the balance in favour of opencast development. 
Historically, planning legislation covered opencast mining nationwide. Now that principle has 
been cast aside in an effort to undermine the public opposition. In doing so many planners 
believe the State has brought the planning system into disrepute as it fails in its intention to 
consider properly the public and the environment and merely serves the interests of the State 
and capital. The argument has taken on a new dimension in recent years from pure 
environmental problems to power and control over people and their environment by 
subjugating the planning process to the demands for profit. 
Mineral Planning Guidance 3 (MPG3) has shifted control away from planning and the public 
in England. In Contrast, in Scotland Circular 23/ 1987's crucial paragraphs 15 and 16 with 
regard to proving 'market need' still remain but they have never been invoked by planning 
officials for or against an application. But even in the North East, there have been doubts as 
to whether the public interest has been served. We further propose that, whether by design 
or not, the current planning process and law serve the strongest interests and in almost every 
case that is not the public but the energy industry. The exercise of control of decision making 
is becoming more removed from the public. The problem does not only lie with the public's 
power to manage and control decision making in opencast mining so much as how that 
control is exercised. Essentially, the State marupulates the supply of coal by 'managing' the 
planning system and through financial regulation of British Coal to extract surplus value. 
This being an exploratory thesis covering new ground of an on-going process and debate in 
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political economy, is made all the more complex by the privatisation programme of this 
government. While the State is a central player, it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide 
a coherent theory of the state, this has been attempted elsewhere ( Otfe; 1984. Crouch; 1979, 
Habermas, 1976;). For my purposes the State arbitrates between energy industries to 
assimilate private accumulation of capital. 
( b 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ORIGINS AND MOTIVE FOR OPENCAST MINING 
L. The Earlv Formation 
The long decline in the coal industry after the first world war was preceded by a period of 
prosperity which shielded inbuilt tendencies and structural anomalies (Garside 1971). 
Manifest in the labour relations of the period, they produced continuing constraints, conflicts 
and crises over control of production that were to a great extent the origins and motives for 
commercial opencast mining. Current thought still maintains that opencast mining was 
developed to sustain coal production especially during the 1939 to 1945 war (POWE.40 
1946). Formal origins of its development arguably lie in the years during the first world war 
(POWE.40 1946). However, its utility has been realised from 1918 and its strategic value in 
coal production was seized upon during the 1930's. With dual control of the opencast 
industry maintained for the private sector in 1943, it has remained in relative hibernation 
until developed into a greatly expanded process during the 1970's and 1980's. 
Overall, opencast coal mining has been developed as a response to various expediencies in 
the coal industry which were part of the wider crises in capitalism. More by default than 
design, the seeds of modem day commercial development of opencast mining were sown in 
the 1930 Coal Mines Act (1930) and the Coal Mines Reorganisation 
Commission (1933)(CMRC). Arguably, the early origins of opencast 
mining lie in the informal workings such as those on the banks of the 
river Wear west of Bishop Auckland and around Greenside in County Durham 
and at Dollar, cumnock and Mauchline in Scotland from the turn of the 
century. Here, according to local knowledge, estate workers joined 
miners in surface/drift workings of exposed seams. The recognition of 
these early developments should be placed in their true political 
context of the politics of opencast coal mining -- its relationship to 
landownership, capital and labour (Benwell CPO 1979; Fine 1984) and set 
within the context of the ongoning crises of capitalism (Aglietta, 
1982; Baran and Sweezy-1968; Bareham and Dow 1980; Kalecki, 1933; 1939; 
1954; Scase,l980). It is arguable that because of the poor 
organisational and technical progress in opencast mining limited profit 
was made from it until the early years of the second world war. 
However, its potential as an additional and alternative source of income 
was well learned between the wars (P.E.P., 1936 1947' ) as enough 
profit was made for its advantages to praised in parliament at the 
beginning of the war (Hansard, 1407-9, 17/3/1942). It was at this point, 
opencast coal production was realised as a strategic element in the 
control of production by both state and private operators, especially in 
terms of finance and displacement of manpower (Hansard ibid). Scotland 
and North East England in particular were to experience the endeavours 
of opencast development. At this point it was always in the background 
but always available, in latter days opencast coal mining has been 
brought out to serve both as a financial prop, as a method of regulating 
production, and as a facilitator of industrial change • 
..... _ •-" 
ii Crisis and Solutions in the British Coal Industry after the First 
World War 
crises in the capitalist system, with notable exceptions, do not appear 
overnight, as in some 'crack in the wall' from subsidence. On the 
contrary, the experience of the British economy this century has been 
one of deflecting and absorbing one crisis after another. Indeed, some 
commentators argue that capitalism in striving for accumulation lurches 
from one crisis to another (McFarlane, 1982) and that the system has 
inbuilt 
structural aspects which clearly militate against any simple 
strategy for its resolution. 
Clegg et. al., 1986, Class Politics and the Economy, pp.345-6 
From at least 1900 we have witnessed the attempts by various regimes 
fighting to maintain control of a coal industry in continuing decline. 
Early in 1913 the colliery owners, many of whom had capital invested in 
land, and consequently 'opencastable' coal, were giving lessons in 
history on how they were central to the process of wealth accumulation. 
After all, the coal industry was enjoying the fruits of a period of 
prosperity, culminating in 1913 in a record year of output levels with 
high royalties to land-owners and coal exports. (Court, 1945) 
Whatever views may be expressed as to the absolute right 
of the individual to property in land, and allowing that on 
occasion the exercise of such right may have been abused no 
student of history can fail to see that the prosperity of this 
country has been intimately associated with the stability of landed 
interest. 
Colliery Guardian P.915 May 2nd 1913. 
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The relationship between coal and land ownership cannot be overstated 
across this century (Fine 1990; See Chapter 5. also). Arguably, the 
power and control landowners wielded placed colliery owners in a strong 
position to exploit surface coal reserves to alleviate the loss of 
markets, revenues and production. Taylor (1961) argues that the period 
of prosperity for coal owners in a buoyant market situation hid 
underlying movements affecting cost and production. Equally, those who 
rented land to exploit coal reserves were keen to avoid paying more 
royalties to landowners than were necessary. Continuation of this 
situation was exacerbated during the First World War by the government's 
policy of 'coal at any price' and the winning of flat-rate wage 
increases by the miners union in the two successive years of 1917 and 
1918. 
The first national coal strike took place in 1912 and was followed tne 
next year by the first 'Triple Alliance' of the Miners Federation of 
Great Britain (M.F.G.B.), the National Union of Railwaymen (N.U.R.) and 
the National Transport Workers Union (N.T.W.F.). Political events such 
as these were not without effect and influence upon the industry. 
Towards the end of 1913 concern grew amongst coal owners and politicians 
over costs and production of coal. Periods of industrial action 
produced gains for the miners and concessions from the coal owners 
through legislation. Profit margins were narrowed to the point where it 
chastened the owners to comment with some alarm: 
There is a marked tendency --- to an increase in the cost 
of fuel ----The upward curves of prices and cost of production 
must soon reach a limit at which no further elasticity in output is 
possible. 
Colliery Guardian Dec. 5th 1913, p.ll70 
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Following the expression ofthese concerns in the closing months of 1913 
came the advent of formal opencast coal mining in Britain(POWE,40,1946). After the first 
World War, Pease and Partners (Annual Report 1920), along with the North Bitchbum 
Fireclay Company indulged in quarrying for materials including coal at various points in the 
west of the region. Evidence from the Greenside Public Inquiry indicates that small scale 
workings continued for the extraction of coal and other materials after the First World War if 
it was avaialable and profitable. 
If you had to look for a specific reason why coal owners and the state supplemented deep 
mine coal output and revenue with that from opencast mining then look at the industry's 
industrial relations and its financial state. In 1912 Mr. F .H. Macleod of the Labour 
Statistics Department recorded that wages disputes had formed 86% of time lost in the coal 
industry, and: 
The outstanding feature of the year was the national dispute 
....... in which about 1,000,000 workpeople were involved ... 
... and 30 million days lost. 
The 25th Report on Strikes and Lockouts in thk ~ .l2U to 
~ Bllilrd of Il:ruk 
British coal production at the end of 1913 stood at 287 million tons with 94 million tons 
going to export. The political arrangements of the Versailles Treaty had a dramatic effect on 
this performance. German reparations of free deliveries of coal to France and Italy virtually 
supplanted exports from Britain to these countries. In addition, there were other 
contributory factors from which the British coal industry never recovered. 
The first of these affecting the coking coal market was the more 
efficient methods and usage of coal in the steel industry. Secondly, 
the British Navy and Merchant fleet changed over to oil and diesel from 
coal (Royal Commission on Coal Industry, 1925). Thirdly, the former 
export market countries were determined to be more self-sufficient and 
to look for lower cost sources of energy. Indications of the crisis and 
the owners' attempts to control profit margins in the industry through 
rationalisation of labour and production have been observed in various 
studies (Feinstein 1976; Page-Arnett 1961; Buxton 1978; Heineman 1944; 
Supple 1987) 
From the high ouput years of 1923 and 1924 when production reached 
276.0 and 267.0 million tons respectively the trend, despite some 
notable achievements in 1929 and 1937, was downward to 227.0 million 
tons in 1938. Employment in the mines in the early twenties steadily 
contracted from 1,200,000 in 1920 to 781,865 in 1938. Significantly, 
output per manshift(OMS) rose steadily from-1929 until 1937 with 
Heineman(1944) finding that OMS rose by 31% between 1924 and 1938. 
Much of this increase, an apparent result of mechanization (Supple, 
P184-85), could not be generalised across every coalfield in Britain and 
certainly not in North East England and Scotland. Nor is the other 
claim by Supple of the relationship between the decrease in total costs, 
an increase in OMS and mechanisation conclusive as he suggests. 
Mechanisation in Scotland and North East England did increase but was 
ineffectively applied. Over the years from 1927 to 1939 no appreciable 
gain was made in OMS from the introduction of mechanisation on the 
coalfaces in these areas. There was little difference in wage costs 
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and total costs between Durham and Scotland, yet Durham was 
substantially less mechanised than Scotland. Having double the levels 
of mechanisation does not mean a guaranteed increase in OMS, a reduction 
of costs or that "total production costs remained comparatively low in 
Scotland and Northumberland" (Supple, Pl85) when the ratio of costs and 
mechanisation are compared with those in Durham. The performance and 
returns on this investment in Scotland and North East England must have 
been viewed with some dissatisfation, especially in Scotland with 
extensive mechanisation. 
Moreover, we learn that the industry was in a "deplorable state" and 
that Wallace Thorneycroft and Sir Adam Nimmo, both with extensive 
interests in coal in Scotland, regretted that wages could not be 
depressed further without government subsidy to the miners (SCOA,9 May 
1927). It is clear coal owners were looking to lower the costs of 
coal production but even mechanisation did not provide the complete 
answer. Critical observation of the coal industry at that time from 
a prominent economic journal confirms its parlous state: 
Between that year(l923), however, and 1930, and in particular 
in the four years succeeding the general strike, output, 
number of persons employed, tonnage exported and proceeds per 
ton all substantially declined, whilst in 1927 and 1928, the 
industry as a whole worked at a loss. 
Roberts A.S. P.78, The Marketing of Coal under the Coal Mines 
Act 1930, The Manchester School, 1938. 
The increasingly poor situation in the coal industry was met with a 
response by the government through the Coal Mines Act 1930 to improve 
the finances of the industry. Though its impact varied from area to 
area it was a fairly unproductive piece of legislation. Partii of the 
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Act, which involved the CMRC attempting cartelize the industry into 
larger units, stuttered to a stanstill in 1935 under instruction from 
the Ministry of Mines. The consternation of some coal-owners who saw it 
as a fetter to their operations was balanced by the fact that for others 
it sought to arrange previous anomalies into quotas of production 
district by district, production unit by production unit. The 1930 Coal 
Act's overall success was marred by its failure to stop cut-throat 
competition, and its inability to develop Parliament's intention of 
modernising the structure of the mining industry. Most importantly, it 
was however the first piece of legislation to give acceptance to 
opencast coal mining as a legitimate process of producing coal without 
incurring excessive labour costs. The State, from this point in time 
accepted that opencast coal mining had commercial value and potential: 
Disposal of opencast coal is the responsibility of the 
selling organisations set up under the Coal Mines Act 1930 
P.E.P. (1936;) .E..:2Q 
In areas such as Durham it was also possible for the colliery owner to 
continue to sell his own coal and find his own customers 
Roberts A. P.89 
With 'landsale coal' (direct sales) still the most lucrative operation 
in private coal production we can well understand the desire of owners 
in the 1930's to effect sales which circumvented the Sales Committees. 
For it was these same Sales Committees which attempted to control the 
quantity and quality of tonnages, prices and conditions of sales. The 
best possible opportunity for circumvention was from opencast mining as 
it did not come under the same scrutiny from the Sales Committees as 
deep mine operations. Geared as they were to the sale of deep mine 
coal, little monitoring of opencast operations took place, with some 
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lower cost opencast outcrop also sold as deep mine coal. The process 
has parallels with operations in the late 1980's with opencast and 
imported coal sold directly as opencast/deep mine coal. Officially some 
15,000 tonnes of coal carne from 'quarries' in the North East each year 
in the 1930's(Min. Fuel and Power Table 150, p.128). In the drive for 
surplus value opencast operators have to this present day been 
economical with the truth; even British Coal officially produce 10-15 
per cent over their stated tonnages. With the state relying to a 
large extent on the coal companies for production returns opportunities 
for deviousness in reporting the production of coal were exemplified by: 
Many evasions devised to get past the scrutiny of the 
independent accountants appointed by the Executive Boards 
even to the point of setting up selling agencies whose main 
purpose was to show an economic loss in order to gain trade. 
Factors, Merchants, Dealers and the Co-op all had a 
finger in the pie. 
Roberts ~ ~ and ~ 
The 1930 Coal Act, was a response of the State to rectify the pattern 
and trends of crises in the coal industry. From this Act carne 
acknowledgment of opencast coal production development as a commercial 
operation. The relative price of coal was unchanged between 1933 and 
1938 even with the G.D.P. and industrial production both growing by 2.4 
per cent between 1929 and 1938. This poor performance is confirmed by 
the figures for total coal consumption which in stark contrast increased 
by only one per cent while wages and other costs rose rapidly towards 
the end of of the 1930's (Feinstein, 1976, Table 10). Increasingly, the 
industry was looking for salvation and it carne in three ways, firstly 
from improved technology in opencast mining, secondly from its largest 
customers and thirdly from the state and the second world war. 
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In the Colliery Guardian of January 29th 1937, "The Smith -seven' 
Excavator" was given whole page advertisement coverage. While there 
was no mention of its coal removal statistics, there were special 
highlights of how fast it could remove the overburden: 
An output of 30 cubic yards per hour of earth and 10 cubic 
yards per hour of boulder clay. 
Colliery Guardian 29/1/1937, P.209 
Significant though this was, what prevented the full blown development 
of opencast mining at this time were the technical and organisational 
considerations of extraction. Put more simply: if the overburden 
ratios were too high, the extraction of coal would either not take 
place or be abandoned. However larger excavators such as -smiths' 
helped ameliorate the costs of extraction, albeit in a relatively 
crude fashion. It and other technical advances prior to 1940 had helped 
make an industry out of opencast mining. 
There were other reasons for advancing the technology of opencast 
mining - political rather than economic. Industrial relations between 
the miners union and the coal owners continued to break up over the 
issue of wages and the pressure for a national wages agreement. Against 
the background of a general election the Miners Federation of Great 
Britain(MFGB) on October 17th 1935 had supported the executive 
committee's recommendation for a ballot vote to "enforce the claim for a 
flat rate advance in wages ••••• and the executive committee be empowered 
to conduct any negotiations on the present wages demand". The vote was 
carried by 320 votes to 172 votes. The 113 Durham delegates voted 
against the motion, while the 33 Scottish delegates voted for, as did 
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the 27 Northumberland men. 
The government had attempted the postponement of the ballot vote and the 
coal owners refused to negotiate on a national level. The result of 
that ballot, held between the 11th and 13th of November, was in favour 
"by the largest majority in our history" of a ratio of 14:1. What added 
to the mounting pressure upon the government was the Durham area miners 
voting by 73,765 to 7,120, against the inclination of their leadership 
and the expectation of the owners and government. Then, in a most 
telling statement in support of capital and class, the government 
pronounced that: 
The government is not prepared to adopt the suggestion 
made by the MFGB that a subsidy should be granted from 
public funds to augment wages in the mining industry ..... 
The Government will use its good offices to assist the 
coal owners in their endeavours to secure voluntarily 
from big consumers increases in price for the specific 
purpose of increasing wages. 
Quoted ~ Arnott P. in The Miners in Crisis and War: 
~History of the MFGB, p.192 
The prospect of the strike becoming reality was brought into sharp 
relief when the MFGB Executive anounced the date for 27th January 1936. 
Propelled by a sense of concern and anxiety the biggest firms entered 
into a remarkable voluntary agreement with the coal owners and the 
State: 
Imperial Chemicals(ICI) wrote to the Mines Department 
agreeing "to an advance over 1935 prices of one shilling 
per ton under all their forward contracts •.•.• bettering 
the wages of workers in the coalmining industry" 
Arnott P., The Miners in Crisis and War: 
~ History of the MFGB, 12..!...!2.! 
'Blue chip' industries such as ICI stood most to lose should there be a 
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national coal strike; gas, electric and iron and steel firms followed in 
bailing out the coal industry. With coal the most important commodity 
in furnishing their contracts, continuity of production was equally 
vital to capital as well as to the State, manufacturing the major 
material contributions in the build up to the war. In a remarkable 
volte-face the miners union praised the initiative by the -blue-chip' 
industries allowing them the continuity of production they, the State 
and the coal industry desired. These developments, however served to 
underline the continuity of the crisis in the coal industry and the 
economy and the amenability of the coal owners to opencast mining 
development in their search for profits. 
iii I!;u Politics v.f Opencast Coal Mining During tbJ:. Second World 1:f1u: 
While the conditions of the inter-war years created the climate for the development of 
opencast mining, it was the opportunist conditions of war that established opencast mining 
as both a strategic commercial element in coal production in Britain. In what may have been 
a contrived coal crisis at the outbreak of war (Pimlott, p.35, Supple, p.538) coal was to be 
produced at any price and with this opencast coal output was expanded to meet the war 
effort. Significantly, opportunists in the opencast industry represented their interests in 
parliament, and had ideas on the future structure and control of the coal industry. An 
indication of how well developed the opencast industry became during the 1930's came from 
the founder of one of the 1990's prominent operators, Fairclough-Parkinson, when he stated: 
I recalled that for many years past in certain parts of the 
country it had been the practice to exploit the surface mines. 
I therefore s11ggest to my honourable Friend that he should 
employ the civil engineering industry with their modern 
machines to exploit the surface coal. 
Major Braithwaite M.P .. Hansard 14Q1.11th March 1942 
Then, outlining the financial advantages of this alternative mode of 
coal production, we are given an indication of the motive for expanding development of 
opencast mining. 
In my opinion there is not less than 50,000,000 tons of coal 
of burnable quality which is within 30 feet of the surface in 
this country. I .aWl :mmt m ~1M JH!int I~ practical 
experience !!f thiL that~ mal D:hkh h .bdng JW md h 
ruiD:lg gnt md at economic prices. It has not been got out at 
any more cost than that which is being mined underground. 
(my emphasis) 
Major Braithwaite M..£_ Hansard 1408 11th March~ 
Disclosures that comparative costs were made between opencast and deep 
mined output are quite revealing. Clearly, to arrive at this conclusion 
previous exercises in the 1930's took place and the industry was being 
financially assessed for the future. Moreover, as economic prices' and 
comparative costs were not part of the government's criteria in wartime, 
but 'coal at any price' was, there appears to be an agenda for the 
opencast operators different to that of the State at that time. Ardent 
descriptions of the efficiences and the comparative advantages of 
opencast mining continued in graphic detail the opportunities presented 
by opencast mining: 
I am willing to show the han. gentleman the figures, because 
I have been closely in touch with this business. I say in 
all sincerity that here is a tonnage which is the equivalent 
of the work of 20,000 miners if it is put on a proper basis. 
Will t~e Minister see that in his own Department a proper 
organisation is provided to deal with this surface coal and 
that he will not let it into the ordinary routine of mining, 
because so many problems are involved. 
Major Braithwaite M.P., Hansard 1409 17th March 1942 
Industrial relations and the separated control of opencast mining from 
the influences embedded in deep mined production were of major concern 
for opencast operators. Its attractions lay as an economic and 
strategic alternative to deep mine production having the potential to 
replace and control labour as well as ameliorate production and labour 
costs. The opencast sector was looking beyond the war to the 
development of this alternative mode of coal production and if there was 
any doubting the ability of its operators then this could be countered 
by the fact that: 
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The civil engineering industry has the machinery available 
and we can stack 10,000,000 tons a year if the proper effort 
is made at the top, as I hope it will be. 
Major Braithwaite M.P., Hansard Hill 7th March l2i2 
In Apri11943, Braithwaite, supported by 128 other M.P's, placed a 
motion before the house with reference to Defence Regulation 54 C.A. to reduce state 
interference and control of the opencast industry. 'Dual control' was an important political 
move influenced by the private sector in an effort to keep control away from the trade 
unions. The motion was successful. Opencast mining has since remained operated by 
contractors from the civil engineering sector. Maintaining this form of operational structure 
was to have important ramifications much later for the coal industry. 
Up to a quarter of opencast production came from North East England during the war years 
(no full records exist from Scotland). This is hardly surprising as the opencast sector in the 
North East was well developed by 1943. With 38 sites worked out by 1943, and given the 
development life cycle for a site of2 years, the commercial beginnings of opencast in North 
East England must extend well back into the 1930's and not in 1942 as convention would 
have it. We also know that officially, "In 1942, 50 sites were being worked with a total 
production of70,000 tons per week" (P.E.P. 1947 p.69) and at least one third of those were 
in the North East, given the number of sites 'worked out'. Knowing the process of such 
development, these sites are likely to have succeeded a reduced number of other sites. The 
basis for this process is illustrated in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 
NUMBER .QE OPENCAST MINING SITES IN 
NORTH EAST ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND UP TO 1946 
Working/producing Working/non-producing Worked out 
NORTHEAST 
at end 1943 24 1 38 
at end 1944 32 1 24 
at end 1945 29 5 26 
at July 1946 33 1 10 
SCOTLAND 
at end 1943 1 4 0 
at end 1944 10 5 3 
at end 1945 8 3 10 
at July 1946 10 0 2 
Source: £...E..£...1211 The British ElJd and~ Industries. 11&.2 
The U.S. process of contract working, with the contractor responsible for engineering, 
planning and extraction was adopted in opencast mining after the finding of a British 
'mission' there to learn of new techniques in mining. The contractor was paid a 'tendered' 
price per ton of coal delivered and mining was undertaken on the basis of "separate 
payments for the removal of overburden and the winning of coal on a yardage basis" (P .E.P ., 
194 7, p. 72) This was an economic turning point for opencast mining, it almost guaranteed 
profit for the contractor, but not necessarily for the state because during the war: 
Its chief value lay, in the fact that it released higher grade 
coal for essential purposes. 
£..E..£... Report. l2fl.. p,.1.Q 
It was always the State's intention, as in the 1914-18 war, to mothball 
their sponsorship of opencast mining. However, the decision by the 
Minister of Fuel to "wind up" opencast mining was reversed in 1946 when 
the Minister stated it would continue indefinitely. Possible coal 
shortages were the accepted reason but it was more than one assessment 
of the advantages of opencast mining that may have encouraged the State 
to continue its involvement with the opencast sector. 
The cost of winning is said to be comparable to the normal 
mining cost and output per man is much higher •••••• the 
winning of this type of coal does not need skilled miners. 
P.E.P. Report. 1947, ~ 
In years to come this turned into a truism as opencast output was used 
as a strategic replacement for deep mined production in the extraction 
of surplus value. 
iv. Conclusion to Chapter One 
Overall, the commercial development of opencast coal mining originated 
in an expedient way during the continuing crisis of the coal industry 
after the 1914-18 war. From commercial acceptance in 1930 Coal Mines 
Act it was expanded during the 1930's as an economic alternative to 
deep mined production, then underwent its more formal development by the 
State during the 1939-45 war. Motives for its development were more 
sophisticated than crude profit-taking. The experience of previous 
years taught the private sector and the State that an alternative and 
strategic element of coal production outside the control of a strong 
unionised workforce was essential to the well being of capital 
3'7 
formation. The 'dual control' operation of the opencast sector by the 
State and the private sector was to be sustained throughout the 
nationalised operation of the coal industry in a similar way to which 
the deep mines were 'dual controlled' from 1942. With great insight at 
that time Bevan had seen the State as the 'guardian of private 
interests' and dual control as: 
Economic Fascism debated in a tepid atmosphere because all 
the various interests had been squared beforehand. 
Bevan !!.L Hansard 11th June 1942 eels 1294ff. 
Braithwaite M.P. orchestrating 'dual control' had been the opencast 
operators' strongest advocate and obviously endeared the State to the 
economic and political arguments against 'impediments' to the free 
operation of opencast mining; these arguments were never to go away even 
under a nationalised coal industry. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPENCAST COAL MINING from 1947: 
Part One: The Post War Strategic Supplement 
i Post-Nationalisation 
The nationalisation of the coal industry was effected on January 1st 
1947, and was in the main welcomed by the majority of people involved in 
the industry for differing reasons. However, the public were unaware 
that this action by the state brought with it the private baggage of 
ghosts past, including an opencast coal industry primed for strategic 
use within an economy that continued in decline (Leys, 1985, NLR 151), 
At the end of second world war there were several political and economic 
factors affecting the coal industry; most were of varying complexity 
(Buxton 1978; Reid Report 1945). Both of an internal and external 
nature, they combined to change in the longer term the process, 
structure and organisation of British coal production. From a run down 
industry leeched of life by private ownership it went through an intense 
period of State investment and financial control. State financial 
control greatly increased after the intervention of the International 
Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) in 1976 after its attempt at restructuring the 
British Economy. The consequences for the coal industry were dramatic. 
Opencast coal mining was recast in a new role. Already a strategic 
element in coal production, it was, for the Treasury, to become an 
acceptable economic form of production in the financial remodelling of 
the coal industry in Britain, North East England and Scotland 
especially. 
From 1947 the approach to coal production became one of concentration, 
provid~ng more for home centred demand than meeting opportunities in a 
wider market. Even so, it was still predicated upon a maximisation 
approach to coal production in the home market, meeting demand for a 
variety of ranks of coals to meet specific purposes such as steel 
making, gas production and steam raising. Allied to this was the 
commitment to an expansion programme to support the dominance of coal in 
the domestic market. Opencast coal was a strategic element in this and 
the government set about improving the technology and management of this 
type of mining through the adoption of new approaches gleaned from 
practice in the United States of America. In part, this was a response 
to the increasing importance of oil in the world energy market. Table 
2.1 shows the declining role of coal in the latter half of the first 
twenty years of nationalisation 
Table 2.1 
NATIONAL COAL OUTPUT 1947-1966/67 
Year Deep Mine Opencast Licensed Total 
1947 184.4 10.2 2.2 196.8 
1948 194.6 11.8 2.1 208.5 
1949 200.7 12.4 1.9 215.8 
1950 202.3 12.2 1.7 216.2 
1951 209.4 11.0 1.8 222.2 
1952 210.7 12.1 2.1 224.9 
1953 209.8 11.7 2.0 223.5 
1954 211.4 10.2 2.2 223.8 
1955 207.8 11.4 2.4 221.6 
1956 207.3 12.1 2.7 222.1 
1957 207.4 13.6 2.7 223.7 
1958 198.8 14.4 2.7 215.9 
1959 192.5 10.8 2.8 206.1 
1960 183.8 7.6 2.3 193.7 
1961 179.6 8.5 2.3 190.4 
1962 187.6 8.1 1.7 197.4 
1963/4 187.0 6.1 2.1 195.2 
1964/5 183.2 7.0 2.3 192.5 
1965/6 173.5 7.1 2.2 182.8 
1966/7 163.8 7.1 2.1 173.0 
Source: Extracted from Berkovitch,P.93, Coal on the Switchback 
----
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ii The Economic Plight of the Coal Industry 
We should not lose sight of the fact that from its inception the newly 
nationalised industry was disadvantaged by financial burdens. 
Compensations to the previous owners were of some s165 million. 
Annuities averaging three and one half per cent of assets worth s388 
million were payable for 50 years and capital expenditure was not 
covered by the coal pricing policy. Consequently, the coal industry 
marked up substantial deficits on its capital accounts from forced 
borrowing. 
The initial structure of the newly nationalised industry is illustrated 
in Table 2.2. At one and the same time it reflected the shape of the 
industry under private ownership, set the nature of power relationships 
for decades to come and determined the destinies of mining communities 
along the way. The industry was largely centralised and run like a 
very large private corporation with no workers participation let alone 
'control' and a limited role for the unionsindeed upon reflection, from 
personal experience of working in three Durham pits and one in Somerset, 
the structure and process had changed little over the years, becoming 
all too obvious that the industry could be quickly turned around to 
private ownership given the political will. We never felt in 'control' 
of the industry!. Buxton reminds us why nationalisation took place: 
The tendency to diminishing returns and the relatively low 
level of output per man during the interwar years required 
colliery reorganisation and capital expenditure on a scale 
which private enterprise, given prevailing markets and 
trends, could not hope to provide. 
Buxton N.K. 1978 The Economic Development of the Coal Industry 
P.231 
Table 2.2 
DIVISIONS AREAS AND COLLIERIES OF THE NCB WITH ANNUAL OUTPUT 1946-47 
Division Areas Collieries Annual Tonnage 
Scottish(1) 5 
Northern(2) 10 
North Eastern(3) 8 
North Western(4) 5 
East Midlands(5) 8 
West Midlands(6) 4 
South Western(?) 8 
South Eastern(8) 0 
Totals 48 
Source: NCB Annual Report 1946 
187 
213 
117 
75 
102 
60 
222 
4 
980 
21.9 million 
34.0 million 
37.4 million 
12.6 million 
32.6 million 
16.1 million 
21.8 million 
1. 3 million 
177.7 million 
N.B. 400 small mines not managed by the NCB are not included in figures 
For Buxton, the role of the State is laid out in stark terms as the 
financial crutch for private capital; arguably, it became more than that 
as a financial regulator of the NCB. The end result is most telling. 
The 1950 Plan for Coal established a deep mine production target of 
some 240 million tons by 1965 with opencast mining phased out to a 
minimum by then. Six years later this policy was reversed by the 
1956 N.C.B. Investing in Coal, confirming the position of opencast 
mining as outlined by Shinwell, by re-allocating 10 million tons to 
opencast mining from the deep mine target. Unfortunately, the N.C.B. 's 
production planning against an increasingly unpredictable world energy 
market was in constant re-adjustment. The 1959 Revised Plan for 
coal was a response and re-adjustment to the major shift away from 
coal in energy production to oil, gas and nuclear power. It officially 
marked the point arrived at by 1957 in which any expansionist dreams for 
coal were overtaken by Treasury financial targets. It wasn't so much 
that coal lacked competitiveness, as Buxton has argued, coal prices were 
held artificially low. But that a glut of oil on the world market at 
low marked down prices seriously undermined the position of coal in 
relation to other fuels. This is reflected in the consumption of 
petroleum rising from nearly 21 million tons in 1957 to over 60 million 
tons in 1965 and 84 million tons by 1974. 
Buxton(P.238) may rightly argue that the dominant economic role of coal 
in the last 100 years was diminishing, but this loses sight of the 
increasing strategic importance of opencast mining. We see from Table 
2.4 that opencast output increased from 10.4 million tons and 5.2 per 
cent of total output in 1947 to 14.5 million tons and 6.5 per cent of 
total output in 1958. Thereafter, in keeping with policy responses to 
market conditions, production was reduced to 7.7 million tons and 3.9 
per cent of total production in 1960. While this emphasises the 
importance attached to opencast mining up until the 1959 scaling down of 
total production, it underestimates the financial contribution that it 
was increasingly making from 1950 to the bottom line accounts of the 
National Coal Board (Table 2.4). Even with the reduced economy of scale 
after 1959, and taking into account two years re-organisation, profits 
per ton continued to show a year on year increase. By doing so it was 
becoming abundantly clear that opencast mining was a significant and 
strategic operation of the National Coal Board. Essentially, its role, 
far from being diminished after the war years as first advocated, was 
being firmly established through its economic capacity rather than its 
productive capacity. And this in spite of retardation of overall coal 
production. 
After the 1959 Revised Plan for Coal placed restrictions on coal 
production, including opencast coal, and industry reverted to burning 
lower cost oil, we experienced coal production to some extent being 
sheltered from the energy markets during the 1960's by a series of 
measures both political and financial. Precisely, these were: the 
writing off of 6415 million of capital debt and the State contribution 
increase in two years(1966/67) of 69,5 million; then the prohibition of 
coal imports for ten years and a 25 per cent increase in the price of 
oil; a ban on the conversion of coal fired stations to oil or gas fired 
and the compelling of the Power Generation Industry (P.G.I.) to 
additional coal burn. In spite of all this, the overall economic 
position of the coal industry failed to maintain its advantage over 
other fuels. 
By 1971 the economy of energy was changing. Even though th~ markets for 
coal were improving, this was worsened by the decreasing price of oil on 
the world market by the machinations of the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC); Britain at that time was not a 
producer of oil let alone a member of OPEC. Looking at the performance 
of coal as opposed to other fuels from the viewpoint of consumption we 
find significant changes from 1947 to 1975. Table 2.3 clearly shows the 
dramatic decline of coal consumption and the rise in consumption of oil 
and gas, especially in the late 1960's. Table 2.3 also shows that from 
having over 90 per cent of total consumption in the early period of 
nationalisation, coal consumption plummeted to only 36 per cent at the 
time of the 1973 oil crisis. In contrast, Petroleum in the same period 
rose from 9 per cent to 46 per cent of total energy consumption on an 
input basis. But it has to be said that the significant change came in 
the late 1960's when the price of oil was markedly reduced. Thereafter, 
the average costs per metric tonne of crude oil landed in Britain 
between 1970 and December 1973 increased dramatically from $14.47 to 
$86. These price changes were reflected in the thermal costs at power 
stations. The price of coal to the power station almost doubled from 
1.5 pence per therm to 2.9 pence per therm from 1955 to 1972. Because 
of this oil had a clear advantage over coal from being 1.7 pence per 
therm around 1959 and never rising beyond 2.5 pence per therm until 
after 1972. Overall, the pattern of performance in the coal industry 
between 1947 and 1974 was influenced by past burdens of poor investment, 
excessive financial charges on capital costs to update the industry and 
heavy political and financial control by the state. All of which was 
overlain by the increasing resurgence of lower cost oil on the energy 
market decreasing the dominance of coal as a primary source of fuel burn 
in Britain. During this period opencast mining maintained its strategic 
place in coal production proportionate to overall production. 
Table 2.3 
INLAND ENERGY CONSUMPTION: PRIMARY INPUT BASIS, UNITED KINGDOM 
(million 
1947/1950 
Coal 194.2(90.5) 
Petroleum 19.7(9) 
Gas(natural) 0.0 
Electricity 0.8(0.5) 
tonnes of coal 
1952/1955 
210.9(87) 
29.7(12) 
0 0 
1.1(1) 
equivalent) 
1962/1965 
189.2(66) 
90.0(32) 
0.5(0.2) 
5.3(1.8) 
1972/1975 
121.4(36) 
151.4(46) 
47.6(14) 
12.7(4) 
Source: Digest of Energy Statistics. N.B.: Percentages in Brackets 
Table 2.4 
OUTPUT AND PROFITS OF OPENCAST MINING, 1946 TO 1973 
Year end Opencast Opencast Profit/(Loss) 
31 Dec. output share of per tonne 
(m.tonnes) total output I; I; 
1946 9.0 4.7 (0.47) 
1947 10.4 5,2 (0.15) 
1948 11.9 5.6 (0.07) 
1949 12.6 5.8 000 
1950 12.4 5.6 0.04 
1951 11.2 5.0 0.05 
1952 12.3 5.4 (0.10) 
1953 11.9 5.2 0.19 
1954 10.3 4.5 0.30 
1955 11.6 5.2 0.41 
1956 12.3 5.5 0. 72 
1957 13.8 6.1 0.68 
1958 14.5 6.5 0.58 
1959 11.0 5.3 0.37 
1960 7.7 3.9 0.31 
1961 8.6 4.4 0.78 
1962 7.3 3.6 0.75 
1963 6.6 3.3 N/A 
1964 5.6 2.8 0.90 - 15 month year 
1965 6.5 3.3 0.88 
1966 6.9 3.7 0.70 
1967 6.8 3.9 1.09 
1968 6.8 3.9 0.91 
1969 6.4 3.9 0.78 
1970 6.3 4.2 1.16 
1971 8.1 5.5 2.03 
1972 10.1 8.3 1.43 
1973 10.1 7.2 1.92 
Sources: British Coal Annual Re]2orts, MMCL National Coal Board, I, 234 
iii The Development of Opencast Coal Mining 1947 to 1972/73 
Three significant years after the second world war marked a new future 
for opencast. The first, 1948, signified a change of policy ideal and 
intent by government from phasing out opencast to endorsement of a 
future in coal production: the second, 1959, an economic short term 
perspective in world energy production which reduced overall coal 
production but at the same time increased the proportion of opencast 
within the total output in the following years by 10 per cent: thirdly, 
1972/73, a political event not unrelated to the second perspective that 
again affected attitudes to coal production, expanding further opencast 
production. Overall there was a reduction in deep mine production and 
relative consolidation of opencast development. Moreover, throughout 
this period from nationalisation to 1973 job losses in the deep mines 
accelerated to large proportions without much industrial action 
(Ashworth 1986; Berkovitch 1977). 
The changes between the dates of 1946 and 1959 and 1972/73 were marked 
by growth in opencast in the first period and a reduction to a low 
plateau in the second period. The main changes came with low cost oil 
in 1958/9 reducing the nation's dependence upon coal: the reverse 
situation was to happen in 1973. However, this low plateau did not mean 
a poor outlook for opencast mining. On the contrary it showed that 
profits could be made even when production was curtailed by government 
policy (Table 2.4). Despite the technical improvements evident in 
increased production (Table, 2.4) opencast output was cut back. However, 
these technical improvements had important implications for the future 
of opencast mining developing as a strategic industry in its own right. 
A critical element in opencast mining is the degree of overburden that 
has to be removed. The capacity of excavators and scrapers after the 
war was limited. This is reflected in the figure of 745 dragline 
excavators and 568 scrapers in use in 1944 (Arguile 1975). By 1973 the 
situation had changed. There were only 276 dragline excavators and 104 
scrapers, the difference they made was through their increased capacity. 
The biggest was the excavator at the Butterwelll site in Northumberland, 
'Big Geordie' with a capacity of 65 cubic yards. Improvements and 
innovations in blasting techniques and borehole drilling brought 
benefits in reduced unit costs. Civil Engineering firms were placed 
upon an extended list in competition for a site, when one had no 
contract it often hired to the one that did have work. The Opencast 
Executive had a budget and within that was responsible for a rolling 
programme of sites, their exploration, and supervision of contracts and 
contractors. Arguably, the answers to the growing financial success of 
opencast mining are to be found mainly in two elements, increased 
technology and improved organisation and management, importantly 
financed by the rapid growth of profits after 1974 market changes. 
From the "purchasing mission" to the USA (Caseley 1959, p.5-8) in 1952 
the NCB operated with larger and more variably powerful equipment 
increasing the scale of operations. Continuing improvements in 
surveying, explosives and blasting techniques combined with larger sites 
greatly reduced unit costs. This made possible the removal of lower 
seams and a greater overburden than in earlier years where the ratio was 
often 5:1. In the 1980's it is often 35:1. and increasing. 
Critically, the process of opencast coal mining has meant that it has not always been under 
constraint or control by unions or the state in a similar manner as the deep mine sector. Being 
born out of the private construction industry opencast mining had been legitimated as an industry 
apart from deep mining by the State during the second world war. Opencast coal mining 
technology has been largely confined to the exclusive capability of a few large firms, a process 
which tends to perpetuate the continued concentration of power of firms such as Wimpey, 
Fairclough-Parkinson, Costains and Taylor-Woodrow. 
Opencast mining operational process and organisation, in terms of power and control, is dual 
controlled with the State and de-coupled from the State run deep mine industry and certainly 
outwith the effective control of a trade union such as the NUM. The Transport and General 
Workers Unions are represented on opencast sites but the levels ofunionisation and numbers on 
sites with representation are comparatively low.(Gibson D., 1990 TGWU). Contractor firms such 
as Wimpey are in working control of the site, this allows them to resist, not only by the nature of 
the work but by their exclusivity, the pressures presented by trade unions. Moreover, by engaging 
in such a capital intensive exercise, and because of financial constraints imposed by the State, the 
National Coal Board has endured a close association and dependence upon the construction 
industry. Effectively, this dual relationship with the private sector continues as before 
nationalisation. For firms such as Wimpey and Costains' it is equally a cost effective exercise, and 
a very short distance from road construction to utilizing their civil engineering technology inter 
alia with opencast mining. 
Equally, the relationship of construction companies with the land and 
coal extraction has continued largely unaltered, being re-constituted as 
opencast mining contractors to the landowning National Coal Board which 
has brought its own rewards in economic development projects across the 
country. Quite apart from the 1,400 mines, 30 fuel plants and a number 
of brickworks the National Coal Board(N.C.B.) inherited some 225,000 
acres of farmland.(NCB Annual Report 1947). Some of this land had the 
added value of containing a bank of opencastable reserves. The extent 
to which the future working of opencast mines on this land was to cost 
less in compensation payments to their tenant farmers than land not 
owned by the N.C.B. is not known. But the eventual business of land 
buying, conveyancing, compensation and development has grown into a 
major element of opencast mining, not always open to scrutiny. 
In 1946, the Minister for Fuel, Emmanuel Shinwell, sought to deny the 
claims of private coal interests over the necessity for opencast coal to 
alleviate that fuel shortage by stating that opencast mining would be 
'wound up' over the following two years. However this intention was to 
remain an ideal. At the 28th meeting with National Coal Board on the 
18th of October 1946 Shinwell revoked his previous statement. Though 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power controlled production from opencast 
sites, Shinwell saw the political advantages of bringing opencast mining 
under the NCB umbrella. But it was not until the 18th of January 1952 
(POWE, 40/4) that those efforts carne to fruition. By this time several 
changes had taken place in the industry to make it attractive enough to 
the NCB. The fact that it was into profit making status by 1950(Table 
2.4) was significant in itself. This, combined with financial and 
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technical improvement together with increased proven reserves, convinced management at the 
NCB of its longer term viability. They even managed to recover a financial liability settlement of 
£4 million from the Ministry of Fuel and Power in December 1955 for taking the opencast 
industry 'off their hands'. Such financial assistance contributed to the improvement in production 
and general organisation. 
We can see from Table 2.4 government policy of halting new opencast production took place 
from 1959, as a response to the overproduction of oil and the depressed market for coal, with the 
introduction ofthe 1959 "Revised Plan For Coal". The importance ofthe 1958 Opencast Mines 
Act however cannot be overstated. It bestowed upon planning authorities the rights and status of 
'Statutory Objector'. This meant opencast operators were obliged to consult the local planning 
authority on any opencast proposal. Powers were also bestowed to force the Secretary of State for 
Energy to bring a public inquiry over a proposal the planner authority strongly objected to. 
Nevertheless, opencast mining as an industry did not suffer too much financially because of these 
constraints.(Table 2.4) 
Opencast production, compared with 1947-1959, remained at a constant low average of6.9 
million tonnes over the 1960's. Equally, opencast share of total production remained on a lower 
plateau during the period 1960-1969 than the previous decade. What is more important is the 
attractiveness as a profitable producer of coal. Opencast coal profits in the NCB rose from a low 
of £0.31 per tonne in 1960, peaking at £1.09 per tonne in 1967, before retreating to £0.78 per 
tonne in 1969. 
However a new high was reached in 1971 with ~2.03 per tonne marking 
opencast mining out as a lucrative industry as it doubled its percentage 
share of total production, nationally from 1969 to 1972 (Table 2.4). 
Much of the reason for this was technical and organisational change. 
It was but a short distance in time before the NCB gave their written 
evidence to the Commission on Energy and Environment (CENE) (NCB, Land 
Use Aspects of Mining - Opencast, Part III Section 3-4 1979) when they 
testified that the Opencast prospecting programme would take the 
industry into the 21st century. How this was to come about is most 
revealing. Not only was it a reflection of the financial importance of 
this method of coal production, but of the strategic opportunity 
presented by the IMF intervention in the British economy and the 
Treasury responses from 1976. In some aspects it was to parallel the 
efforts and the vision of Braithwaite with his company now in the 
forefront of the continuing development of the opencast coal industry. 
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Chapter Two Part Two 
Opencast Coal Mining: The Financial Light 
i Responses to the Deepening Crisis 
Crucially, it was the external political factors of an international 
order and State regulation rather than internal matters of the NCB 
that had a critical effect upon Britain and changes in structure and 
process of mining in North East England and Scotland in particular. 
These changes led to the contraction of deep mine production and the 
expansion of opencast mining. This is not to deny the importance of the 
internal burden that the coal industry took on upon nationalisation of 
low morale, financial liabilities, and the low level of technical 
production and organisation(PEP.l947). Unorthodox accountancy measures 
also played an insidious role in debilitating many gains made by the 
deep mine industry(Cooper et.al.l985). In addition we have already 
noted the mounting opposition from the nuclear and oil lobby. All this 
is set in the context of a wider international political plane of a 
crisis in capitalism. Essentially it is argued, the 1973 oil crisis and 
the consequent financial intervention by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), brought about radical change in the political economy of 
the British public sector, and in turn the coal industry. From this 
point onward two factors influenced the development of coal mining in 
the north of Britain, 'financial controls' in extracting surplus value 
(Hopper et al. 1988) and European Commission Policy. 
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The markets for coal have been heavily influenced by more global factors 
such as oil and nuclear power. Politically and economically, both of 
these have had a decisive effect upon the decline of the coal industry, 
not least because the world price of coal was linked to that of oil, 
control of which is seen as essential for the stability of a world 
order. Additionally, nuclear power generation in terms of recent 
world politics has been seen as necessary by major world powers for 
the production of nuclear weapons (Benn 1982P.97-99). The power of 
the nuclear establishment was disproportionate to the contribution it 
made to the energy economy and concealed the true costs of nuclear 
generation (Henderson 1977; Sedgemore 1980). In general political terms 
therefore, the production of these two fuels has taken priority over the 
production of coal in Britain. 
We can adjudge this discrimination by significant periods in the coal 
industry's history. From the state buy out of the industry in 1947 
which gave an injection of capital in response to coal demand and the 
first steps to commercial viabilty. Then came a mortal shift in the 
loss of deep mine markets and jobs to a cheap oil policy in the 1960's. 
There is no doubting the drastic reduction in coal production enacted by 
the State to compensate for this, but the inconsistent application of 
investment in mines compared to opencast mining should be given greater 
consideration. As a measure of this the trend in production for 
opencast mining showed a marked contrast with the deep mines over the 
same period (Table 2.5). Opencast production after reaching its peak of 
14 million tonnes in 1959 sustained output levels, albeit on lower 
plateau, from that year until the advent of the 1973 oil crisis. 
Table 2.5 
NATIONAL COAL OUTPUT 1947 - 1989/90 
(million tonnes) 
1947 1960 1965/6 1974/5 1976/7 1980/81 1985/86 
NCB/BC 
Deep Mines 187.5 186.8 177.0 116.9 108.5 105.5 88.4 
NCB/BC. 
Opencast 10.4 7.7 6.9 9.2 11.4 15.3 14.1 
Private 
Licensed 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 2.0 
Total 200.0 196.7 185.7 127.2 120.8 126.7 104.5 
Opencast 
per cent 6.2 5.0 4.7 8.0 10.2 12.9 15.4 
of Total 
Source: British Coal Annual Reports 
Table 2.6 
Year 
1948 
1965/66 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1985/86 
BRITISH COAL OPENCAST MINING PRODUCTION 
AND PROFITS 1948, 1965, 1972/73, to 1989/90 
Opencast Output Opencast Share Profit/(Loss) 
(million tonnes) of Total Output per tonne 
11.9 5.6% (0.07) 
6.9 3.7% 0.70 
10.1 7.2% 1.92 
9.0 8.3% 1. 74 
9.2 7.2% 5.08 
10.4 8.3% 6.07 
11.4 9.4% 5.74 
13.6 11.2% 6.48 
13.5 11.3% 7.07 
13.0 10.5% 8.43 
15.3 12.1% 10.27 
14.3 11.5% 10.93 
14.7 12.2% 13.08 
14.1 15.4% nfa 
1989/90 
85.0 
16.8 
1.7 
103.5 
17.4 
Sources: NCB and British Coal Annual ReEorts and MMC National Coal 
Board, I, 234. 
Concurrently, the expansion of nuclear power generation merely compounded the problem 
for deep mines. 
However, only once has there been a temporary reversal of policy when the 12Q1 White 
Paper illl Fuel Policy. with its arguments based upon employment and amenity, stressed 
that no new opencast sites should be opened unless for special value coals. Paradoxically, 
the efforts of a Labour government in the 1960's and after 1974, expanding new coal 
output as a response to the 1973 oil crisis, contributed to the commercial changes to be 
brought upon the public sector. Borrowings for the coal industry were to become such a 
heavy burden on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) to attract attention 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and opponents of nationalisation (Littlechild 
1978). In addition, and much to the chagrin ofthe Conservative Party, the miners' strikes 
of 1972 and 197 4 also reflected the social and political strength of the trade unions and 
plans were made to challenge the miners power (Economist 25/5/78). These were the same 
trade unions that the Wilson government had tried to reform after its costly failure to 
introduce the 'white-hot heat of technology' to the British economy. 
The reaction from the IMF to the Labour government's PSBR problems, in 
which Labour chose to develop a more commercial approach to public industry (Fine and 
O'Donnel 1985), gave ideological advantage to the right wing of the Conservative Party 
(Miliband et al. 1987). Right-Wing influence increased further after the 1979 and 1983 
elections and can be measured by the adoption of policy for the privatisation of public 
industry to operate in a market which is given as axiomatic and unassailable (Littlechild 
1981; 1983; 1986). While some borrowings had the intention of generating new capacity 
in mining and to facilitate the expansion of coal, the cost exacted from the IMF and the 
consequent 'authoritarian statism' (Poulantzas 1978) vastly outweighed the benefits. 
Arguably, from this same political process, the expansion of opencast mining because of its 
financial attractiveness and rationalisation of the deep mine industry met monetarist 
criteria. 
From the 1974 .:.£lim for Coal' which was endorsed by the 1978 Green Paper on Energy 
Policy Cmnd 7101 the government argued that the need to secure national output of coal 
to the year 1985 and beyond could not be done without an increase from opencast coal. 
Projection of a progressive increase of opencast output to 15 million tonnes per annum 
re-cast its strategic importance in financial terms but also legitimated any increasing share 
of total coal production. The most dramatic statistic arising from this policy is the 66 per 
cent increase in opencast output from 197 4/5 leading to the rapid achievement of this target 
by 1981. Considering it was against a background of declining energy needs and coal 
demand (Chesshire 1991; Manners 1991) merely emphasizes its increasing importance. 
The ascendency of opencast was in part made possible by the increase in the size of 
opencast mines, expanding the economy of scale combined with a greater efficiency in 
operational management. Taking on a commercial orientation meant a propensity for 
greater profit and a larger share of total output. 
The effect ofthis political process on the coal industry is demonstrated in Table 2.5 where 
the reduction in deep mined production is not paralleled by a reduction in opencast save for 
that brief period in the 1960's. The 2 million tonne sof exhausted capacity that 
Ezra (1978, P .11 0) stated would be lost in the deep mine sector per annum, has been 
supplanted by an average of more than 2 million tonnes per year from NCB opencast 
mines. The new role for the private sector is also revealing. Not until the advent of the 
Conservative government did the private sector opencast double its output to the 2 million 
mark at a time when privatisation was being placed on the political agenda in all but name. 
The upward trend in opencast coal's profit per tonne (Table 2.6) suggests their probable 
correlation with the expansion of opencast mining and its increased share of total output 
(Fig. 2.2). From 8.3% and £6.07 per tonne at the time of the IMF intervention in 1975/76 
it rapidly increased to 11.2% in 1977/78. In 1981, when nationally over 15 million tonnes 
were produced opencast mining achieved 12.1% of total production and a profit per tonne 
of £10.27. Because of its sustained profitability opencast mining was allowed to grow 
beyond its commercial beginnings in the 1930's and the supportive role ofthe 1940's and 
50's. 
From Table 2.6 we see evidence which suggests it having increasing importance in 
replacing deep mine production. Not least because profits per tonne almost doubled from 
1976 to 1981. Opencast profits contrast sharply with those of deep mines in the late 
seventies and early eighties . In the period prior to 1972, only half the accumulated 
operating profits of £450 million came from the deep mine sector. In contrast, the opencast 
sector channelled £13 8 million into the accounts and the difference continued to 
widen.(NCB Reports, MMC 1983). 
Arguably, we can see evidence of this commercial approach which led to a concerted 
expansion in the opencast sector from 1975-76 (Table 2.5). The future role of opencast 
was made clear by the then Chairman of the NCB Derek Ezra: 
"Plan for Coal" looks to an expansion of opencast coal 
output, as we have seen, from the present annual total 
of around 10 million tonnes to 15 million tonnes a year . 
...... In the case of Butterwell, this means 12 million 
tonnes of high quality and economically produced coal over 
the next ten years. 
~ Ezra, .l2.H. .c&al and Energy, P .150-151 
The language of this statement is an early indicator of changing perceptions and attitudes 
to coal production from years prior to a commercial approach to coal production. The 
phraseology "expansion of ( opcncast) economically produced coal" is a marked shift both 
in emphasis from the economics of previous administrations and from a production 
orientation to one based upon financial criteria and private ownership. In this sense Fine's 
argument that "the current policies of privatisation are not so much a break as a 
continuity with those of the past" (Fine 1990, P.174) ring true. 
Fig.2.1 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTROLS ON THE BRITISH ECONOMY: 
DRAWINGS AND LOANS REPAYMENTS FROM 1976-1985 
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Facility 
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Foreign Currency 
Loans to Public 
1976 1978-83 
1978 1981-84 
1977-85 
Source:Hansard. Cols.696-7 24/2/1977 Mr. Robert Sheldon, Written Answers 
Fig.2.2 
LEGISLATION AND POLICY AFFECTING THE COAL INDUSTRY 1976-88 
Legislation/Policy (Regulation/Controls) 
l2TI.c&al fur ~ Future: 
1981 Coal Rationalisation 
l28l MMC. .Q1l Coal Industry 
Crull&. Environment Cmd 7788 
1983 .c&al Industry Bill 
(Financial Controls) 
1.2..8.4 fit Closure Programme 
Circulars 3/84 & .4L8.4 
(Planning Regulation) 
.1.2..82 ~ Strategy fur Crull 
(Financial Controls) 
.1.2..82 Crull Industry &1 
_l2llMPG3 
Sources: British Coal. Hansard. MMC 12ll 
Outcome 
Opencast to rise to 20mt p.a.: 
1978 0/C share/ output rises to 11% 
1981 strikes over Pit Closures Policy 
0/C up to 15mt now 12% of of output 
Scotland/NE 0/C targets reached. 
Signals 'high cost tail' of pits. 
Enforces primacy of free market> >0/C 
Underpins commercial running of industry 
0/C profit/tonne up £5(1976) to £13 (1983) 
1984/85 National Strike 
End of 15mt 0/C limit. 0/C share 
rises to 15% of total output. 
Confirms 0/C vital to new era of coal 
mining in commercialisation agenda. 
Initial privatisation preparartion: 
0/C Plann. Regulation > >privatisation 
ii Political and Economc Change and the Expansion of Opencast Coal 
The political background is critical in the development of opencast 
mining. What came out of the 1973 oil crisis was the decline of 
Keynesian economics and concensus politics with the implantation of a 
right wing philosophy in British political life. One watershed came in 
1976, with inflation at 24 per cent and the PSBR at a high level, the 
government chose to seek support from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The IMF imposed economic conditions on loans that were extremely 
unfavourable upon a Labour government which shifted it economic policy. 
Tony Benn, reflecting upon this very situation said that: 
In 1976 the IMF may actually have been informally 
encouraged to put pressure for public expenditure cuts 
upon the Labour cabinet •••••• 
Benn T., 1982, Arguments for Democracy, P.S8. 
His evidence for this comes from well informed sources including Peter 
Browning (1986), an economist with the Treasury from 1964-1985, who has 
given an enlightening account of the events as they unfolded and: 
Peter Jenkins who reported in the Guardian on 28 Oct. 1976 
that Treasury civil servants had been in touch with their 
opposite numbers in another European finance ministry 
saying, "Don't bale the bastards out". The Labour 
government was at the time negotiating for an IMF loan. 
Benn T., P.241 
Hall (1977) has noted that while international capital was conspiring 
against the Labour government, their bedfellows in the Tory party were 
preparing for the eventual outcome of its demands. 
On the other side of the Parliamentary scene we can 
observe the Thatcher leadership preparing for power and 
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constructing an authoritarian popular consensus. 
S.Hall, P57 in~ Hunt(ed), Class and Class Structure,London 1977 
Denis Healey, then Chancellor, admitted that the crash of Sterling on 
the world market was 
probably the most shattering experience I had in office 
and I myself was in a state of shock for fifteen hours 
on the day that it occurred. 
Denis Healey, BBC1, More Than Meets the Eye, 14/6/1990 
One of the conditions of IMF support was that a Labour government 
prepared a more monetarist economic policy: consisting of wages control, 
a deflationary strategy with inevitable consequences for employment and 
stringent controls in the public sector. Browning (1986) is quite clear 
on the policy of cutting expenditure in the public sector from 1976: 
expenditure on programmes fell by 3.6 per cent (Cmnd 7049). The 
implications of this commercial policy for the coal industry were 
manifest in the process of concentrating resources upon the most 
profitable production, especially opencast coal mining production 
Denis Healey, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1976, stood up to 
address the House of Commons in a serious debate on the 'Economic 
Situation' • 
It may be convenient for the House if I opened this debate 
by re-affirming the principles of the government's 
economic policy on which our application to the I.M.F. was 
based. They are, to restore balance to the economy in 
the short term through securing a massive shift of resources 
into the balance of payments. This is already under way. 
Unequivocal in his explanation on how this was to be done, he first 
explained where the crisis lay: 
In a word the problem has been to reduce the PSBR 
sufficiently to restore confidence in the financial markets 
at home and abroad. 
It is then at this point that it is confirmed beyond doubt that the 
nationalised industries sector is to be affected by the government's 
response to the IMF 
For this purpose an essential element of the Government's 
strategy will be a continuing and substantial reduction 
over the next few years in the share of resources required 
for the public sector. 
Hansard 21/12/1976, Cole 482-505 
Increasingly, the Treasury exacted financial controls over the industry 
based upon monetarist economics. Consequently, the only expansion in 
the industry was going to be in low cost production and especially the 
profitable opencast sector. Two months later the public sector learned 
how the State was to proceed with the repayments: 
Repayment, or to use the technical term, repurchase of 
drawings, on the I.M.F. credit tranches will become due 
between three and five years after the dates of draw down: 
drawings are spread over the years 1976-78 and repurchases 
will thus be due between 1979 and 1983. Drawings under 
the I.M.F. oil facility are due to be re-purchased between 
three and seven years after the date of draw down; the 
drawing by the United Kingdom was made in 1976 and the 
repurchases will thus be due between 1978 and 1983. 
Both of her Majesty's Government Euro - Dollar loans are 
due to be repaid between 1981 and 1984. The $10 billion 
of foreign currency borrowing by other public sector bodies 
comprises of loans with different maturity dates, with 
repayments spread between 1977 and 1985. 
Hansard, Cols.696-7 24/2/1977 Mr. Robert Sheldon, Written Answers 
These continuous repayment dates were a contributory factor in a process 
causing pressure for change in the political economy of the public 
sector. As we know from Denis Healey, the balance of payments had such 
a deficit that a massive shift of resources was required away from the 
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public sector. Constructed out ofthe 1976 crisis was the stringent economic process 
which allowed the penetration of an extreme economic and ideological discipline in the 
politics of British society that became established from 1979. Planned periods and dates of 
Government loan repayments (Fig.2.1) are shadowed by changes to a more commercial 
orientation in employment and production in the coal industry which has been leveraged by 
Treasury financial control (Hopper et al. 1988) and configured by policy and legislation 
(Fig.2.2) since late 1976. 
Increased pressure upon the economy by the machinations of OPEC and the rationalisation 
of the coal industry over the decade brought periods of industrial disputes culminating in 
major industrial and political conflict in 1984 (Beynon 1985; Hyman 1986). Certainly, the 
coal industry had from 1976 been driven through a financial process into the current 
situation where open cast mining is a dominant feature of the economic, political and 
environmental landscape. Opencast mining became identified by the State as economic 
and strategic coal production (Cmnd 7788), beyond its intended supportive role, now not 
least because of the imperative of the 'market'. Taking the whole process to its eventual 
outcome bodes ill. The pursuit of these ideological aims indicates that economic power is 
to be mediated through the market place overiding what remains of political democracy . 
• 
iii The State and Financial Re~ulation in the Creation 
u.[Surplus Value in Coal Production 
Hopper et al's. detailed empirical study 'of the internal systems, processes, ideologies and 
practices of financial control in the NCB' is a valuable work on the State's efforts to 
realise surplus value from a nationalised industry for capitalism. And, following the 
economic impositions of the IMF on the PSBR, the response of the State to coal 
production as with other nationalised concerns has been clearly sought through a 
monetarist approach (Browning 1986). In financing the NCB the State had a very strong 
influence as: 
Each month members of the Finance department of the NCB meet 
with Department of Energy and Treasury officials to discuss 
the monthly monitoring return. Together with the Nationalised 
Industries Financial Information System, these returns serve 
as the basis for quarterly accountability meetings ........ . 
Interviews with headquarters personnel in all departments 
reinforced our view of the significance of Finance in the process 
and the consequent enhanced status of finance in the NCB. 
Hopper et al. P. 34 
Under this new orthodoxy of control the rationale of maximising output had been 
overtaken by a financial imperative in the re-organisation of the production of coal and 
starkly: 
The influence of the State has become increasingly evident 
through finance at NCB headquarters .... and we witnessed the 
increasing pressure of the State being exerted, largely 
through the finance department, throughout the NCB. 
Hopper et al. P.35/36 
From using new financial benchmarks the State directives to the NCB were to exclude 
higher cost output from deep mines and maximise lower cost output such as opencast coal; 
we have seen the extension of this in the 1985 New Strategy for Coal. These benchmarks 
are partially contrived 
from an equally contrived world coal market with subsidized low prices 
but the NCB has been expected to operate to those financial standards. 
This process eliminates a high percentage of deep mined coal from 
production but encourages and creates a greater market for an expanding 
opencast coal mining sector with lower average costs. Financial 
statements and annual accounts using spurious market prices can control 
the labour process and create a situation where: 
Surplus value generated by coal extraction is distributed 
out of the public sector coal industry and into the private 
industry generally. This is because the raw material costs 
of the electricity supply industry are the revenues of the 
coal industry and energy costs of private industry are the 
revenues of the electricity supply industry. Cheap coal, 
leaves the NCB with large 'losses' and the PGI or industry 
(private) with profits larger than they would otherwise be. 
Hopper et al. P40 
In conclusion, there appears an apparent inevitability in the expansion 
of opencast mining since 1947 and especially from 1976. once opencast 
coal's profitability was realised, in an economic climate of IMF 
controls on the PSBR, the Treasury accountants arguably ruled it a 
candidate for expansion in contrast to the majority of a declining deep 
mine sector. The new right Thatcher government was then elected in 
1979. They achieved this by transforming the creation of popular 
discontent from the crisis of late 1970's into reactionary ideas. The 
main purpose was to reverse the decline of the economy by destroying the 
current regime of accumulation and reconstruct it on lines similar to 
the 19th century (Leys 1985). Consequently, the Thatcher agenda of 
maintaining the primacy of profit and the market became a pre-requisite 
for survival in the British coal industry. In the NCB, accountants 
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constructed financial controls over the labour process, procuring 
surplus value through an expansion of lower cost production and the mass 
closure of less profitable mines. While this process has been mediated 
by responses from organised labour and public opposition to opencast 
mining expansion from 1976, it is well to remember that we have just 
lived through a political shift where: 
The ideological basis of management control is shifted from 
direct discipline in the labour process to an impersonal 
financial logic which obscures the relationship between work 
and the realisation of surplus value. 
Hopper et al. P.44. 
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iv. The Conservative Government's Agenda of Privatisation 
The Conservative Party manifesto that appeared before the election of 
May 1979 never expressly stated that privatisation of public assets 
would be a major policy that would be brought to bear upon the political 
economy of Britain. Yet, imposition of a privatisation programme has 
been evident not least by the expensive and sophisticated advertisements 
on television screens beckoning 'punters' to buy shares in newly floated 
'PLC's'. Such was the nee-liberal ideological recipe for improving the 
economic competitiveness of British industry that it cloaked an 
expansive privatisation programme in the garb of 'the commercial 
realities of the market' and the 'freedom of the individual'. It was 
also becoming clear that the government saw privatisation as an answer 
to the crisis of accumulation. A major component of this policy was 
further reductions in state spending on public utilities, other than 
that which primed them for privatisation. Amersham, Cable and Wireless, 
Jaguar, Sealink and BR Hotels were the intial privatisations giving 
claims of 'creeping privatisation'. But these were to set the 
ideological foundations for a more determined and wider ranging thrust 
in reducing the scale of the public sector. In 1988 the estimated 
accumulative sales of state assets was a dramatic 620 billion including 
companies with a total capitalization of over 658 billion (Bishop and 
Kay 1988). The process is not finished yet. Besides reducing the size 
of the public sector, the money appears to have also contributed to 
paying off loans relating to IMF impositions of 1976 (Browning 1986). 
69 
The apparent unpreparedness of the British public in the issue of 
privatisation, and apathy towards accusations from the Labour party of 
asset stripping may be due in part to the years of the Keynesian social 
democratic consensus and the teaching of the idea that Laissez-faire 
and an indolent state belonged to the 19th century. 
Whether the intent to privatise the coal industry was a formal or 
informal policy within the Tory party before the 1984 strike is not 
clearly known. What was long suspected, not least from evidence at 
public inquiries into opencast mining, was confirmed by Cecil Parkinson, 
then minister responsible for energy, at the 1988 Tory party conference: 
I can understand your impatience and I can meet it today 
with this historic pledge - Coal will be privatisedl 
because it is formed upon the belief that: 
As soon as sensibly possible, we should separate the British 
Coal Industry from the Department of Energy and the Government 
(because) ••• a British Department of state and the running of 
a business are just not compatible. 
Malcolm Edwards, Commercial Director, British Coal, 
Speech to The Coal Industry Society, 7/1/1991 
However, Clarke (1987:P.67) argues that privatisation of production, 
unlike consumption, did not exist as a coherent strategy for economic 
and social change until some time after the 1983 election. In contrast 
Pirie (1985), reputedly one of the architects of the privatisation 
process, nevertheless suggests there are as many as twenty one different 
types of privatisation strategy. This may explain the early 
privatisations of companies which were already 'profitable' or 
'marketable' and the late intent to develop British Coal which, making 
initially large losses, was difficult to 'turn around'. The argument 
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here being that the government is keen to have a continuous flow of 
cash to support its policies even if it does not get the full amount 
for the sale (Buckland 1987). 
Saunders and Harris (1990: p.59) set out a fourfold typology of 
privatisations that have occured in Britain: "Denationalisation, 
Commodification, Liberalisation and Marketization". Basic to all 
privatisations are the change of ownership and control from public to 
private. Denationalisation of state-owned industries to private 
ownership has been the most common and expanding form of privatisation. 
It comes in four main forms: Stock market flotations, management and 
employee buy outs, negotiated take overs, and direct sales. 
Commodification means for example, the sale of council houses to the 
tenants who previously consumed that state-owned resource. 
Liberalization means for example the de-regulation of local authority 
services, allowing private firms to compete with council direct labour 
organisations for the same work. :Marketisation~involves the removing of 
state provision and supplanting that with voucher schemes based on the 
u.s. model. For the purpose of coal denationalisation the intention 
that it will come in various guises has not been denied by Malcolm 
Edwards (Energy World Yearbook 7/1/91). He favours a "progressive 
metamorphosis" based on "the wholehearted involvement of men and 
management" where "franchising of various colliery operations" is but 
one development in "the new market place". 
It is also interesting to note that the nee-liberal government is not 
the only one with vested policy interests in privatisation. The role 
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played by the rewards of privatisation to financial managers and 
advisers has been very important. With vested interests in pursuing 
privatisation to bolster the portfolios and bank accounts of financial 
institutions, a momemtum has been generated of privatisation for the 
sake of it. Bishop and Kay claim that a: 
powerful lobby in favour of privatisation as an end in 
itself has been created by the way in which privatisation 
has developed in the U.K •••• The interest is served mainly 
by the process of privatisation itself rather than what 
happens to the industry. 
The effect on efficiency is decidedly a secondary question, 
and some possible routes to efficiency - such as regulation 
or restructuring - are viewed as undesirable obstacles 
which may reduce or delay the gains which privatisation 
will bring to financial institutions. 
M. Bishop and~~ "Does Privatisation Work?, Lessons from the 
U.K.": Centre For Business Strategy, London Business School: 
Quoted in the Financial Times 25/11/88 
In all this proccess there is an underlying hint of desperation in the 
striving for accumulation of capital. Neo Liberalist policies have 
posed as an alternative to the Keyensian period of accumulation, where 
ideally from the destruction of the old regime is built a new regime of 
sustained accumulation (Leys 1985:P.25). Essentially it is an 
alternative response to: 
the first instance of the threatened absolute decline of a 
fully capitalist formation. (in which) The last phase of 
the internationalisation of capital has finally subjected 
whole national economies of industrialised countries to the 
unforgiving judgements of the law of value. 
~ Leys, Thatcherism and British Manufacturing: ~ Question of 
Hegemony: N.L.R. No. 151, May/June 1985, P.3 
Given Clarke's (1987) assertion that no coherent strategy for 
privatisation existed before 1984, the evidence to date of continuing 
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recessions and the apparent insecurities of the financial institutions, 
we may say that this 'alternative response' has not been wholly 
successful. Coal privatisation itself, may be based upon dogma as much 
as upon an agenda to arrest the decline of the British economy. 
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~ Conclusion to Chapter Two 
Continual changes in the demand for coal during the 1950's-60's 
(Table 2.3) affected deep mined production very much more than opencast 
mining. By the time of the 1973 oil crisis opencast coal mining had 
secured its strategic position, re-established its share of total 
production returning to the output levels of 1947. The reason was 
simple. Profits per tonne of opencast coal, despite the cut backs in 
1959, rose from s0.41 in 1955 to s1.92 in 1973 (Table 2.4). This is in 
stark contrast to the political and financial control exerted by the 
State upon the deep mined sector between 1947 and 1974 which experienced 
severe contraction, especially after 1959. The die was cast. By 1979 
the role of opencast was totally re-defined by the National Coal Board 
as one which would take the coal industry into the 21st century (CENE 
Sec. 3-4, 1979). The increase of opencast output from 1976 appears to 
have been related to monetarist doctrine established after the IMF 
impositions of 1976 (Fig. 2.1). Profit making from 1976/77 (Table 2.6) 
riding on the back of an expansionist 1974 Plan for Coal made opencast 
an acceptable harbinger of change. Preparations for the end of 
nationalisation and the return of the public sector to private control 
and a monetarist government developed out of the IMF agenda (Benn 1982, 
Hall 1977). Between the oil crisis in 1973 and the advent of the 
Conservative government, opencast coal output increased by over 50 per 
cent to 15.3 million tonnes (Table 2.5). The evidence suggests that 
there was an intentional policy response to the crisis in the political 
economy of energy production in Britain. Opencast Coal, strategically 
available, was used as part of a wider policy initiative to solve 
economic problems and ideological imperatives. 
74 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE COAL INDUSTRY IN SCOTLAND: HILLSIDE CRESCENT NO MORE?! 
Part One 
i Economic Nationalism 
In 1942 a Committee of thirteen was set up to report to the then 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Thomas Johnstone M.P., to provide 
prescriptions for the Scottish coal industry under its on-going failure 
in private control. Essentially, the tenor of the document was the 
cultivation of a co-operative relationship between labour and management 
so as to develop the industry in the most efficient and effective 
manner. It put in place arrangements that would cement a corporatist 
approach that would mature through the post-war political consensus 
years. This incorporation, set within a nationalistic ideology, would 
provide the process which would allow the expansion of opencast mining 
and the demise of deep mine production in Scotland. The main part of 
the remit was to report on how best to exploit the resources of the 
Scottish coalfield (Scottish Coalfields Committee Report 1944). This 
was reinforced in 1955 when Scotland's Coal Plan was published showing 
reconstructed expansion in production of 50 per cent by 1965 from the 
1947 level of 22 million tons (P.14). The inability to achieve the 
intended expansion by 1965 was made more poignant when placed 
alongside the first increase in opencast mining in that same year, 
7 l' .) 
marking the future trend for coal production in Scotland. In 1947 five 
Areas containing 187 collieries operating with an output of some 22 
million tonnes (N.C.B. Annual Report 1946 and 1947). By the end of 
1990 only the Longannet Complex producing 1.5 million tonnes survived 
alongside 30 or more opencast sites producing over 6 million tonnes 
(British Coal Annual Report 1991/2). 
It is important to understand at which level decisions on engineering 
development would have taken place in the 1950-70's, especially in 
relation to events in the late 1980's. The decision to go for deep 
mining rather than opencast was a much less political one than today, 
with engineers rather than senior management influencing decisions. 
The s.c.c. report confirms the co-operative approach to industrial 
relations in arguing that: 
The great task which lies before the British mining 
engineer is that of securing greater productivity and, 
in particular by what new system of mining and mechanical 
equipment, getting the fullest co-operation between 
colliery management and men, better results can be obtained. 
At the time "relations between owners and men, generally speaking,(were) 
soured and embittered and the efficiency of the industry relative to 
that of our continental and other competitors (was) distinctly 
backward", according to the Minister for Fuel and Power, Emanual 
Shinwell (Shinwell 1955). One way in which Shinwell set out to improve 
this situation was by 'courting' N.U.M. Area leaders such as Abe Moffat 
in Scotland for a more co-operative approach between capital and labour. 
This theme had been taken up a few years earlier by the Scottish 
Coalfields Committee, exemplified in the committee itself, which 
included leaders from both sides of the industry. The elevation of 
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these labour leaders to positions of ~confidence' established certain 
customs, practices and expectations, which at one and the same time had, 
in the longer term, important implications for policy in the miners' 
union and the energy industry. Distinct parallels can also be drawn 
with the ~popular front• philosophy of the Scottish miners' leadership 
which had its origins in the Communist Party. 
Abe Moffat had been very active in the miners' unions in Scotland since 
1923 (Moffat 1965). He was not unknown to Shinwell since those early 
days when Shinwell was M.P. for Linlithgow in the mining area of West 
Lothian from 1922 to 1931. Significantly, with the advent of a Labour 
government in 1945, the Parliamentary Secretary to Shinwell at that time 
was Alfred (later Lord) Robens who was later to vehemently express his 
opposition to Moffat and to anything that resembled Communism.(Robens 
1972). As Parliamentary Secretary to Shinwell, Robens had knowledge of 
his relationships with union leaders and as such must have resented any 
communist influence in government decision-making. 
The relationship between Shinwell and miners• leaders, including Moffat, 
across the years, although tenuous, was one of ~accommodation'. It even 
developed into common condemnation of Robens' appointment in 1960 as 
Chairman of The National Coal Board. Such condemnation marked the class 
differences between Robens and themselves. In later years the political 
contrast between Moffat and Robens was clearly illustrated by the final 
appointment of Lord Robens as Chairman of the Johnson Matthey Bank, 
while Moffat, in turn, was said to have remained ~loyal to his cause' 
until death. 
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These government/trade union relationships were developed through the 
perceived need to expand coal production more efficiently so as to 
enhance the legitimacy of the proposed nationalisation of the coal 
industry by the Labour government. Consequently, the expectations of 
NUM Area leaders were conditioned by 'custom and practice• of being 
party to decisions regarding energy policy concerning that coalfield. 
To an extent this suited Moffat and the Communist Party. Giving an 
impression of participation and shared control reinforces their power 
base, their credibility with the membership, and assists in the 
elevation of the leadership to that of an 'Aristocrat•. In contrast, it 
is perhaps worth noting that a similar process occurred with Sam Watson, 
the Durham miners' leader of that period. Both cases have been 
described as 'popular bossdoms' differing only in their political 
orientation but still within a general corporatist framework. However, 
for capitalism the advantages of corporatism appear more readily 
available in Scotland through the political appeal of nationalistic 
dreams (Nairn 1967, Kellas 1980) 
The control of the Scottish labour movement has had an important bearing 
upon the current structure and situation of the Scottish coalfield 
today. The ideological position taken by the labour movement's leaders 
has been consistent over its history as much as it has been consistent 
in its weakness. This has taken the form of what could be called 
"economic nationalism" which ultimately becomes a position of weakness 
for the labour movement and allows capital to take the advantage. The 
leadership of the labour movement in Scotland, especially in times of 
economic recession, call upon superficial meanings and all things 
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uniquely Scottish, such as the "Scottish Psyche". This is meant to 
appeal to all classes in an effort to maintain some position of strength 
against the 'alien foe', usually in the form of 'foreign capital'. To 
do this they will engage with bodies and forces such as the opposition 
parties, churches and business to combine in the defence of something of 
interest of all. From the periods of John Maclean to Campbell Christie, 
from Gallagher to Eric Clarke, by far the largest contribution to this 
situation has come from the Scottish Area of the National Union of 
Mineworkers as the dominant force within the Scottish Trades Union 
Council (STUC) 
The Scottish N.U.M. has for decades been dominated by the Communist 
party, disproportionate to their membership in the coalfield. Positions 
in the miners unions', in both leadership and executive, have been 
controlled by the Communist Party over the best part of this century. 
While it is testimony to their organisational abilities, it also poses 
other questions of how this was done and why the Communist Party has 
remained in the positions of power even as a relatively spent force in 
British politics. Further and most importantly, the Communist party and 
its development should not be viewed in isolation from the process and 
the trade union which assisted its maintenance and organisation. Its 
strength has been gained through the achievement of positions of power 
in and across the Labour movement in Scotland forming a social hegemony 
often through an appeal to the 'Scottishness' of the workplace and the 
relationship of labour within it. Rarely does the Communist party, 
despite its internationalism, relate the closure of plant to wider, 
international problems. An example of this is the Upper Clyde 
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Shipbuilders with its connotations of ~Clyde built ships', red Clydeside 
of John Maclean's days and an appeal to save the Scottish yard and 
Scottish shipyard workers' jobs. In this the Communist Party were at 
the forefront and keen to stay there even at the expense of other 
parties. It is my personal impression that it attempted to play a 
~Godfather' role over the labour movement in Scotland. 
Those who have shunned its wisdom have barely been tolerated. Billy 
Hubbard, a sacked Scottish miner, originally from the Durham Area, 
recalls the day when he first entered the Hillside Crescent area offices 
of the Scottish N.U.M. as a delegate from his union lodge. Mick 
MacGahey and Jimmy Young were seated downstairs in the private bar and 
Billy was sent down to deliver his message. Expecting to engage in 
union business he was told to take a seat and asked what he wanted to 
drink. 
When I refused their offer of a drink I was told. "You 
know Billy if you want to get on this union the best thing 
you can do is join the Party". At that point I said "no 
thanks" and left. I mean, it might as well have been the 
~Masons' he was talking about! 
Billy Hubbard, Blink Bonny Lqdge Delegate, March 1986 
Well perhaps he was. One of the major concerns of Durham miners 
visiting the Scottish Area was the number of Freemasons and Orangemen in 
the labour movement. They found it difficult to come to terms with a 
miner who has left wing sympathies and is a member of an Orange Lodge or 
a Knight of Saint Columba. According to Alan Mardghum, compromise comes 
as hard as the tolerance of such organisations to the new left in the 
Durham Area. To live with the apparent contradictions between communism 
and secretive Orders for some time is one of the most illuminating 
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insights into the process of power in the Scottish Area N.U.M. Either 
you join or you effectively become outside the 'privy council'. Billy 
Hubbard remarked that he didn't wish to rubber-stamp approval for 
policies that serve sectional interests. Representing an unwelcome side 
of trade unionism for Durham miners, equally these facets of life 
highlight the nature of trade unionism in Scotland. Effectively, even 
leaderships with a different political outlook can share the same 
'interests' as management and government. But also, for North East 
miners it then raises the question of being in a position of compromise. 
The origins of the current 'national alignments' lie with traditional 
Liberalism favouring the home rule issue to win Scottish votes and 
compensate for their decline in England in the 1880's. Early Scottish 
socialists endured a complicated relationship with the Scottish 
Liberals; among them, Ramsay MacDonald, Emanual Shinwell, Keir Hardie 
and Robert Smillie, the Scottish miners leader. Later as the STUC, and 
the Labour Party sought to develop their influence in the political 
arena they too continued to carry the ideological baggage of home rule 
over from their Liberal background. It was Willie Gallagher, founding 
member of the Communist Party of Great Britain who was the first to 
criticize fellow revolutionary John Maclean for his pro-active home-rule 
line. Before the second world war under the Moscow led line of 'Popular 
Fronts' the Scottish Communists had started to court the middle-class 
nationalists, producing a pamphlet in support of a Scottish parliament 
in 1936. The Scottish Communist party now acts as a pressure group in 
the assembly campaign with the Scottish Area leadership active 
cross-party campaigners. 
81 
The general premise and practice of leaders in the Labour movement in 
Scotland that the best way to carry support is to appeal across classes, 
while longstanding, is narrow and flawed. History has shown that the 
attempts to unite with dissidents from other parties, church dignitaries 
and senior figures from the Scottish Law Society against the 
reconstruction of the capitalist process have failed (Fraser 1988; Hume 
& owen 1988). Similar efforts were made at the onset of several 
colliery closures in the 1980's whilst avoiding the real issue of 
opencast coal expansion. Any proposals to take industrial action 
against closure came more often from the men than their leadership. Few 
words were uttered by the Scottish Area leadership in its campaigns 
against closure of deep mine pits or the process of mounting domination 
by opencast coal mining within the scottish Coalfield during the 1980's. 
Yet there was plenty of discussion and co- operation over future 
planning between the Coal Board and the Scottish N.U.M. leadership, 
regularly reported in the press. However, by August 1987 all the STUC 
and the Labour Movement leadership could offer those who were losing 
their jobs was "a day out for all the family" comforting their anxieties 
through a 'glorification of the Scottish Psyche'. Coming away from the 
rally many people were feeling more disappointed than elated. The 
reason for such disappointment clouding people's thoughts can be better 
summed up with comment from a recent critique on similar ventures of 
economic nationalism. 
The revival of claims about the distinctive 'Scottishness' 
of the Labour movement's politics has led many workers into 
dead ends of class collaboration and token industrial 
gestures.----- The Scottish working class ----- has fared best 
when it has escaped from the inhibitions of a narrow focus on 
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Scottish affairs. But from 1918 to 1988, when workers' ideas or 
actions have been influenced by those who preach the unique 
virtues of a separate Scottish politics, or who demand devolution 
as a priority, it has always been for the worse. 
~ HUME, ~OWEN 1988, Is There a Scottish Solution. P.72/73) 
This 'economic nationalism', with its origins in the 'popular front' of 
the Communist Party of the 1930's, may have contributed to the 
accelerated run down of the deep-mine coal industry in Scotland and the 
consolidation of opencast coal mining. Hidden from conventional public 
visibility, decisions were made by what the public thought was 'their' 
public utility, British Coal, and 'their' trade union, the N.U.M •• As 
evidence will shortly reveal these bodies contrived to bring about a 
mutually agreed outcome in crucial situations regarding opencast and 
deep mine development and closures. Importantly, this was with the 
knowledge that resistance was already diminished by appeals, overriding 
class interests and differences, to dream of better days in the Scottish 
industry; in effect, based upon economic nationalism. The philosophy is 
of an economically sound Scotland activated in critical economic and 
social circumstances, grounded in historic myths and dreams, through an 
appeal to the "Scottishness" of economic and industrial corporatism. 
Some decisions were taken separately as structure and process 
determined; inevitably, some were taken with the agreement of both 
sides, and not always in the best interests of those they were meant to 
serve. 
The pattern and trends in the Scottish coalfield then, have been 
influenced by the ideology of economic nationalism and the custom, 
practice and expectations of a tripartite approach by the Coal Board 
with the NUM in Scotland. For the State this process provides the 
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ability to enable the implementation of policies in an otherwise 
difficult political climate (Jessop 1990, pp 128-135). Within this are 
contained parallels and paradoxes. The parallel is the similarities in 
philosophy and practice between the tripartite approach of the 
government enacted firstly by Shinwell in 1947, and, the continuation of 
the 1930's popular front approach of the Communist Party within the 
Scottish labour movement. Over time, one strengthened the belief in the 
other and gave rationality and a framework to its practice. The paradox 
has been that in times of economic recession this has manifested itself 
in the form of economic nationalism rather than the communism or 
socialism espoused from the platforms by many Scottish NUM leaders. 
Consequently, in the run-down of deep-mine production, any rank and file 
challenge to the decisions made in the scottish Coalfield during the 
1980's were often minimal and have carried little legitimacy. 
Decisively, because of this, opencast mining because it is 'Scottish' 
and contributing to the Scottish economy, has been considered a 
legitimate part of the development of the Scottish coalfield and only in 
very recent times has been seen as "a necessary evil". 
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ii Corporatist Tendencies in Scottish Coal Production 
Relationships between the labour movement, specifically the NUM Scottish 
area, Local Authorities, the Scottish Trades Union Council(STUC), 
British Coal and, its main customer the Power Generation Industry(PGI), 
have played an important part in changing the structure of the Scottish 
coalfield. Often out of necessity, as much as political expediency, 
policy decision making over the coal industry in Scotland has developed 
through incorporation of these bodies producing a corporate approach. 
Despite directives to the industry based upon free market economics 
corporatism still remained as a political expediency until the 
completion of reorganisation. Essentially, this corporatism lies as 
much with the history of nationalisation as with the history of 
political culture in Scotland. This did not change substantially until 
the organisational restructuring of the "Peripheral Coalfields" under 
Mr. Albert Wheeler in January 1989. By then it had served the State 
well in its endeavours to achieve commercialisation of the coal industry 
in Scotland. 
While the concept of corporatism has been subject to much debate, we are 
concerned with the co-operative political alignments which developed in 
the Scottish Coalfield through British Coal's policy towards opencast 
mining and the transformation of coal production and the labour process. 
In searching for a more theoretical approach to define this process in 
the Scottish coalfield it is argued that: 
corporatism ••••. connotes a political structure within 
advanced capitalism which integrates socio-economic producer 
groups through a system of representation and co-operative 
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mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilisation 
and social control at the mass level. 
Panitch P.66, The Development of Corporatism in Liberal 
Democracies, Comparative Political Studies April 1977. 
Panitch's definition of corporatism appears to be an adequate profile of 
the process between the NUM leadership and British Coal management and 
the strategy of BC in Scotland. The Scottish NUM leadership have 
enjoyeda loyal following over many years. To a large extent this 
loyalty transferred a great deal of authority to the leadership not 
always available in other areas. Loyalty given over a period time can 
be turned into compliance. And in the process of supplanting deep mine 
jobs and production by opencast mining members' compliance appears to 
have been crucial. Eric Clarke defended opencast mining as a "necessary 
evil", George Bolton in his quixotic approach to coal in Scotland saw it 
as further evidence of a bright future for the "Scottish Coal Industry". 
The members have been more sceptical, their experiences were very 
different. 
Everywhere you went you heard people saying "the pit's away" 
I have been hearing it for four years. The management had a 
lot to do with it: the places we were working were just about 
impossible to work in. 
William Aitkin aged 20, Bilston Glen Colliery June 2nd 1989 
The pattern of corporatism over the years in the coal industry in 
Scotland can be signified by a leadership that was complicit in a 
rationalisation/investment process with British Coal involving the 
closure of mines for the re-investment in other mines. The politics of 
the Scottish Communist Party, controlled and centralised, has not always 
been supported by the more articulate elements of the rank and file of 
the mineworkers union. The party, despite the principled stands often 
taken by its members, has often resorted to dogma rather than analysis, 
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position rather than policy. Moreover, for all their work in the 
General Strike and in the Spanish civil war the Communist Party was in 
recent times often reluctant to take the political offensive. The 
leadership of the NUM in Scotland has, in turn, exemplified the internal 
limitations of this political attitude. (Smout 1986). The policy as 
well as the motives of the Communist Party, and de facto its members in 
the NUM, have not always met the aspirations of the miners even in its 
best years. Early evidence of this situation comes from the first issue 
of the "Militant Miner" which was supported across the coalfield during 
the second world war by miners of the Labour party and the I.L.P. as 
well as the people in the Anarchist movement. Alex Greenhorn, the 
anarchist Treasurer worked at Dixons, Wilsontown and wrote during the 
second world war: 
Our policy is to build a rank and file movement which will 
provide an alternative to the present leadership of the 
Scottish Miners Union, an alternative to the Labour party 
and to the Communist Party. 
To blame the strike on a small political group is just 
sheer bluff. Unrest is due to the failure of any of the 
Unions just now to defend successfully the standards of the 
miners. 
Militant Miner August 1943 
The principal reason for this bold alternative was the limited ability 
of the Communist leadership to articulate the voice of the rank and 
file. Scottish miners broke ranks during the second world war to strike 
against conditions in the mines. The Communist leadership of the miners 
unions attacked them for being disloyal to the country, the industry and 
the miners union. It besmirched the Militants• propaganda by stating it 
was anti-union and thus pro-fascist (Pearson, 1943). 
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Scottish Area Management has a background history of "coming up from the 
bottom" and this has greatly influenced its relationship with the 
leadership of the Scottish Unions. Mining legislation ensured that the 
qualifications needed for management posts meant that, as in the case of 
Wheeler and McAlpine (both mining engineers), candidates for Area 
Management posts were unlikely to be from outside the industry or the 
area. Consequently, union members and managers had often worked 
alongside each other in the past, creating respected relationships. 
McAlpine started at the Woodend pit near Armadale in West Lothian since 
1953 with several past and present members of the Scottish Area NUM 
executive. Conditions in the Scottish coalfield at least since the 
beginning of nationalisation were always conducive to a corporatist 
culture between management and unions. As another engineer divulged: 
In practice it was a few mining engineers in management in 
Scotland who were the central figures in selecting colliery 
projects •••• 
Halliday R.S. 1990, The Disappearing Scottish Colliery, ~ 
However, the pruning and centralising of the reconstruction programme 
from the 1960's away from Scotland would be cause enough for the 
development of nationalistic sentiment. Set in the context of perceived 
competition between the Scottish and English coalfields and protecting 
the Scottish coal industry, it would arguably, provide greater 
industrial cohesion. 
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iii Corporatism and Opencast Expansion in the Scottish Coalfield 
Changes in the structure of British Coal and the Scottish Coalfield 
were heralded by the extension of the Audit Department in 1975 to 
management controls in an attempt to give more "value for money" by 
looking for procedures for improvement. Pits were closed in Scotland 
and opencast increased its output but there is no evidence that the 
corporate relationship between the NUM leadership and BC changed. Once 
the process of restructuring began, Hay Management consultants were 
engaged between 1978 and 1982 to implement organisational change through 
"job analysis". Further recommendations on efficiency came from the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC, (1983), NCB, 289-290, 297 and 
305). Apart from Albert Wheeler's spell during the strike until his 
resumption of control over the Scottish Area in January 1989, there is 
little evidence of rupture in that common approach to a policy of 
supplanting deep mined output with opencast coal output in the coalfield 
during this period. The NUM never changed its approach and the evidence 
from McAlpine suggests the adherence to a corporatist position until the 
advent of the "Peripheral Coalfields Area". By then "hibernation 
investment", as we shall see, was in place and the opencast output was 
'holding the markets' to supply the major consumer the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board (SSEB). The SSEB was by then under directives from 
government to re-structure into a commercial company in readiness for 
privatisation. 
Corporatism went beyond the two way relationship between British Coal 
and the Scottish Area NUM. Indeed the whole process was 'anchored' in a 
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symbiotic relationship with the PGI market until electricity 
privatisation. Private industry was the principal benefactor, receiving 
low cost electricity on the back of faulty accounting methods imposed by 
the State on British Coal. (Davies & Metcalf 1984; Berry 1985~,When as 
in the case of British Aluminium in Invergordon it didn't get the prices 
it wanted industry threatened to pull out; this constant pressure from 
industry kept the price of coal down. Eventually, the privatisation 
remit of the SSEB demanded little assistance to augment British Coal's 
rationalisation effort. British Coal's aim to gain more cost effective 
sources of coal to meet the new imperative of 'the market', by design or 
default, was helped by the increasingly aggressive posture of the SSEB 
in trying to secure lower cost coal for power generation. In response 
to this pressure, the "mutual interaction at leadership level and social 
control at mass level" (Panitch, p.66) continued and became increasingly 
more evident. Alignments of local authorities, the media and academics 
were formed around the NUM and British Coal in defence of "Scottish 
Coal". At the same time the disgruntled rank and file took their 
redundancy and watched the development of opencast gather pace. 
However, this neglected British Coal's desire to 'get into profit' and 
increase revenue by accelerating production of opencast coal and closing 
the less profitable deep mines. For the Government and its senior 
management in these industries the outcome has been both favourable and 
necessary to meet government directives and the market imperative. In 
the coalfield the desire for a reduction in the workforce and the shift 
to greater control over cost and production from its Director, Albert 
Wheeler, echoes the proclamation from Major Sir Fenton Braithwaite of 
Fairclough Mining 46 years earlier when he extolled the virtues of 
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opencast production against the "costlier" method of using manpower to 
'get • coal. 
For opencast coal to expand relatively unimpeded it was necessary to 
enlist the labour movement that controlled the District and Regional 
Councils. Here a direct link existed between the NUM, the Labour Party 
and the Mineral Planning Authorities as NUM members such as Eric Clarke 
J.P. in Midlothian were often 'sitting councillors' on Planning 
Committees. In t?e push to develop opencast output people have been 
seriously affected by the corporatism of British Coal, the NUM 
leadership and local authorities. Early evidence of this came from 
Councillor Edward Wright J.P. of Clydesdale District Council fighting 
the development of the 10 million tonne Coalburn site. However, 
additional evidence in the determination of this "co-operative mutual 
interactive" body came from a relation of the Royal Family. 
In the beginning of April 1989 a letter was sent to me from this person 
I knew as a prominent landowner in Fife, later identified as a relative 
of the Queen Mother. He was most disturbed at the treatment he had 
received from Fife Regional Council over his objections to British 
Coal's new plans for the Frances Project of an opencast and drift mine. 
In his letter he stated that: 
The relationship between the Coal Board and the officials 
of the Regional Council has been one of 'cosy corporatism' 
whilst to us complete indifference as to our efforts and 
wishes has been shown ----- One has experienced the regular 
Mason's handshakes and indirect suggestions that if we were to 
withdraw our objections we would be allowed to work certain 
opencast areas ourselves. 
LETTER Andrew Wemyss to Jim Ellison 29th March 1989 
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The urgency to expedite the application for the Frances Project ignored 
the conventions of planning law. But this can, according to their 
councillors, be attributed to the Regional Council's policy on the 'need 
for jobs'. However, this flies in the face of the Region and the NUM 
leadership taking a passive stance on the closure of Seafield Colliery 
which was linked to the Frances pit. Richard Saville of St Andrews 
University undertook research on the Scottish coalfield and Fife Region 
in particular. He found that in the Seafield/Frances combine pit 
closure there were "disconcerting movements of truth which must become 
public". 
We decided that since quite a number of people were very 
unsympathetic to ua actually working on Seafield, we would 
do a report out of our own pocket and not embarrass the local 
authorities. It's cost us a fortune. 
Richard Saville, Glasgow Herald 15/1/88 
If Andrew Weymess and Richard Saville needed reminding what they were 
dealing with they should have looked no further than the pronouncements 
from the leadership of the Scottish NUM and British Coal's Scottish 
Director. The call by George Bolton for a "joint approach" and 
"industrial unity" to the problems of the coal industry at the 1987 
Scottish Trades Union Conference (STUC) later resonated with the words 
of Director George McAlpine in a "putting Scots coal back on top" 
interview. In this he: 
••• lays great repeated stress on good industrial relations. 
There is a hefty measure of mutual regard between himself 
and the NUM Scottish leadership. "What ! have ~ during ~ 
stewardship is to carry out ~ rationalisation of the Scottish 
coalfield in total agreement with all the trade unions." 
(my emphasis) 
The Scotsman, Interview with George McAlpine 20 May 1988 
92 
Arising from these good industrial relations between management and 
union leaders came the promise of developing the Frances Project if 
'flexible shift working' was allowed by the Scottish area NUM. We know 
from Andrew Weymess of the "cosy corporatism" between British Coal and 
the Regional Council. Given the 'relationships' in the Scottish Labour 
movement it would not be unreasonable to believe, because of the 
proposed deal over the Frances Project, that there was some 
communication between the Regional Council and the Scottish NUM 
leadership. This would complete the 'corporate circle' and accounts in 
large part for Fife Regional Council's interpretation of Scottish 
planning law and use of English planning guide-lines to push through the 
Frances Project applications. 
Fife Regional councillors on the Planning and Development Committee were 
pointedly reminded by the Regional Director in his Report on the Frances 
Project of the co-operative stance of the NUM leadership with British 
Coal on this matter. Consequently there can only be one outcome. 
Members will be aware that the NUM Scottish Area have given 
indications of their intention in this respect (on flexible 
working hours) to assist in the development of the Frances 
Project. ---the absence of signed agreements (on flexible 
working) does not provide a sustainable land use planning 
justification for a refusal of the application. 
Report to the Planning and Development Committee 
Fife Regional Council. para.1.2, P.2, Sept. 1988. 
The Director's Report, written with one end in view, is full of 
inconsistencies, often by using British Coal policy jargon which it 
appropriates towards a corporatist approach to coal production. 
Moreover, Richard Saville saw that the key to the future of coal in Fife 
lay in a "hidden agenda" and to a large extent his argument is correct. 
93 
If the Coal Board had been serious about developing Frances 
it would have done so years ago by building a drift mine in 
the late seventies. What Scottish headquarters and London 
want to do is expand opencast mining. They've tied this 
particular opencast in with the fallacious assumption that 
they then can develop a new Frances underground mine on the 
back of an opencast 
Richard Saville, Glasgow Herald 15/1/1988 
Where we differ is, that from the available evidence that we will see in 
the next section, British Coal do actually want both opencast and deep 
mine proposals. Opencast mined coal for the near future and the deep 
mine resources for privatisation. However there is an added dimension 
to this as he rightly points out: 
There are genuine difficulties for the union leadership. 
On the one hand they are being asked to convert themselves 
into an opencast lobbying organisation: on the other hand they 
know perfectly well that if the production of opencast goes above 
what it is at the moment that makes the position of Longannet 
Complex more difficult. 
Richard Saville, Glasgow Herald 15/1/88 
The tide had irrevocably turned in British Coal's favour and they now 
enjoyed a more powerful position in relation to the labour movement in 
Scotland. To underline these concerns in March 1988, the Fraser of 
Allander Institute produced a report at the behest of Fife and Central 
Regional Councils on "An Assessment of the Impact of the Closure of the 
Longannet Complex and the Cowdenbeath Workshops". The Director of 
Economic Development and Planning, continuing to show sensitivity to the 
developments in mining in Fife, stressed in a letter to me that the 
report was "not to be used as a public summary document" (28/4/89). 
Decision making over the Fife pits, between the Local Authority, British 
Coal and the NUM leadership are worthy of further investigation at 
another time. Finally, The Frances Project decision, however 
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disturbing, shows the twin dilemma for the NUM and the Regional Council 
over the retention of jobs in the Region. Firstly, religious 
involvement in the corporate process has contrived to ~dispossess' the 
trade union rank and file and the public of a real opportunity to oppose 
opencast development in other areas of Scotland as well as Fife. 
Secondly, from this process British Coal have been allowed to capitalize 
upon the weakened position of the rank and file and their inability to 
resist radical change in the Scottish coalfield. 
95 
iv. End of an Era in the Scottish Coalfield. 
January 1989 marked a watershed in the relationship between British Coal 
and the leadership of the Scottish Area NUM. It was not only a time of 
on-going change in the organisation of British Coal, with Scotland 
becoming part of the Peripheral Coalfields Area, but also in the 
approach to production and employment relations. 
The closure of Bilston Glen/Monktonhall complex announced to the public 
on morning television, without informing the NUM in the customary 
manner, exemplified the end of corporatism. Formal industrial relations 
procedures were disregarded and apparently the premier informal one too. 
Previously, 'closed' meetings between local authorities, British Coal, 
Labour Party members and the NUM have resulted in close co-operation on 
policy with regard to coal production in Scotland - not this time. But 
what could the NUM leadership have really expected? Whatever British 
Coal had promised them, it was after all they who were complicit in the 
expansion of opencast mining at the expense of deep mines. Perhaps that 
is why it was not convenient to make apparent, at the time of complaint 
by the NUM, the threat to Bilston Glen Colliery from the proposed 
Blindwells opencast extension taking its industrial market. Arguably, 
had Blindwells been ready with coal available, Bilston Glen would have 
gone earlier. That is why it was deemed necessary that the colliery 
manager, J. Sorbie sent a letter to miners at Bilston /Monktonhall 
imploring them to produce more coal on their return from annual 
holidays. 
On Friday 24 June the Area Director informed the area 
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consultative council that unless the poor results from 
Bilston Glen improved immediately during the period following 
the annual summer holidays, the colliery will be placed in 
the colliery review procedure. This could result in the 
closure of the colliery. 
British Coal have shown their commitment to Bilston Glen 
with the installation of ~ face equipment and considerable 
development to replace existing faces.(my emphasis) They have 
also invested in the long term ~ developing towards Monktonhall 
Colliery (my emphasis). Bilston Glen has not responded 
to this commitment. 
We have a market for ~ ~(my emphasis) and must ensure we 
produce it in the quantity and quality required to satisfy our 
customers. 
Immediately after the holidays it is my intention to mount an 
intensive campaign supported by senior management, area and 
local union representatives to lift output to 4000 tonnes a 
day or more. 
BRITISH COAL LETTER TO EMPLOYEES OF BILSTON GLEN/MONKTONHALL 
MINING COMPLEX 27/7/88 
While production never reached the target British Coal required, it did 
produce coal of variable quantity enabling the mine to be kept open 
until Blindwells extension came on stream. It is interesting to note 
that the investment committed at the pit must have been made with some 
knowledge of the pit's current limited life-span. Four days later, Bill 
Stenhouse, the Bilston Glen delegate, responded to the letter by 
claiming that management were engineering the closure of the pit. 
We are fully committed to working Bilston Glen and the men 
are prepared to fight for their jobs. We blame management 
for the non - production because of the things they have done. 
Management removed wooden supports during the holiday and the 
roof came in. It's primed for closure. 
Meeting of Bilston Glen miners, Dalkieth Miners Welfare 31/7/88 
Indeed nine months later, on the 24th of April 1989 British Coal 
announced the closure of Bilston Glen/Monktonhall complex in Midlothian 
with the loss of 700 jobs and 10,000 tonnes a week (average). The last 
"bogie" of coal came up on June 2nd 1989 while earlier in 1989, within 
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eight of both shafts, coal production started at the 3.5 million tonnes 
opencast mine extension at Blindwells with Fairclough-Parkinson (AMEC) 
contracted to extract the coal. Stung by the 'leak' from British Coal 
to the media that the Bilston Glen complex was to close, Eric Clarke, 
N.U.M. Area General Secretary, called a meeting in Lothian Regional 
Headquarters of the Coalfield Communities Campaign. The meeting had an 
air of both despair and embarrassment about it. These were men who 'had 
gone along with the necessary evil' and had been betrayed. Rather 
belatedly, and probably as political expediency on hie part, he 
signalled the first departure from their pro-opencast coal stance with 
British Coal. It also marked the end of any 'cosy corporatism'. 
At the January lOth Meeting with the Coalfield Communities 
Campaign British Coal told us that it intended to continue 
its investment in the two pits (Bilston/Monktonhall). 
They tell us that there is now no market for Bilston Glen 
coal. If that is the case where have they gone? They can't 
disappear overnight. If opencast coal has taken the markets 
for Bilston coal then we will oppose opencaet coal production. 
Eric Clarke c.c.c. Edinburgh 11/4/89 
Another casualty of the end of corporatism was the run down of Killoch 
and Barony collieries in Ayrshire, section by section, to the point 
where the pit was open but producing no coal. Gerald Faulds at Barony 
Colliery "couldn't understand the logic of it all" when the management 
refused more men to man the new development section. Down the road near 
Ayr, Crouch Mining had just signed a s38 million contract to mine 2.75 
million tonnes of coal by opencast methods (Scotsman, 29/3/88). North 
West of Barony, the Dalqhuandy opencast site was producing its first 
tonnage of 10 million tonnes capacity. 
Bloody opencast springing up everywhere you look: what can 
you do. I think the Killoch (Barony) washer is in private 
hands now. -------- I don't want to move south and I'm not 
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taking redundancy, so I'll just wait for the finish.------
Gerald Faulds, Barony miner 4/12/1988 
Such fatalism is indicative of the condition of miners in Scotland. The 
most striking reason for this can be observed when in the social company 
of these men. After visiting Miners Welfare Clubs in the Scottish 
coalfield from 1986 there has been the distinct impression over several 
years o·f a marked progressive social and political distance between the 
NUM leadership and the members. Demoralisation and fatalism bring 
disrespect, and an unspoken knowledge that perhaps it could have been so 
different. The political will to combine has been neutralised by a 
process of incorporation, that regressed into corporatism of which they 
had little part, which started long before the 1984/85 strike. 
While this says a great deal about the outcomes of industrial 
relationships in the Scottish coalfield, criticism of the shift away 
from the rank and file membership has been underlined by unexpected 
sources. The most telling and well positioned comes from Helen Liddell 
in a parting comment before she left the post of General Secretary of 
the Scottish Labour Party. In a review of Hamish Fraser's book on 
"Conflict and Class: Scottish Workers 1700 =. 1838," she made a 
comparative reflection on the Scottish working class then and in recent 
times. 
It would be appalling to look back upon those early wage 
slaves with anything like longing, but Campbell Christie, 
General Secretary of the STUC, should reflect at this crucial 
time for the trades union movement that much of the vigour of 
early trades unionism was because it found its roots in the 
communities of Scotland. 
Now that the unions have grown to become vast bureaucracies 
like their capitalist counterparts, it may well be that the 
price paid for that growth is the lack of involvement on the 
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ground. Just as the social aspirations of the master made 
him put as much distance between him and his men, can we be 
confident that the power and prestige of the trades union 
baron has not created a gulf with the members. 
The Scotsman 19/3/1988 
Helen Liddel was one of the most respected General Secretaries of the 
Scottish Labour Party. It is an indictment on trade union leadership in 
Scotland that even she had distinct reservations on the development of 
trade-unionism in Scotland. Growing away from the membership towards a 
closer association with its "capitalist counterparts" is an indicative 
recognition of the weak situation in which trade unionists and the 
public now find themselves. To a large extent this had resulted from 
the policies and approaches of trade union leadership in Scotland. The 
miners have been weakened beyond recall in Scotland, in part by the 
indolence of the NUM leadership over opencast coal expansion and their 
"class collaboration and token industrial gestures" (Hume and 
owen,1988); but equally by the endeavours of the SSEB. British Coal 
themselves initially were well satisfied with this side of the business, 
power and control of the industry rested back in their hands. 
The actions of British Coal in the spring of 1989 marked the end of a 
long relationship between the NUM, the local authorities and the 
management of the coal industry. The old 'cosy corporatism' of previous 
relationships was killed off and buried under government directives 
coming to fruition and the 'managers' right to manage'. Corporatist. 
relations having served their purpose as an essential ingredient in the 
transformation of the coalfield were then discarded. Albert Wheeler, 
was in a very much more powerful position as Director of the Peripheral 
Coalfields Area, controlling the Scottish Area once again. Investment 
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was taking place in deep mines but some of these were closing and the 
markets were then being held to a substantial degree by opencast coal 
production. But, as Brian Buroo from the Scottish Office said. "what 
markets?: they have no agreement with the SSEB". All of which 
questions the rationale of the State and British Coal in embarking upon 
their ambitions for coal in Scotland. Uncertainty existed over the 
retention and size of those markets. Crucially, this meant that 
planning production for the next configuration of power generation 
continued to be problematic for the coal industry in Scotland. Worse, 
it could all be in vain. 
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Part Two Commercialisation of Coal Production 
i Introduction 
On the first of May 1707, in a fitting symbolic and emotional reaction 
to the ~Union of the Crowns', someone stole into St.Giles Cathederal in 
Edinburgh and rang out on the Bells, the tune, "Why should I be crying 
on my wedding day"? On May Day some 283 years later parallels could be 
drawn with an equally dramatic political and economic industrial shift. 
The people of scotland still had coal production but 75% of this was 
produced without the mining workforce of previous years. Moreover, 
there was a shift in control of administration from the Green Park 
headquarters of the Scottish coalfield to Nottingham under the 
directorship of Albert Wheeler. This event had been heralded by the 
last bells to ring from the shaft bottom of the Barony Colliery in 
Ayrshire and later by those at the "jewel in the crown" of the Scottish 
coalfield, Bilston Glen. Previously, Wheeler as Area Director of the 
Scottish Coalfield had instituted the restructuring of coal production, 
using dubious accounting practices, supplanting deep mined output with 
coal from the production of opencast mining "to keep the markets alive" 
(Eric Clarke, NUM Gen. Secretary, Scotland, CCC, 24/2/88). The 
strategic importance of opencast coal to the energy industry was 
underplayed and not given a public profile by those representing the 
interests of labour or the public at large. On the contrary, as 
opencast coal was often perceived within a homogenous Scottish coal 
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production, it was therefore treated in the same manner as deep mine output, despite the 
NUM having no members within the opencast sector. Privatisation of electricty brought 
pressures to bear upon British Coal in Scotland to follow a State directed strategy that was 
heading in the same direction using opencast coal. British Coal and the government saw the 
Irish and Scottish markets for coal as crucial to their privatisation agenda for the energy 
industry in Scotland and Ireland. To set up the future for trade in supply and demand for 
energy the Government has shown a tendency to contrive demand and supply in power 
generation and in the development of coal production. Aiming at a new era in coal mining, 
British Coal hibernated public investment and held the markets with opencast coal for the 
dawn of a new era of coal mining in Scotland based upon 'three super' pits at Monktonhall, 
Longannet and Frances. The effect upon deep mine jobs and output may have been 
predictable but none the less tragic and probably unwarranted in the long term. 
ii The Commercialisation of the Scottish Energy Market 
The Government's intention to privatise the electricity industry was 
formally announced in the Conservative Manifesto for the 1987 General 
Election in June of that year: 
we will bring forward proposals for privatising the 
electricity industry subject to proper regulation. 
Conservative Manifesto 1987, P36. 
Privatisation of the electricity industry was then duly carried forward 
under the stewardship of the new Secretary of state for Energy, Cecil 
Parkinson. The effects of this privatisation upon the energy industry 
have been far reaching, none more so than in Scottish coal production. 
The organisational culture and policy of the Power Generation Industry 
(P.G.I.) has been re-shaped by the Government's privatisation programme, 
planning for a variety of energy sources for power generation and 
directives to make it a commercial enterprise. In turn, the policy and 
organisational culture within British Coal have been as much influenced 
by its increasing dependency upon the P.G.I. as by government 
financial directives. In Scotland this new 'commercial relationship' 
has been brought into sharper focus by action in the High Court in 
Edinburgh between British Coal and the South of Scotland Electricity 
Board.(S.S.E.B.). Paradoxically, the S.S.E.B.'s single minded action 
and approach to which British Coal objected also had the effect of 
complementing and contributing to organisational restructuring and 
cultural change that had already begun in British Coal. In the second 
half of the 1980's such action has compounded a process that can be 
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traced back to the era of the then National coal Board Chairman, Lord 
Robens. Since that time British Coal in Scotland have resorted to 
increasing the proportion of opencast coal production, as their least 
expensive method of mining coal, to meet the demands of the s.s.E.B. 
The S.S.E.B., unlike the P.G.I. in England and Wales, operated until 
recently under the umbrella of the Scottish Office. It was responsible 
for operating power stations, and selling electricity, whereas these 
functions were separated down south. For that reason the main bulk of 
its policy was determined by the Scottish Office under directives from 
the government. Its organisational culture though not dissimilar to 
that of British Coal in the 1960's and 1970's was to change gradually 
under a greater belief in nuclear power brought about by the influence 
of the nuclear lobby in government. Scotland has had, even before 
Torness was built, one of the largest generating capacities, in 
percentage terms, of nuclear power in the world. With new era man 
Donald Miller in charge at the S.S.E.B., previous commercial 
relationships were changed and the market for coal was placed under 
great pressure under his aggressive management approach. 
An important part of this approach to fuel purchase with British Coal 
was the use of 'bargaining counters'. To force down the price of coal 
in real terms from British Coal, the increased use of nuclear capacity, 
imported coal, cheap oil burn, burning gas is threatened. The idea is 
that if the price is acceptable to the s.s.E.B. then the threat is 
withdrawn. However, Donald Miller has maintained the threat of Torness 
in an attempt to force further price cuts out of British Coal. This 
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organisational strategy has produced added pressure for British Coal at 
a time when, under government directives, it was undertaking a cost-
driven restructuring programme. At first sight, the main effect of this 
pressure upon British Coal has resulted in the accelerated increase of 
lower cost opencast output at the expense of deep mined production in 
Scotland. 
One way to understand the determination of the S.S.E.B. to become a 
commercial force in the energy business is to look at its objectives. 
These are based upon the agreement reached with the government over what 
is termed "Performance Aims". As in the rest of Britain these are 
outlined in the Electricity Supply Industry's (E.S.I.) Medium Term 
Development Plan 1986-93 which has as its prime objective the 
requirement: 
to develop and maintain electricity supplies to meet customers' 
needs on a continuing basis as cheaply as possible.---- with a 
goal of achieving a reduction in the real average price per kWh 
sold. 
This is to be done by: 
pursuing a vigorous and selective marketing strategy ----
securing a long term supply at minimum cost, particularly by 
continuing to develop further the commercial relationship 
with British Coal ---- increasing the proportion of electrical 
energy supplied by nuclear energy to 25% by 1992/93. 
Because of British coal's inability to sell coal elsewhere in the 
market, it has had little alternative but to accelerate a similar 
organisational culture and policy which had itself become increasingly 
obvious after the 1984/1985 miners' strike: 
We need to maximise output at our lower-cost collieries and 
opencast sites as a means of reducing average costs. 
~~B., 1985 New Strategy for Coal, Paragraph ll,iii,iv 
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In 1986, the S.S.E.B claimed to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(M.M.C. Report, Command 9869, para 2.12} that they needed 7,412 Megawatts to cover a 
security element and other energy requirements. By the beginning of 1988 Hunterston 'A' 
and 'B' nuclear reactors, the B.N.F.L. Chapelcross reactor and the newly commissioned 
1,290 M.W's ofTomess reactor provided almost halfthe expected demand for power 
generation of some 3,000 M.W .. For the S.S.E.B.(Scottish Power) this alone provided a 
powerful "bargaining counter" in negotiations with British Coal. Importantly, with 
additional capacity coming on stream at Tomess, it diminishes the success of British Coal's 
own strategy in Scotland, centred as it is around the State-inspired 1985 New Strategy for 
Coal. It also enables Scottish Power to maintain monopoly control of energy production in 
the industrial and commercial heartland of Scotland. State investment and development of 
individual industrial sectors to commercial standards, coerced into a contrived competitive 
arena without regard to the outcome, is a waste of public money and scarce resources and 
raises questions over the rationale of the government's privatisation programme (Kerevan 
and Saville 1987). Despite the S.S.E.B. development of new additional capacity their 
attitude to British Coal has not resulted in the loss of coal fired generating capacity. 
Clearly, the main reason for this is founded upon the policy of having a wide variety of 
competing fuel sources as outlined in the E.S.I Long Term Development Plan. How this 
applies downward pressure on production and prices is equally important in understanding 
other factors which create competition in coal production. What is constructed from this 
apparent largesse of capacity in power generation is not only surplus amounts of' electricity 
for export' but 
the constitution of a type of market for fuel sources in generating 
capacity. The purpose as currently understood from Brian Buroo in the 
Scottish Office is that they are to buy in fuel at the appropriate price 
and time. Clearly, the ability to burn a variety of other fuel sources 
such as nuclear and gas have enabled the s.s.E.B. to use them as a 
bargaining counter to bring pressure to bear on the contract price of 
coal to be burned in power stations. In terms of power and control over 
energy production it is most disturbing. Having monopoly control over 
the price of fuel 'bought in' even bastardizes the concept of 
competition through privatisation. Consequently, the propensity then 
exists for distortion in the rest of the economy. Inevitably, the trend 
to commercialism has led to an acceleration in British Coal's strategy 
of producing 'lower cost sources of coal', but probably at the expence 
of deep mined capacity. 
The fear of losing a section of the S.S.E.B. market may or may not be 
real. To maintain its market share British Coal's answer, as in the 
rest of Britain, has been 'industrial Darwinism' cutting the 'high cost 
tail' of production and accelerating development of opencast. We know 
from Table 3.1 that opencast coal forms the largest production of any 
coal mining sector in Scotland. Moreover, with the majority of 
Scottish coal output consumed in Scottish power stations, evidence from 
Table 3.2 indicates opencast coal as the major source of coal production 
supplied by British Coal to the S.S.E.B. However, British Coal cannot 
deny that this process was already in progress albeit at a slower pace 
before the advent of electricity privatisation. Government financial 
directives to the coal industry are evidence to that. 
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George Knox, Planning and Marketing Manager of British Coal, Scotland, 
had responsibility to respond to the demands of the S.S.E.B. Brought up 
in the Durham mining village of Bearpark, he became an important source 
of information in Scotland and spoke of the problems in maintaining the 
S.S.E.B. market. 
We are dependent upon s.s.E.B.'s ability to sell energy to 
the C.E.G.B ••. There are physical and political barriers. 
We only put down 50% of what we wanted last year •••••••••• 
We have an idea of cheap coal produced in the North East, 
transported to Scotland and sold to the s.s.E.B. to meet 
their requirement. This is just one of the models on the 
computer. Thank God we are not into that stage yet. 
Elements of desperation appear here and the choice was stark. With 
nuclear power taking an increasing share of base load and part of the 
contract for coal tied into exports of electricity 'down the wire' 
(interconnector) to the C.G.E.B., British Coal are being forced to 
resort to their lowest cost coal. Scottish deep mines have not produced 
below British Coal's financial criterion, as set out in the 1985 New 
strategy for Coal, of 51.65 G/J. Indeed for some time it has been 
around 52.00G/J. to 53.50GfJ. Responding to the s.s.E.B.'s pressures 
meant the more rigorous pursuit of the long time policy of supplanting 
deep-mined production by opencast production under new government 
financial directives, in the face of a declining market for coal. The 
result of this can be seen in the closure of Seafield Colliery on the 
Fife coast in early 1987. 
Production from the Seafield Colliery was of superior quality than that 
of opencast coal and went to the Longannet power station to compensate 
for the low calorific burn in the boilers. This was part of s.s.E.B.'s 
arrangement in the summer of 1986 to buy in 4.75 million tonnes of coal 
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in 1987 as part of an agreement with British Coal on a revised structure 
for supplies allowing it to reduce electricity tariffs by 3 per cent. 
When Seafield lost its main production face and 10,000 tonnes of coal 
per week through fire, the S.S.E.B. said their contract would not be 
adversely affected as they would burn extra opencast at a lower cost. 
Privately they told British Coal: 
they had been unhappy at the high price of Seafield coal 
----and it believes coal could cost less if Seafield were 
closed. 
Scotsman, 20th December 1986 
Seafield colliery was closed in early 1988 and S.S.E.B. continue to use 
nearly 60% of opencast coal in the coal - fired generation since 
Seafield lost its main production face. No deep mine coal replacement. 
Perhaps the most telling indication of British Coal's sensitivity to the 
expansion of opencast arose at the Scottish Minerals Officers Group 
(SMOG) Conference in Edinburgh. British Coal were hosts, furthering the 
case for responsible opencast expansion with Area Opencast Manager 
Trevor Cragg outlining the 'special qualities of opencast coal'. With 
my 13 year old son at my side I attempted to broaden the debate with the 
question: 
Will costs be a factor in determining the levels of 
extraction if so what implication does that have for deep 
mined production? 
The response was stinging! 
British Coal have the right to commercial confidence!. 
You(general) would get a punch in the nose if it were in 
private hands. The need for opencast coal is based on more 
than cost, but on quality of the coal. 
Trevor Cragg, British Coal, SMOG Conference, Edinburgh 9/4/87 
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The problem with that answer is that it contradicts the practices of 
British Coal in supplying the S.S.E.B. Seafield colliery coal was 
replaced by opencast coal at Longannet despite being of superior quality 
than most opencast output. The situation is being repeated across the 
coalfield in response to their own strategy and the demands of the 
S.S.E.B., that is why Trevor Cragg was ~marketing' it at the SMOG 
Conference. 
As British Coal were forced to respond to the pressures from the P.G.I. 
it was inevitable that their production was to dovetail into the pricing 
and generation capacity of the S.S.E.B •• Once engaged in this process 
it became necessary to restructure the organisation within British Coal 
to match the production requirements. Evidence of this came in what 
British Coal did in Scotland when they amalgamated their opencast sector 
with the deep-mine production sector in 1985. It is a long long way 
back to 1950's energy planning; Shinwell, Selsdon, Moffat and Robens. 
From 1950 where opencast coal was to be phased out, to 1992 where it 
was over 70% of total production in Scotland. 
There has been a certain inevitability over the commercialisation of 
British Coal in Scotland. From the 1985 New Strategy for Coal it seems 
they had already embarked upon a similar commercial approach to 
production and organisation. Once the S.S.E.B. strategy of having a 
~choice of capacity' was in place, British Coal were locked into 
competition with other fuel sources making them conform to the demands 
of ~the market'. After all there is only one major market for coal from 
Scotland and that is in power generation. In contrast to previous 
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decades, when the National Coal Board had a security of market, the 
S.S.E.B. have been developing a type of internal market for fuel sources 
to compete in generating capacity. Creation of this market has forced 
competition within the production of coal between profitable and less 
profitable sources of coal. It all has a very Darwinian look about it. 
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iii Policy and Trends in Production and Emoloyment 
ill .t.b£ Scottish Industry 
Political pressures from the State upon the corporate arrangements in production, markets 
for coal and demands for technological change have conspired to have a radical impact upon 
the coal industry and communities in Scotland. As will become apparent, much of this could 
not have taken place without the complicit agreement of the Scottish NUM in the expansion 
of opencast coal mining. With a history and reputation for militancy (Allen 1981) in 
protecting pits and jobs, critics may ask "why did the Scottish area NUM allow a process 
indicating that the closure of pits was related to the increase in opencast output to gather 
momentum even without the slightest rebuke?". Economic nationalism explains much of the 
attitude of the NUM leadership, often seen in its separation from NUM national policies 
after the 1984/85 strike. Such a contradiction between apparent indolence on the issue of 
opencast expansion and the loss of deep mine pits and jobs contrasts starkly with 
that militant reputation. While the remaining production has been transformed by increased 
technology, a substantial amount of output in a declining market for coal has been 
supplanted by opencast mining (Fig. 3.6). Employment in the industry has been the major 
casualty. Having already experienced a sustained decline over the years, the number of 
people employed at the face, on the surface and in staff and clerical posts have contracted at 
an alarming rate in recent years. 
Coal Board Policy in the Scottish coalfield since 1966 has given an increasingly important 
role for opencast mining in overall production, especially from 1976 onwards, 
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Table 3.1 
SCOTTISH COAL PRODUCTION (millions tonnes saleable) 
Year 1965 1970 1976 1980 1982 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Deep Mine 17.5 11.1 9.4 8.1 6.6 4.3 3.6 2.8 1.9 
Official# 3.9 2.9 2.1 2.1 
Open cast 0.9 1.3 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.6 3.0 3.6 3.9 
Official# 2.9 3.2 4.0 4.2 
Totals 18.4 12.4 11.8 10.4 9.4 6.9 6.6 6.4 5.8 
Official 6.8 6.1 6.1 6.3 
Deep mine 
as % total 95% 90% 80% 78% 70% 62% 54% 44% 
production 
Official 57% 48% 34% 33% 
Opencast 
as % total 5% 10% 20% 22% 30% 38% 46% 56% 
production 
Official 43% 52% 66% 67% 
Incremental 
change as % 
of Previous 
Output 
Deep Mine -37% -15% -14% -19% -35% -16% -22% 
Official -41% -26% -28% -5% 
Open cast +44% +85% -4% +18% -7% +15% +20% 
Official +4% +10% +25% +5% 
Source: British Coal, Strathclyde Regional Council 
Official# - Scottish Office statistics 
Note: Deep mine coal includes the output of licensed mines 
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Table 3.2 
COAL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION IN SCOTLAND 1979, 1983-1989(000 tonnes) 
1979 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Total Production## 10972 9208 3581 6729 6925 6730 6629 6370 
Deep Mines(saleable) 8172 6198 988 3600 3860 2937 2112 2086 
Opencast coal 2438 2986 2593 3085 2898 3206 3996 4165 
Imports(including 1285 1339 1211 2000 1559 1638 1528 1487 
from rest of U.K.) 
Disposals 12470 8577 5887 9722 9027 10229 8050 7412 
Inland total 11900 7408 5682 8721 8310 9463 7424 6348 
Electricity 8440 4578 3329 5357 4980 6399 4549 3716 
Coke Ovens 1133 1164 1188 1309 1221 1223 1189 1183 
Industrial 527 404 265 677 888 900 862 725 
Merchants 1084 691 516 842 765 549 486 445 
N. Ireland(export) 570 542 157 523 187 646 520 814 
Stocks(end of period) 
Distributed 1411 3156 884 2060 2216 1693 2985 3548 
Undistributed 337 3037 4308 2388 2094 931 949 989 
Source: Scottish Office Development Department. 
## Saleable deep mined coal includes the output of licenced mines 
N.B. Disposals sub-totals are to major consumers. 
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Table 3.3 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN BRITISH COAL COLLIERIES, SCOTLAND 
1977/78, 1981/82 - 1987/88 
77/78 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 
Employment 
Wage Earners on 
Colliery Books 
(Weekly Averages 
Thousands) 
overall 22.1 18.3 16.9 14.4 12.3 8.8 6.0 4.3 
Underground 18.7 15.7 14.5 12.5 10.6 7.5 5.2 3.7 
Employees(at 
end of Period)## 25.9 21.0 19.9 16.0 14.0 9.7 4.5 3.5 
Operative Mines 19 14 13 9 9 9 7 4 
Productivity 
Average Output 
per Manshift(tonnes) 
Overall 1.96 2.00 1.97 1.94 0.37 2.21 2.54 2. 71 
Underground 2.34 2.38 2.33 2.30 0.46 2.65 3.03 3.18 
Face 7.05 7.48 7.64 7.81 4.20 9.95 10.76 10.95 
Proportion output 
Power- loaded(%) 89.7 92.2 92.7 93.8 87.2 93.3 94.6 95.1 
Source: Scottish Office Development Department. 
##This includes white collar staff and workshops staff 
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and a diminishing one for deep-mining. This is demonstrated in Table 
3.1/Fig. 3.1. where from 1965 we have seen a steady rise in the tonnage 
of opencast mining to the detriment of deep-mined production. This is 
not so obvious by examining the actual figures of production for the two 
sectors. Only by taking production figures on an incremented basis, can 
we realise the progressive consolidation of opencast mining in Scotland, 
and, the diminishing importance of the deep-mined sector. While this 
may appear to have been a traditional long term development, the 
Scottish Area NUM have yet to argue this point. Indeed, when the latter 
part of the 1980's saw the situation reaching critical proportions for 
the deep mines, relative to the expansion of opencast, their responses 
ranged from the defensive and evasive to a distinct silence on the 
issue. British Coal themselves had been extremely keen to avoid the 
true role of opencast mining to become a public issue in Scotland 
(Scotsman 6/1/1988). 
When George Knox of British Coal Scotland, in conversation with me in 
1987, responded to the point that opencast was at least 50% of total 
output by remarking "We'll make sure it never goes over 50%" (of total 
output) he meant the figures and not the tonnage. Figures supplied to 
local authorities by British Coal for a long time continued to show the 
predominance of deep mined coal over opencast output. For whatever 
reason they were misleading. This became evident through the production 
of more recent statistics demanded by the Scottish Office which shows 
British coal were often misrepresenting the saleable output of both 
opencast and deep mine coal. Psychologically these differences are not 
minor, for had the truth been fully extended into the public domain the 
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response may have disrupted the progress of British Coal's strategic process towards a 'new 
era in coal mining'. Discrepencies in tonnage figures were never raised as a major issue by 
the Scottish Area NUM leadership according to Michael Hogg (Executive Member). 
However, when Billy Hubbard (Blink Bonny Delegate) did take output statistics from me 
into a major NUM meeting on closures he was dismissed by the leadership for 
'scaremongering'. Having previously accepted the "economics" of British Coal's argument 
this came as no surprise. 
According to figures supplied to Strathclyde Regional Council by British Coal, from 1965 to 
1970, there was a 37% decrease in deep -mine production and a 44% increase in opencast 
mining production. Over the next six years the incremented change as a percentage of 
previous output continued on a dramatic scale. Deep - mined production fell by 15% while 
the policy of support for opencast production increased it by an extraordinary 85%. Even 
though the following five years figures to 1980 were influenced by the 1974 and 1977 'Plan 
For Coal', the relative decline for deep- mine production continued against the expanding 
figure for opencast mining which shared a very small absolute decline. Opencast coal output 
was now supplanting deep mined output. 
Overall, total saleable output has undergone a sustained decline, related to market demand, 
from 18.4 million tonnes in 1965 to 5.8 million tonnes in 1988. Alarmingly, within this 
figure deep mine production has been reduced from 17.5 million tonnes in 1965 to only 2.8 
million tonnes in 1988. Therefore, deep mine production has lost output of some 14.7 
million tonnes and opencast mining has increased its output 
by some 2.7 million tonnes. Admittedly, in mining tonnage terms 2.7 
million tonnes is not a great deal, but the crucial point is that 
opencast production has progressively increased its share of total 
output, especially during the 1980's; we can see this more graphically 
in Fig.3.2. From just 5% in 1965, opencast coal output has increased to 
56% of total output in 1988. In stark contrast deep mine production as 
a percentage of total production has fallen dramatically from 95% in 
1965 to 44% in 1988. The percentage gain of opencast output and 
percentage loss of deep mined output in each of the years since the 1985 
"New strategy for Coal" has been substantial. From 1986 to 1987 to 1988 
the gain for opencast and loss for deep mined output has been 8% and 10% 
respectively. Previously, such changes as these would have occurred 
over longer time spans and on a larger base total. However, further 
evidence in the form of incremented changes as a percentage of the 
previous years output is perhaps the most telling aspect of radical 
change in the production of coal in the Scottish coalfield. 
These statistics show a sustained and relentless decline in deep mined 
production across the years. This is contrasted with a progressive 
consolidation of opencast mining as the major method of coal 
production in Scotland. Recent years show the most marked changes. 
From an already diminishing base total in 1982, 35% of deep mined 
production was lost by 1986. In the following year the decrease 
amounted to 16%, and then a remarkable 22% from the previous year of 
1987 from a base total of only 3.6 million tonnes. Opencast production 
in contrast, was kick-started from 1965 to 1970 and 1976 with dramatic 
increases of 44% and 85% respectively, as incremented changes as 
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FIGURE 3.2 ~ish Coal Production 
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percentages of the previous periods' output. Following such large 
increases it is hardly surprising that the situation stabilised with a 
small decrease. Even so, this was against a decrease in deep mining of 
some 14%. Following the arrival of the Conservative government in 1979 
and industrial action in 1981 there was again a marked rise in opencast 
output. Over the two year period from 1980 to 1982 it rose by 18% 
against the background of a decrease by 19% in deep mining over the same 
period. We could argue that the figures that represent the changes from 
1982 to 1986 were affected by the 1984/85 industrial action. But even 
with a decrease by 7%, opencast mining output still progressively 
consolidates its position as deep-mined production was slashed during 
the same period by 35%. What is startling from this period in time is 
that opencast coal production from 1986 to 1987 to 1988 expanded by 15% 
and 20% against the sustained decrease in deep-mined output by 16% and 
22% respectively. 
The dramatic change in the production of coal in Scotland is brought 
into sharper focus by the discovery of 'alternative' official figures. 
The figures in Table 3.1 are the 'conservative' figures given by British 
Coal to the Regional Councils for public consumption. These are 
augmented in Table 3.1 by figures from the Scottish Office supplied by 
British Coal for the years from 1986 onwards. The full figures are 
reproduced in Table 3.2 for reference purposes. If we look at the 
figures held by the Scottish Office the regression of deep mining and 
the expansion of opencast mining is all that more graphic. As early as 
1987 opencast coal output represented more than 50% of total production 
by 1988 it was 66%. This official figure stands in contradiction to the 
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figures given to Strathclyde Regional Council of 46% and 56% for those 
same years. Similarly, this meant that the incremented changes from the 
previous years' outputs would be misrepresented. Therefore the 
incremented deficit for deep mines was much greater than previously 
stated post 1985 "New Strategy for Coal". Moreover, in opencast mining 
in 1986 we find far from a deficit of 7% in that year it inherited a 
gain of some 11% and then continued its strident march into the 1990's 
in Scotland where incremented decreases and increases reach saturation 
point. The trend has been to a perpetual decline in deep mined 
production and a progressive consolidation of opencast mining ever since 
1965 and especially since the election of a conservative government in 
1979 and the 1985 "New Strategy for Coal". 
The strategy behind this policy of supplanting deep mined output with 
apparently lower cost opencast output would at first sight appear to be 
a purely economic one. Scotland had certainly some of the highest cost 
deep mines in production (Halliday 1990 pp.l7). However it would be 
naive to believe that financial choices of production was the only 
strategy. The control of a flexible workforce in a high-tech industry 
as outlined in the Wheeler Plan (Appendix t.) is also a very desirable 
outcome for British Coal in pursuing privatisation plans. Effectively, 
the power base of the N.U.M. in Scotland has been reduced by shifting 
emphasis on the mode of production from the deep-mine sector to the 
opencast sector holding the market for coal. Consequently, there has 
been a shift in the control of production from union to management and 
decision-making from engineers to managers and accountants (Berry et al. 
1985b). Gradually and purposefully, production moved from the deep-mine 
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sector creating a more passive flexible technically minded workforce, to 
the opencast sector under a less cohesive, more mobile, passive labour 
force run on a contractual basis. 
The legacy of this process has been tragic in terms of loss of jobs; 
both employment and environmental prospects remain extremely bleak. A 
visit to the former Lanarkshire coalfield sadly confirms that view. 
British Coal's Coalburn opencast mine operated by Crouch Mining 
dominates the Douglas Basin creating despoilation that would not be 
tolerated south of the border. LAW Mining, the largest private firm who 
were found guilty at an industrial tribunal in 1988 for dismissing four 
men who refused to work a 15 hour shift, continue to expand down the 
Rigside area. According to one of LAW's engineers, ex-miners will not 
be taken on by the private opencast firms because of their socialisation 
into 'restrictive practices', so there is little chance of opencast 
mining alleviating the unemployment. 
From 19 production units in 1977/78, Scottish deep mining is recently 
reduced to 1 large combined unit in the form of Longannet. The loss of 
employment has been equally startling. From over 22,000 men employed on 
Colliery books in 1977/78 it stood at under 1,000 in 1992. However 
within periods of this time span there have been job losses of some 
magnitude. In the one year from 1982/83 to 1983/84, the year before the 
strike, there was a substantial loss of nearly 4,000 jobs. This was 
followed in the year of the 1984/85 strike by the loss of a further 
2,000 jobs. During the year of 1985/86, following the strike, British 
coal took advantage of the NUM's vulnerability to shed labour in 
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Scotland by a total of 4,300 jobs. 
However, this may seem unusual that during this period of accumulated shedding of labour 
by over 10,300 jobs, British Coal still maintained 9 operative production units. There is 
more than anecdotal evidence to suggest that this was a political decision so as not to 
undermine relations with the NUM and preserve the general perception of the importance of 
mining in the public's eye. During 1986/87 with the closure of 2 more pits and 2 workshops 
came the shedding of the largest number of employees' jobs in the mining industry in a 
single year since nationalisation. A total of 5,200 jobs were lost in the Scottish coalfield 
with the greater loss coming from surface workers, white collar staff and fitters and 
electricians in the workshops. Further losses of 1 ,000 jobs in the industry occurred with the 
closure of 3 pits in 1987/88. The deep-mine industry as people had previously known it had 
been decimated. 
Despite this loss of manpower we can see from Table 3.3 that productivity rose markedly in 
every section ofthe coalfield since the 1984/85 strike. For an explanation ofthis we should 
look predominantly at the increasing amount of new technology introduced into the mining 
industry (Winterton 1986). Evidence for this in Table 3.3 is indicated by the proportion of 
coal production which is power-loaded. This has progressively increased from 89.7% in 
1977/78 to over 95% in 1987/88. Importantly this was accelerated after 1985 and is reflected 
in the Output per Manshift (OMS) on the faceworkers' statistics. Given the extremely high 
technological input at Scotland's remaining colliery at 
Longannet, power-loaded coal production may well be nearer 98% as other 
production units are closed. Technological investment, as we shall see 
later, has been concentrated, in a deliberate policy, upon the pits 
targeted to survive into the 1990's. 
British Coal appear to have had one major strategy - making the mining 
industry in Scotland financially viable and ~dressed' for privatisation. 
It is apparently achieving this through different courses of action 
within a complex process of supplanting deep mine output with opencast 
coal output and technological rationalisation of the most productive 
deep mines with the consequential outcome of these two processes being 
the incessant reduction of manpower levels in the industry. This 
~commercial' process has been attuned over time to the demands of the 
reconstituted market for coal from the Scottish coalfield. 
Who can be responsible for the dramatic and often traumatic changes? 
Certainly, government wanted radical changes in the Scottish coalfield, 
but the Thatcher government was not alone in determining what amounted 
to a transformation of the Scottish Coalfield. As long as direct 
political responsibility for the coal industry lies with the Ministry of 
Energy in London, the Scottish Office can claim to have little direct 
influence in coal production in Scotland, apart from the planning 
aspects of opencast mining. And to some senior civil servants this has 
proved irksome and inconsistent with their counterparts in England, as 
Brian Buroo in the Scottish Office confirmed in frustrated tones. 
We have little input into British Coal, as we are not 
responsible for its policy in the same way as we are for 
electricity generation. 
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The fact that Brian Buroo's part in the development of electricity privatisation helped to 
determine the outcome of Scottish coal production is a moot point. Conversely, the Scottish 
Office itself was not directly involved in developing a strategy for a new era in coal in 
Scotland, shifting the emphasis on deep mined production to opencast mining. Privately, 
Brian Buroo wished the Scottish Office wished it was; he thought British Coal management 
lacked intellect and their policy in Scotland ill-founded. 
This process, after all, would not be the first time in Scotland that the demands of capital 
have shattered communities and their culture, nor will it be the last. The legacy of previous 
years is not fifty miles away from Glasgow. At Auchendrain in Argyll is a 'preserved' 
crofting community museum. In keeping with 'tradition', the Scottish Tourist Board have 
just opened a deep mine museum at Lady Victoria pit, near Dalkieth. The process in the 
coalfield has remarkably similarities; then again perhaps it isn't so remarkable as predictable. 
Its political structures underwent radical adjustment and 
the social and economic foundations of life were also 
altered by pressures of market technology, population and 
social leadership. Most of these found important origins 
long before Culloden. 
Eric Richards, 1982, The History of the Highland Clearances, 
11./ 
iv Holding the Market .fur Scottish Coal 
The market for coal in Scotland is largely tied into the demand for coal from the S.S.E.B. 
and on a smaller scale, industrial and public sector bodies. Radical changes affected the 'old 
arrangements' between British Coal and the S.S.E.B. since the advent of a commercial 
regime and the re-constituted supply of coal from previous reliance largely on deep mines to 
an increased capacity of opencast production. Already we have learned that: 
A fundamental part of the [British Coal] strategy is 
concentration of production on the lowest cost sources 
of output, of which open cast output is clearly a major 
contributor.---- The Government has set the Chairman of 
British Coal demanding objectives. The cost reduction 
target in particular will require an increase in output 
from low cost sources. 
Department of Energy. Letter to Durham County Council. 
Para. ~27/3/1987. 
British Coal have certainly become increasingly dependent upon expansion of opencast coal 
to maintain their market share; however, the matter has not been a straightforward one of 
supply and demand. The determination of the S.S.E.B. to become a 'commercial enterprise' 
has in turn directly affected the commercial strategy of British Coal in Scotland. One aspect 
of commercialisation was the intended use and configuration of power stations according to 
the price of fuel and the obligation of nuclear generation by the S.S.E.B. Therefore for 
British Coal, the use of coal fired power stations to generate electricity was vital to 
sustaining market share of fuel consumption in electricity generation. Table 3.4 shows the 
variety of stations burning different fuels that are available to the S.S.E.B.: 
Table 3.4 
SSEB POWER STATION CAPACITIES AND FUEL BURN TYPE 
Stations 
Longannet 
Inver kip 
Cockenzie 
Kincardine 
Methil 
Torness 
Hunterston B 
Chaplecross 
Hydro-Electric 
Dunfirmlinef 
Clydes Mill 
Total Mwts 
Fuel 
Burn Type 
Coal 
Oil 
Coal 
Coal 
Oil/Coal 
Nuclear 
Nuclear 
BNFL 
Water 
Gas Turbine 
Installed Maximum Available 
Capacity(Mwts) Output (Mwts) 
2400 2304 
2028 642 
1200 1152 
400 375 
60 57 
1400 1200 
1246 1160 
?? 200(variable) 
121 125 
125 125 
8980 7310 
N.B. 2.100 Gwh of electricty produced by 1 million tonnes of coal 
Source: SSEB Annual Reports 
Table 3.5 
Moisture 
Ash 
Volatile 
Sulphur 
Calorific 
Value 
Sources: 
SPECIFICATION OF SCOTTISH DEEP MINED COALS 
Bilston Glen Monktonhall 
(Peackock) 
11.5 11.5 
4.0 8.0 
31.5 nfa 
0.5 0.9 
28800 28300 
British Coal SMOG seminar 
----
Monktonhall Barony 
(Parrot) 
11.5 n/a 
7.0 4/10 
nfa nfa 
1.3 1.0 
28700 34000 
9/4/87 
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Polmaise 
nfa 
9/14 
n/a 
0.75 
28900 
Table 3.6 
SSEB CONSUMPTION FOR MAY JUNE (average per week) and W/E July let 1989 
Longannet 
Cockenzie 
Nuclear 
Oil 
Total 
May June 
45,000 tonnes 30,000 tonnes 
{ 27,000 tonnes } 
145,000 tee. 145,000 tee. 
5,000 tee 5,000 tee 
195,000 tee 180,000 tee 
Source: S.S.E.B. Station Management 
July 
65,000 tonnes 
19,000 tonnes 
85,000 tee ## 
5,000 tee 
174,000 tee 
N.B. Cockenzie burned 27,000 for the two month period 
## Nuclear generating sets out for maintenance at Torness and Hunterston 
which meant 40 per cent increase in coal burn 
Table 3.7 
SCOTTISH COAL OUTPUTS AND SALEABLE OUTPUT - 1983/84, 1987/88 
1983/84 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 
Deep Mined 5.3 4.2 3.38 2.6 
Opencast 2.8 2.5 2.40 2.8 
Lise. Mines 0.35 0.64 0.7 0.67 
Total Output 8.45 7.35 6.47 5.97 
Saleable 7.58 9.9 6.9 7.2 
Source: British Coal, November 1989 
Table 3.8 
SCOTTISH OPENCAST DISPOSALS (Sales) 1987/88 
Mines P.G.I. Industrial Domestic Export Total Private Overall 
2800 387 68 101 3356 + 674 = 4040 
Source: British Coal and SSEB. 
-------N.B. British Coal Disposals include private sector delivered tonnage. 
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Table 3.9 
ACCOUNTANCY ALLOCATION PRACTICE IN THE SCOTTISH COALFIELD 
Proceeds Allocated 
Longannet: 
Actual Rating 
Allocation 
by B.C. ' 
Across Year 
Average Rating 
BC Allocation 
for SSEB Income 
Opencast: B.c. 
1;35.26/tonne 
1;34.28/tonne 
1;32.06/tonne 
1;30.16/tonne 
1;30.32/tonne 
1;34.28/tonne 
Average Rating 1;45.00/tonne 
Allocation 
Proceeds Rating 
1;1.64GJ/tonne 
1;1. 67GJ /tonne 
1;1. 52Gj /tonne 
1;1.43GJ/tonne 
1;1.59GJ/tonne 
1;1.67GJ/tonne 
1;1. 75GJ/tonne 
Rating 
21.48GJ/tonne 
20.52GJ/tonne 
21.09Gj/tonne 
21.17GJ/tonne 
19.00GJ/tonne 
. 20. 52GJ/tonne 
24.56GJ/tonne 
Source: Kerevan and Saville, 1988, Scottish Coalfields Study, 
Summary, Paras. 3.2.2, 3.2.3. 
Table 3.10 
AVERAGE OPENCAST PRODUCTION COSTS AT DISPOSAL POINTS 
IN SCOTLAND AND NORTH EAST ENGLAND 1988 
Scotland N.E. England 
Killoch 1.35 1;/GJ Widdrington 0.78 1;/GJ 
Knockshinnock 1.05 1;/GJ Butterwell 1.15 1;/GJ 
Westfield o. 71 1;/GJ Wardley 1.09 1;/GJ 
Headlesscross 1.14 Ji;fGJ 
Thorneyhill 1.42 1;/GJ 
Blindwells 1.17 1;/GJ 
. Roughcastle 0.97 1;/GJ 
Average 
Source: British Coal Scotland and British Coal Proofs of Evidence 
---- ---Daisy Hills and Marley Hill Opencast Public Inquiry 
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Diversity of fuel burning options and the ensuing shift away from coal 
to nuclear generation are more graphically portrayed in Figure 3.3. The 
Scottish Office has invested a tremendous generating surplus for the 
s.s.E.B. beyond the claimed maximum power demand of 5,791 Mwts (MMC t~eb 
......... 
Report~ s.s.E.B., Cmnd. 9869 para 2.12) and even beyond their 
extravagant strategic security requirement of 7,412 Mwts. The effect of 
this was that with Torness coming on stream it gave the s.s.E.B the 
opportunity to supplant coal generation with nuclear and other fuels, 
driving down the price of coal, Gas burn generation from Peterhead (640 
Mwts), in an arrangement with the Hydro Board, adds to the portfolio and 
further strengthens their bargaining position. Imported coal has not 
been a major strategic issue in Scotland because of the lack of large 
port coal-handling facilities. However, coking coal which was imported 
in large quantities for Ravenscraig now leaves the custom built 
Hunterston terminal available for imports to the power stations. All 
this created great difficulty for British Coal to hold the market for 
coal. 
Unlike the North East of England in 1991, the chemical specification of 
the majority of coal mined in Scotland is now confined to RANK 500-900 
(Appendix~). British Coal therefore, found little difficulty in 
meeting the coal-burning specification requirements of the s.s.E.B., 
directly supplanting deep mined coal with opencast output. An internal 
study by British Coal done in 1987 was shown to me by Calum Martin of 
the Marketing Department in Edinburgh. The study argues that the 
S.S.E.B. will be sourcing much more fuel than it can use and that the 
s.s.E.B. will have 20% over capacity by the end of the century. This in 
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part is a result of the S.S.E.B.'s contractual arrangements with British 
Gas to burn gas at 1.5 million tonnes coal equivalent (mtce) from the 
Miller field from 1992. British Coal's study projections shown in Table 
3.11 were based upon a 2 per cent increase in G.D.P., no oil burn and 
the de-commissioning of Hunterston 'A' with Torness unlikely to be on 
full capacity. 
The s.s.E.B. have indeed turned to other sources for generation in the 
1990's and demanded improvements in the price of coal. As we shall see, 
the long running High Court case in Edinburgh between the two boards was 
very much about security of markets for British Coal and flexibility of 
supply for the S.S.E.B. Given the imposition of a 20% nuclear burn upon 
the s.s.E.B. by the government they are unlikely to move much beyond 4 
million tonnes per year for the foreseeable future. British Coal 'buy 
in' coal from the private sector for disposal to customers as well as 
disposing of stockpiled coal from previous years. They, together with 
the s.s.E.B. and NIES add to and hold strategic stocks, but stocks 
remain high since the record stock levels of 3.3 million in July 1989 
(Longannet 2.26mt., Cockenzie 773,000, Kincardine 253,000](SSEB). Coal 
is often drawn by both the Power Generators and British Coal from 
existing stocks to meet a sudden upsurge in demand. This accounts for 
the differences between output in any one year and actual saleable 
disposals. Hence total sales at 7.2 million tonnes in 1987/88 were well 
above the total output of 5.97 million tonnes (Table 3.7). Coal stocks 
went to new industrial consumers such as the new pulp mill at Irvine and 
La Roche at Dalry, or, either stocking was taking place by S.S.E.B. 
(not NIES as coal shipped is coal bought). Up until 1988 there was a 
134 
market for coal production in Scotland, albeit a declining one. 
Increasingly, this market has been fed by opencast coal to the detriment 
of deep mined output, leveraged by commercial pressures contrived by the 
s.s.E.B. and financial controls from government upon British Coal to 
adopt a similar commercial path. 
The actual British Coal production delivered to the S.S.E.B. during the 
summer of 1989 averaged no more than 60,000 tonnes per week or some 1 
million tonnes per year over demand for stocking purposes. Unlike power 
stations, coal mine production, deep or opencast, does not adjust output 
downward to take account of the fine weather. Scottish opencast output 
has increased with the onset of the 10 - 15 million tonnes Coalburn site 
coming on stream. This more than compensates for the loss of Barony and 
Bilston Glen the majority of whose production went to ~industrial and 
domestic markets'. Scottish opencast sales in Table 3.8 totalled 4,040 
million tonnes against combined deep mine and opencast total sales of 
7.2 million, almost 1 million tonnes more than deep mine production in 
1987/88. Though over four million tonnes of opencast coal were accepted 
by industry and commerce not all of it is consumed immediately. 
Contracting markets set against continued levels of production have 
ensured that opencast can hold the markets by means of cost and 
accounting advantages over deep mines. However work by Kerevan and 
Saville, gaining access into the accountancy methods of British Coal in 
Scotland, have cast grave doubts over the financial rationale of 
expanding opencast production and drastically reducing deep mining for 
coal: 
1 q~ . d~ 
The financial state of the Scottish deep mines is not a 
'scientific fact' but is in part a self-fulfilling prophecy 
resulting from the peculiar accounting conventions imposed by 
British Coal. British Coal sells a total tonnage of coal to 
the SSEB at a series of list prices, but this transaction is 
independent of the individual deep and opencast mines. They 
in turn are allocated (by BC accountants) an internal "shadow" 
price for the coal they contribute to the total tonnage passed 
on to the SSEB. But this shadow price (which determines their 
revenue and their profit or loss) is an internal accounting 
fi~tion - it is not determined on the outside market by the 
SSEB. 
The 'price' of Longannet coal is arranged internally by 
British Coal itself. What British Coal sells to the SSEB is a 
total package not a series of individual pit outputs priced at 
different amounts on the open market. At the very least the 
short term closure of Scottish capacity has been happening on 
dubious grounds. 
Kerevan and Saville, 1988, Scottish Coalfields study, 
Summary, Para. 3.2.1. 
Table 3.9 graphically illustrates financial regulation of the coal 
industry in Scotland by British Coal management accountants. Opencast 
coal production received positive price discrimination by allocating it 
an arbitrary internal 'shadow' price credit above the average rating. 
Deep mines by contrast, were never allocated an internal 'shadow' price 
at the levels for opencast mined output but consistently placed in a 
position of increasing unviability. Kerevan and Saville found that the 
Scottish Area had been directed from London to allocate higher shadow 
prices for opencast output which always placed it in the higher tranche 
price paid by the SSEB of 191.00pGJ/tonne (169.3pGJ/tonne SSEB average). 
Further discrimination against deep mines existed by allocating them 
much lower proceeds down to sl.43GJ/tonne, making opencast look 
extremely profitable. This arbitrary added value to opencast gave 
justification to the expansion of opencast holding the markets and 
avoided embarrassing questions being asked while deep mined production 
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was curtailed and restructured. The once accepted self-evident ~truth' 
of opencast being super profitable remains extremely questionable, if 
not untenable. 
Market demands for opencast coal are driven as much by British Coal as 
the SSEB. However, the more ~lower cost, added value' opencast coal was 
produced, the larger the high cost tail of the deep mines in Scotland 
became. The ~sting• was that when that pit is closed those capital 
costs (assets) were written off. Justification for the continuation of 
such levels of opencast production appeared to have specific purposes. 
In the face of a declining market and stocking levels, the continued 
level of applications for opencast sites across Scotland meant that 
British Coal were increasing ~capital in the bank' with the corollary of 
increasing the attractiveness of the industry to private investors. It 
follows, that unless deep mines were developed to ~super pit' standards 
it is difficult to believe there would be a deep mine industry in 
Scotland. British Coal had at least one good reason for there would be 
-the ~west coast interconnector'. 
Anticipating permission from the government and the European Commission 
for a replacement for the west coast grid interconnector between 
Strathaven and Harker near Carlise is part of a strategy upon which both 
S.S.E.B. and British Coal were hoping to increase sales. 
We have been working for some months now to secure future 
contracts with distribution boards in the south and the 
Central Electricity Generating Board to supply them with 
electricity from Scottish coal. 
Donald Miller, quoted in the Scotsman 28/2/1988 
1.37 
The interconnector will almost double the current capacity from 850MW to 1600MW to sell 
electricity into the 'pooling arrangements' south of the border. British Coal claim that to 
make a reasonable return on exports, the S.S.E.B. had arranged with them to be supplied 
with opencast coal because the cost of deep mined coal would diminish S.S.E.B.'s profit 
margins. If this were correct then it means British Coal in striving to keep a market for coal 
are taking a reduction in profit margins themselves to pay for S.S.E.B.'s profits. In other 
words British Coal are subsidizing S.S.E.B. 
Disregarding the arbitrary accounting of British Coal, arrangements such as these raises 
questions over the viability of supplying opencast coal in different parts of the country to the 
electricity generators to generate locally or to generate for export. There would be little 
advantage in supplying the S.S.E.B. with opencast coal having average costs higher than the 
average costs of opencast coal across the border. Yet that is precisely what is happening 
under this 'export arrangement' between British Coal and S.S.E.B .. Table 3.10 shows us 
why. Even on these figures it would cost less for the English generators to buy North East 
opencast coal to generate electricity than to buy electricity from the S.S.E.B. even 
discounting transmission costs. 
Cockenzie power station has two 600MW generating sets one of which is geared to supply 
electricity across the border. These 'sets' exclusively bum coal of which at least 60% is 
opencast coal, mainly 'across the tracks' from Blindwells at £1.17 /GJ and Roughcastle at 
£0.97/GJ near Falkirk .. Taking an average of these two and discounting transport costs 
improves the average cost to Cockenzie to £1.07/GJ, still well above the North East 
average of ~l.OlGJ. We can only deduce that either British Coal are 
prepared to make a loss to keep the Cockenzie market or they have an 
arrangement whereby an element of discount on price exist for longer 
term supply that are not to the detriment of both parties. 
British Coal may well have their own strategy and agenda, but to a large 
extent this has been reconditioned by the commercialisation of the 
S.S.E.B., de facto acting as an instrument of the State, regulating the 
supply of coal. In the effort to maintain their market share British 
Coal sales to the s.s.E.B. have continually increased the proportion of 
opencast coal. The expansion of opencast coal through the financial 
regulation of their accountancy practices became an integral part of 
British Coal strategy to hold the market for coal while curtailing a 
major portion of the deep mine sector in Scotland. All this has brought 
into sharper focus the future structure of coal production in Scotland. 
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Part Three - A Strategy For Coal Production in Scotland? 
i. Opencast Coal in Court = 'The Best Laid Plans of Mice and Men• 
Control over the management of energy in Scotland spilled out into the 
High Court at Edinburgh. Backed by the Local Authorities, the NUM and 
the STUC, British Coal took the SSEB to court over 'contractual 
arrangements' to supply them with coal. Supported by a frenetic press 
in Scotland over this disagreement, a sense of urgency bordering on 
panic prevailed in the coal industry. The markets that they thought so 
secure and had depended upon for so long were to be completely 'untied'. 
British Coal had a great deal to lose. In stark terms, their 'New 
Strategy For Coal' in Scotland hinged upon 'keeping these markets 
alive'. However the s.S.E.B., considering they only had 'arrangements' 
with British Coal, wanted 'new contracts with new prices•. In rebuttal, 
British Coal stated that they had 'agreements' and not 'arrangements' 
with the s.s.E.B •• Behind the tussle, lay at stake the strategy of each 
organisation's 'commercial future•. The issues were not so much as who 
would win this battle of words, but to what extent British Coal would 
maintain a market for their coal and how much further could the s.s.E.B. 
reduce the cost of fuel sources it 'bought in'. While the outcome would 
be important for both industries it had profound implications for 
British Coal. Clearly, the larger the gap between their aspirations and 
the eventual outcome of implementing government directives on the coal 
industry as a commercial venture, the more untenable and unviable the 
commercial future for coal becomes. From within the court there arose 
valuable indications of British Coal's aspirations for that future. 
1!0 
The legal requirement for electricity generation in Scotland, for which 
the SSEB and Malcolm Rifkind as Secretary of State are responsible, has 
now been turned into a directive without the flexibility of previous 
years. Consequently, the S.S.E.B. arguments for cheaper sources of 
supply are set out in Section 4(a) and 4(b) of the Electricity 
(Scotland) Act 1979. In this it specifies the general duties of the two 
electricity boards(S.S.E.B. and Hydro) obliging them to: 
promote the use of all economical methods (of generation) 
and to secure as far as practicable --- the cheapening of 
supplies of electricity. 
The Scotsman 10/3/1988 
The use of this legislation was a most contentious issue. The Scotsman 
editorial of the day placed in context the SSEB's cynical use of the 
legislation and pointed out that British Coal as well as the s.s.E.B. 
had both chosen to operate in their own interests rather than that of 
the public since the advent of the Conservative government. 
They know they are placing on legislation a burden that it 
was not intended to carry. And they know, most clearly of 
all, that had the 1979 Act had the meaning which they now 
attach to it then they have both been neglecting their 
statutory responsibilities since at least 1982. 
The Scotsman 10/3/1988 
Bearing in mind that Miller was Deputy Chairman at the time of 
enactment, the legislation presented an opportunity, through a 
re-interpretation, to 'manage the energy industry' with a commercial 
perspective. This new agenda, clearly a response to government 
directives, ended past relationships and questioned the basis for new 
arrangements of supply. Their message to British Coal was stark. The 
agreements carried no legal weight in law and the S.S.E.B. were ending 
1 t1 
them. Moreover, they pointedly told British Coal of their intention to 
import coal as a substitute fuel source. 
If there is not an agreement whereby the Board (SSEB) is 
obliged to take its supplies of coal exclusively from 
British Coal then interim interdict cannot be granted. 
It must be an agreement in contractual terms, not expressions 
of intentions, not references of keeping faith with a concept 
which appears in other documents, but an enforceable obligation 
on the Board. 
Ranald Maclean Q.C. for S.S.E.B., Court of Session Edinburgh 
2/3/1988 
Alan Johnston Q.C. for British Coal, in seeking an interim interdict on 
the S.S.E.B., told Lord Prosser in the Court of Session in Edinburgh on 
the 2nd of March 1988, that if the s.s.E.B. were allowed to proceed as 
they now wished this would have 'catastrophic' effects on British. Coal 
in Scotland: 
1. The Scottish coal industry would be effectively destroyed with 
the loss of 3,500 miners' jobs 
2. The loss of Longannet power station would account for 2000 of those 
jobs 
3. The liability in respect of redundancy and similar payments would 
be about s28 million with serious consequences for the local 
economy. 
4. The other smaller mines which also supply Longannet would also be 
forced to close 
5. The s60 million development at Bilston Glen/Monktonhall aimed at 
meeting the future needs of Cockenzie would be cancelled. 
Alan Johnston Q.c. for British Coal, Court of Session Edinburgh 
2/3/1988 
There are some disturbing assertions here. Firstly, in light of 
subsequent deep mine closures it smacks of duplicity as British Coal 
knew their commercial strategy involved the loss of at least 2,000 jobs 
across the coalfield. Equally cynical was the use of the emotive issue 
of lost jobs to bolster the case when their aspirations and intentions 
1!2 
were material ones of new era mining with high tech ~super pits•. we 
had indications of this in the mention of the 560 million capital 
investment at Bilston Glen/ Monktonhall. What was most revealing is the 
omission of the future of opencast coal, the threat to that production 
was not a model on anyone's computer, despite providing over 60 per cent 
of saleable output to SSEB. The assumption must be that it had a 
strategic part to play in the commercialisation strategy of British 
Coal. 
Mr Ranald Maclean Q.C. for the SSEB brought us an insight into the 
unusual marketing approach of British Coal. In stating they were not 
objecting to the interim interdict by British Coal on the supply to 
Cockenzie until April let when that agreement expired, he went on: 
The difference between Cockenzie and Longannet was that 
the former had a formal agreement (until April 1st) and the 
latter had not. The dispute was whether there was an agreement 
that the SSEB would take supplies of coal exclusively for that 
power station from British Coal. 
SSEB Court of Session Edinburgh 2/3/1988 
Sensing the loss of investment and revenue, as well as the obvious 
reason that in the case of Longannet there was no obligation for the 
SSEB to take coal exclusively from BC for that power station, Mr 
Johnston posing as the M.D. of British Coal replied: 
Apparently, I have sunk these mines (such as Castlebridge) 
on speculation and must sit around with piles of coal sitting 
on the ground until my learned friend says graciously he would 
take some coal. If he says one tonne I will give him one tonne 
Alan Johnston for British Coal, Court of Session, Edinburgh 2/3/88 
The seriousness of lasing the market for coal and, consequently, the 
ability to create a private sector operation, can be measured by the 
1~3 
estimated loss of revenue. In the study done by the Fraser of Allander 
Institute for Fife Regional Council (March 1988) it found that beside 
the loss of 3,227 jobs in the Scottish economy, the closure of Longannet 
would reduce Scottish output by ~95.3 million. Loss of such revenue, 
not to mention investment, would seriously damage British Coal's 
strategy of developing the industry as an attractive proposition for 
private investment. Therefore, with the S.S.E.B. being the largest 
burner of coal in Scotland, the securing of that market was an 
imperative for British coal. 
Lord Prosser reserved judgement but granted an interim interdict in 
favour of British Coal on the 5th of March 1988. After some ministerial 
pressure was applied both sides sought to improve their credibility with 
the public as part of the longer term effort to become attractive 
enterprises. On appeal by British Coal, Lord Davidson later lifted the 
court order for a three month negotiation period which saw each side 
state its position and true commercial intent more clearly: 
We need to have credibility with investors. 
Donald Miller Chairman S.S.E.B., Scotsman 10/3/1989 
Surely it is much better to have this whole matter settled 
for a long time ahead and described in a prospectus so that 
potential investors know exactly where they stand 
British Coal, quoted in The Scotsman 10/3/1989 
In that court room drama so removed from the life of mining the anxiety 
shown by British Coal indicated how much importance they placed upon 
their 'super pit' strategy in Scotland. The best part of s24 million 
had already been written down for payment for 3,500 men from pit 
closures; the s60 million 'golden mile' at Bilston Glen/Monktonhall was 
developed for the future, along with other large investment. Opencast 
coal was mentioned only in terms of overall production. Even though its 
output has been maintained deep mines at Bilston Glen, Barony, Seafield 
and Monktonhall were to 'go to the wall' for reconstruction. The 
outcome to the litigation proved little other than SSEB (Scottish Power) 
had monopoly powers in a declining market for coal. Irrespective of 
British Coal's moral victory, their strategic intentions for a new era 
in coal mining have been pursued but remain unfulfilled. 
ii lnyestment Hibernation : The Priyatisation Prescription 
Following the High Court wrangle over coal supply in Edinburgh, it became more clear that 
a strategy for commercialisation of coal production in Scotland existed where opencast was 
fundamental in realising the aims of British Coal and the Conservative Government. The 
intention was to achieve this through a complex process of balancing the judicious 
investment of technology allied to the rationalisation of deep mine production, at the same 
time, supplanting the lost production with opencast coal output to maintain what was a 
decreasing market. Industrial relations objectives (Fife Regional Council, 1988, para. 2.2), 
called for a reliable, flexible, efficient young workforce in the Scottish mines. The final 
intent was to have the industry 'dressed' for private ownership, with high-tech deep mines 
similar to the Wheeler Model (1986) and an attractive 'bank' of opencast sites. 
Experience has shown new technology can be an instrument of change in mining by 
effecting changes in production practices and behaviour. High -tech specialised mining 
methods extending and intensifying the working week are deemed the necessary requirement 
to attract private investors (Fine, 1990, p.180). Feickert (1979) has argued that the basis of 
introducing new technology is grounded in managerial philosophies which are centred on 
winning control of work processes from workers. More specifically to mining, FIDO the 
face monitoring system, and MINOS a standardised hierarchical computer system, provide 
management with that very ability to control the production of coal (Winterton 1985, 1988). 
Wilkinson suggests that the introduction of such as MINOS has immediate implications for 
the control of coal production : 
With automation under MINOS the threat to job control is 
obvious. I do not have the evidence to demonstrate that 
undermining the central position of faceworkers in coal 
getting is the central motivation for MINOS, but certainly 
this could be the consequence 
Wikinson !L (1983). 
The expansion of opencast mining has allowed the phasing in of a combination of these 
concepts towards a new model of mining in Scotland. However, it would appear that there 
were subtle differences in the introduction underground of new technology and investment 
in new infrastructure into Scottish pits. Some investment was placed directly, but the 
manner in which other investment was introduced gives cause for concern. How far did 
opencast mining in itself facilitate the introduction of investment/technology? In Scotland it 
has not just replaced deep mined production per se but in a determined and measured 
way. 
Of all the pits that have closed in the 1980's the only ones to receive major investment have 
been close to the three super pits of Longannet, Monktonhall and Frances. Those that were 
geographically distant from the super pits such as Barony and Polkemmet, have not. 
The crucial factors in this process were: 
1. Striking a balance during installation of new investment 
between closure of deep mines and loss of tonnage whilst 
increasing opencast coal output "to keep the markets alive". 
2. Most importantly, this installation of investment in pits 
that were to be closed was linked, to the future as British Coal 
saw it, of three 'super pits'- Longannet, Monktonhall and 
Frances Collieries 
3. The three 'super pits' have each themselves received substantial 
amounts of investment both direct and indirect. 
Investment into opencast infrastructure in Strathclyde Region has been of breathtaking 
intensity (Appendix 3.). Incorporating Barony/Killoch colliery washer, 'privatised' in 1988 
for the use of opencast coal output, open cast mining in the west of Scotland is itself of 
'super pit' proportions. The overall result for management are greater control and flexibility 
in working methods and an increase in cost effectiveness. This is reflected by the current 
director of the Peripheral Coalfield Areas, Albert Wheeler, in his model of the ideal colliery: 
Many capital intensive industries have to operate their 
plant over the full seven days to reduce the capital charges 
on the unit of production to a minimum. ---- A reduction in 
the number of men to cover for absence by 50% would save 70 
men on books. The shaft should be available to wind material 
for 23 hours a day six days a week and 48 weeks of the year. 
Wheeler~ (1986). 
The cost of deep mine production in many mines in Scotland has often been, on British 
Coal's figures, prohibitively higher than the national average. 
Despite government directives on 'taking out' production costing more 
than ~1.65GJ (GigaJoule) this did not stop the flows of investment into 
a number of Scottish pits during the 1980's. Ironically, deep mines 
in the North East of England in comparison, operating much more 
efficiently, were starved of investment. The logic at first sight begs 
belief, but equally it demands answers to the pursuance of such a 
strategy. There are four possible approaches or scenarios to its 
solution: the first the Scottish NUM's perception, the second British 
Coal's version of events, opencast as a total replacement for deep 
mined production, and finally, the hibernation investment approach. 
The Scottish NUM Perception: 
In Scotland there was not enough efficient deep mined production to 
carry the industry through the period of pressure from the PGI for lower 
cost coal contracts. Geological difficulties combined with the loss of 
markets to deny further production at many pits. In a straightforward 
swap, opencast coal was expanded, but not fast enough, to supplant all 
the deep mine output that needed to be 'taken out•. Therefore, some 
high cost deep mine production had to 'carried' for strategic as well as 
'political' reasons. Some attempts were made to improve the situation 
at these pits through capital investment. The investment plans for 
Scottish pits, high cost and otherwise were already laid down in the 
1950 Plan for Coal (Halliday 1990) and continued without much regard to 
commercial disciplines. This investment once committed had to be 
completed at least to a certain stage and opencast was supported as 'a 
necessary evil' (Clarke CCC, 23/2/88) to ensure that investment came to 
fruition. The opencast executive were working hard to create the 
opportunity of new output from opencast mines (Pace Frances Project and 
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Coalburn). Unfortunately, when this came on stream it either reduced 
the attractiveness of completing the investment in pits or, if completed 
as in Bilston Glen /Monktonhall, made deep mine production leas viable 
because of immediate benefits from lower cost opencast coal. Pits were 
closed even with investment in them to cut the losses to the Coalfield. 
In short, the State's agenda for the coal industry had forced British 
Coal to take an instrumental short term view of supplying the immediate 
needs of the PGI with opencast coal and closing higher cost deep mine 
production. 
Jim Ellison 
The motives for responding to pressure from the PGI would be credible as 
much as they are convenient to British Coal's strategy, but this hardly 
explains the painfully slow death of some production units. certainly, 
there is an argument that some pits had to be 'carried', but not wholly 
for the purpose of waiting until there was sufficient opencast 
production on stream to supplant the higher cost deep mine coal. 
British Coal have admitted that it had a strategy of investment for 
Scottish deep mines, tactically misleading the public saying that it was 
partly financed from opencast revenue in Scotland (Kerevan and Saville 
1988, para.3.2.5). Investment into deep mines can be, and, from 
personal experience, has historically been, shut down within 24 hours. 
Persisting with high levels of capital investment in deep mines that 
were to be 'taken out' whilst having a determined approach to increasing 
the level of opencast coal, even though it may not be expanded fast 
enough, denies the financial objectives of the '1985 New Strategy for 
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Coal'. It is more probable that the deep mines could not be taken out 
because the capital investment programme was not sufficiently complete. 
It would appear as soon as this was achieved they were closed once 
sufficient opencast production to replace them (Table 3.1, 3.2) (Pace 
Monktonhall/Bilston Glen/Blindwells opencast site). British Coal in 
Scotland driven by the government, may have short term aims but they 
appear to be looking also to the future. 
British Coal's Version/Scenario 
This is based upon the British Coal's assertion of cross-subsidization 
of deep mine investment with opencast coal production revenue. The role 
of opencast is used a financial prop to deep mines in Scotland by 
providing investment to introduce new technology and thereby improve 
production. 
This (opencast) tonnage generated profits to support deep 
mines both by giving them time to improve productivity 
and by helping to finance investment. In addition 2.4 
million tonnes of opencast coal were produced by British 
Coal in Scotland at a profit of 650 million. 
British Coal, Press Release 2373, 14/12/1987 
One assertion is that deep mines will remain open with the support of 
opencast until a certain level of efficiency is reached. Following the 
logic of this, deep mines upon reaching this level of efficiency will 
continue to be supported by opencast revenues providing some future 
investment finance. 
Jim Ellison 
There are shortcomings in this approach. Not least the arbitrary and 
dubious accounting practice of allocating higher ~shadow' prices to 
opencast output and lower than average ·shadow' prices to deep mined 
output. It paints an idealised picture of coal production where deep 
mine closures are overcome by the altruistic actions of the opencaet 
sector. Evidence from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 contradict this view. 
Figures show in a number of years there has been direct replacement of 
deep mine production by opencast output. Several pits may have had time 
to improve productivity but in each case the workforce have complained 
of the manner in which these pits have been operated and then made 
redundant. The myth of cross-subsidization was not only dispelled by 
this direct supplanting of deep mine output but as we shall learn later 
by British Coal's own policy regulations. Then again, what happens to 
opencast mining production once deep mines become efficient? Does it 
retire into the former strategic role as a supplement to deep mine 
production? 
Irrespective of what British Coal would have us believe, increased 
levels of deep mine production combined with current levels of opencast 
means the market would be over-supplied in the declining market for coal 
in Scotland. They were aware at the time of their press release of the 
impending reduction in the market for coal because Torness nuclear power 
station was about to come on stream. Finally, but moat importantly if 
British Coal's statement was correct then why has substantial deep 
mine production subsequently been made redundant in Scotland with an 
equally generous amount of investment hibernating within it? This 
negates the idea that British Coal was "giving them time to improve 
productivity" as the investment has hardly been used and in moat cases 
never. 
Open cast as f! Total Replacement 
Opencast mining production from any one site is of a short time scale, between one and five 
years, and compared to deep mine production has a limited life span. This is quite adequate 
in a policy of temporary full replacement or as a strategic support in coal production. 
Arguably therefore, the markets for coal can't solely rely on opencast output in the long term, 
but then nor do Scottish Power have to depend at all on coal for their fuel needs. However, 
for a policy of total replacement must need a continuity of production where the future 
output is well assured. It is extremely doubtful that even the planning system in Scotland 
would tolerate the levels of opencast required to sustain coal production required by the 
current market (6 million tonnes) without calling in applications for public inquiry. 
Consider two problems with this approach: 
If they did have enough opencast coal to meet the markets then why didn't they shut the pits 
earlier-
Because the capital investment was not in place and political expediency demanded the 
retention of the special relationship with the NUM leadership and the Local Authorities. 
If they did not have enough opencast coal to replace deep mine output then why invest large 
amounts of capital into production units which for a long time were woefully short of British 
Coal's financial criterion and were targeted for closure? 
Jim Ellison, Investment Hibernation Approach/Scenario: 
This argument draws upon elements of truth in both the previous 
approaches. The emphasis is on the probable intentions of British Coal, 
having developed new deep mine capacity then left it dormant for a new 
era of mining, rather than attempting to meet the immediate needs of the 
market. 
Opencast coal output, by 'holding the markets' during this process, 
played a strategic role in to allow a 'once and for all change' 
through new investment to develop three 'super pits'. These super pits, 
drawing upon previous capital investment (and reserves) often 
strategically placed in redundant pits in their locale, were to allow 
the development of new technology and re-defined working practices 
through organisational restructuring in readiness for a private coal 
industry. one distinctive feature of this investment was that it had 
been placed in production units that have since been closed but are 
within the coal 'take' of the three super pits (Figs.J.+-3·7• Appendix 
4r.·> Every one of the production units in Scotland has received capital 
investment direct from London, distinct from the annual area funding for 
production and maintenance. Some of this investment has been fairly 
substantial. 
British Coal aimed for a future for deep mining in Scotland of a form 
not dissimilar from the Wheeler Plan, with continued levels of 
opencast output based upon an optimistic view of the market for coal 
(Table 3.11). For that to happen it needed substantial capital 
investment, reconstitution of working practices and processes within a 
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new regime of manangement. This could not be put into action under 
past production processes and practice as it clashed with corporatist 
ways of producing coal. So what we have seen is the closure of 
production units with capital investment hibernating inside the 
redundant production units, adjacent to proposed 'super pits'. The 
'super pits' are then re-opened, or as in the case of Longannet 
rationalised and threatened with closure, following the institution of 
new working practices ready for the dawn of a new era in mining. 
Moreover, given such a mission the NUM leadership could easily identify 
with it as a future for Scottish mining and, did so. The problem now is 
that there is no market for the coal from all three 'super pits•, and, 
opencast coal production; ultimately, it may be too late to retrieve 
much of the investment hibernating in those mines.(end) 
One issue arising from the restructuring process which is difficult for 
British Coal to explain away has been the length of time they have kept 
nine inefficient units open since the 1984/85 strike until 1987/88 when 
these were more than halved to 4 operative mines. Experience of deep 
mining in Scotland shows that once investment was being placed the 
miners have endured a painfully long process of uncertainty through 
closure of sections in pits and pits themselves. Typical in the process 
of investment and rationalisation preceeding closure was that undertaken 
in the Lothian region: 
Production will be continued at Bilston Glen Colliery by 
concentrating on fewer faces and ultimately from one horizon. 
Monktonhall Colliery will cease to be a production unit and 
operations will be confined to the development of the Peacock 
and Parrot seams, a link roadway will be driven to interconnect 
Monktonhall and Bilston Glen. At the completion of this 
programme, all coal produced in the Lothians will be raised to 
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the surface and prepared for market at Bilston Glen. 
British Coal Press Release 3/10/1986 
This was aligned to the placement of capital investment and the 
expansion of opencast coming on stream to replace deep mine output. In 
any event there has been a crossover point of capital investment and 
opencast coal supplanting the coal production from deep mine unit 
closure. For the State and British Coal instituting capital investment 
in new technology and restructuring in failing pits, in terms of return 
on capital, can only make sense when new flexible working practices are 
invoked. Even with a co-operative NUM leadership, that cannot be 
totally achieved without first making the pit and the workforce 
redundant, and then re-starting with a new regime and working practices, 
selectively drawing men from the 'pool of labour'. Patently, such 
action allows management to re-constitute the labour and production 
process in line with current British Coal thinking. The end product 
will be the erosion of miners' control in the production process and the 
installation of management controlled systems. This is quite different 
to another approach to capital investment in new technology but with a 
similar end in mind: 
The pattern of job contraction due to new technology is 
unevenly spread between the areas. As 'super pits' are 
created with the MINOS facility other pits will be classed 
as uneconomic, just as occurred under mechanisation 
Burns et al., P.l8 The Miners and New Technology, 
IRJ Vol. 14, No.4. 
Burns et al's. description of new technology investment differs from the 
hibernation investment as here the intention was to create 'super pits• 
with direct capital investment, such as in the Selby Coalfield. The 
1.60 
pattern of investment hibernation is one where indirect capital 
investment was placed in adjacent production units together with 
additional direct capital investment. The question of writing off 
capital invested at these former units is difficult to assess. Some 
knowledge of costs of closure has been is given by Glyn(l985), Davies 
and Metcalf(l984) and Kerevin and Saville(l985) but it is likely that 
the 'super pits' in Scotland will make a capital gain by not picking up 
the tab. While a process of judicious investment was taking place 
during the run-down of deep mine capacity, opencast production was 
effectively 'holding the markets'. Intended as a strategic facilitator 
to a new era in mining, opencast coal has had undoubted additional 
utility in supplanting reputedly higher cost deep mine production to 
'keep the markets alive' for 'Scottish Coal' 
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iii The New Era f1ll:. !d!Jl!. in Scotland? 
With the emphasis altered from output led targets to ones of financial efficiency the 
operational process and culture within British Coal has markedly changed. We have shown 
that the consequences of meeting financial targets alone has meant a reduction in production 
units and manpower in all deep mine units in Scotland. Despite this reduction in capacity, 
substantial amounts of capital investment in the Scottish Coalfield have taken place during 
the last ten years. During the ascendency of open cast production much of the capital 
investment has been in pits that have since been made redundant. More telling from Table 
3.14 is that these capital investment resources are within reach of existing production units at 
Longannet, Frances and Monktonhall which in turn are being developed into 'super pits'. In 
the meantime opencast output is holding the markets for the new era in mining. Evidence 
supporting this process is fairly convincing and comes from a reliable source: 
If deep mining goes what do we do with all the future 
opencast? To keep the markets alive, to keep Cockenzie 
burning coal we agreed to some of these particular 
developments in the east side of the country. We went 
along with it, in other words I will sum it up as a 
necessary evil. 
Eric Clarke CCC Edinburgh 23-26 February 1988 p.N7 
In debate with Eric Clarke on the same day he reiterated the point that 'to keep the markets 
alive when deep mining goes' is the reason the Scottish NUM agreed to opencast expansion 
as 'a necessary evil' for a new era in coal mining. To find the reason why they needed "to 
keep the markets alive" we look to the Scottish Area draft budget projection for 
Jb~ 
1985/86 given by British Coal to The Scotsman which confirmed the 
nature of coal production in the next century: 
Production unite in the twenty first century will include 
the Francie Seafield complex, the Longannet mines, and 
Monktonhall/Bilston Glen. 
Scotsman: 30/11/84 
And Eric Clarke knew that the 'super pits' were on the agenda with 
opencaet "keeping the markets alive" for them: 
The Francie in Fife will go up from 70 miners to 1300. 
Monktonhall has the potential for 700 workers and there are 
still massive coal reserves throughout Scotland. We may end 
up negotiating with Rio Tinto Zinc or Anglo American, but we 
will be doing our damndest for our members and the mining 
industry. 
Observer Scotland, 23rd of October 1988 
Taking the investment at Longannet and ita workforce increased on Eric 
Clarke's lines to 1500, we end up with a manpower figure of 3,500 in the 
Scottish coalfield. This would suggest an output of around 3.8 to 4.5 
million tonnes using manpower/output ratios. Clarke's statement was 
not made without knowledge of the strategy for the future of the 
Scottish coal industry, being said with conviction and inferring a 
certain inevitability in a future privatieed coal industry. The 
indication of the future privatisation strategy came from a report on 
energy by the body with the most influence in the government, the Adam 
Smith Institute: 
Transfer of new capacity: Another strategy for dealing with 
the uneconomic areas would be to break them down even further. 
For example, new pits under construction or planned by the 
N.C.B. might be sold as individual units or as small batches to 
single or multiple buyers. Indeed, the initial reform measures 
might require this, confining all such future developments of new 
capacity to the private sector. 
Adam Smith Institute The omega Report, Energy Policy, P.37. 
16 ~1 
Table 3.11 
OUTPUT PROJECTIONS FOR THE SCOTTISH COALFIELD 
1988/89 1989/90, 1995/6 2000 
million 4.8 3.8 4.7 6.9 
tonnes saleable 
Source: British Coal Scotland 
Table 3.12 
COLLLIERIES, OUTPUT, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS 1984 and 1990 
Area 
1984 
SCOT. 
N.E. 
Pits Output Employed Investment 
m.t. mt lim 
10 5.30 
16 12.33 
13831 
23482 
70 
27 
Pits 
1990 
3 
6 
output Employed Employed 
m.t. minimum maximum 
3.68 
6. 71 
3408 
4588 
6431 
12680 
Source: Jon Winterton and Ruth Winterton 1989,"Coal Crisis and Conflict" 
Table 3.13 
COMPARATIVE PROJECTIONS FOR THE SCOTTISH COALFIELD 1990 - 1995 
Clarke 
Wintertons 
Martin(BC) 
Production 
3.8 to 4.5# 
3.68* 
3.8 to 4.7 
Employed 
3,500 
3,408** 
3,500# 
N.B. * = at 1990 ** = minimum at 1990 # = estimated at 1993 levels in 
-----line with the Frances development. 
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Under this strategy, the investment and new capital dormant and 
~hibernating' in the coalfield would be transferred or 'franchised' to 
the private sector to continue capital developments and resources 
~acquired' from redundant unite by Monktonhall, Francie and Longannet. 
Calum Martin recently retired from British Coal Scotland having served 
as a projects manager and marketing manager. During the interview with 
him I was allowed to see the red contracts book with production 
projections made for the Scottish Coalfield . This I was informed was 
the most accurate assessment they had of future output trends in 
Scotland and are detailed in Table 3.11. 
The figures confirm Clarke's pronouncements and British Coal's statement 
for three ~super pits' in the 1990's. With a constrained market in 
Scotland these high-tech production units are intended to match world 
coal prices. With some of the coal being low sulphur it is envisaged as 
a competitive premium export value coal on world markets. In Table 
3.12, Winterton's figures in 1990 suggest that British Coal projections 
take a similar view. Unfortunately, like many comparative projections 
taken from British Coal, it makes no allowance for the role of opencast 
mining by burying the figures in the total output. For our current 
purpose though it is useful as a comparative measure of the future of 
the industry in Scotland if we use it with the projections from another 
source in British Coal such as Calum Martin. We then have projections 
from British Coal, the Scottish Area NUM leadership, who have been in 
the confidence of British Coal management, and a leading academic on 
investment and technology in the coal industry. 
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Table 3.14 
INVESTMENT IN BRITISH COAL SCOTTISH AREA MINES 1985 to 1989 
Colliery Nearest 'Super Pit' Investment ~ million 
castlebridge Longan net 60.2 (1986 prices) 
Polmaise Longannet 15.8 (1986 prices) 
Kinniel Longannet 20.0 (1981 prices) 
Solsgirth Longannet 20.0 (1986 prices) 
Bilston Glen Monktonhall 60.0 (1987 prices) 
Seafield Frances 100.0 (1989 prices) 
Killoch Washer Opencast 10.0 (1987 prices) 
/Ancillary 
Opencast Opencast 20.0 (1986 prices) 
TOTAL 1;306.0 million 
Source: British Coal, NUM Scottish Area, Strathclyde Regional Council. 
N.B. 'Additional Sources' of some li100 million pound have been added to 
Opencast infrastructure and the Frances Project making li406min. 
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Taking a benchmark of 1990-95 in Table 3.13, at a time when the Frances 
project is said to have taken off, and using a comparative assessment of 
the three projections for employment/production, we find remarkable 
similarities between Jon Winterton and Calum Martin and Eric Clarke's 
figures. The figure for the year 2000 from Calum Martin suggests that 
investment hibernation was at the very least "a model on the computer". 
The operational imperative of these 'super pits' is that capital 
resources are effectively maximised, preferably round the clock. 
Ideally, this means that deep mine output would provide the vast 
majority of the total production. Of course the issue arises for 
British Coal of over capacity; all the deep mine capital investment 
would be vastly underutilized unless opencast coal provides a smaller 
proportion of the overall tonnage. 
If we want further evidence of the foregoing then Table 3.14 makes a 
telling contribution. The table shows the investment for capital 
projects at collieries adjacent to the three 'super pits•. The contrast 
with investment in previous years is quite stark. Investment per head 
(sOOO's) at 10.9 in Scotland over seven years to 1983 was the lowest in 
all the British Coalfields (Labour Research Sept.1983). The Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission Report(·j9S3 P.65) confirms that with a capital 
expenditure of 6200 million, between the years 1974/75 to 1982/83, 
Scotland had the lowest absolute investment of any area; to confirm this 
Kerevin and Saville reported in 1985 that: 
Only four investment projects worth 51 million were in 
operation in Scotland in 1982/83. Scottish capacity has 
been cut by 40% since 1974, as against all areas average 
of 25%. 
Kerevin and Saville P.109, The Case for Scottish Coal, Jan. 1985 
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However since the inception ofthe 1985 New Strategy for Coal the turnaround is fairly 
dramatic. The same amount as spent in the previous ten years has been delivered in less than 
half the time. Capital investment, without the annual area investment outlined in Table 3 .12, 
is available to the 'super pits' within a short space of time. 
All but Castlebridge have been made redundant. It is a special piece in the intended 
Longannet/ Polmaise/Kincardine investment jigsaw and this along with the development of 
the other pits are illustrated in Figures 3.4 to 3.7. Additional investment of £60 million at 
the Frances Project development of a combined drift mine and opencast coal extraction at 
Borland, near Kircaldy to mine the Frances/Seafield/Michael reserves should have 
commenced in Autumn 1989. Production is meant to commence sometime after 1993 (Fife 
Regional Council Report into the Francis Project). 
Remarkably, in the second half of the 1980's capital investment in reconstruction and new 
technology had risen to at least £406 million. Such a commitment to a new era in coal is 
quite convincing. It is very easy to explain closures directly as due to a contracting market, 
but extremely difficult to explain why you are injecting £406 million into the industry of 
which £346 million is being pumped into the deep mines. The Wheeler Plan had already 
been instituted, in part, at Longannet where "the objective for the colliery is to produce low 
cost high volume coal"(Wheeler P.158). 
All across this period and in apparent piecemeal fashion we heard reports of large amounts 
of investment in every pit in Scotland yet the information from the men in the pits told a 
somewhat different future. The investment was going into the mines but management were 
managing a closure programme. Upon further investigation, the evidence for hibernation of 
investment of capital projects for restructuring the production process and workplace 
practices in the Scottish coalfield became more plausible and eventually compelling. The 
fact that British Coal's objectives are not yet fully realised is another matter. The State's 
ideological approach to energy provision, electricity and coal, has meant the vitual abortion 
of British Coal's strategy for a new era in coal. that now lies firmly with opencast coal 
mmmg. 
The attractiveness of opencast coal is not limited to its availability as a cost cutting 
replacement in terms of production and manpower, but also as a facilitator for radical change 
in deep mining. It has been a long time since the overtures of Major Braithwaite in the 
House of Commons on the sterling qualities of opencast coal; this has had its resonance in 
the 1980's with the new captain of the coalfields in the north of Britain -- Albert Wheeler 
and the new era of opencast mining in Scotland. 
iv. Investment Hibernation- From Theory to Practice 
The 1985 New Strategy for Coal, opencast coal mining, investment hibernation, new 
technology and privatisation are all terms synonymous with the commercialisation of the 
energy industry in Scotland. The rationale for this, which epitomises British Coal and 
Government ideology, has its origins in United States mining work practices and processes. 
Protagonists of U.S. mining techniques have made a dramatic impact in the coal industry 
here. One such landmark in British Coal's new strategy for coal production came with the 
presentation of a keynote address to the Annual Conference of the Institution of Mining 
Engineers in Edinburgh on 15th May 1986 by Albert Wheeler. "Frontiers Forward - Colliery 
Production and Productivity" is a zealous re-construction of a model super pit, such as the 
attempt at Longannet and the proposed ones ofMonktonhall and Frances, to produce coal at 
£1.00/GJ from a one currently producing coal(profitably) at £1.437/GJ. It has been applied 
in refined form across the British Coalfields. The obsession with the subject matter is 
graphic. The paper focuses on minimising manpower and maximizing production, removing 
current regulations, reshaping attitudes and re-distributing tasks: 
The long term aim is to generate all investment monies from 
current earnings and invest that capital where it can produce 
the best returns. In particular the Board has decided that 
investment in new or additional capacity must produce coal at 
a cost of less than £1.00/GJ. 
This paper examines the frontiers to be crossed to ...... . 
produce coal at the same cost, that is £1.00G/J 
Albert Wheeler Edinburgh 15/5/1986 para ll 
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This zealous approach to maximising coal production has the ability to 
be refined according to the geopolitical landscape of each area and 
colliery. 
Using the physical factors for that colliery it will examine 
the changes that would be necessary to achieve that objective 
(reducing costs to ~l.OOG/J) and identify the frontiers that 
now prevent the industry from achieving those objectives. 
Albert Wheeler Para. 1. 
Clearly, one of those 'frontiers' in the maximisation of production 
would be manning levels: 
Maximum use would have to be made of the installed capacity 
and coalfaces. Manpower would have to be reduced below what 
would now be acceptable. 
Albert Wheeler, para. ~ 
In Scotland the strategy to achieve those 'objectives' entailed the use 
of opencast coal output 'keeping the market alive' whilst the 
investment, in large part, hibernated in deep mines adjacent to the 
proposed super pits, or, in the super pits themselves. There is a 
subtle but distinct difference between a mothballed pit and investment 
hibernated in a pit. In a mothballed pit the existing production and 
infrastructure, with or without additional investment, is temporarily 
redundant, but kept under care and maintenance. Investment hibernated 
in a pit is there by design; the pit, being adjacent to the proposed 
super pit, is then closed or, if the investment is to be the super pit 
itself, mothballed. Investment is, nevertheless, still hibernating in 
that mothballed super pit. However, there is in Scotland a combination 
of both investment hibernated at an adjacent pit and in the proposed 
super pit itself. The strategic 'objective' was to make the pits and 
the coalfield an attractive proposition for private investors with the 
171 
potential retrieval of a lucrative capital gain already in place at the taxpayers' expense. This 
potential gain is multi-faceted and cannot be overstated. Besides the capital investment, 
much of which can be used again, in many situations they would not be bearing the 
substantial cost of 'winning out' the access to the coal reserves which in themselves provide 
substantial revenue. 
Wheeler talked openly about 'changing men's attitudes', specifically on a colliery to colliery 
basis, to achieve desired results (Para.6,9,11.). With Longannet now on a shift pattern 
advocated by Wheeler, after being identified as amenable to change, the employees that start 
at the other two super pits will be signing contracts with similar shift patterns to Longannet 
(Kerevan and Saville 1988, para. 3.3.2.). It is an additional advantage, in terms of industrial 
relations, that in mothballing the two pits kills off the existing working practices and creates 
new ones when the super pit is re-opened. All the new employees would be re-employed on 
new contracts with new working practices according to the needs of each pit, refined on the 
Wheeler model. If that investment is in place then it is a distinct possibility that production 
from these pits could take place at profitable levels, though perhaps not as profitable as 
opencast coal under current legislative practices of the Mines and Quarries Act. Despite 
being mothballed with hibernated investment, it is hard to deny accountancy practices may 
determine production developed at these 'super pits' could take the place of opencast coal. In 
this respect however, it is worth referring to the letter from Sir Robert Haslam, Chairman of 
British Coal to Gerry Steinberg M.P. (Appendix 5): 
f7Z-
If I may refer you to Table 4.5, page 35 of the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission report on the investment programme of 
British Coal Corporation, you will see that the operating cost 
of incremental tonnage for three specific projects at three 
collieries was well below £1/GJ, and this is reasonably 
typical of the cost of output obtained by capital investment. 
The marginal cost of additional incremental output from our 
continuing collieries will, indeed, generally be lower than 
the average cost from new opencast sites - although not by a 
large margin. 
Sir Robert Haslem. Chairman of British Coal to 
~ Steinberg M. ~ 18th April 1989 
In 1989 the average cost of coal produced from opencast sites in 
Scotland at £1.12/GJ was higher than the national average of opencast at £1.02/GJ and the 
opencast average cost of £1.01/GJ in the North East of England (Table 3.10). Taking 
Haslem's assertion, and bearing in mind their arbitrary accountancy practice, there should 
few reasons for the hibernated investment not to come on stream at Frances and 
Monktonhall and replace opencast coal - apart from continuing the hibernation of this 
investment. Indeed it would seem equally hard to deny that, in addition to being stored in 
readiness for private investors, they are being kept in mothballs until the repeal of what 
Wheeler saw as 'frontiers' in the Mines and Quarries Act. Drawn from U.S. models of 
production such de-regulation carries inherent threats to safety standards if applied across 
the board in British pits. However, for British Coal, the need to reduce unit operating costs, 
maximising production and minimising manpower and a repeal of these 'frontiers' are 
synonomous with The 1985 New Strategy for Coal, and privatisation ofthe industry. 
British Coal in meeting their aspirations and intentions have taken distinctive approaches to 
each of the three super pits in Scotland. Longannet has maintained production and is already 
utilizing hibernated investment from other redundant pits as well as receiving direct capital 
investment. Frances and Monktonhall, both have combined elements of hibernated 
investment while they are mothballed. Practices of 'holing' into workings of pits previously 
closed and retrieving reserves using existing access roadways comes from personal 
experience: Harraton into Lambton colliery, Lady Park Drift and Ravensworth Shop Pit, 
Boldon into Hilton colliery, all in the North East area. Much ofthis has been confirmed by 
mining engineers. Halliday (1990), from a mining engineer's perspective, views 
'amalgamations' as natural rationalisation of failed engineering projects. Normally, this 
would be acceptable to some extent if the investment were to continue to accrue to British 
Coal, but that is not the case. Evidence of hibernation investment in two of the three super 
pits is re-inforced by a letter from Billy Etherington, General Secretary of the NUM Durham 
MechanicsAppendix 6), referring to information recieved from Adam Smith, the NUM 
Mining Engineer in Scotland. For evidence on Longannet see section viii. 
I questioned (Adam Smith) about the position at Monktonhall 
and Francis and the position is as follows: 
1) Monktonball: The workings that were in operation in 
conjunction with Bilston Glen have been physically sealed 
off. However the drivages towards Musselbrougb basin are 
intact and all that is required to begin operations is for 
equipment to be placed on a face line. These roadways are 
all being maintained, the mine being kept free of water 
and both shafts are in proper working order. This would 
possibly explain the light that we saw on our way home 
when we were at the C.C. Conference two years ago. 
2) The Frances Mine: All the old workings at the Francis 
mine have been sealed off, as bas the connection with the 
Seafield mine. There are drivages out into the new reserves 
somewhat similar to Monktonhall but there is no actual face 
line constructed. It would be necessary to drive face 
lines but the roadways are being kept maintained as are the 
shafts, and it is also envisaged, as you were quite rightly 
informed, that a drift is to be put in intercepting with the 
shaft area to gain direct access to these development roadways. 
(The Frances Project-6100 million) 
It would seem that the information you had was somewhere near 
being correct and it is obvious that these two units are in fact 
being properly mothballed so that they can start production 
within a relatively short time. 
Letter, Billy Etherington, General Secratary, Durham Mechanics to 
to Jim Ellison, 11th June 1990 (Appendix ~ 
Since this letter it has been confirmed by the former General Secretary 
of Bilston Glen Lodge, Jackie Aitchieson, that although Bilston Glen's 
substantial coal reserves through the 'golden mile' of investment are 
sealed off from Monktonhall, they are in fact only 300 metres away and 
can be easily accessed again. It is likely that they are sealed off for 
ventilation and safety reasons. Figure 3 • .tf-and Appendix f . detail the 
workings and development at Monktonhall and show:: it primed for 
relatively early production. 
Etherington's letter itself is quite revealing for removing the air of 
doubtful existence that surrounded the projects, and not least in the 
confirmation of investment hibernation in mothballed pits. The scale 
and size of the process is dramatic and slightly disturbing. For it to 
happen at all demands a measure of co-operation between the NUM and 
British Coal which compromises the remit of the National Union of 
Mineworkers to federated unions on defending jobs and pits which was the 
central issue of the 1984/85 strike. NUM labour is maintaining these 
pits at an estimated cost of s4million per year on a very different 
agenda to the policies of the National Union. Equally, it shows from 
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Billy Etherington's comments on the issue just how little he knew, and, 
just how much the Scottish NUM and British Coal managed to contain 
knowledge of these developments from the rest of the NUM for some two 
years. To all intents and purposes both Bilston Glen/Monktonha11 and 
Frances/Seafield Combines were closed. 
Monktonhall Colliery is across the east coast main railway line from 
Cockenzie power station. It is connected to Bilston Glen colliery by 
the 'golden mile' of capital investment. George Knox, Marketing 
Manager, on the lOth November 1989 revealed to me that the pit was not 
to be closed but was part of another agenda after its nationalised life: 
as part of the British Coal's policy to mothball that pit 
for two years or until the economic climate right.------
Millerhill is handy and will be ready next year for freight 
handling. 
Several observations from repeated visits to the area and the pit 
combined to reinforce that statement. Since the Monktonhall/Bilston 
complex closed Monktonhall has been on a care and maintenance basis. 
The 6360 million investment into 'the golden mile' is complete. In 
Loanhead Miners Welfare ex-miners from Bileton Glen report that 
"production could start in a matter of weeks rather than months if they 
wanted". 
With this strategy towards coal privatisation in place you get the 
distinct impression that this is not unconnected to developments on the 
rail network. British Rail's electrification of the east coast mainline 
from Newcastle to Edinburgh has to take into account all future 
industrial and commercial development. Under commercial directives from 
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government it does this to attract the highest form of revenue. 
However, any branch line development has to be a proven viable 
proposition under these government directives. One such branch line 
with sufficient traffic until recently that would have met that 
criterion would have been the Millerhill spur which connects to 
Monktonhall Colliery. It is probably with that in mind that British 
Rail electrified the spur. Added to this is the ongoing improvements 
to the Millerhill freightliner depot, bought by Russell of Aberdeen, 
one of Scotland's largest transport, aggregates and minerals firms. 
With Cockenzie power station ~across the tracks', the opportunity to 
sell coal from a super pit to the S.S.E.B. as well as ~Trainload 
Freight' it (pace Rail News Dec. 1991) to other parts of the country 
would become a very attractive proposition for private investors. When 
the scenario was put to Brian Burroo in the Scottish Office he replied 
in civil service double speak "it makes a lot of sense". 
More than half of Bilston Glen's output and the reserves under 
development at the Monktonhall in the Lothians were intended for coal 
burn at nearby Cockenzie power station. The &60 million development 
again had been based on the ~opportunity to sell' that production on a 
projected S.S.E.B. take of 5 milllion tones per year. In a further 
effort to secure their strategy for the future British Coal offered to 
buy Cockenzie power station, stating that it went a long way to relieve 
SSEB of their problem of overcapacity. But we already know that the 
over-capacity was an integral part of S.S.E.B strategy on reducing fuel 
prices. The S.S.E.B. replied: 
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Now that we have at least a chance of getting cheaper fuel 
why should our customers be expected to give up Cockenzie. 
We have an important role for Cockenzie in the future and 
the only problem relating to it is the fuel price. 
The Scotsman 12/2/89 
We have been reminded already what that role may be: 
In addition to meeting Scottish electricity requirements, 
British Coal also supplies -- under a separate agreement 
--additional coal to the SSEB to be burnt in its modern coal 
fired capacity for onward transmission to the CEGB system 
Energy Committee Report p.xxiii, para.30, taken from Evidence 
of SSEB P. 113 para. 18 ~ 
However the best aspirations and intentions may not come to fruition. 
There are elements of uncertainty for coal supplied to Cockenzie. 
Secure supplies already come from Blindwells opencast. Moreover, with 
electricity privatisation the complex sourcing arrangements directly 
affect Cockenzie and it remains to be seen how these are arranged. So 
if Monktonhall was depending upon Cockenzie alone it could be squeezed 
especially by opencast as well as the burning of other fuels at other 
stations on the 'grid'. 
In its entirety the Longannet complex symbolises the grand era of 
nationalisation, representing a huge investment in manpower and public 
capital investment. The mine itself, surface plant and power station 
are interlinked and have many new innovations. However, in maintaining 
production at the combined operation there has been a remarkable 
exercise in rationalisation. Over the years it has incorporated the 
surrounding pits of Comrie, Solsgirth, Bogside and Kinnie! and added the 
~61 million sinking of Castlebridge to its portfolio. The capital 
investment in mining alone is difficult to measure as the displaced jobs 
at these pits. At the best estimates 4,000 men were on these 
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collieries' books. In contrast, Longannet comp~ex in 1988 had 1200 men 
on colliery books. Ned Smith, former NCB Industrial Relations Director, 
has confirmed Castlebridge was one of the corporatist trade offs, 
quietly developed whilst other units were run down. One of those 
nearby, Polmaise east of Stirling, has reserves accessable from 
Castlebridge/Longannet and capital investment in development work of 
some ~22 million. Eric Clarke, having the benefit of inside knowledge, 
certainly sees a future in retrieving the capital and reserves invested 
in the Hirst seam developments at Polmaise. (Figs. 3:",3"'7) 
But more than that the Forth Valley all the way up to 
Stirling and into the Doon Valley in Central Region is a 
mass of coal ••••••••• The Longannet complex with Solsgirth 
and Castlebridge, going west in the Hirst seam where the 
quality of coal is better, with a sinking, probably because 
of the distance away, in Kincardine in the near future will 
guarantee the jobs of 2,500 men. 
Eric Clarke, General Secretary Scottish Area NUM, 24/2/1988, 
Coalfield Communities Campaign Conference(CCC) P.N4 
What is most revealing about this statement is the probable sinking of 
another additional shaft in Kincardine(area?) in the near future to 
retrieve what in fact are the Polmaise reserves. 
Longannet has seen some remarkable improvement in productivity as a 
result of restructuring, supported by flexible working, forming the 30 
per cent bulk of deep mined output in Scotland. The men at the new 
faces to the north of the shaft have repeatedly beaten the Scottish 
output record and their colleages along side them beat the Eurpoean 
drivage record of 126.7 metres. Despite this, Longannet, being the only 
productive British Coal mine in Scotland, has yet to make significant 
inroads in the total share of total coal production, yet obviously 
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British Coal and the Scottish NUM have great intentions beyond the current production 
profile. In the meantime opencast coal mines continue to supply the largest share of saleable 
coal to Longannet power station. 
Finally the Frances project, which potentially has the largest direct capital investment and 
arguably the largest available indirect capital investment and coal reserves, the extent of 
which is known only to British Coal. Kerevan and Saville (1987) as well as the miners had 
serious misgivings over the way management handled the run down of the Seafield/Francis 
combine nevertheless the outcome was a positive one for British Coal: 
British Coal had operated a combined Seafield/Frances complex 
since the collieries were linked in 1980 ...... Following a 
fire caused by spontaneous combustion the sole production 
face was lost in 1985 and the colliery was retained on a care 
and maintenance basis to safeguard valuable coal reserves 
which lie mainly in the area of the former Michael colliery. 
In January 1987 a fire at Seafield resulted in the loss of 
a production face. In January 1988, an announcement was 
made to close the colliery. However, following an evaluation 
British f:J!gJ. formed t/Ji:.l!W£ tllJlt. iJ. ~possible to devetou 
a B.J:1£ low cost dJ:iJ1 mine to exgloit ~ reserves.(my emphasis) 
Planning and Development Committee Report from the Director 
of Planning "Proposed Frances Project". September 1988. para.l.3 
In relation to market requirements British Coal have pointed 
out that the proposed Frances opencast is needed to maintain 
existing particular markets following the loss[ sic] of Seafield 
production. 
Ibid. para. 5.1.2. 
According to British Coal's application, 45 million tonnes is directly available from the drift 
mine and 1.5 million tonnes from the opencast. Employment from the Frances project is 
highly optimistc with British Coal estimating that it is set to provide work for 1130 
miners, 30 management, 20 clerical staff and 90 during opencast 
operations. Moreover, in addition to stating these figures in their 
application to Fife Regional Council, British Coal revealed evidence of 
how the miners were to produce Dysart seam coal from April 1993. 
British Coal's estimate for the employment in the drift mine 
is based on assumptions of the method of working(full retreat 
system), the use of latest technology in a drift mine(as 
opposed to a deep mine) and the implementation of flexible 
working systems.(my emphasis) 
Planning and Development committee Report from the Director 
of Planning "Proposed Frances Project", September 1988, para.2.2a 
Graphically, this explains the super pit strategy of a high-tech Wheeler 
Plan approach that is inextricably part of any hibernated investment 
strategy. In other words, the commercial package consists of the 
hibernated investment imbued with 'new era' industrial relations, new 
working practices and processes within a high-tech management controlled 
production set up. 
The proposed super pit is within striking distance of the now abandoned 
Seafield/ Frances complex (Fig. 3.5). Though Seafield shafts are now 
'capped', the Frances shafts are being maintained to enable the drivages 
to be pumped free of water. Machinery and infrastructure left in the 
complex are intact, much of which may have been written off at time of 
closure for the accumulation of capital to the private sector. The 
evidence from Billy Etherington on Frances is supported by the Director 
of Planning in Fife Region. Retrieval of hibernation investment is at 
least possible and a prominent part of British Coal strategy at Francis: 
British Coal have advised that the overall quality and 
quantity of the coal is not in doubt. The project envisages 
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the drivage of twin sut:face drifts from a location east of 
Bore/and Village to intersect the Francis Pit bottom ....... . 
and maximise output initially in the Dysart seam and 
simultaneously provide means of access to the reserves in the 
upper seams. 
Planning and Development Committee Report from the Director 
ofPlanning "Proposed Frances Project". September 1988. para.2.2c 
Seafield/Frances coal is of superior quality to most opencast coal in Scotland but the colliery 
was closed because British Coal had a lower cost alternative supply for the S.S.E.B. -
opencast coal- to 'keep the markets alive'. British Coal have assets available in the Frances 
mine and plan to retrieve coal from the same seam in which it was last working by entering 
via the old Frances shaft and drivages. The very fact that it is the 20 foot Dysart seam makes 
it very improbable that some of the previous investment laid down in that seam over the last 
five to eight years is not available for retrieval at a later date. 
There are common denominators in the development of all three super pits. First. they all 
have well developed rail links. Second. they are all close to fossil fuel power stations at 
Methil( Frances), Longannet(Longannet) and Cockenzie (Monktonhall). Andlbird. they 
have all received direct and have access to indirect(hibernated) investment. One can't help 
but wonder at the apparent co-ordinated manner in which this situation has developed. The 
industries concerned Coal, Electricity and Rail are strongly interdependent and all scheduled 
for some form of privatisation. To imagine that the privatisation of one industry occurs in 
isolation from the privatisation of another may be denying the fact that their development 
has often hinged upon reliance upon each other. Commercialisation leading to privatisation, 
ultimately means the extension of past relationships and the invention of new ones. 
As events unfold we find opencast coal has a more integral role for the 
government in the commercialisation of the energy economy than we first 
would have ventured. The human cost from exacting such changes should 
not be understated: 
I worked at Cardowan, my mates are now travelling to Longannet. 
only the younger ones were really wanted.--- Aye, I believe that 
Kinniel was left for Longannet, and Polmaise; that's what the 
boys are saying anyway. 
Councillor James Slaven, Strathclyde Regional Council, 25/11/1989 
"Only the younger men are wanted for the super pits" as the old ones 
have attitudes which are difficult to change in the new scheme of 
things. Some are travelling over 40 miles each way to Longannet and 
some have gone to England, the older ones took redundancy. A most 
telling comment on the passing of control from the public to commercial 
hands came from Councillor Pat Burt, chairman of the Industrial 
Committee in Central Region, which has unemployment rates of 20 per 
cent. 
If Longannet closes I believe history will judge it not only 
as the day in which deep mining in Scotland died, but our ability 
to be masters of our own future energy needs was thrown away. 
The Scotsman 27/3/1989 
Longannet, Monktonhall and Frances were intended as refined models of 
Wheeler's super pits. Rationalised, restructured with investment 
hibernating these were packaged with new methods of working and working 
practices. Without opencast coal production 'keeping the markets alive' 
it may not have been possible. However, even with the best of 
intentions only Longannet performs as a 'super pit', Scottish Power 
and the financial regulation of British Coal have determined that. 
Francis and Monktonhall await, with optimistic support of NUM President 
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George Bolton, their future under private ownership. In the west of 
the country deep mines such as cardowan, Sorn, Killoch, Barony and 
Polkemmet closed in the 1980's with men 'proud and bitter' from their 
experience (Macllvanney 1991). All were displaced by production from 
that other 'super pit' opencast coal mining, gearing up in its own right 
for private ownership. Starkly, control over the future operation of 
these super pits, proposed and otherwise, now lies with the commercial 
world and not the public world of Councillor Burt and his colleagues. 
Despite their well intentioned efforts for the miners and the coal 
industry, their keenness to co-operate with British Coal may have been 
the downfall of some remaining form of public control in the industry. 
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Part Four - The Boys of Ballymoney and Coalburn: The State's Agenda 
for Energy Provision in Northern Ireland 
i The Irish Market for Scottish Coal 
Sales of coal production from opencast mining in the west of Scotland 
rest substantially upon the demand for 'coal burn' in Northern Ireland 
power stations. Recent expansion of opencast coal production to meet 
this demand, in planning and political terms, has been predicated upon 
the "opportunity to sell" to a specific market. That market depends 
upon feeding West Belfast, and Kilroot '1' power stations and 
specifically developing a coal fired operation at Kilroot '2' in 
Northern Ireland. Both operations are being created with public money 
for the benefit of private wealth in the privatisation of NIES and 
British Coal. However, British Coal's projections to 'nest' its 
expanding opencast production within the configuration of power station 
development and generation demand in Northern Ireland, could flounder 
upon the Northern Ireland Electricity Service's (NIES) future strategy 
of flexible sources of fuel supply. These include the planned 
development of a lignite fired power station and the possibility of an 
interconnector with Scotland taking nuclear generated electricity from 
Hunterston 'B'. Despite this, further planned expansion of opencast 
coal mining in Strathclyde region is based upon meeting the needs of 
Kilroot '2'. The interdependence of the two industries is disturbing. 
For the development of this power station, which has lain unassembled 
for 15 years, has been predicated upon a political imperative buttressed 
by an unsound economic report (NIEDC, 1987) favouring a coal fired 
station against a lignite one. 
Curiously, Parliament had approved the Electricity Supply Amendment 
Order 1987 to provide for the establishment of a privately owned power 
station in the North of Ireland. What is ignored by government 
proponents is that under commercial operating conditions a substantial 
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amount of Kilroot '2' power station's coal burning capacity is unlikely 
to compete with a privately built power station burning the indigenous 
resource of lignite. Even so, Tom King, then energy minister, announced 
on the 15th July 1988 that energy generation requirements in the short 
term would be met by the completion of the Kilroot '2' power station, 
and privatisation of NIES has since been brought forward to commence 
before the 1992 general election. At best, opencast coal will have to 
remain extremely competitive at or below world prices with production 
efficiently targeted and timed to meet the competition from a lignite 
fired power station at Ballymoney. The reason for this is that the 
Ministerial decision to convert Kilroot 2 to coal firing did not exclude 
the development of lignite but rather implicitly encouraged its 
development as increased competition in the market place. The person 
who helped to devise the privatisation scheme told me that: 
NIES will be privatised and the supply of coal to Kilroot 
will be open to bid from any quarter. The development of 
lignite will follow later. 
Brian Buroo 26/7/88 
Arguably, the decision over Kilroot was made to support the flotation in 
the private sector of NIES and British Coal. Plainly, there is no 
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financial gain for the government by allowing a private sector 
Ballymoney to go ahead of a public sector Kilroot '2'. Quite simply, an 
assembled Kilroot '2' commands greater revenue than lying in an 
unassembled state during the sell-off of NIES public assets. 
Recognition of lignite as a viable fuel in the North of Ireland, as we 
shall see, has been vindicated by a number of prominent bodies. 
Accumulative evidence that it may make redundant elements of 'coal burn' 
generation at Kilroot power stations and diminish British Coal's market 
for its opencast operations in the West of Scotland does not seem an 
immediate concern of the government and their supporters, but 
ideological imperatives do. 
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ii opencast Coal Costs and Operations to meet the Irish Market 
Opencast coal production in the West of Scotland is concentrated under 
the jurisdiction of three main District Councils of Strathclyde Region. 
Motherwell, Clydesdale and Cumnock and Doon Valley in the old Ayrshire 
coalfield provide the bulk of operations supported by a new and large 
investment in supportive infrastructure. Once closely associated with 
deep mining, these and other areas in Strathclyde Region are now 
synonymous with opencast coal mining and its infrastructure (Fig. 3.8). 
The only deep mines are small private mines such as the recently 
developed Viaduct mine. Dumfries and Galloway Region has opencast 
development on a smaller scale though interest is expanding in the 
Canonbie coalfield. The West of Scotland operation is intensive. The 
expansion from 1975 has been quite startling. In Strathclyde Region in 
1975 there were 8 N.C.B. deep mine production units and only one million 
tonnes of opencast reserves in production. However, in 1984 British 
Coal indicated to Strathclyde Regional Council that: 
Opencasting could increase by 50 - 100 per cent in the 
next 5 years. 
Strathclyde Regional Planning Dept.: Technical Working Paper, 
Note 6-1: Para 2:2 
By 1987 there was one deep-mine production unit, 19.1 million tonnes of 
opencast coal with planning permission 7.5 million tonnes of which were 
in production in the management of British Coal. At the end of 1989 
this had changed into 21 million tonnes of opencast coal with planning 
permission and over 10 million tonnes in production. Compounding the 
situation for people in the community and their environment is the 
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predominance ofprivate operated sites in Strathclyde. Since 1986 there have been over 30 
private opencast sites operating with permission for a total tonnage of nearly 1.5 million 
tonnes. Testimony to a commitment to the expansion of the opencast industry is the largest 
opencast site in Europe with over 20 million tonnes of coal at Dalqhuandy, near Coalburn in 
Lanarkshire. Stewart Graham, British Coal's Deputy Marketing Manager in Scotland has 
talked enthusiastically about the future for opencast mining and the giant Dalqhuandy site 
where: 
it had its first Box Cut from the first of the 32 seams 
of coal to become a major feeder to the Irish market -----
(and that) Canonbie coalfield was investigated some time ago 
and is set to supply Kilroot 2 partly by using opencast methods. 
Graham Stewart. British Coal Scotland. 12/711989 
The additional information on Canonbie is most interesting. The coal reserves lie very deep 
in a geological 'bowl' and the top seams were last worked in the 1930's. Until recently they 
had been considered too difficult and expensive to extract. During 1989 senior officials in 
the NUM had shown interest over its status and development, voicing concern over the 
future use of Canonbie. However, there is no doubt that British Coal have prospected 
opencast reserves not only in the west but in the south of Scotland to meet an "opportunity to 
sell" a projected output to the Kilroot stations over a period of several years. 
We have a 3 year deal with NIES for Kilroot 1 and we have 
been talking to them about Kilroot 2 and hope to get a 20 
year deal for the whole of Kilroot. 
Graham Stewart. 12/7/89 
Canonbie could well be the longer term target for Kilroot '2' power stations. However, this 
may not only have to be justified on the grounds of' opportunity to sell' coal to NIES, 
but on the economies of scale and extraction. Costs of production are of primary 
importance. British Coal Opencast Executive Director Mike Proctor had provided average 
costs of opencast coal to justify the expanded development of opencast coal. 
We have to exist in fiercely competitive conditions where 
the scarce resource is low cost indigenous coal - i.e. 
opencast coal. The average cost of deep mine production is 
£41.90 per tonne, and the average opencast is £26.90 per 
tonne. The average cost per G/J for deep mine is £1.65/GJ and 
for opencast it is £1.02/GJ. The cost advantage of opencast 
coal over deep mine coal is some thirty five per cent. 
M. Proctor, Executive Director. British Coal Opencast. Opencast 
Mining Seminar. Newcastle University 28/2/1989 
From Table (3.1 0) we know the average cost of opencast coal in Scotland from disposal 
points to be £1.12/GJ. already well above the national average but still much lower than 
deep mined coal. Looking at the Disposal Points in Strathclyde (Table 3.15 and Fig. 3 .8) 
the average costs of opencast coal from here are not much better than the Scottish average. 
Table 3.15 
PRODUCTION COSTS £/GJ AT DISPOSAL POINTS- STRA THCLYDE REGION 
Killoch Climpy Knockshinnock Dalquhandy Average 
1.35 1.14 1.05 0.90** 1.11 
_ Source: British Coal Scotland 
* * Best Estimates from British Coal 
As a vast proportion of this coal is shipped through Ayr harbour to the North oflreland the 
average costs of opencast coal from these Disposal Points will be £1.11GJ. However, the 
average costs of coal is relative to the configuration of tonnage and British Coal would 
argue the greatest tonnage comes from the biggest site at Dalquhandy, consequently the 
average cost to NIES would be much lower. Ironically, both stocking 
costs and transport costs of opencast coal have been underplayed by 
British Coal in North East England, until established as additional to 
production costs at Public Inquiries (P.I.) (Prior, Para. 7.4, 
Billingside P.I.; Gladstone, Para.9.3, Marley Hill P.I.). In Scotland 
however, the importance of transport costs in opencast production is 
given the highest regard: 
British Coal's ability to sell coal in the market is entirely 
dependent on the cost of production. A substantial part of 
the costs involved in producing coal from any mine is the cost 
of transporting that coal to the customer. We must therefore 
when considering any transport arrangements for coal from any 
site give due regard to the effect that the cost of such 
transport will have on the final selling price of the coal. 
The decision to transport the coal eastwards to Ravenstruther 
(road/rail transhipment facilities to Ayr harbour) has been 
taken after lengthy discussions with full-time and elected 
Officials of Strathclyde Region and representatives of District 
Councils. 
William Rowell, Opencast Manager (Scotland) to ~ Wright ~ 
Leader of the Labour Group, Clydesdale District Council 24/2/1986 
Combining coal sourced from Killoch(lSm) and Knockshinnock(28m), being 
the nearest Disposal points to Ayr harbour, reduces the average cost to 
between ~1.04G/J and ~l.lOG/J (~30.00t) depending on Dalqhuandy 
proportions. Taking the figures in Table 3.16 and adding 'stocking 
costs' at a very conservative ~5 tonne and transport costs at ~5 tonne 
FOR(Free on Rail), we arrive at a figure of well over ~40 tonne making 
opencast coal now around ~1.60G/J delivered to Northern Ireland power 
stations. 
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TABLE 3 ' (' CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS USED IN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE GENER-
ATION PROJECTS 
Lignite Fired Kilroot Phase II Kilroot Phase II 
(a) (b) 
Station Rating (MW) 450 520/360 450 
(3 X 150) (2 X 260/180) (2 X 225) 
Station Load Factor (%) 70 70 70 
Capital costs (Em 1986) 405 ( l) 190(2) 260(3) 
(ex interest during construction) 
Operating Life (Years) 30 30 30 
Thermal Efficiency (%) 33 35 35 
Construction Tim& (Years) 6 4 5 
Fuel Prices (%1986/tonne) Lignite = 10 
coal = 35(low) Constant 
= 38(central) in real 
42(high) terms 
from 1995 
Heavy Fuel Oil = 106(low) onwards 
115 (central) 
127(high) 
Fuel Calorific Values (Gj/tonne) Lignite = 10 
coal = 26 
Heavy Fuel Oil = 42 
Discount Rate = 5% per annum 
Notes (1) Includes cost of new transmission equipment. 
(2) Includes ~ominal allowance of ·£20m for opportunity cost of generators in 
storage. 
(3) Includes £70m for new coal boilers. 
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iii Lignite: The Brown Opencast Coal Alternative for 
the Irish Market 
It is perhaps ironical that one form of opencast mining will be 
competing with another for the same market. The Jefferson and Hewitt 
Report(l988) commissioned by t~e Northern Ireland Economic Council 
(NIEC) (as distinct from NIEDC) established the value of the Lignite 
resources in the North of Ireland for future power generation. 
Responding to the recognition of lignite as a viable commodity, the 
Chairman of the NIEC in turn expressed his keenness to exploit those 
resources. One reason he had in mind was that the highest energy costs 
in the United Kingdom are in the North of Ireland because it is not 
'wired in' to the national grid: 
The Economic Council's general view is that, if lignite is 
reasonably competitive in price with other energy resources, 
it would be desirable to exploit it as soon as possible. 
Sir Charles Carter May 19S7 Chairman of NIEC Report 65. 
Evidence to the Commons Select Committee on Energy given by the Northern 
Ireland Electricity Service (NIES.) made clear that they were to reduce 
their dependency on coal and oil by increasing the use of indigenous 
resources, lignite in particular. According to the Chemical Engineering 
Division of Queen's University of Belfast, "lignite offers a whole new 
industrial base in the Northern Ireland community" in a range which 
includes the various markets for coal from the British mainland 
(McKay G. et al,~Energy World, Aug.,1988). 
Graphic reinforcement of lignite's potential to replace a substantial 
proportion of coal burn in power stations the Chairman of NIES Mr. John 
194 
Gaston, speaking at the meeting of Lisburn Economic Development 
Organisation (L.E.D.O.) stated that: 
There is every prospect that lignite could be delivered to 
the power station at a coal equivalent price of around one 
third of the current international price for coal, and no 
more than one sixth of the current price of heavy fuel oil. 
L.E.D.O., Minutes, 16/4/1985 
On Friday 22nd of January 1988 the 'City of London' Public Relations 
Company issued a press statement on behalf of Meekatharra Minerals Ltd. 
It was headed by the statement: 
BALLYMONEY PROJECT COULD CREATE UP TO 3,000 CONSTRUCTION 
JOBS AND MORE THAN 1,000 PERMANENT JOBS 
Employment Aspect of the Project "Unmatched" States Ministerial 
Briefing 
Confirmation came from Don O'Callaghan of Meekatharra Minerals of the 
economic viability of the lignite mine. He has argued that the deposits 
at Balllymoney could be mined and marketed at ~7.00 - ~8.00 per tonne. 
This means that lignite fired electricity station could sell its output 
for less than 40 per cent of the current 1988 price of electricity. The 
feasibility study done by Meekatharra in 1986 was based on NIES 
requirements for an average of 3.1 million tonnes a year for the 30 year 
life-span of the proposed new power station. Meekatharra believed it 
could produce suitable fuel at ~7.10 tonne from Ballymoney (Fig.3.9) for 
~5.00 to ~8.00 per tonne less than British Petroleum (B.P.) Would at its 
Crumlin site. This assessment has since been justified by B.P. putting 
up for sale all B.P. Coal assets, including its lignite developments at 
Crumlin and Coagh. To reinforce its position Meekatharra has signed an 
agreement with another ~ustralian mineral group, BHP - Utah, a unit of 
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Broken Hill Proprietary, to continue further exploration of lignite at 
Ballymoney. BHP - Utah will assume responsibility for project 
development, construction and operation to fuel the lignite fired power 
station in the late 1990's. Underpining these efforts, Cecil Parkinson 
Secretary of State for Energy, in a speech to the Coalfield Communities 
Campaign conference in Edinburgh called the development of a lignite 
fired power station in the North of Ireland "a very interesting project" 
(23/2/1988). Despite the environmental problems there is no doubting 
that there are sufficient resources of lignite to supply the power 
station: 
Table 3.17 
ESTIMATE OF RECOVERABLE LIGNITE RESERVES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AUGUST 1988 
Balllymoney 500 million tonnes 
Coagh 450 million tonnes 
Crumlin 420 million tonnes 
Source: McKay et al. Energy World, August 1988 
Political diplomacy was exercised by the Meekatharra directors when they 
said: 
The Government's 1988 decision to complete the Kilroot ~2' 
power station as a 360MW coal fired facility has been to 
satisfy short term needs. However the relevant UK Minister 
has publicly indicated that the next power station will be 
lignite fired. 
Annual Report 1989, Meekatharra Minerals, ~ ~ 
Clearly the State had another agenda, one which gave the British Coal 
boys back at Coalburn priority over the Meekatharra boys at Ballymoney. 
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iv Meeting the Irish Power Station Market for Coal 
The siting of a private lignite power station at Ballymoney would, 
similar to s.S.E.B. policy, increase the amount of energy and fuel 
sources available to the electricity grid system. And similarly, the 
relationship with British Coal then underwent a commercial metamorphosis 
forcing the price of coal downwards. However, from this point the 
similarities disappear. In Scotland, the unbridled expansion of other 
fuel sources was unleashed on an already depressed market for coal upon 
electricity privatisation; this forced further reductions in the price 
of and demand for coal. British Coal's response was to increase further 
the supply of lower cost opencast coal to the detriment of deep mine 
production. 
In the North of Ireland, the future political strategy of NIES (1982) 
developing ~one third fuel options' (Fig.3.10) by the end of the century 
pre-determines the level of coal demand. By doing so it has the 
tendency to constrain the price of coal and the current relatively high 
profit margins enjoyed by British Coal up until 1988 (Brian Buroo 1988). 
Quite starkly, the NIES strategy would directly affect the current level 
of coal demand and reduces any hopes the Scottish coal industry had of 
increasing its market share of energy fuel supply to the NIES beyond 
their recent shipments (Tables 3.18, 3.19). Patently, a corollary 
develops similar to the SSEB experience yet from a different strategic 
political base. Diversification of fuel supplies gives NIES increased 
control over the choice of fuel to be burnt, it follows that NIES also 
will achieve greater control over the price of fuel supplied to the 
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Table 3.18 
SHIPMENT OF COAL INTO NORTHERN IRELAND 1977 - 1986 
(thousand tonnes) 
Domestic Industrial NIES Total 
1977 921 106 730 1457 
1978 905 104 501 1510 
1979 1064 107 525 1696 
1980 898 75 577 1550 
1981 856 28 487 1371 
1982 978 47 518 1543 
1983 1506 45 547 2098 
1984 1225 27 144 1396 
1985 1638 61 496 2195 
1986 1310 91 288 1689 
1987 
Source: Northern Ireland Abstract of Statistics 1987, Table 12.10, 
Table 3.19 
EXPORTS OF OPENCAST COAL FROM AYR HARBOUR TO NORTHERN IRELAND 
(thousand tonnes) 
P.137 
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
600 550 565 625* 165* 543 369## 630 475 
Source: British Coal/Ayr Harbour Master 
* Years affected by national coal strike 
## Tonnage affected in part by reconstruction of facilities at Ayr 
harbour 
** Problems experienced with ship discharger at Kilroot 
N.B. Figures include 100,000 tonnes of industrial coal contracts each 
of last 2 years. 
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Table 3.20 
BRITISH COAL PROJECTIONS FOR KILROOT AND WEST BELFAST 
(Power Stations --- 000' tonnes) 
Kilroot West Belfast Total 
19B8/89 145 610 755 
1989/90 650 585 1235 
1990/91 740 560 1300 
1991/92 740 535 1275 
1992/93 740 510 1250 
Source: British coal Scotland 
Table 3.21 
GENERATING PLANT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1990 
Station/Units 
Belfast West 
2 X 30MW 
3 X 60MW 
Ballylumford 
3 X 120MW 
3 X 200MW 
2 X 60MW 
Kilroot 1. 
2 X 250MW 
(1) 
Fuel Thermal 
Efficiency 
coal 27.5 
HFO 31.3 
Dist. 23.3 
G.T. 
HFO 33.0 
2 x 30MW(G.T.)Dist. 23.3 
Coolkeeragh (2) 
2 X 30MW Oil 19.5 
5 X 60MW Dist. 21.2 
1 X 60MW G.T. 
Plant Load 
Factor 
59.6 
32.5 
0.3 
41.0 
0.3 
6.8 
0.6 
Source: NIES Annual Reports and NIEDC. 
Units Gen. 
MWhours 
1,253.8 
2,733.8 
3.2 
1,797.7 
1.4 
179.9 
3.0 
Commissioned 
Retirement** 
1954-1958 
1994-1999** 
1968-1974 
1999-2005** 
1981-1982 
2011-2012** 
1959-1967 
1990-2002** 
(1)Kilroot Phase 2. was to be commissioned alongside Kilroot 1. 
generation sets with a combined design rating of 520 MW burning oil and 
360 MW burning coal. 
(2) While Kilroot 1. was being converted 60 MW of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) 
plant at Coolkeeragh, in storage since 1982 has been recommissioned to 
make up some loss in the grid. 
N.B. Dist. = Distillate Oil 
G.T. = Gas Turbine (standby) 
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power stations by choosing the lowest cost fuel. With little room for 
cost cutting in opencast mining it is difficult not to envisage a cut in 
demand for coal burn. Uncontrolled, the consequences could be quite 
traumatic for employment in the coal industry. The surplus opencast 
coal production from Scotland and North Cumbria that could not meet the 
cost criteria of NIES would either be closed or challenge the market 
share of deep-mine production in Scotland and the North of England. 
only by comparing British coal projections (Table 3.20) with NIES 
generation demand projections and adding in some smaller variables can 
we achieve an assessment of the viability of British Coal's "opportunity 
to sell" to the North of Ireland market. Figure 3.10 also shows us the 
potential capacity of supplying the market for coal in NIES strategy for 
the coming years. The variations in different sources of fuel supply 
are related to the timing of commissioning of the Kilroot stations and 
the de-commissioning of Belfast West and Coolkeeragh as well as their 
stated "one third option" each of coal, oil, and lignite for the future. 
Production and shipment of opencast coal to the North of Ireland is not 
so much about maximising market advantage by increasing the size of take 
in that market, but with the market limited by the maximum coal burn the 
ethos has been to maximise profit from supplying coal with the highest 
profit margins. Ninety eight per cent of exports from Ayr harbour is 
coal from opencast sites in Strathclyde supplied to NIES and 
'Industrial' customers. 'Domestic' coal is imported from Cumbria and 
North East England as well as from overseas sources such as Poland. 
This market is set to decline with the development of gas fields in the 
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Irish sea. Unless privatisation accelerates the NIES strategy indicated 
by projections in Figure 3.10 there is to be little diversity of supply 
until after 1998. By extrapolating the tonnages from Table 3.19 to 
Figure 3.10, and given that the British Coal export tonnage has never 
been more than 630,000 (including industrial coal) against a minimum 
projection of 755,000 (Table 3.20), then 1998 with NIES coal burn 
reduced to 18 per cent the most Scottish coal can hope to export is 
400,000 tonnes. In 2010 against a projected coal burn of 33 per cent, 
the generous maximum looks likely to be 1 million tonnes. Clearly, 
unless there is a strategic swing towards more coal burn in Northern 
Ireland power stations opencast production in Strathclyde at over 2 
million tonnes a year and 18 million tonnes of 'approved' reserves 
(Opencast Coalmining Statistics (CPOS] 1990) would appear to be over 
producing for this market in the 1990's. 
The retirement programme for existing power stations in the North of 
Ireland has as much a bearing on future demand for fuel requirements as 
the introduction and timing of new generation sets. It is worth bearing 
in mind that new plant has always been a desirable aim for electricity 
engineers, mainly from their remit to develop and commission generating 
plant ahead of load growth needs in terms of fuel cost savings and the 
Generation Security Standard (GSS). We can see from Table 3.21 that the 
generating capacity in Northern Ireland was 2,400 MW. at the end of 
1990 and note that electricity demand is set to grow between 2 and 3% 
per annum to the year 2000 (Table 3.22); however by that time some of 
the generating plant will be coming to the end of its useful life. 
Kilroot 1. was only converted to dual oil/coal fired in 1989 as part of 
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NIES policy of strategic flexibility. During that commissioning period, 
coal fired capacity represented 10 per cent of the total capacity. Upon 
commissioning it represents a potential of more than 28 per cent. 
(NIES). For this to create a market for opencast coal from Scotland it 
must be matched by demand for coal burn generation. 
The retirement programme for power stations is also dependent upon the 
running age of the plant. The life of coal fired plants is limited by 
the durability of the boilers rather than their generators. In the case 
of Belfast West, its coal fired boilers have seen intensive burning. 
Its continuous use, in contrast to the Coolkeeragh oil fired plant, has 
been determined by fuel price differentials. From Figure 3.10 we can 
also see how projections for coal demand will decrease by 10 per cent 
all through the 10 years from 1989. Yet when you look at British Coal 
projections for the first half of the next decade there is no account 
taken of this decrease by a consequent reduction in output projection 
figures (Table 3.20). When other competing factors are taken into 
consideration it makes the projections even more incredible. Opencast 
mines will be over producing in the 1990's for the NIES market. Coal 
demand may even be decreasing below existing levels as British Coal 
ignore the future, determined by NIES and graphically portrayed in 
Figure 3.10. 
NIES in their 1982 Generation Strategy Report projected that demand for 
electricity would grow at •a trend rate' of 2 per cent per annum up to 
1989-90 and at 3 per cent per annum in the 1990's. Their central load 
growth projection of 2 per cent per annum is the basis for forward 
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TABLE ·tg ELECTRICITY DEMAND(l) 1983-84 TO 1999-2000 - N ( E S 
~ .. A6 -~- --~ iG.:__ - ~ 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87. 
N 1987-88 
Q 1988-89 
~; 1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
Central Load Growth Case (2% pa) Higher Load Growth Case (3% pa) 
{ GWh ) ( MW ) ( GWh ) ( MW ) 
5,474.9 
5,670.2 
5,972.8 
6,092.3 
6,214.1 
6,338.4 
6,465.2 
6,594.5 
6,726.3 
6,860.9 
6,998.1 
7,138.0 
7,280.8 
7,426.4 
7,575.0 
7,726.5 
7,881.0 
1,199 
1,260 
1,312 
1,337 
1,364 
1,392 
1,419 
1,448 
1,477 
1,506 
1,536 
1,567 
1,598 
1,630 
1,663 
1,696 
1,730 
5,474.9 
5,670.2 
5,972.8 
6,152.0 
6,336.5 
6,526.6 
6,722.4 
6,924.1 
7,131.8 
7,345.8 
7,566.2 
7793.1 
8,026.9 
8,267.8 
8,515.8 
8,771.3 
9,034.4 
1.199 
1,260 
1,312 
1,351 
1,391 
1,433 
1,476 
1,520 
1,566 
1,613 
1,661 
1,711 
1,762 
1,815 
1,870 
1,926 
1,983 
Note (1) Strictly speaking, demand forecasts should be temperature corrected 
to be consistent with standard weather conditions, normally take~ to 
be the median weather condition over a run of years (the average cold 
spell). These forecasts ignore this complication. The error 
involved in doing so is not significant. 
planning. Northern Ireland Electricity needs a third fuel option in the 
medium term if it is to maintain its customer objective of providing the 
most efficient, reliable and economic electricity it possibly can. 
"it recognises the future role of lignite as Ulster's indigenous power 
station fuel" O'UES, "The Next Generation'/ 19 g 2) 
With the advent of Lignite development as an additional fuel source it 
changes past conventions on fuel supply to its stations, potentially 
affecting the ability of British Coal to supply fuel at a competitive 
rate. Coal burn demand is not the same as coal burn capacity in coal 
fired power stations and further expansion of opencast in Scotland may 
become a ~model on the computer' that may not be realised given the 
history of this situation and the advent of a Brown coal (Lignite) fired 
station. The State have seen that British coal does not have a monopoly 
on the market for coal. But then the State would argue that demand is 
not the sole criterion for the development of new opencast sites and 
they have proven that. 
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v. Arguments for Coal and Lignite - NIEDC Rebutted 
Northern Ireland Economic Development Council (NIEDC) made an assessment 
of the economic virtues of bringing on stream a coal-fired Kilroot 2 and 
an alternative Lignite fired power station. While an extremely useful 
document, it neglected certain evidence and made some assumptions, which 
while admissible at the time of analysis are flawed now. NIEDC ignored 
the claims of Ballymoney and wrongly assumed that any lignite will be 
mined at Crumlin, near the environmentally sensitive area of Lough 
Neigh. Their assessment uses the supply price of ~10 per tonne based 
upon the supply of lignite from that mine (Table 3.16). What is 
revealing is that they and the government must have been aware that 
Meekatharra chairman Don O'Callaghan stated as early as December 1986 in 
the Belfast Telegraph (6/12/86) that lignite from "Ballymoney deposits 
could be mined and marketed at ~7.00 per tonne". Consistent with this, 
the stated offer price of lignite mined by Meekatharra Minerals at 
Ballymoney to the Minister in the Ministerial Briefing (22/1/88) was 
~7.10 per tonne. When NIEDC did their calculations, in equating lignite 
with coal to generate the same amount of electricity, they casted 
lignite at 3 times ~10 per tonne instead of 3 times ~7.10 per tonne. 
Therefore the cost of lignite was disadvantaged by 30% per tonne above 
its true price, making Kilroot a better economic prospect than it really 
was. However, cost was not the only factor ignored in the NIEDC 
assessment and in government decision making. It is internationally 
known that lignite has a much lower sulphur content than coal and burns 
with extremely low sulphur emissions (Crouch G.R., 1988). 
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NIEDC deduce, using figures based upon Crumlin lignite, that in terms of 
cost: 
The lignite station offers no benefits over the Kilroot 
option from electricity generation since the system savings 
in both cases are similar. 
NIEDC, May 1987 The Impact of Lignite P.73, 
Then equally, it surely follows that the Kilroot option offers no 
benefits over the lignite station from electricity generation seeing 
that the "system savings in both cases are similar". NIEDC Table A3 is 
reproduced as Table 3.23 to show the assessment of costs for Lignite and 
Kilroot options based upon their above assumptions, with opencast from 
Scotland supplying Kilroot. Remarkably, the authors admit that if 
simple net costs are applied as the "choice criterion" then Kilroot 
options have the distinct advantage over the Lignite station only at the 
lower coal price level (Table 3.23). And even this is before the 
--- ---- ---- --
adjustments for Ballymoney costs and burning profile are made. Once 
made, the argument· for Kilroot '2' and the "opportunity to sell" 
opencast coal from Scotland in the Irish market is markedly diminished. 
Crumlin lignite costs 30% more than Ballymoney lignite. If we adjust 
their lignite fuel cost to the Ballymoney levels of 30 per cent less, 
with its better burning profile, lignite generated electricity becomes 
the favoured option over Kilroot'2' in an even competitive market. The 
government and its agencies patently were not unaware of this. Evidence 
detailed in a coloured brochure issued in March 1988 by Meekatharra 
(N.I.) Limited made fuel cost comparisons between coal and lignites in 
costs per gigajoules.; this is the standard unit of heat applicable to 
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Table 3.23 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE A3i" Eti:N::MIC ASSESS1ENT OF ALTERNATIVE GENERATIOO OPTIOOS 
Coal Price Assi.Ulption 
!AM Central High 
Lignite K-II(a) K-II(b) Lignite K-II(a) K-II(b) Lignite K-II(a) K-II(b) 
--
' Annual capital Charges ( 1 ) 31.36 13.98 19.63 31.36 13.98 19.63 31.36 13.98 19.63 
Annual Operating and 
Maintenance costs 9.66 5.52 6.90 9.66 5.52 6.90 9.66 5.52 6.90 
Annual Fuel costs 30.10 30.57 38.21 30.10 33.19 41.48 30.10 36.68 45.85 
· Total costs 71.12 50.07 64.74 71.12 52.69 68.01 71.12 56.18 72.38 
~ system savings fran . 
Displacing Higher cost Plant 86.37 69.10 86.37 9~.82 75.06 93.82 103.75 83.00 103.75 
Net Annual o:>st -15.25 -19.03 -21.63 -22.70 -22.37 -25.81 -32.63 -26.82 -31.37 
Net Effective Cost (2) (£/kWpa) -33.89 -52.86 -48.04 -50.4~ -62.14 -57.36 -72.51 -74.50 -69.73 
O>st per kWh of Units Generated 
(pence) 2.58 2.27 2.35 2.58 2.39 2.46 2.58 2.55 2.62 
Lignite = 450Krl minemooth station 
K-II(a) = Kilroot Phase II 520/360!t'l option 
K-II(b) = Kilroot Phase II 450MW option 
Notes (1) Total capital ooats (including interest during construction) annualised over 30 years at 5 per cent. 
~~ Annual cost normalised for design rating of station. 
Source: NIEDC 
.·) 
·-. 
\ .............•.. ~--·-·-.... 
~· 
= ~ 
all fuels delivered to the power stations. Table 3.24 marks out in 
clear terms the differences in price between imported opencast coal, 
Crumlin lignite and Ballymoney lignite. 
Table 3.24 
PRICE OF COAL AND LIGNITE DELIVERED TO THE POWER STATION(1987 prices) 
Coal Source Ballymoney 
Coal price at ~0.80G/J 
power station 
Crumlin 
~1.19 to 
~1.46G/J 
Imported Coal 
~1.37 to 
~1.66G/J 
Source: Meekatharra (N.I.) Ballymoney Lignite, Brochure, March 1988 
Imported coal can cost twice as much as Ballymoney lignite and Crumlin 
lignite is at least 50% more expensive according to these calculations. 
Previously, I assessed the cost of opencast coal delivered to Northern 
Ireland power stations by British Coal as around ~1.60G/J., this finds 
common ground with the figure for imported coal in Table 3.24. While 
costs per gigajoule is the most accurate way of costing coal, further 
information reinforces the argument that lignite outstrips other fuels 
on other measurements of cost. In a discussion with Jim Quigg, Senior 
Manager of Meekatharra (N.I.)(27/4/90), he argued that the true cost in 
terms of 'tons of coal equivalent'(t.c.e.) of importing coal from 
Ayrshire was ~34 t.c.e. and lignite was available at ~22 t.c.e. (i.e. 
~8 a tonne (high level) multiplied by two and two thirds to achieve the 
energy equivalent). Even allowing for commercial prejudice, on any 
scale of measurement there is a marked difference between the cost of 
lignite at ~0.80G/J and ~22 t.c.e. to coal at ~1.60G/J and ~34 t.c.e. 
respectively. 
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At the Sizewell Public Inquiry, British Coal gave evidence that the most 
accurate price of coal to the year 2025 was between 540 and 560 per 
tonne. In Table 3.16 coal is given as ~constaqt in real terms from 1995 
onwards' at three levels. Coal ~delivered' to Kilroot is given as 538 
per tonne in the central estimate, coal discount price is 533/t.c.e. 
(Quigg-534 t.c.e.). We are aware that three times more lignite is 
needed than coal to generate the same amount of energy. Even using the 
Crumlin price of 510 per tonne this still gives a price advantage to 
lignite. Jim Quigg also believed that British Coal and the Government 
were in: 
an awkward position having to buy in ~scrubbers' for Kilroot~2' 
at 53 million each to keep within the EEC Emission Standards 
or continue to buy in low sulphur coal" (this implies that 
British Coal also buy in low sulphur coal from oversees) •••••• 
Then there is the cost of dumping the sludge .•••••••••• 
they have spent so much on Kilroot they will probably go ahead 
with it regardless of cost as the government have told us they 
are looking ahead to privatise NIES and Scottish Coal. 
Jim Quigg, Meekatharra (N.I.), 22/1/1988 
This assessment and testimony is graphic and most telling. They bring 
sharply into focus the political reasoning of the State and its 
agencies, artificially stimulating privatisation of the public sector, 
NIES and British Coal, by contriving to achieve the ideologically ~right 
outcome'. Having ignored the cost advantages of Ballymoney lignite, the 
advantages of burning fuel with a high volatile matter and much lower 
sulphur emissions (of Lignite) are also set aside. This is despite the 
onset of EEC Directives and the extremely high cost of compensating for 
coal with a higher sulphur content with ~scrubbers' or low sulphur coal 
imports (Crouch G. R.,1988). Here two important issues, cost and the 
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environment, appear to be overridden by government ideology in their 
determination to pursue the advantages of a privatised coal fired 
Kilroot '2' and secure a market for a private sector opencast industry 
in Scotland. Yet remarkably, we learn that they were constantly made 
aware of the significant advantages of a lignite fired station. 
The technical proposals in the Company's 1987 feasibility 
study to supply an on site 450MW power station were accepted 
in May 1988 by the Northern Ireland Department of Economic 
Development and data have been continually upgraded from that 
date. The Company has maintained a policy of ensuring that 
all relevant government bodies have been kept fully informed 
of progress by regular briefing sessions. 
Detailed costing has demonstrated that Ballymoney coal is 
the cheapest fuel currently available to supply power in 
Northern Ireland. On the basis of cost per energy unit 
(1987 real costs) imported Scottish black coal is from 36 
to 79% more expensive than Ballymoney. It is clear that a 
fully integrated Ballymoney mine and base load power station 
could produce the cheapest thermal electricity in the U.K. 
Meekatharra Minerals, Annual Report, 1989, P.3 
Having disregard for the impact of Ballymoney lignite station after 
bringing Kilroot '2' onstrearn beggars belief. Constructing a power 
station knowing that in a few years time its ~apacity will be greatly 
underutilized is a mis-use of public money. Costs of electricity 
generated at Ballymoney will be considerably lower than those at 
Kilroot. Therefore, given the commercial intentions of NIES, only the 
cheapest coal burn electricity will be demanded by the system seriously 
squeezing both Kilroot capacity and opencast coal demand from 
Strathc1yde. 
Unequal comparisons also exist between the capital charges of Kilroot 
and Ballymoney. omitted in the costing of Kilroot (Table 3.16) and 
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opencast coal are the huge amounts of investment into the road, rail, 
harbour discharging and disposal point infrastructure in Strathclyde and 
Kilroot necessary for the extraction and transportation of coal to 
Kilroot. The extent of this investment is quite startling: 
In terms of disposal plants, the picture is dominated by 
roads linkages into the disposal plants and rail linkages 
from the disposal plants. A major element in this has been 
heavy investment by British Coal, as part of the strategy, 
in rail-orientated unloading and loading infrastructure at 
Killoch and in re-opening formerly closed railway lines from 
Doon Valley and also from the main Dumfries line via the 
Mauchline-Annbank line. As part of the future development of 
Powharnal-Gasswater, British Coal and British Rail are to 
promote a new line from the Cranberry area to Auchinleck to 
join the main Dumfries line. 
Opencast Coal Liaison Group, Joint strategy Statement, Para. 27 
It is difficult to ascertain where the funds for all this investment 
came from as there are so many bodies involved, not least the government 
and the EEC. Kilroot is inextricably linked to the Strathclyde 
operation and simply could not operate without this new infrastructure. 
Equally if Kilroot '2' was not developed this investment in 
infrastructure would be vastly underutilized. Obviously, the lignite 
fired minemouth station does not require that type and cost of 
investment as the power station would burn lignite directly from the 
mine to generate electricity straight into the system. Given the 
State's privatisation agenda for British Coal and NIES, the size of the 
Strathclyde investment makes Kilroot '2' more than a vested interest; 
crucially it is an ideological imperative to come on stream within the 
NIES privatisation time limits. Because of the State's imperative a 
lignite fired station at Ballymoney, despite its claims to be 
economically superior, has been relegated behind a privatisation agenda 
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for NIES and British Coal. 
There are some disturbing truths and parallels in this process. If the 
purpose of the report was to buttress the government's case for 
increasing the revenues from developing Kilroot '2', Strathclyde's 
publicly funded opencast infrastructure and British Coal it would 
appear, that despite its flaws, it has served that purpose. Again, it 
would appear the report tried to influence the decision on the 
configuration of power stations during the next two decades to time the 
preference for Kilroot "2" before Ballymoney. Similarly with the deep 
mines, the dubious accountancy practices of British Coal contrived to 
exalt opencast coal's value beyond that of deep mine production; and 
apparently for the same ideological agenda. 
Tilting the economics in favour of the 'Boys from Coalburn' (British 
Coal) to the disadvantage of the Boys from Ballymoney (Meekatharra 
Minerals) and to the final advantage of the 'Boys in the City• may be 
far removed from the minds of ex-miners in Ayrshire and Lanarkshire. 
Ironically however, they may yet live to see the demise of another 
'economic cipher' that contributed to their own destiny as "proud but 
bitter economic ciphers" (Macilvanney 1991) - opencast coal mining. 
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!~ Conclusion to Chapter Three 
In Scotland, the expansion of opencast coal mining has to a large 
extent depended on the utilization of 'co-operative political 
alignments', based upon 'economic nationalism', developing thus into a 
form of corporatism. This expansion of opencast coal production was 
part of the intended transformation of coal production and the labour 
process towards a private sector operation. The miners leadership 
amongst others in the labour movement placed the NUM in Scotland in a 
compromised position by accepting British Coal's strategy of 
rationalisation of the industry into a commercial entity as a 
'necessary evil'. The NUM leadership especially, provided no 
differentiation between opencast and deep mined coal production. 
Opencast coal production was dealt with within the context of economic 
nationalism as 'Scottish coal' and given favourable pricing arrangements 
'.by British Coal compared to deep mining (Kerevan and Saville 1988). 
Corporatism and opencast expansion were synonymous with the decisions 
made by several councils, not least Fife Regional Council over the 
Francis Project, turning logic on its head and using English planning 
guidance notes to push through the application. The watershed of 
corporatism was clearly marked by British Coal in the closure of 
Monktonhall/Bilstom Glen colliery and their disregard for custom, 
practice and procedures with the NUM leadership in April 1989. Bilston 
Glen was summarily closed without reference to the NUM leadership once 
Blindwells opencast came fully on stream and the capital investment at 
Monktonhall was in place. 
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The end of corporatism is linked to the psychology of closure engendering alienation and 
fatalism which itself affects attitudes to production and this was apparent across the breadth 
ofthe coalfield. The Wheeler Plan(1986) which constituted a dramatic shift to a new era in 
coal mining in Scotland could not have been possible without the historic corporatist attitude 
of the labour movement in Scotland in allowing the full blown expansion of opencast mining 
to supplant deep mine production. 
At the High Court in Edinburgh the 'divorce' ofthe SSEB and British Coal marked the end 
of a longstanding symbiotic relationship in energy production in Scotland. It also ensured 
the dominance of opencast coal in coal production at Longannet and Cockenzie power 
stations in the east of the country on grounds of 'cost'. Its impact at personal level can not be 
measured by the statistical loss of jobs resulting from deep mine closure even though these 
have numbered more than 20,000 men on colliery books since 1977/78.(Table 3.3). 
Expansion of opencast output has maintained the markets for coal while supplanting deep 
mined coal output and jobs. During this period chosen deep mine production units 
underwent technological change and investment, namely investment hibernation, ready for 
the new commercial era of mining in Scotland. Output projections (Tables 3.11-3.13) 
confirmed the purpose was the reconstruction of the Scottish coalfield towards a new era in 
coal mining based upon the three super pits at Longannet, Francis and Monktonhall, and of 
course opencast mining. Only Longannet is operational with the opencast sector. 
I.Jb 
Higher investment was directed at various pits within the geographic 
locale of the three designated super pits. Capital investment was also 
taking place when "opencast coal output was expanding at an increased 
rate to cover the lost output from the closure of deep mines" (Tables 
3.1 & 3.8). Yet, despite British Coal having sufficient replacement 
capacity in opencast, they continued to invest large amounts of capital 
into pits that for many years fell drastically short of their own 
financial criteria for investment. one reason was that capital 
investment was not fully in place and British Coal would not and could 
not shut pits even if they had enough opencast coal to supplant deep 
mined output. 
Opencast had its own investment, largely in the west of scotland, 
amounting to sizeable amounts of capital related directly to maintaining 
the Irish market. The State's approach to commercialisation of the 
energy industry was further illustrated by the relationship between the 
expansion and infrastructural investment in opencast mining, the 
development of Lignite as a competing fuel, and British Coal's markets 
in Northern Ireland. The situation has been extremely complex and 
politically volatile on. both sides of the Irish Sea amounting to a 
contest between Coalburn and Ballymony developments. 
The State monitored and controlled decisions made on energy provision 
and production in Northern Ireland and opencast expansion and 
infrastructure in Western Scotland. Subsequently, the decisions over 
developments in energy production in Northern Ireland have been based 
upon ideology rather than any economic or social logic. The market for 
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opencast coal was ~rigged', in favour of developing a coal burning power 
station at Kilroot against a Lignite fired one at Ballymoney, to suit 
the privatisation agenda for NIES and British Coal. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INFLUENCE OF OPENCAST MINING IN NORTH EAST COAL PRODUCTION 
Part One Employment and Production 
i Re-Organisation and Commercial Realism 
The pattern of deep mining in the early 1990's in the North East has 
been characterised by the trend since the 1884/85 strike to increasing 
productivity and profitability and decreasing costs often from the 
dramatic loss of manpower and production units through rationalisation. 
In stark contrast, opencast mining has enjoyed a steady expansion on a 
plateau of low costs and profitability. As the deep mines improve their 
productivity and the costs of extracting opencast coal begin to lift off 
the comfort of that plateau of profit, questions arise over further 
expansion of opencast mining. Indeed, whether there really is a market 
for the current amount of opencast coal now produced is brought into 
focus by the very success of the deep mines. Furthermore, there is a 
growing problem of over-supply of coal by 1992 that presents a political 
challenge to the relationship of opencast to deep mine production at 
current rates. Moreover, there are complex technical questions 
previously hidden from public gaze that, given adequate scrutiny, 
decisively challenge existing thinking on the need for opencast coal 
expansion. 
Overall, the contraction in the deep mine sector and the development of 
the opencast sector in the North East has taken on a different pattern 
than that in Scotland. The trends however, in terms of deep mine 
contraction and in the increasing dominance of opencast mining are 
striking in similarity, despite the opposition to opencast in the North 
East. But how the mining of coal in the North East arrived at this 
situation to become a commercial business has yet to be fully explained. 
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After nationalisation, in 1948, there were 185 collieries in the North East with a manpower 
of 149,445 producing 36,8 MT. The first major 'rationalisation' of the industry was 
evidenced by both the number of pits and manpower going below the hundred mark for the 
first time. In 1965/66, there were 98 collieries in the region with manpower on the books of 
83,718 producing a tonnage of29.8 MT. By the time of the 1972 coal strike that had been 
halved again, leaving 4 7 collieries with a total manpower of 42,959 in the operating year 
1972/73 which produced 18.3 million tonnes. This downward trend was less pronounced 
during the 1970's, even so the region has a 'creeping' loss of 20 production units. So that in 
the year 1980/81 there were only 25 collieries in the North East with manpower reduced to 
31,968, producing 14.0 MT. By April1990 the 7 pits remaining with 9,000 men on Colliery 
books produced over 1 O.OMT in the previous twelve months. North East deep mining 
rationalisation and the trend in contraction can be clearly seen from Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
NORTH EAST DEEP MINED PRODUCTION, MANPOWER 1947-1990 
Year Saleable 
Output 
(000 tons) (cwts) 
1948 
1965/66 
1972/73 
1980/81 
1989/90 
36,848 
29,750 
18,027 
14,008 
10,000 
Overall 
OMS 
End 
19.2 
30.8 
38.1 
47.61 
93.84 
Manpower 
at Year 
at Year End 
149,445 
83,718 
42,959 
31,968 
9,000 
Number of 
Collieries 
185 
98 
47 
25 
7 
Sources: British Coal. North East Coal Digest 1987 *Tonnes 23 cwts = 1 tonne 
What is often forgotten is that the coal industry has a large 
administrative arm supporting mining operations. This is administrated 
by Colliery Officials and Staff Association (COSA) members who belong 
to the National Union of Mineworkers. Equally, like the mines they have 
been subject to recent and dramatic changes in the last decade. 
Organisational changes to the structure and process of coal production 
in the North East coalfield since the 1984-5 strike have been designed 
to inculcate a commerc~al realism into all their operations. This has 
been applied equally at white collar level as much as at the point of 
production in deep mines and opencast mining; the only difference 
being that opencast mining has not undergone contraction in production 
or staff levels. One of the the first visible signs of change came when 
the North East Area of British Coal which consists of the Durham and 
Northumberland Coalfields moved from its large, long standing home at 
Team Valley, Gateshead. In 1974 there were 3,300 white collar staff on 
the N.C.B. books, the vast majority at the ~The Crystal Palace', Team 
Valley. By 1988 this was reduced dramatically to 950 staff with 400 at 
Team Valley(Reid, May 1988, B.C.). Indicative of this rationalisation 
was the shift from a production orientated operation to a cost culture 
one: 
We have a cost culture here •... There was not the awareness 
that this is a ~business', even some management don't 
understand this. 
Mr. Reid, Assistant Personnel Manager, North East Area: 
= from ~ Management Survey, New College Durham, May 1988 
The North East headquarters is now sited in Ryhope, but still contains 
one old characteristic: the Marketing Department have responsibility not 
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only for deep mine coal but the output from opencast mines too. one 
most telling fact is that it is more efficient to ~run' all coal, which 
is destined for the same market anyway, through one centre of operation. 
All other Opencast Executive operations are administered from their 
Newcastle headquarters. From Ryhope, in 1989, are controlled the 
operations of the seven deep mines employing 10000 people, profitably 
producing around 10 million tonnes annually since 1988. Contrast 
this, over the same period as the reductions of over 70 per cent in the 
white collar sections; to 1974/5 when the number of pits in the area was 
35 and the manpower stood at 37,655.(Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE NORTH EAST COALFIELD 1974/75 AND 1988/89 
White Collar 
Staff 
Manpower 
in Area 
Saleable Output 
1974/75 
3,300 
37,655 
14,551 
(000 tons) 
1988/89 
950 
10,000 
10,000 
(000 tonnes) 
Reductions 
2,350 (71.2%) 
27,655 (73.5%) 
4,550 (31.3%) 
(000 tonnes) 
Sauces: Reid, 1988, British Coal, North East Area: North East Coal 
Digest 1986·87: Coal News Editions 1989-90: British Coal Annual 
Reports: 
The white collar staff have 'gone quietly' compared to the miners over 
this 15 year period. Losses of jobs in the industry are dramatically 
drawn into perspective by the figures in Table 4.2, together with 
combined reductions in output over a longer period in Table 4.1. A 
seventy three per cent loss cuts right at the heart of the mining 
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community and culture. Given such a devastating loss, it is indeed a 
tribute to the North East people that so many more thousands turn out 
each year on the second Saturday in July for the North East Miners Gala 
Day. The effect it should have had on esteem and morale is certainly 
not reflected in the production figures. On the contrary the trend in 
productivity is decidedly upward. But the graphic fact is that in the 
classic operation of capitalism the reductions in the workforce are 
disproportionate to what is a much smaller reduction in output. 
Control of this process is at the heart of debates over the 
accumulation of capital versus increasing standards of living for 
society as a whole. Community and culture are equally important in 
the process of controlling the political economy of energy production. 
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jj Productivity. Performance .awl the Future of the Deep Mines 
Productivity by any measure has increased steadily since nationalisation and more rapidly in 
recent years (Tables 4.1, 4.3); even the State directive of a new profitability benchmark of 
£1.50/GJ applied by British Coal to all deep mine production has been overtaken. Despite 
short term problems, Wearmouth, Westoe and Easington managed performances down to 
around £1.40/GJ that even brought congratulations from British Coal (Coal News, 
May/September 1990). Lord Haslem, chairman of British Coal in 1990 described the 
region's seven collieries as "the jewel in British Coal's crown" with an operating profit of 
£66 million which matched that of the region's Opencast Executive in 1989/90. With 
productivity rising by 7.3 per cent coal production was maintained at 10.2 million tonnes. 
It is perhaps surprising that despite the performance of the deep mines there were few 
ambitious plans for expansion. Even the announcement of some £22 million new 
investment in the May 1989 issue of the Coal News would have hardly be enough to develop 
three new coal faces. Yet in the face of this cost effective productivity in a contracting deep 
mine sector we are presented with continuing expansion of opencast mining. Bearing in 
mind the contracting market for British Coal output, with competition from imports and 
other energy sources, there is bound to be a problem of over-supply in the reduced demand 
for coal. Table 4.3 shows the improvements in performance, though it should be understood 
that deep mining is not a production line - yet: 
Table 4.3 
NORTH EAST DEEP MINES PRODUCTION AND PERFORMANCE 
thousand tonnes 
Production Production 
1981/82 1985/86 
Dawdon ••.••••••••. 1061 
Easington ••••••••• 1291 
Ellington ••••••••• 1763 
Murton •••••••••••• 1219 
Vane-Tempest ••••••• 525 
Wearmouth ••••••••• 1105 
Westoe .•.•.••••••• 1412 
& Costs tr./GJ 
1237(1.64) 
1285 ( 1. 86) 
2118(1.49) 
961(2.63) 
910 ( 1. 87) 
1184 ( 1. 84) 
1228(2.10) 
Production 
1988/89 
& Costs tr./GJ 
1323 ( 1. 38) 
1525(1.57) 
2326(1.34) 
1350 ( 1. 46) 
894 ( 1.41) 
1291(1.59) 
1407(1.74) 
Source: British Coal, Coal News 1990 editions. 
Production 
1989/90 
& Operating 
Profit F./T 
1120(6.00) 
1610(1.92) 
2310(6.84) 
1160(0.78) 
860(1.51) 
1290(2.97) 
1630(4.10) 
Despite the contraction in the deep mine sector in the North East in 
pits, employment and production the situation in the deep mines until 
1992 was remarkable. The cost effective performance of the North East's 
deep mines increasingly challenged the need for expanded production in 
the opencast sector. The intended productive pattern of North East deep 
mines is laid out in Table 4.4. However, there were signs that even 
with the best endeavour the future of deep mining was to be further 
curtailed whilst applications to mine opencast increased in the North 
East. In depth analysis of 'shadow pricing' and the arbitrary 
accountancy practices of British Coal are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, following Berry (1985b) and Hopper (1988) work by 
Kerevan and Saville(1988) detailed and accepted earlier (Chpt 
3.2.iv) again calls into question the process of supplanting deep mined 
output with opencast coal on price allocation grounds. In a bid to beat 
imported coal, and with a "dash for gas" to replace coal fired 
generation and a subsidized nuclear sector (tr.1.5 billion p.a.), it would 
appear that the State in the process of extracting surplus value was 
giving British Coal no alternative than to expand the opencast sector 
and run down the deep mines to a mere 'rump'; in this respect Table 4.4 
may be more than optimistic in its projections. 
Table 4.4 
NORTH EAST DEEP MINES FUTURE PRODUCTION PATTERN AND TREND 
Colliery 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
Dawdon .•••• 300 560 
Easington.1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 
Ellington.2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 
Murton •••• 1350 1300 1300 1300 650 
V.Tempest •• 900 900 900 900 900 900 
Wearmouth.1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Westoe •••• 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 
Total 10050 9260 9350 8750 8050 7400 
Source: British Coal: com12iled from submissions ~ British Coal at 
Various Public Inquiries Between 1986 and 1990 
-------
The State may protest that it maintains a hands-off approach to the 
management of British Coal but it is not just existing internal research 
into internal management that cries foul! (Hooper et al. 1988; Davies 
and Metcalf 1984; Berry 1985~. In research and conversation with 
management from both deep mine and opencast sectors it is clear that 
there has been a certain amount of political cleansing in British Coal. 
Management that met the criteria of political correctness were speedily 
promoted via intensive courses with outside consultants. Andrew 
Horsler was one such person from Oxbridge going on to uninspiring 
performances as Marketing Manager at public inquiries, then to Marketing 
Director of British Coal. Others who have given years of service who 
failed to have the necessary 'commercial attitude' and the 'right 
political awareness', even in the opencast sector, have been demoted or 
'shed'. Senior management such as Director Clarke have been bought in 
to British Coal from the private sector to ensure conformity on hard 
commercial lines in the new regime. Existing British Coal management 
essentially are the product of, and conform to, the new 
cost-centered/accumulation culture directives of the State machine. 
From this, the culture of cost centred commercial realism has become 
embedded into the operations of British Coal. The 12 month in-house 
education courses for management have been progressively evident at 
public inquiries into opencast mining. It is at these inquiries that 
the comparative cost and improving performance of deep mines against 
opencast production have been brought ever more sharply into focus. 
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iii British Coal Opencast Mining in the North East 
Opencast coal mining in the North East is now operated within the 
Northern Area Opencast Executive. !~eluding Cumbria since the 1989 
re-organisation, it is administered by a team of re-trained management 
at its surburban headquarters in Newcastle. The style of management 
which is often displayed at public inquiries reflects the new priority 
and direction of opencast mining in coal production towards a commercial 
orientated private sector approach. For while less profitable deep 
mining has suffered continued contraction from 1980 to 1990, opencast 
has enjoyed a consolidated expansion. Though the ascent of opencast 
mining has not been quite as dramatic as it has in Scotland, mainly 
because of persistent opposition, its impact in the coalfield has not 
been any less marked. Table 4.5 shows the expansion of opencast mining 
in recent years where a marked 'hike' in output occurs after 1985/86. 
Table 4.5 
OPENCAST OUTPUT IN NORTH EAST ENGLAND (I 000 tonnes) 
1983/84 1984/85 1985/6 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 
BCC •••• 3067 2699 2801 3121 3298 3392 3544 
Sites 
Lisc •••• 341 366 355 626 S59 584 548 
Sites 
Total •• 3408 3065 3156 3747 3857 3976 4092 
Source: County Planning Officers (CPO), Opencast Coalmining Statistics. 
Opencast production has risen by more than 25 per cent since 1985/86 
against the national rate of 20 per cent. Remarkably, despite all the 
opposition to opencast mining in the region, it has in 1989/90 exceeded 
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the 4 million tonne mark for the first time in the region. Such 
expansion is related to British Coal's "New Strategy for Coal" in 1985 
which clearly marked out its commercial intentions. Since then the 
deliberations of the opencast sector have been the subject of several 
public inquiries, but thi~ belies the number of applications to the 
Mineral Planning Authorities to operate sites: 
There is a continuous pressure for opencast coal workings 
in County Durham. Durham County Council dealt with 57 opencast 
coal applications in three years 1987 to 1990, 49 by 
licensed operators. This was nearly twice that dealt with 
by the second 'busiest' authority, Strathclyde with 31. 
Proof of Evidence, Richard Hird, Environment Dept. Durham 
County Council, Whiteside Public Inquiry, Burnhope. 
It is relevant to mention here in relation to Table 4.5 and 4.6, that 
from 1987 licensed sites originally granted permission in which their 
output exceeded the licensed limit have been included in British Coal 
figures. The sum total of opencast production still represents a trend 
in expansion and a new approach to production. British Coal have 
intensified their operations in Northumberland since 1988 with plans 
for larger sites at Allerdene and Unthank near Berwick (Fig. 4.1, 4.2) 
to improve the economics of extraction. They have already been 
successful in Durham applying for Rye Hill and Eldon Deep with a 
combined annual output of 350,000 tonnes from 1993/94. With Hathery 
Lane in Northumberland it would bring the total of these three sites to 
around 7 million tonnes (BCC, Marley Hill P.I.). It is worth bearing in 
mind that in 1988/89 twenty sites with a total reserves of 15.35 million 
tonnes received planning permissions and they are not always direct 
replacements for worked out sites: moreover, another 3.2 million tonnes 
were approved after successful appeals against planning consent refusal. 
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Table 4.6 
OPENCAST COAL OUTPUT OF BRITISH COAL SITES IN THE NORTH EAST TO 1995 
Sites(OOO'ts) 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
Butterwell ••••• 1071 320 
w. Chevington •.• 450 458 
E. Chev ington •• 3 8 7 380 370 220 300 
Chester House ••• 386 386 420 420 320 
Stobswood ••••••• 170 750 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Linton Lane ••••. 105 234 260 260 260 170 
Plenmeller •••••••• - 40 260 260 260 
Jacks Law Ext ••• 150 150 150 100 
Colliersdean •••••• - 300 300 150 
Chapmans Well ••• 156 200 330 200 
Red Barns ••••••• 112 
Daisy Hills ••••• 238 207 170 110 
Thrushwood ••••••• 46 110 150 
West Carr ••••.•••• - 110 130 
Hilton Moor ••••••• - 110 110 5 
Inkerman ••••••••• 37 64 100 60 60 
Priors Close •••• 152 141 60 
Park Wall East •• 210 
Total 3670 3510 3298 3040 2505 1580 
Sources: British Coal: Collated from proofs of evidence and submissions 
at various public inquiries between 1986 and 1990: British Coal 
applications to MPA's 
Table 4.7 
FUTURE OPENCAST OUTPUT FROM CURRENT SITES 
IN NORTH EAST ENGLAND (OOO's tonnes) 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
British •••• 3510 
Coal 
Private ••••• 500 
Sector 
Total. ••••• 4010 
3298 
500 
3798 
3040 
500 
3540 
2505 1500 
500 500 
3005 2000 
1995/96 
1500 
500 
2000 
Source: British Coal~ C.P.O. Opencast Coalmining Statistics 
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While some of this tonnage is represented in Table 4.6 a significant 
proportion has yet to feed through the process of development (Fig.4.2). 
This will of course bolster the apparent declining rate of extraction in 
in the 1990's, outlined in Table 4.7, from much larger sites in the 
north of the region towards the 6 million tonnes per annum mark. 
Remarkably, even without the private opencast sector, the trend of 
expansion continues in contradiction to the background of a declining 
market for coal and regardless of a cost effective deep mine sector in 
North East England. After considering the pattern and trends in British 
Coal's deep mines and opencast sectors we can now turn our attention to 
the relationship between output, supplies and their market. 
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iv. Output, Supplies and their Market 
Having a general perspective on opencast and deep mined production in 
North East England allows us to establish whether there is an 
over-production of coal; to determine if there is an unnecessary 
production of coal from the opencast sector we need to know the market 
requirement for North East output. The programme for this is shown in 
Table 4.8 and wider discussion follows later on this complex and 
challenging issue. 
Table 4.8 
THE POSSIBLE MARKET FOR NORTH EAST COAL(ooo's tonnes) 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
Power 6500 6500 6500 6500 6000 6000 
Stations 
Industrial 2400 2300 2200 2000 1900 1900 
users 
Other Users 1000 1000 900 900 900 900 
Total 9900 9800 9600 9400 8800 8800 
Source: British Coal, Submissions at Various Public Inquiries, 1986-90 
Deliveries to what are called the 'rogue' markets of Yorkshire are not 
included as Selby mines may displace this output sometime in the near 
future, although the production of high sulphur coal may also become 
an issue here after 1992. Still, this is an uncertain market for North 
East coal. Supplies to Thames power stations are threatened by imports 
following the privatisation of electricity and the contract with British 
Coal to supply Thames ceases in March 1993 increasing the probability 
of further imports. The two generator sets at Blyth power station, 
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being at the end of the grid, are under review as the import of Scottish 
Electricity via the interconnector increases and Hartlepool nuclear 
station gradually imposes the 20 per cent nuclear levy on the PGI. The 
import of nuclear generation undermines the market for coal burn and 
some 3 million tonnes coal equivalent (mtce) is brought to the south of 
England via the 'French Link'. 'Industrial' deliveries will suffer 
especially in 1993 when I.C.I Wilton commences with its gas fired CHP 
power station replacing a large chunk of opencast coal burnt at its coal 
fired plant.(Horsler, B.C.,Daisy Hills P.I.). So with this information 
to hand we can assess the supply and markets for coal from Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 
OUTPUT AND MARKETS FOR NORTH EAST COAL(OOO's tonnes) 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
Output 
Deep Mine 10050 9260 9350 8750 8050 7400 
Opencast/ 
Brit Coal 3510 3298 3040 2505 1500 1500 
Opencast/ 
Private 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Drifts/ 
Private 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Total 14220 13218 13050 11915 10210 9560 
Markets 9900 9800 9600 9400 8800 8800 
Oversupply 4320 3418 3450 2515 1410 760 
Sources: Com,Eiled from Tables 4.1 to 4.8 
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I have tried to determine whether there is over-production of coal in 
North East England, and further, to establish that expansion of opencast 
is a major contributor to this problem. In table 4.9 I have combined 
the estimates of future output from different sectors and set them 
against the available markets for the same period. 
With their continuing levels of productivity, there being no reason 
for closure other than exhaustion at Dawdon and Murton, in theory they 
could supply around 90 per cent of the market total. With homogeneity 
of production blurring the distinction between public and private sector 
opencast output, deep mines could supply in theory the extra production 
needed to fulfill market obligations. That leaves 2-3 million tonnes of 
opencast from British coal each year. But as we shall learn later that 
is not how the market can be or is supplied. In British Coal's 
operation a certain amount of 'blending' of deep mined and opencast is 
necessary for their markets, for the purpose of optimising costs as much 
as meeting a specification. 
Deliberately, in Table 4.9, no account is taken of additional 
opencast from British Coal that would be coming on stream over this 
period. The purpose of this is to bring into focus the fact that should 
there be no new sites brought on stream during this period there would 
still be considerable over-production. So the introduction of more 
opencast coal onto the market would only tend to displace higher cost 
supplies from elsewhere and thereby reduce employment in the deep mines, 
even though those supplies were profitably produced. With stocks still 
at very high levels it would be difficult to take more than one million 
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tonnes for the replenishment of stocks out of each of the first five 
years' totals. This still leaves a cumulative total oversupply of over 
10 million tonnes from 1990/91 up to and including 1994/95. In 
confirmation of this Her Majesty's Inspector at the Marley Hill Public 
Inquiry concluded: 
For the forseeable future, coal output in the 
exceed the requirements of available markets. 
that the blending of opencast with deep mined 
North East will 
To the extent 
coal is already 
necessary to meet customer preferences, I accept the 
authorities' evidence that it could continue until 1994 
without any further grant of planning permission. That 
period could be very considerably lengthened if it were 
thought appropriate to bring the resource to the market at a 
rate consistent with full utilization of its special 
qualities and allegedly superior handlebility. 
Report of H.M. Inspector to the Marley Hills Public Inquiry, 
paragraph 458: 
Markets for North East Coal production will be oversupplied from current 
sources from 1990. This is without taking account of new opencast 
output coming on stream from sites with permissions such as Eldon 
Deep(SOO,OOO tonnes). This site has the tacit approval of Shildon Town 
Council as it is known to have toxic waste in the quarry section of the 
site which they want disposed. While British Coal would be complimented 
on this action, there seems little justification for the expansion of 
opencast production through working other sites to the detriment of cost 
effective deep mine production and employment. The simple fact is that 
there is over production and it comes largely from the expansion in the 
opencast sector. But if like British Coal you tilt the economic 
balance in favour of opencast as the lowest cost production then 
inevitably some deep mine production, profitable though that may be, 
will be 'taken out' with inevitable consequences on the region's 
compliment of miners jobs. 
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Part Two 
Narrowing the Gap: competing Costs of Mining in North East England 
i Comparative Trends 
In keeping with national trends which saw a two hundred per cent 
increase in profits and turnover in the deep mines, and a thirty three 
per cent drop in profits and turnover in the opencast sector (B.c. 
Annual Reports 1987-1992), North East deep mines were continuing to 
close the gap in costs with the costs of opencast coal production. In 
terms of cost alone, it went beyond the financial criteria laid down by 
British Coal and provided a challenge to any further expansion of 
opencast coal in the North East. Moreover, it does appear that the 
ability of opencast mining to reduce its cost in a similar manner as the 
deep mines was limited by scale, technology and geology. Justification 
for replacing deep mined output with opencast coal, even on British 
Coal's terms, may be limited. To counter the problem caused by 
economies of scale' British Coal applied for larger scale sites such as 
Stobswood, and Marley Hill. Trends such as this, and the reduction in 
the higher cost tail of mining, are not unrelated to the intent to 
privatise the coal industry. However, as we shall see these measures 
may be short sighted for they ignored the incremental cost of coal and 
the potential of North East deep mines to close the gap with opencast 
production even further. 
Table 4.10 shows the increasing productivity of North East miners since 
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the strike and the consequent narrowing of the gap between average 
opencast and average deep mine costs. Until 1986/87 opencast coal costs 
stayed above s1.15/GJ, since 1986/87 opencast costs have risen upward 
from a low of s1.02/GJ to a current 'ceiling' of s1.08/GJ in 1989/90. 
In contrast, deep mine costs during the same period show a downward 
trend from s1.58/GJ in 1986/87 to s1.40/GJ in 1989/90. While deep mine 
costs were falling progressively on the back of static levels of 
production, opencast costs have risen to a plateau on the back of 
increased production. This confirms that incremental output from 
opencast is costing more while the costs of every tonne of deep mined 
coal is gradually decreasing. But equally important, it clearly shows 
that the gap was closing between costs of opencast and deep mine 
production. Moreover, the rising average costs of opencast are on the 
back of a slowly increasing share of total production. With a 23.3 per 
cent share costing an average of s1.02/GJ in 1986/87, expansion took 
this to a 25 per cent share costing s1.08/GJ in 1989/90. One important 
reason for this is that the opencast operation does not ha~e the same 
capacity for increasing intensive use of initial capital investment that 
is found in the deep mine sector. 
The trend for closing the gap between opencast and deep mine costs of 
production is clearly established. As the deep mines still have the 
capacity to increase productivity, and on the evidence available, the 
deep mines will close the gap further. There are several reasons for 
this. Firstly, the ability to operate in large scale sites such as 
Stobswood (10 million tonnes) to effect lower costs is limited by three 
factors: 
a. The limitations placed upon the opencast sector by the planning 
system and objectors to opencast 
b. The diminishing number of large sites available 
c. Under planning law British Coal are forced to take all the coal 
from a site including the very high sulphur coal 
Secondly, there is the environmental problem. On average, opencast coal 
has a higher sulphur content than deep mines. New contracts with the 
P.G.I. have yet to be negotiated, and these must take into account 
reduced sulphur emissions imposed by the European Parliament. The need 
to provide low sulphur coal means having to choose a site with a low 
aggregate sulphur value, however this has presented great difficulties 
for British Coal: 
The only site that may be approved on agreement with the MPA 
without an inquiry is Rye Hill - high sulphur content of 3.38%. 
cannot produce until Chapmans Wells is finished (4.15% sulphur). 
Swalwell already 2.18%, and there is a penalty for overall supply 
above 1,87%. 
Jeremy Burford Q.C., Closing Submission Personal Notes, P.26: 
On Behalf of British Coal, Bi1lingside Public Inquiry 
As some sites will breach the penalty standard this reduces the number 
of lower cost sites available for extraction as a number of sites 
previously suitable will not meet the new specification. Of course a 
high sulphur content can be blended out by lower sulphur coals, but this 
process adds costs to the final product. The ability of British Coal to 
sell coal to the P.G.I. market is not only dependent on the cost of 
extraction, but also on the suitability of that coal to meet the PGI 
specification. The evidence from Burford is final proof that the 
majority of North East opencast coal, having a high sulphur content, 
would incur a financial penalty from the PGI under E.C. Directives if 
it were not blended with deep mined coal. Conversely, the majority of 
coal produced in North East deep mines would meet the new standards. 
Thirdly, the foregoing factors exacerbate the problem of diminishing 
number of lower cost sites. Consequently, we may find opencast 
operators extracting coal at slightly higher cost levels than in recent 
times. Though this is not to deny that lower cost sites such as that at 
Marley Hill may come on stream and have some bearing on the average 
costs of opencast output in the North East. 
The cost of producing coal from the Marley Hill site is 
estimated at less than 60.80/GJ. This is considerably less 
than the average cost of production for opencast coal in 
the North East as shown in British Coal's Annual Report 
and Accounts 1987/88 (Schedule 2) as 61.04/GJ for opencast 
coal 
Letter, ~ Carrick British Coal Opencast Executive to Durham 
County Council, 3/11/1988 
On the evidence presented here there are new factors affecting the 
already narrowing gap between deep mined and opencast costs. Processes 
both within and outwith the industry are combining to make opencast 
mining costs have a tendency to increase and deep mine's costs decrease. 
E.C. directives on sulphur emissions are but one factor that pose 
problems for opencast mining. In addition, we have found that on the 
grounds of sulphur content alone North East opencast coal needs deep 
mined coal before it can be marketed. Average opencast production costs 
have risen over the last five years, probably for the same reasons as 
they will gradually rise in the future. The number of large and/or 
lower cost sites that will be available will diminish. Deep mines, as 
has been stated, have the capacity for further productivity gains that 
will feed into the costs of production. They avoid the sulphur/lower 
cost site extraction ratio problems of opencast mining as the low 
sulphur content of North East deep mines is some of the lowest to be 
found in Britain. For deep mines it may mean that they will produce 
down to an average of 1>1.35/GJ in the near future. The gap then could 
narrow well below the 25 per cent mark. 
Table 4.10 
BRITISH COAL NORTH EAST OPENCAST AND DEEP MINE PRODUCTION 
81/82 82/83 83/84 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 
Deep Mine(MT) 13.5 12.5 11.0 9.6 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.0 
Costs per GJ 1>1.55 1;1. 96 1;1.58 1;1.46 1;1.43 sl. 40 
Opencast(MT) 3.00 3.00 3.07 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 
Costs per GJ 1>1.18 1;1.17 1;1.15 1>1.18 1;1.02 1>1.04 1;1.08 1;1.08* 
Private (MT) 0.34 0.36 0.63 0.56 0.58 0.58 
Total (MT) 13.93 14.16 14.28 15.68 
BCC Opencast 18.8 19.4 21.8 22.6 23.3 24.3 24.8 25.0 
% of total output 
Source: British Coal: *Includes Cumbria in new Northern Region oeencast 
Table 4.11 
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION COSTS OF NORTH EAST DEEP MINE AND OPENCAST COAL 
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91### 
Deep Mine 1.96/GJ 1. 58/GJ 1.46/GJ 1.43/GJ 1. 40/GJ 1.38/GJ 
Opencast 1.18/GJ 1. 02/GJ 1.04/GJ 1.08/GJ 1. 08/GJ 1. 08/GJ 
Per Cent. 66 55 40 32 30 28 
Difference 
Source: British Coal: ### 1990/91 figures are erojections assessed from 
available evidence 
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ii Policy and Credulity. 
Intentionally and otherwise, the pattern and trend in coal production 
costs has been historically transformed. The intent to privatise the 
coal industry has led British Coal to prioritise certain elements of 
policy where its future structure has been clouded by the zealousness 
of endeavours to operate in the 'world of commercial reality•. It will 
in the event be enlightening to see the next development of British 
Coal's policy on the relative merits of deep mine and opencast 
production. For as G.K. Wilson of the CPRE, and a life-long opponent 
of opencast mining, has stated succinctly at the Hilltop Brusselton 
Public Inquiry: 
It seems that little account is taken of the fact that deep 
mine production has several avenues of technical advancement. 
Opencast production costs have little room for technical 
improvement, and what is more important is that the majority 
of the geologically easy sites have already been worked. 
He then went on to argue what the outcome would be: 
It is therefore more realistic to expect that their costs 
will rise as the de~p mine costs fall. Current trends of 
those two factors carried forward, are likely to reverse 
the present marginal advantage of opencast coal working. 
G.K. Wilson, CPRE Proof of Evidence, Hilltop Brusselton 
Any additional opencast production needs to be considered in this light. 
The reduction in the size of their markets will mean that capacity may 
be withdrawn at profitable pits that may be continuing to gradually 
reduce their costs. In the meantime, opencast production is 
consolidated. This was inferred at the Billingside public inquiry: 
At present opencast production is a low cost coal ..••.•.• 
However I consider it likely that, in future, the 
differential between opencast and deep mine costs will be 
reduced and that British Coal will be well on its way to 
·2·•~ 
-d 
making a full profit .•••. It also seems likely that by 
1990, there will be a surplus of deep mined coal over 
the market requirement. 
H.M. Inspector's Report to the Secretary of State on the 
Billingside Opencast Public Inquiry 1987 
Andrew Horsler, British Coal's deputy regional marketing director, 
Oxbridge educated, never finished his Ph.D., but joined British Coal as 
a graduate management trainee. Nervous under cross-examination by H.M. 
Inspector at Hilltop Brusselton public inquiry at Shildon, Co. Durham, 
he revealed some startling evidence: 
H.M Inspector: 
What is the maximum quantity of opencast coal that could 
be sold from the North East as a share of total production.? 
Horsler: 
If one assumes the North East market is 10 to 13.5 million 
tonnes •.•••••• I see no reason why 5 or 6 million tonnes 
should not be sold in total. 
H.M. Inspector: 
Your Table 8.2 Mr Horsler, relating to Total UK Market for 
North East coal .•.•.••••• That gives a ratio of 9.5 deep 
mine coal to 3.3 opencast coal. Going back to your answer 
a moment ago, can you imagine that 3.3 million tonnes of 
opencast coal expanding to 6 million tonnes?. 
Horsler: 
Yes Sir, that is the ideal. 
Hilltop Brusselton Public Inquiry 1987, Transcript ~ 
Horsler's evidence tells us the intention is to double production 
replacing deep mined output. This 'ideal' strategy is generated, most 
probably by the State's requirement to securing surplus value through 
the expansion of opencast mining and the run down of deep mining. In 
the context of this process Horsler's comment is instructive and most 
important. The cost differential and the size of the markets will 
determine the future of deep mine and opencast coal. Historically the 
loss of or reduction in markets for North East coal has not been 
accompanied by a reduction in opencast coal production, but always deep 
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mined. Based on costs of production, that pattern should be changed by 
the recent reverse trend in sector costs. Table 4.11 depicts opencast 
coal costs rising from 61.02 in 1986/87 to 61.08 in 1989/90. 
Conversely, deep mine costs have been falling from 61.58 in 1986/87 to 
61.40 in 1989/90. Rises and falls of 5.6 per cent and 11.4 per cent, 
respectively. Yet it is perhaps incredible that we are presented with 
the Horsler spectre of opencast expanding from the current 3.5 million 
tonnnes to 6 million tonnes, simply because opencast is reputably a 
lower cost coal. In this scenario only the lowest cost form of 
production survives. As Sir Robert Haslem was reported in the Coal News 
as saying: 
the Corporation intend to maintain the volume of coal 
production by raising output from efficient, low cost pits. 
Conversely, this will involve the closure of more high cost 
collieries which no longer have a viable future in these 
fiercely competitive conditions 
Coal News March 1989 
And the result of this was reported by him a year later: 
A deficiency grant will cover about 61 billion of losses 
all of which arose as a consequence of the recent major 
restructuring of the industry and interest charges •••••••. 
With the dramatic cut back in manpower, we now have nine 
pensioners for each employee. 
Sir Robert Haslem, Coal News, April 1990 
Privatisation intentions appear to determine that there is a future for 
only the lowest cost coal. Examination of all the costs may produce a 
different approach than that of the 6 million tonne man, Mr. Horsler. 
All North East deep mine production is profitable. But with expanding 
opencast in a contracting market that in effect then becomes a separate 
coal company in competition with production from the deep mines. From 
the available evidence, the loss in employment would be greater than the 
loss in output. 
iii "Gannin Back Brockens": The Merits of Incremental Mining 
Achieving financial imperatives through the expansion of opencast 
production appears to be a major plank in the agenda of intent to 
privatise British Coal. 'Shadow pricing' and biased price allocation 
aside, opencast coal production costs compared to most deep mine costs 
have always been considered in a more favourable light. Nevertheless, 
the history of British Coal accounting has encouraged some opponents to 
challenge accepted beliefs and processes, more especially since the 
improved performance of deep mines. In the North East British Coal's 
accounting procedures have special relevance in what has become a 
complex matter of deep mine costs versus opencast costs: unlike 
Scotland, where evidence of such a debate in public inquiries has been 
as scant as the public inquiries themselves. 
It has taken British Coal the best part of 10 years to present a case at 
a public inquiry for developing an opencast site based upon the actual 
reason for opencast expansion - cost and the accumulation of capital. 
Planning law until the advent of Minerals Planning Guidance 3 (MPG3) 
would not consider cost as an outright material planning consideration. 
MPG3 was brought in England and Wales to sustain opencast expansion 
until vesting day after all arguments other than cost had been defeated. 
Now, the case for expansion is based upon financial imperatives laid by 
the State upon British Coal. These imperatives were set out in the 
document "The New Strategy for Coal" in 1985: 
There (is a) need for the industry to phase out its dependence 
on subsidy .•••• The Board therefore aim to break even on 
revenue account without subsidy (after grants for social 
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costs) ••••• and to achieve a major degree of self-financing 
by 1990. Para.4 
The industry currently has capacity in excess of the likely 
levels of demand. The task will be to meet the demand at 
minimum cost. Para.11 
The cost imperative is then outlined through 
all measures which reduce costs must be vigorously pursued • 
•••.•• and should aim to introduce flexible working ••••• to 
improve capital utilisation. Para.11 
Like Scotland, for the North East mines this cost accounting exercise 
means the "priorities within the investment programme will be" 
'operational' capital to fully exploit the best existing 
capacity and reserves to improve infrastructure and reduce 
costs ••••••• (and) maximise output at our low cost 
collieries and opencast sites as a means of reducing 
average costs. Para.11 
Incremental output from new investment was expected to be produced at 
not less than 61:00/GJ and the colliery itself to have an operating 
average cost of not more than 61:50/GJ, some 15 to 20p/GJ less than coal 
prices. 
What is certain is that costs will continue to ·have to be 
rigorously contained in order to compete. Para.16 
The purpose of the expansion in opencast production has been clearly 
reiterated by British Coal at almost every Public Inquiry: 
The National Coal Board's case for the development of the 
Hill Top Brusselton opencast site is based upon the need 
to develop low cost sources of coal in order to meet the 
market requirement. 
Mr. ~ Horsler, Supplementary Proof of Evidence, Hilltop 
Brusselton Public Inquiry Para.1.1, Februry 1987 
and that: 
The site would be worked at low cost and thereby make an 
important contribution to improving the financial performance 
of the Board(British Coal) in line with its objectives. 
~ Horsler Proofs of Evidence, Hill Top Brusselton Public 
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Inquiry, Para.9.1, February 1987 and Para.9.3 Daisy Hills 
Public Inquiry 
The main thrust of any challenge to the financial imperatives of the 
State and the accepted rationale of opencast being 'a lower cost source 
of coal' has come from the Council for the Protection of Rural England 
(CPRE). It is an 'interest group' body made up of people of diverse 
political persuasions and employments. The Northumberland and Newcastle 
Society is "The County Association of the Council for the Protection of 
Rural England". Its patron is the Duke of Northumberland, its President 
the Lord Mayor of Newcastle and its following includes as advisors 
Professor Bryan Hackett M.A., R.I.B.A. and M.R.T.P.I., Gateshead Labour 
Councillor G.K.'Pitch' Wilson, with the inevitable Capt., an A. J. 
Saker-Cresswell D.S.o., R.N. as Vice-President. The Association was: 
Founded in 1924 to preserve and increase the beauty and 
the amenities of the County and City, which now includes 
that part of Tyne and Wear north of the Tyne. 
The CPRE has been the leading opponent at Public Inquiries into opencast 
mining. Its noted successes were at the Public Inquiries into 
Whittonstall and Woodhead sites where CPRE held deep seated resentment 
of British Coal's attitude towards dissemination of information. 
Experience has shown that this reluctance to divulge information is not 
without foundation and reason. British Coal's secrecy over costsjcoal 
quality was also apparent at the Plenmellor application and 
examination: 
We approached the NCB (now British Coal) and asked Mr. 
Collier for information ••.•. Mr. Collier provided names 
of coal seams some (other) information but after 
referring to his superiors refused any further information. 
Northumberland and Newcastle Society(CPRE) letter to 
Northumberland County Council County Planning Officer 6/6/1985 
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The CPRE in the name of the Northumberland and Newcastle Society 
expressed their deep frustration at being denied information which would 
within the legitimacy of planning legislation current at the time 
examine the cost and source of supply of the coal in the site: 
We (and Northumberland County Coucil) require to know the 
precise nature of the coals and to study the market needs 
for these at this time and note all the possible alternative 
sources of supply and their prices etc. This analysis is 
not possible because the NCB alone has the data and refuses 
to divulge it. 
Ibid. 
More importantly for our case they found: 
It is our fear that this secrecy could indicate that the 
data would not stand up to the sort of scrutiny applied 
to NCB data put forward at the Whittonstall and Woodhouse 
sites. In both cases NCB data was shown to be erroneous, 
and even deliberatly misleading in part. 
Ibid. 
One of their most knowledgable people on coal production and costs is 
Malcolm Brocklesby. He is a Chartered Engineer, a Qualified Colliery 
Manager, holding degrees in Mining Engineering and Mechanical Sciences, 
with considerable experience in the mining industry. 
I worked in the coal industry from 1955 to 1965. During 
that period I was involved in the design and implementation 
of a number of capital projects and the design and 
installation of underground equipment and coal handling 
plant. 
Malcolm Brocklesby, Interview, 19/1/1990 
At the recent Marley Hill Public Inquiry he became one of the first 
people to present a coherent and concerted challenge to the coatings of 
opencast coal production against deep mine production. The purpose of 
his evidence was to: 
examine the cost implications of obtaining alternative 
coal supplies from less environmentally damaging deep mines, 
in accordance with the requirements of government policy as 
set out in MPG3, paragraphs 4 and 11. 
~ Brocklesby, Proof of Evidence, Public 
Marley Hill Opencast Site, January 1990, 
Inquiry into 
Para. 2.7 
In January 1989, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) published 
its report findings on British Coal operations. Concerning itself with 
the impact of investment at one mine - opencast or deep mine - upon 
another production unit they argued that: 
In our view British Coal's output related investments are 
not mutually exclusive in that each project will have some 
effect on the cash flows projected in connection with other 
projects. Indeed, with the present emphasis on low cost 
collieries, each investment project will have implications 
for the continued viability of higher cost sources unless 
Be can increase its sales. 
MMC 1/1989, Paragraph 5.90 
Having noted the excess capacity and stocks of coal in the country one 
can share the concern of the MMC over the effects of investment 
input/production outputs between opertcast and deep mine sectors. 
Brocklesby addresses the issue which other opponents have often 
overlooked. Correctly, he states that national average costs tell us 
nothing about a particular areas performance, even less in comparing 
costs of incremental production of opencast and deep mine sectors. In 
view of British Coal's commitment to the lowest cost sources of coal 
incremental/marginal and avoidable cost are the relevant and salient 
types of production costs that should be assessed. 
When planning to achieve the lowest production costs in 
an industry where capacity exceeds demand, it is necessary 
to compare the costs of incremental production from one 
sector against those of the other sector, or against the 
avoidable costs of reducing production from that other 
sector. 
Brocklesby, Proof of Evidence, Marley Hill, Para. 4.2 
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Table 4.1.2 
Colliery 
Harwerth 
Daw Mill 
Silverdale 
Total 
Source: MMC 
Table 4.13 
INCREMENTAL DEEP MINE PRODUCTION COSTS 
Project 
Cost 
t:.million 
22.2 
23.2 
32.5 
Incremental 
Annual 
Output 
tonnesfyr 
350,000 
500.000 
300.000 
77.7 1,150,000 
Report,1989, Para. 4.32 Table 
Cost of 
Incremental 
Output 
F./GJ 
0.65 
0. 72 
0.67 
0.69 
4.5. 
--------
Total Colliery 
Operating Cost 
F./GJ 
1.12 
1.04 
1.17 
1.10 
COMPARITIVE COSTS OF INCREMENTAL OPENCAST AND DEEP MINE PRODUCTION 
Units Opencast Deep Mine Opencast less DMP 
Average Costs F./GJ F. 1.04 F. 1.54 (F. 0.50) 
F./tonne 527.05 539.20 (512.15) 
Incremental Costs t:.fGJ F. 0.97 F. 0.69 t:.0.28 
for Additional or F./tonne 525.26 517.97 t:.7.29 
Replacement Output 
Percent 100% 71% 29% 
Sources: MMC Re:12ort 1989, Page 35, Table 4.4 
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·Figure 4 .3 
D Opencast 
II Deep Mine 
Comparative costs of opencast and deep mine coal 
Average 
cost 
Per/GJ 
Average 
cost 
Perrronne 
Marginal 
cost per 
/GJ 
Marginal 
cost 
perffonne 
£40.00 
£35.00 
£30.00 
C' J 
L.~ 
£25 .00 C\1 
£20.00 
£15 .00 
£IO.OO Sources: MMC 1989 , Variou 
E . I : s i n Opencast Mining , 
£5.00 
£0 .00 
Schedule 1 of the 1988/89 British Coal Annual Report and Accounts states 
the proportion of unit costs attributable to the production process. 
From this can be established the average production costs of a new 
opencast site. Overheads of an opencast site account for 6.5% as all 
other costs are credited to the prospecting and production of the site. 
Therefore the incremental costs of developing a new site are 93.5 per 
cent of the production costs and the cost of incremental output from a 
new opencast site is around 97p/GJ or s25.26 per tonne. Table 4.12 
refers to 5.13, page 35 of the 1989 Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
Report on the investment programme of British Coal, from this we see 
precisely what the 'operating costs of incremental tonnage' are. 
Consequently from Table 4.13 we find that the marginal costs of deep 
mine coal are around s18/tonne and opencast marginal costs are around 
s25/tonne. Both well below s1.00/GJ, but significantly the deep mine 
coal costs considerably less than opencast coal and this is graphically 
represented in Figure 4.3. According to Sir Robert Haslem these costs: 
.•••••• are reasonably typical of the cost of output 
obtained by capital investment 
Letter 18/4/89 Robert Haslem to Gerry Steinberg M.P. 
Consequently, Brocklesby argues that: 
Based upon this data, every tonne of opencast produced 
at the expense of deep mine capacity would cost the 
nation s7.29 more than it need. 
Proof of Evidence, Para. 5.13 
British Coal had two choices, invest in deep mines or opencast. And 
spelling out the 'economic misadventure' Brocklesby shows: 
The British taxpayer contributed s296 million in grants towards 
BC's restructuring costs - a further s148 tonne (BC Accounts 
1988/89, p.47). In the light of these concealed costs, the two 
investment alternatives take on a very different hue. 
Exploitation of the deep mine potential would involve a public 
sector investment of 667.5 per tonne of incremental output. 
Increased opencast would involve a private sector investment of 
&40 per tonne of incremental production, but in addition it would 
also incur a public' expenditure of 6282 per tonne (to cover 
closure of deep mine capacity). At a conservative interest rate 
of 10%, the nation would be contributing 628 tonne or about 
&1.08/GJ to opencast production. 
M. Brocklesby, Proof of Evidence, Public Inquiry into 
Marley Hill Opencaet Site, January 1990, Paras. 6.13-17. 
Brocklesby, in his supplementary evidence, provided a 'What If' analysis 
of three alternatives in meeting market demand with opencast and deep 
mine production. It is a model that can be readily applied to the North 
East but for our purposes it demonstrates the logic/illogic of British 
Coal's approach to opencast coal production: 
Alternative A - Maintain Deep Mine Production and Reduce Opencast by 
10 million tonnes per annum (mpta) 
Deep mine production is maintained at 84.5 million tonnes 
while opencast is reduced from 16.8 million tonnes to 6.8 
million tonnes. The average cost of deep mine coal remains 
constant at &37/tonne, opencast rises to &30/tonne, average 
BC cost rises by 51/tonne to &38/tonne and operating profit 
falls &182 million to &222 million 
Alternative B - Maintain Opencast and Reduce Production from Existing 
Deep Mines by 10 million tonnes per annum 
Opencast production is maintained at &16.8 million tonnes 
while production from existing deep mines is reduced from 
84.5 million tonnes to 74.5 million tonnes. No deep mines 
are closed. The average cost of deep mine coal rises to 
&42/tonne, opencast remains constant at 627/tonne, average 
BC cost rises &2 to &39/tonne and operating profit falls 
&227 million to &177 million 
Alternative c - Maintain Opencast at a High Level and Close 10 million 
tonnes of Deep Mine Capacity 
Closing 10 million tonnes of deep mine capacity with an 
average cost of &2.00/GJ (&48.38/tonne) would only reduce 
deep mine operating costs by &0.05/GJ (1.23/tonne). 
Compare this with the reduction in deep mine operating 
costs of &0.09/GJ which was achieved during 1988/89, 
mainly by improvements in productivity. Opencast costs 
increased by 60.01/GJ during the same period. 
Shutting seven collieries (1988/89) with an annual production 
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of 2 million tonne involves terminal depreciation charges of 
s172 million and net restructuring cost of s97 million. 
Social and restructuring costs to the taxpayer involved 
grants of s297 million. on the basis of these figures the 
closing of 10 mpta deep mine capacity would ,incur costs of 
the following order: 
British Coal: Terminal Depreciation Costs s 860 
British Coal: Net Restructuring Costs s 485 
The Taxpayer: Social/Restructuring Costs s1,485 
Ultimate cost to the nation s2,830 
Interest charges at 10 per cent on this sum would add 
s3jtonne to the average cost of the nation's coal. 
~ Brocklesby Supplementary Proof of Evidence to the Marley Hill 
Public Inquiry 
Brocklesby clearly demonstrates the financial penalty of developing 
opencast production at the expense of deep mine output within a reducing 
market for coal. British Coal will tell you very readily that the 
average cost of opencast is lower than the average cost of deep mine 
coal, what they won't readily admit is the incremental costs advantage 
of deep mine over opencast coal. By doing so, they mislead the public 
over the cost of coal to the nation. Why the State and British Coal 
choose to neglect the process of interaction of one production unit upon 
another especially opencast upon deep mine in terms of costs is not 
known. Then again the MMC were mystified as well: 
We were surprised that British Coal had not made more use 
of its models to carry out 'what if?' analysis of, for 
example, possible outcomes from ESI privatisation ••••••••• 
We recommend that British Coal should plan a regular 
programme of 'what if?' analyses to examine the effect on 
the industry of specific developments ••.••••• 
MMC 1989 Paragraphs 6.32 - Recommendation 19, and 6.34 
Recommendation 23 
What model it uses has an inbuilt criterion for production. This 
appears to be the range and amount of profitability of the individual 
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production unit (opencastfdeep mine) within given parameters, operating 
in isolation from other units. 
The only logic for such a course of action would be to 
facilitate the privatisation of BC by the premature closure 
of some of the less profitable collieries at the taxpayers 
expense. The scale of this sweetening operation, however, 
would appear to be some five or six times larger than the 
5460 million which the sale of Rover cost the British 
Taxpayer. 
M. Brocklesby, Supplementary Proof of Evidence to the Marley Hill 
Public Inquiry, Paragraph 4.2. 
Corollary can be drawn with Brocklesby's ~sweetening operation' from the 
~investment hibernation' in Scotland (3.3.ii-iv). Taken together they 
contribute to a more complete picture of the State's operational 
objectives in creating additional value in the coal industry for the 
private sector. Avoidance of costs by making the taxpayer soak up costs 
of closure endows the remaining pits with additional value for the 
private sector. Brocklesby's assumption starts from the point that deep 
mine closure will be absolute, but implicitly this does not deny that 
within this generalised ~sweetening operation' some concealed investment 
cannot be accrued from the privatisation transaction. The forms w~ich 
privatisation will take appear to depend on circumstances particular to 
each coalfield, but generalised to this is a sweetening of the whole 
operation at the taxpayers expense. 
From the above evidence we have deduced that there is under utilisation 
of deep mine productive capacity incurring a cost penalty or further 
tonnage costs to be added to stockpiles of coal. There appears no logic 
in over supply other than to say it was produced within financial 
guide-lines. This logic is to be found in British Coal's 'internal 
market' where each production unit competes with other production units 
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to achieve the lowest cost output. It is a terrible indictment that 
little or no account appears to be taken of the incremental costs of 
mining coal, otherwise there would be less opencast mining and more deep 
mining. Each opencast site as a production unit may be in itself a 
profitable venture in a contrived market. Understanding of the relative 
costs of coal production is made that more difficult when having to 
consider in addition British Coal's costs, their ~shadow pricing' and 
accountancy practices (Chpt.3.2.iv). Allocation of an above average 
price to opencast~ within parameters where only the lowest average cost 
tonnage is supplied to the PGI gives a disproportionate advantage to 
opencast coal. But when coal production is considered only upon narrow 
economic cost grounds the situation becomes an economic fiction. Even 
in accountancy terms the whole exercise produces a waste of scarce 
resources as other profitable production is not considered. 
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Part Three - The Markets For North East Coal Production 
i Recent Lessons: Opencast Coal and the Steel Market 
British Coal have persistently argued since the early 1970's that 
coking coal in some of their opencast sites would be sold to the coking 
coal market. Subsequently this has been proved false or invalidated by 
British Steel using its commercial prerogative to import lower cost 
coking coal. The loss of the steel market for North East coal has 
uncanny similarities to the current process affecting the market for 
coal in the Power Generation Industry (PGI). Consequently, the way in 
which British Coal have responded to the changing situation in the 
markets for coal has brought stinging criticism from a number of 
quarters. Not least of these is the Council for Protection for Rural 
England(CPRE) when British Coal's 'response' has been the use of coking 
coal as a steam raising coal for the PGI, bring accusations of the 
"mis-use of scarce resources" in producing coal for other than the 
intended market: 
At local level, the Opencast Executive have, during the past 
15 years demonstrated a total inability to forecast the 
market for coal they were seeking to opencast and which can 
be demonstrated by referring to previous inquiries. 
G.K. Wilson, CPRE, Proof of Evidence, Brusselton 
Public Inquiry, Para. 5.3 
At Medomsley(l974), Horsegate(l976), Whittonstall(l977), 
Woodhead(l983), Witton-le-Wear(1984, private site) and Plenmellor(l986) 
public inquiries, British Coal claimed that the predominance of coking 
coal in these sites was required for stated metallurgical markets. 
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Crucially, none of this coking coal was burned at any steel works, but 
it was 'lost' in blends for the PGI market. The coal at Medomsley was 
'required' for Redcar, Consett and Hartlepool steel works and 
Derwenthaugh coke works (Wilson, CPRE Proof, Brusselton Para. 5.5). 
Embarassingly for British Coal, after being refused permission, Consett 
and Hartlepool closed and Redcar steel work's start up was delayed for 
years. Derwenthaugh Coke works operation continued as it had done 
previously with coal from Marley Hill's Harvey Seam. The National Coal 
Board claimed at the Horsegate and Whittonstall inquiries that coking 
coal from these sites was 'urgently' needed for British Steel's blast 
furnace at Redcar (WERU 1985). This was contradicted by the existing 
contract between the Polish government and British Steel for specialist 
Rank 301 coals. By the time of the Woodhead(l983) and Witton-le-Wear 
(1984) public inquiries there was only the coke works at Derwenthaugh 
and British Steel, Redcar left. British Coal argued that they had 
found a niche market with Fords of Dagenham for a coke with specialist 
phosphorus qualities from Derwenthaugh. on the day the Secretary of 
State's letter of Site Refusal was issued, Fords announced the closure 
of the very foundry that British Coal were so eager to supply. The 
Derwenthaugh coke works, the designated market for Witton-le-Wear 
coking coal as well as Woodhead closed in December 1985. The once 
buoyant market for North East coking coal had collapsed, primarily 
under the commercialisation of the steel industry. 
The scale of the collapse in the coking coal market was made 
clear in the closure of Sacriston Colliery in West Durham -
a producer of 30lb - and the giant Horden Colliery on the 
coast. It can be seen too in the planned re-organisation of 
Easington Colliery, away from its coking coal reserves in 
the Low Main Seam. In discussing the question of the coking 
coal market the Commercial Director of the NCB argued, at the 
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Review of Horden Colliery, that there was no future for 
coking coal production at the pit: 
"for the simple reason that there is no-one to buy it any 
more. BSC can import, •.• as you know •.. They can buy it from 
anywhere in the world, and they do". 
~ Etherington L NUM, Proof of Evidence, Marley Hill 
Public Inquiry, para. 3.6 
Then, remarkably in 1986 at the public inquiry into the 2 million tonne 
Plenmellor site, British Coal said there was an imperative for the 
coking coal to go to British Steel at Redcar. Even disregarding the 
coal imports that British Steel had contracted, British Coal's case was 
found wanting. Under cross examination it was found that the British 
Steel specification could not be met by the coals from the Plenmeller 
site. Moreover in recalling the outcome of the proceedings the CPRE 
found: 
At a late stage in the inquiry British Coal produced figures 
on prices that could be obtained for coal on the site if 
sold to BSC. It was quite clear that the coal could be sold 
at 5 times the profit to the CEGB. The conclusion arrived at 
by these strange manouverings was that the BSC market, on 
which the inquiry had dwelt, did not exist and British Coal 
would find a market in power generation. 
~ ~ Wilson, CPRE, Proof of Evidence, Brussleton 
Public Inquiry, para. 5.9 
Fortunately for British Coal they had an ally in a Mr. A. Grierson, an 
ex-colliery manager and mining engineer employed in the British Coal 
industry from 1940-1950 and now employed as Chief Crown Mineral Agent. 
He was "appointed as an assessor to assist the Inspector, Mr. R. Pierce 
to advise him on matters relating to the mining and geological features 
relevant to this Appeal by the NCB". His report recommendation is 
quite revealing for its bias. In a blatant disregard for his remit he 
concluded in a contradictory and spurious fashion: 
I do not consider it part of my duties as a mining engineer 
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to comment in detail on the financial implications of the 
current oversupply of coal used for coke manufactures ••••• 
In the case of Plenmellor, however, should this "loss making" 
situation arise vis-a-vis coal to Redcar a financial remedy 
is possible by diverting over-priced coking coal to the 
thermal market. There was no indication at the Inquiry that 
(any) deep mine could match the 170,000 tonnes per year coking 
coal output capability of Plenmellor at a satisfactory working 
cost ••••• 
Having regard to the foregoing technical features of this 
~ppeal it is my opinion that it be allowed and that Permission 
be given to enable the Plenmellor site to be brought into 
operation to produce 170,000 tonnes of coking coal and 90,000 
tonnes of thermal coal per year. 
~. Grierson, Assessor's Report, Plenmellor Public Inquiry 
June 1986 
Previously there was a market for coking coal with four coking coal 
plants in the county, now that market is long gone. Plenmellor was one 
site with substantial reserves of coking coal that received planning 
permission, and even then after an 'unusual' High Court judgement. 
Another substantial and most recent site, Marley Hill(l990) did not. 
It follows, there is something both revealing and disturbing about 
British Coal policy of still maintaining a 'portfolio' of opencast 
sites with coking coal in them despite the loss of the coking coal 
market. 
crucially, British Coal had seen the future and attempted to channel 
their opencast coking coal into the PGI market purely for the profit 
margins it gave; this was done under the guise of directing it to the. 
metallurgical market. Even later, after compelling evidence that the 
coking coal market had gone, and that there was no technical reason for 
directing coking coal to a generation market which was adequately 
supplied by deep mined output, British Coal persisted with applications 
for coking coal opencast sites. For what reason? 
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One sensitive, overriding concern for British Coal in public inquiries 
including Plemellor has been the costs of coal extraction and transport 
from opencast sites. At the Marley Hill inquiry, British Coal placed 
great emphasis upon coal in the site with a phenomenally low extraction 
cost of 80 pence per GJ .• Forceful and zealous presentation of these 
matters is understandable, especially at a time when average opencast 
costs have risen back up to 61.08/GJ(Table ~12). Equally, it also 
betrays a sense of anxiety over objectives. Arguably, in a programme 
that would be geared to privatisation of the coal industry, there would 
exist a list of sites with the lowest costs of extraction. Having lost 
the vast majority of decisions there is little alternative but to go 
for your next lowest cost site, regardless of 'Ranks' of coal. But 
there can't be many low cost steam coal sites left of sizeable 
proportions in County Durham. Then again, given the number of site 
applications from the west of the North East region there never was. 
Patently, British Coal exploit reserves regardless of the coal's rank 
or properties. From Medomsley to Marley Hill, with cost and profit 
margins as the prime movers, the purpose has been the same, all other 
considerations are simply dispensed with. Could this be related to the 
allocation of a shadow price, so well above the average rating that it 
allows coals from remote sites such as Plenmellor to be finally coated 
below that of deep mines? That much needed information is not in the 
public domain. 
The disturbing undercurrent to all this is that opencast output has 
consistently affected the traditional markets for deep mined production 
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and employment. Opencast coking coals were supplanting production in 
the traditional coking coal markets of the deep mines. When these 
markets were dissapearing it has switched to compete in an internal 
market with deep mine coal for another of its traditional markets, the 
PGI. The loss of employment has been enormous in what has become a 
litany of opencast applications to utilize coking coals for electricity 
generation. Critically, there are lessons to be drawn from the 
response of the National Coal Board to the collapse of the coking coal 
market in relation to the threat to the power generation market for 
North East Coal production. British Steel's commercial imperative 
provided the catalyst for the NCB to enter the 'commercial world'. 
Their response to the loss of the coking coal market was to close the 
coking coal deep mines, between 1980 and 1984, such as Boldon, 
Blackball, Harden, South Hetton, East Hetton, Marley Hill and 
Sacristan. Regardless of this, commercial pressures meant persistent 
applications for opencast sites, even those with high levels of coking 
coal, were developed and sourced to the PGI because they were lower 
cost sites. Once the threat to that market from imported coal became 
apparent, British Coal exerted new financial criteria. Again the prime 
mover of cost and profit as defined by British Coal, meant the closure 
of even profitable pits with their production supplanted in the PGI 
market by opencast coal. Persistent applications for persistent 
problems. 
Part of the investment strategies for the North East Coalfield (Durham 
Area) processed under the 1974 Plan for Coal arose from British Steel's 
1973 Ten Year Development Plan. From this came new investment in steel 
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production plant at Redcar, and commensurate development of coking coal 
reserves of Rank 501 in the Durham deep mines of B1ackhall, Harden and 
Easington. But this was only part of the blend required by British 
Steel(BSC). Rank 301 coals were needed. Much of the provision of 
these coals was based on the expansion of opencast output envisaged by 
the Plan for Coal. However, a critical change occured that altered 
National Coal Board thinking on traditional production and supply of 
coking coal. In a radical policy departure by BSC, they embarked in 
1975 upon a policy to import coking coal which was s10 per tonne 
cheaper than that of the NCB blend (WERU 1985). From 92,000 tonnes in 
1975, imported coking coal to BSC Redcar had risen dramatically to 
1,025,226 tonnes by 1979 (Table 4.15). Much of this tonnage was meant 
to be provided by production from North East deep mines and opencast: 
The coal Board had spent s35 million on pits in South 
East Durham to supply the Redcar works and reacted angrily 
to British Steel's deal with Australia whose coal was s10 a 
tonne less than Durham's. 
Northern Echo 5th May 1979 
The expansion of opencast, largely in the west of County Durham, was 
also, to a large extent, predicated upon the need to supply Redcar with 
coking coal. This, by design or default, turned out to be a convenient 
vehicle to assist in the process of reducing loss making capacity and 
increasing revenue, necessary under government dictat. 
Significantly, the imposition of commercial criteria upon the public 
sector caused British Steel to import coal and led the NCB to respond 
by increases in opencast coal. This process has been a critical factor 
in the continuing decline of the deep mine sector and the primacy of 
opencast production from the late 1970's. Similarly, as in Scotland, 
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cost was the prime mover in this radical shift in energy supply, not 
the technical or chemical quality of the coal. For British Steel it 
was cheaper to import coking coal: for the NCB, unable to compete with 
imported coal, it was more·profitable to send the expanding output of 
opencast coking coal to the PGI. That in itself put the cap on many 
deep mines. The parallel with British Coal's current response to the 
importation of coal by the PGI is most telling. 
Table 4.14 
OPENCAST COAL PRODUCTION IN COUNTY DURHAM 
Year Production Production Total 
NCB/B.C. Private Licensed Opencast 
Sites Sites Coal Prod. 
1974/75 537,000 164,000 701,000 
1975/76 477,000 95,000 572,000 
1976-77 444,000 95,000 539,000 
1977-78 1,190,000 115,000 1,305,000 
1978-79 874,000 138,000 1,012,000 
1979-80 496,000 110,000 606,000 
1980-81 724,000 154,000 878,000 
1981-82 917,000 179,000 1,096,000 
1982-83 723,000 178,000 901,000 
1983-84 651,000 191,000 842,000 
1984-85 697,000 290,000 987,000 
1985-86 689,000 262,000 951,000 
1986-87 773,000 525,000 1,298,000 
1987-88 808,000 375,000 1,183,000 
1988-89 748,000 245,000 993,000 
1989-90 883,000 283,000 1,166,000 
Sources: British Coal: CPO, Opencast Coalmining Statistics. 
By 1979 (and as early as 1975 perhaps) it was clear that the 
BSC would not be taking up its options on Durham medium 
volatile coal - the 30lb's from the West of the County. By 
that date, it was also clear that too much coal was being 
produced nationally. Yet in one planning inquiry after 
another the NCB insisted upon the need for an expansion in 
opencast workings. In its defence the Board made slavish 
reference to the 15 million tonne target of the Plan for Coal. 
(Mis)Managing Harden, P67/8 WERU Report 1985 
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Again from this process, we witness another parallel when the NCB 
placed a 'freeze' on coking coal prices, this meant a reduction in real 
terms in the cost of coking coal. Crucially as in recent times, this 
then placed a premium on the NCB's lower cost coal production, 
predominately from opencast mining. Even though it would appear there 
was no market for the coal, opencast production was not run down in 
tandem with that of the deep mines. 
Outlining the NCB's bid to 'hold the market' for coking coal the Durham 
Area NUM received a letter from the NCB Marketing Director as late as 
1978 stating that: 
They(BSC) will accept all the rank 301b coals we have 
available which will be in the order of 700/800,000 tonnes 
per annum. 
Ibid. p41 
It became apparent that even the NCB's best efforts at holding the 
market' with its 'lowest cost and best coal' were to be dashed. 
There is no longer any commercial advantage to be gained 
by the Teesside works of maximizing the quantity of local, 
high volatile coals used; additionally, the quality of 
the coal has deteriorated. 
Guerin J.P., Bouness 1984, Preheated coal operations at Redcar 
Coke Ovens. in Ironmaking and Steelmaking, 11, 186-91. 
This placed an imposition upon the NCB to concentrate its production 
upon the lower cost coals, namely from opencast production. Patently 
from Table 4.14, the NCB were all too willing to respond. But their 
faith in Redcar was wildly misplaced as the imported coal contract was 
already in place; the consequent results we can see from Table 4.15. 
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What cannot be seen from this table is how the coking coal from 
opencast sites was processed, other than in a costly exercise of 
wasting scarce resources and supplanting deep mine steam coal 
production for the PGI. 
Table 4.15 
COKING COAL SUPPLIES TO B.S.C. REDCAR 1975-1987 
NCB/BC Supplies Imported Supplies 
Year Tonnes Year Tonnes 
1975 92,000 
1976/77 56,000 1976 164,000 
1977/78 36,000 1977 239,991 
1978/79 134,000 1978 486,697 
1979/80 244,000 1979 1,025,226 
1980/81 199,000 1980 1,252,850 
1981/82 318,000 1981 1,127,130 
1982/83 32,000 1982 1,131,464 
1983/84 48,955 1983 1,441,102 
1984/85 1984 2,104,838 
1985/86 1985 2,483,958 
1986/87 1986 2,608,860 
1987/88 1987 2,697,913 
1988/89 1988 2,669,000 
1989/90 1989 2,878,000 
1990/91 1990 
Sources: British Coal, Hansard Written Answers 645/6 22/2/89, Tees and 
Hartlepool Port Authority Annual Reports 1975-1983, Harbour Master's 
Log Books 
Confirming the demise of the coking coal market for Durham collieries 
such as Blackball, Houghton and Marley Hill, the NCB stated: 
The requirements of BSC have become more demanding and the 
competition from imported coal more acute •••••••••• 
attempts to reduce the size of the pit, then to find 
alternative markets failed •••.••• Its main reserves were in 
the Harvey seam, which were not considered to be viable in a 
situation where there was an excess of coking coal available 
for the reduced market requirement .•••..• 
The Busty seam was closed with a consequential reduction 
of output at the pit consistent with a reduced demand from 
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the market. 
NCB Submissions 1980-81, European Coal and Steel Community 
(Readaption Aid), (Article 56, s.2b, Treaty of Paris.) 
The production of coking coal from the South East Durham pits was 
equally wasted, diverted for a short time to the power generation 
market. This was cynically viewed by the 'Broad Left' in Durham as 
'just :long enough to organise some rationalisation'. Once again the 
Durham deep mine sector was looking into a ravine which it was not able 
to fill with coal, but with the hopes and aspirations of those who 
toiled in it. Not so the opencast sector. It was 'excavating' coal 
from ever widening ravines in the west of the county. 
There were several stages in the expansion of opencast production. 
These stages are called "Pacers" by advertisement people. It is jargon 
for developing the pace of change in an organisation to the desired 
objective. Psychological conditioning is supposedly effected by 
constituting a series of events or situations across a time period to 
influence and change attitudes and perceptions, so that they themselves 
reinforce that change to desired objective ends. Ultimately it meant 
for the North East coalfield that 
Opencast coal production was being established in a new 
role and one which is at odds with its historical relation 
with the mining industry. Rather than supplementing deep-
mined production, it can be now seen as an alternative 
and competing source of supply within a static (or 
declining) market. 
(Mis)Managing Horden, P.63 
Tragically, we have entered a similar era with British Coal repeating 
the same process with the PGI. Slavishly, British Coal have responded 
by persisting with contentious applications at public inquiries. At 
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these inquiries they continue to advertise the virtues of opencast coal 
in striving for short term profits, often to the f~rther detriment of 
deep mined production, in a diminishing market for North East coal. 
From Medomsley to Marley Hill is equivalent in distance to the 
advancement in time and objectives that British Coal and the State have 
achieved from the first of those public inquiries (1974) to the other 
(1990) - "just over the hill". 
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ii Maximising Efficiency, Minimising Cost 
Whatever happens we have got to get this industry into a 
totally viable situation in relation to the world in which 
we now live. It is the market which moves the goal posts. 
The price of coal has halved on the world markets. 
Sir Robert Haslem, Chairman, B.C., Newsnight, 1/3/1989 
--~-
What Haslem failed to say was that the government chose to align British 
Coal production to world prices when less than half of the world's 
coal production uses that benchmark; most of the European producers have 
their own internal financial arrangements. This had epitomised the 
situation for the British Coal industry. Bereft of the previous levels 
of financial support, the State then chose to expose British Coal to the 
vagaries of the international coal market following the privatisation of 
the electricity industry. The future for coal according to the State 
and British Coal lay in a policy of maximisation of their lowest cost 
resource rather than the fullest utilization of existing profitable 
resources. Over many years the markets that existed for coal from the 
North East have been reduced, by design or default, to an unhealthy 
dependence upon the Power Generating Industry(PGI). Historically, the 
hallmark of the North East Coalfield was its diversity of markets 
arising from the varying quality and flexibility of its coal supply: 
Durham coals are of high rank, being 501 with some 401 
suitable for gas making and blast furnace ovens ••.•.•. 
while coals to the west of the Al road are largely 301 
Rank, being prime coking coals. The coals all have a 
high calorific value and in addition to being high 
quality carbonisation coals, are very good general 
purpose coals for steam raising •••••••• (their) unique 
flexibility arises from the inherent quality of the 
coals, with high thermal values, and the fact that in 
Durham, coal preparation is more widely developed than 
in general throughout the industry 
William Reid (Chairman of the Northern Area, NCB), 1972 
The Development of the Coal Industry in Co. Durham, pp.ll-12 
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Equally, part of that diversity were coals from Northumberland. From 
Rank 40ls on Tyneside to Rank 701 further up the coast, they serve to 
illustrate the variable geology of coal in the North East (Atkinson 
1980). However, commercial expediency has overtaken technical logic. 
The usage of these coals to their maximum potential has been matched by 
the imperative of British Coal to hold its markets and,recently, achieve 
the financial targets set by government in preparation towards 
privatisation of the industry. So much so, that any previous 
distinctions between 'Ranks' of coal have been reduced to 'opencast 
coal' and 'deep mined coal'. 
In the late 1980's we have to exist in fiercely competitive 
conditions. In such conditions the scarce resource is not 
indigenous coal, the scarce resource is low cost indigenous 
coal. And when you are talking about low cost indigenous 
coal you are talking about coal produced by opencast means. 
Please don't think the opencast is a short term industry, we 
have in our reserve bank some 300 million tonnes of 
opencastable reserves, and we are discovering opencast 
reserves at the rate of 24 mtpa. 
Ray Procter Managing Director Opencast Executive, Newcastle 
University, Energy and the Environment Debate, 28/2/1989 
Here Ray Proctor talked confidently about opencast coal as the long term 
solution to British Coal's problems. It is of course also being used as 
a short term solution in a declining market for coal both regionally and 
nationally. In contrast with opencast mining which has held onto its 
high plateau of production, deep mines have redu~ed output in line with 
the trend in consumption (Table 4.16). Statistical results however, do 
often hide the impact upon the human condition of those working in the 
industry, and changes in the pattern and trends of coal production have 
proven traumatic in the past (Bulmer 1978, WERU 1985, Beynon 1986). 
Leveraged through the financial determinism of British Coal, we now 
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witness again a similar process of change. This time, the increase of 
opencast output in relative terms over deep mine production carries the 
portent of distress beyond the specific mining communities and into the 
wider environs. 
Table 4.16 
NATIONAL TRENDS IN COAL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION(OOO's Tonnes) 
production consumption 
Total Deep-Mine Opencast PGI Imports 
1985 94,112 75,289 15,569 73,940 12,732 
1986 108,099 90,366 14,275 82,652 10,554 
1987 104,533 85,957 15,786 86,177 9,781 
1988 104,066 83,762 17,899 82,465 11,685 
1989 101,135 79,628 18,657 80,633 12,137 
1990 92,937 71,501 17,802 82,555 14,783 
Percentage - 8.1 - 10.2 - 4.6 + 2.4 + 21.8 
Change from 
Previous Year 
Source: Energy Trends: Tables 3 and !L June 1991 
The commercialisation of the market for coal aligned to world market 
prices is instrumental in ~ffecting those changes. The intent by the 
PGI to continue to import coal is shown graphically by the 21.8 per cent 
increase in imports in itself it stands in stark contrast to the 10.2 
per cent decrease in deep mine output. This increase in imported coal 
and the maintenance in the relative level of opencast coal in a static 
market suggests the rapid displacement of some deep mined production. 
In 1990 the only substantial market for North East coal is for steam 
raising coal at power stations and special 'Ranks' of coal for the 
industrial markets. In contrast to Scotland, the North East production 
and market relationship is anachronistic in structure and process. For, 
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apart from the Blyth generation sets, much of the coal produced is 
burned in power stations outside of the region. The last power station 
to be commissioned in the North East was a nuclear one in 1968; this has 
consistently failed to live up to expectations in terms of electricity 
generation. 
The financial advantages of maximising opencast coal in relation to deep 
mined coal, in holding these markets is made apparent in Table 4.17. 
With opencast costs rising and deep mine costs decreasing, serious 
questions have been posed over the marginal costs of coal produced in 
the North East (Chpt. 4.2.iii). Nevertheless, at public inquiries 
British Coal have placed great faith in the figures in Table 4.17, using 
them to justify expansion of opencast output. Relative consolidation 
of opencast coal in an overall declining market for North East coal is 
made clear from Tables 4.18 and 4.19. 
In the year 1987/88, there were 3,769,000 tonnes of opencast coal 
produced. Of this total 2,142,000 tonnes, representing 57 per cent, was 
supplied to the CEGB, along with two thirds of deep mine output. In 
keeping with common practice, some further 717,000 tonnes went to 
intermediate destinations from opencast sites. However the industrial 
market was set to change and the temporary nature of the 'rogue markets' 
in Yorkshire and the Midlands only served to emphasize the size of 
surplus production (Horsler, British Coal, Proof, Brusselton, para 8.2: 
Burford, British Coal, Billingside, ~- Table 4.19 shows supplies of 
coal from the North East deep mines to the PGI. It indicates the 
percentage of the saleable output from each production unit as well as 
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the degree of importance of such a market to the deep mines. 
Table 4.17 
AVERAGE COSTS OF OPENCAST AND DEEP MINE COAL IN NORTH EAST 
1987/88 
Opencast 
~/Per tonne ~/GJ 
26.96 1.02 
Deep Mine Cost 
~/Per tonne ~/GJ 
38.00 1.48 
Cost 
Advantage 
31.5% 
Source: British Coal, Various Public Inquiries - 1986-1990. 
Table 4.18 
BRITISH COAL NORTH EAST OPENCAST DISPOSALS 
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 
(Northern) 
Power stations 2,099 2,142 2,435 2855 
Thames 880 920 834* 740 
Blyth 1,250 1,580 1,184 1100 
Yorkshire 200 185 200 341 
East Midlands n/a 465 500 674 
Industrial/ 134 433 482 624 
Exports 252 477 398 682 
Collieries 419 717 n/a 485 
Stocks 493 223 460 365 
Sources: British Coal; Opencast Coal Mining Statistics, CPO 
Colliery deliveries to the PGI from the North East have reduced markedly 
in the past decade. British power stations consumed 9,790 million 
tonnes in 1981/82 from the coal produced in the North East. In 1989/90 
this declined to 7.8 million tonnes under the short term arrangements 
struck with the PGI in its new formation under privatisation. New and 
changing situations have meant that coal from the North East is being 
supplied to more diverse, but equally temporary, power station 
destinations. These have been described by British Coal's North East 
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Marketing Manager, Paul Kerry as rogue markets'. So that in 1990 North 
East coal is supplied to four main power station markets. These are 
Blyth, Thames/Medway Estuary, Yorkshire and Central East. Coal is also 
sourced in an internal competition market to Scotland, Fiddlers Ferry 
and Northern Ireland. 
Table 4.19 
DISPOSALS TO THE CEGB AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES 
First six months from March 31st 1987) 
Production Unit 
(OOO's tonnes) 
Dawdon ••••••••• 606 
Easington ••.••• 656 
Ellington •••••• 932 
Murton ••••••••• S75 
vane Tempest/ 
Seaham ••••••••• 384 
Wearmouth •••.•• S72 
Westoe ••••••••• 736 
Total •••••••.• 4467 
Saleable Output 
(OOO's t) 
497 
500 
313 
555 
195 
219 
705 
2984 
Sales to CEGB 
(per cent) 
82 
76 
33 
97 
51 
38 
96 
63 
Source: British Coal and Opencast Coalmining Statistics 1987/88 
Alignment to international coal prices has in itself brought added 
pressure to bear upon the coal industry. Choosing to compete with 
imported coal prices has brought the rapid decline in demand for deep 
mined coal, displaced by a policy of maximising opencast coal 
production. Regardless, the PGI will maintain an element of imported 
coal for strategic purposes at power stations which have been markets 
for North East coal, limiting advantages British Coal may gain from 
maximising opencast and minimising costs by deep mine closures. 
iii The ~ Power Station Market for North East Coal Production 
Apart from the industrial power stations of Alcan and ICI Wilton, the 
North East's only coal fired PGI station is at Blyth. To all intents and 
purposes the Stella Gill power stations at Blaydon are redundant. 
Situated on the Northumberland coast, Blyth 'A' and 'B' were designed to 
be both fully fuelled by coal produced from the deep mines in the North 
East region. They are unique in themselves, and make an important 
contribution to the continuity of the deep mines in the region. 
Generating at an end point in the national grid and being so distant 
from other stations has given them an advantage by running at a higher 
load factor than the PGI would wish. Because of their inherent low 
thermal efficiency, running them at a high annual load factor has not 
always been a viable process. This has happened nevertheless, with the 
consequence that coal burn has been that much higher than normally 
justified. 
Opencast coal contributes a greater proportion of coal to Blyth power 
station than that going to Thames. Moreover the increase in the 1980's 
has been dramatic. From a low of 13 per cent in 1978/79 it reached a 
high of over 48 per cent in 1986/87, dropping back to align with PGI 
specification levels (Table 4.20). Since the closure of two of the last 
three pits in Northumberland opencast coal disposals have declined to a 
fairly static level of around 37 per cent, primarily because of a 
mismatch with PGI specification requirements as much as a decline in 
demand for coal. Despite this reduction in coal consumption, opencast 
coal output is expanding at the highest rate across the region in East 
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Northumberland. 
Table 4.20 
BRITISH COAL DELIVERIES TO BLYTH POWER STAIION 
Year Total Coal Deep Mine Opencast 
Delivered Delivered Delivered 
(OOO's tonnes) (OOO's tonnes) (OOO's tonnes) 
1978/79 3370 2930 440 
1986/87 2580## 1330 1250 
1987/88 3340 1760 1580 
1988/89 3110 1930 1180 
1989/90 3000 1900 1100 
Source: British Coal, Various public inquiries 
## Blyth B. out of commission for a short while 
Opencast as 
percentage 
of Total 
13.1 
48.5 
46.7 
38.0 
36.7 
It is worth a reminder that besides Stobswood's 10 million tonnes (m.t.) 
there is an expansion above the regional average in the number and 
tonnage of Northumbrian east coast opencast coal sites, from the new 
Linton Lane and East Chevington sites with a combined tonnage of 4.8 
m.t., to the proposed Highthorn site of 6 m.t., Windmill Hill with 1.5 
m.t. (Fig.4.4) and N.E. Northumberland sites with over 10 m.t. (Fig. 
4.1). With the prospect of further loss of deep mine production after 
Dawdon and Murton in the early 1990's this pointed to consolidation of 
opencast coal burn in North East coal markets. Opencast has been used 
at Blyth for specific purposes as a cost effective exercise: 
At Blyth, CEGB take a minimum of 15% of their bunker supplies 
as opencast in order to meet the ash and calorific value 
requirements of the station. In addition they require that 
coal laid down for winter and weekend lifting should be mainly 
opencast coal •••••• 
A. Horsler, British Coal, Proof of Evidence, Billingside 
Public Inquiry Para. 8.2 
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However, Andrew Horsler at the Daisy Hills Public Inquiry under cross 
examination of Durham County Council's Q.C. Mr. Parten was determined 
to justify the large amount of opencast disposals to Blyth power 
station: 
Parten: 
Compared with today, Mr Horsler, the present situation is 
this: In the last complete year, or present year, you 
supplied 2.6 million tonnes to Blyth, so the grand total is 
2.6 million tonnes now and 3.37 in 78/79. 
Horsler: 
2.6 million last year. 
Parten: 
Now of the 2.6 million tonnes last year, as I understand it, 
some 320,000 tonnes was opencast? 
Horsler: 
I'm sure you're right. 
Parten: 
So 100,000 tonnes out of 3.37 million in 1978 and 320,000 
from 2.6 million in 1986. Blyth was operating happily in 1978 
with about 3 per cent of its total being made up of opencast, 
and then they got 540,00 tonnes of the 3.37 million being 
opencast coal. But now you are supplying something like 50 per 
of it.· 
Horsler: 
Correct. 
Parten: 
Blyth could operate quite happily, could it not, if five 
-sixths of its coal, rather than one half were deep mined? 
Horsler: 
Well, it could if it were forced to do so because there was 
no alternative. 
Porten:(probing) 
Where is it that the inspector finds that the CEGB say we 
must have 50 per cent Blyth coals opencast, rather than 5, 
10 or some other figure? 
Horsler:(unconvincingly) 
You'll find some guidance to it in various letters, but you 
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will not find the 50 per cent other than in the CEGB's day to 
day requirements. 
Porten:(tauntingly) 
The Inspector's view on that in 1979 - you will find in para 
12.8 of his conclusion- •••• "I conclude that the use of coal 
for heat energy making is considerably in excess of that 
called for, by CEGB specification, is wasteful; especially 
when scarce energy resources ought to be sparingly used". -
Is this a specific item that you're wasting on the CEGB, 
still now, only than in greater quantities? 
Horsler:(indignantly) 
Certainly not. The use of coal is marginally in excess of 
the minimum called for by the CEGB - I'll accept that. But 
there's been increasing attention given by the CEGB in the 
past few years that British Coal should maximise their 
efficiency and minimise their cost. 
TranscriptJLCross ~Examination of~ Horsler, British Coal, 
~ Mr.Porten Q.C. for Durham County Council, 
Daisy Hills Public Inquiry, 3.10, P.21-23 
A robotic off the shelf retort, and not credible; why should the CEGB, 
as a seperate organisation, suddenly take an interest in British Coal's 
operational performance other than they meet their specifications? 
British Coal have produced no evidence at public inquiries to support 
his view of the CEGB. Yet the whole issue is disturbing as much as it 
is revealing. Horsler admits that Blyth could operate with 
substantially less opencast coal than the current levels. Should Blyth 
go back to levels of around 50 per cent this would, as Horsler admits, 
be in "excess of what is called for", but in the interest of "maximising 
efficiency and minimising cost". That makes it alright. It shows a 
certain disregard for the cumulative effects of such an approach. 
Besides a waste of scarce resources, it displaces profitable deep mined 
output and employment, themselves much of an unaccountable item in 
British Coal's accounts. The case of what level of opencast is 
justified at Blyth died on the altar of electricity privatisation. The 
current percentage levels may rise again with the use of east coast 
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Northumbriam opencast coal to hold the market, but even that market may 
be in jeopardy. 
The privatisation of the electricity industry has, with some certainty, 
cast the future of Blyth power station in a different light. 
Importation of electricity from Scotland is something that has been 
occurring infrequently for some time, and the ability of Hartlepool 
nuclear power station to rise Pheonix-like and fully operational for the 
first time, ever, presents a continuing threat to the present level of 
coal burn at Blyth. British Coal having settled on a five year coal 
supply arrangement for Longannet power station are busy negotiating with 
Scottish Power 'in good faith' on a joint venture agreement to burn 
opencast coal at Cockenzie and sell the resultant power south of the 
border through the interconnector which is to be upgraded in 1994 giving 
Scottish Power an export entit.Leui~~t of 910 MW. However, there are those 
observers in Scotland who question whether this arrangement will come to 
full fruition. 
Now, pushing the output of Cockenzie(net output capacity 
1152 MW ) down the grid interconnector would soon eat into 
Scottish Power's share of its main export channel. Potential 
Scottish Power shareholders will want to know what commercial 
logic drives these negotiations with British Coal, if British 
Coal is to get a slice of any profits and Scottish Power's 
other own account export options are compromised, as a result. 
A. Young, Economics Editor, Glasgow Herald, 13/5/1991 
The 'logic' of this process could be the closure of one of the 
generating sets at Blyth. The influence of cost is uppermost in a 
privatised PGI. Maintaining Blyth so high in the merit order is perhaps 
more costly than importing electricity from Scottish Power. If that is 
the case, and it appears very likely, it means that the oldest set of 
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Blyth generating units will close by 1994. The cost to the coal 
industry, especially the deep mines is not known. But taking out a 
third of deliveries to Blyth would not be unreasonable. Dramatically, 
it means that disposals to Blyth could be as low as 2 million tonnes per 
annum or less. Moreover, with the cost of 'imported' electricity 
through the interconnector underpinned by lower cost opencast, from 
nearby Scottish opencast mines such as Blindwells(S MT), the price of 
coal supplied to Blyth after 1994 will have to be similar to that at 
Cockenzie. Crucially, only the most profitable coal will be produced in 
the run up to privatisation of the coal industry as a consequence of its 
pricing structure and the demands of a privatised PGI. As a result, the 
least profitable production units in British Coal's North East region 
will all disappear by 1994. British Coal's accountancy practice and the 
new passive policy of Northumberland County Council towards opencast 
mining have seen to that; the fear of lost jobs in North East deep mines 
has become the 'commercial reality•. 
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iv. The Thamesside Power Station Market for North East Coal Production 
The situation at Thamesside is no better. Faced with an onslaught of 
competition by imported coal British Coal again have resorted to 
maximising the lowest cost coals. Consequently, the trend has been for 
a rise in the proportion of opencast coal in recent years to a ceiling 
of around 21 per cent (Table 4.21.), but arguably it will go beyond 
that. 
Table 4.21 
BRITISH COALS DELIVERIES TO THAMES POWER STATIONS 
Year Total Coal Deep Mine Opencast 
Delivered Delivered Delivered 
(COO's tonnes) (COO's tonnes) (COO's tonnes) 
1981/82 6180 5140 960 
1982/83 6320 5460 860 
1983/84 5360 4630 730 
1984/85 ################ Year of Strike ################# 
1985/86 4950 4200 750 
1986/87 4600 3720 880 
1987/88 4300 3380 920 
1988/89 4240 3406 834 
1989/90 3500 2760 740 
Percentage -17.5 -19 -11.3 
Change Last Year 
Source: British Coal, various public inquiries. 
Opencast as 
Percentage 
of Total 
15.5 
13.6 
13.6 
15.5 
19.1 
21.4 
19.8. 
21.1 
+1.3 
While it would appear that the opencast percentage of total disposals to 
Thamesside stations has levelled off in recent years to around 20 per 
cent, it should not be forgotten that this is within a declining market. 
From 13 per cent of total disposals to the PGI in the early 1980's, it 
had risen to 21 per cent at the end of the decade. The percentage 
changes in the last year of Table 4.21 are the most revealing. North 
283 
East deep mines, despite increased performance and profitabilty suffered 
their greatest reduction in disposals to Thamesside for over five years 
of some 19 per cent. The trend in total tonnage reductions each year 
since the strike, apart from a slowdown in 1988/89, mirrored those 
reductions in disposals by the deep mines. Moreover, even with an 11 
per cent drop in opencast disposals from the previous year, opencast 
coal still continued to maintain over 20 per cent of the total market 
share. Decidedly, this underlines the trend that deep mine production 
is losing out to opencast coal production for the Thamesside market, 
regardless of the propensity to further increase profitability. This is 
in contrast to previous statements by British Coal. At the Rosehills 
Public Inquiry, we were informed by Mr. D. Catchpole, then North East 
Marketin·g Manager in British Coal that: 
To provide the calorific value required our shipment 
blends to the Thames power stations consists of 85% 
deep mine and 15% opencast coals. 
~ Catchpole, Proof of Evidence to Rosehills Public Inqiury 
~Para 4.7.4 
That was in 1986. In 1987 his successor stated that the proportion of 
opencast coal had increased further. 
The current percentage of opencast coal in cargoes shipped 
to Thames Estuary power stations is about 20% and we would 
not expect this to change significantly in the future. 
A. Horsler, British Coal, Supplementary Proof of Evidence to 
Brusselton Public Inquiry, Para. 3.2 
Of course this has real implications for coal specification and quality 
discussed later in the chapter. For current purposes it does show 
British Coal's determination to maximise opencast despite the increasing 
fortunes of the deep mines. In the Rosehills, Brusselton and subsequent 
public inquiries, they argued that this level of opencast was needed to 
offset the dirt content from Ashington and Whittle Collieries and/or 
increase the calorific value of the total tonnage delivered to 
Thames/Medway. At the time this was accepted by their opponents. 
Northumbrian east coast opencast coal replaced most of the closed 
production of Ashington and Whittle that went to the PGI. Opponents 
believe, with some justification, that British Coal will reduce the 
level of opencast coal commensurate with the reduction in deep mine 
output or in the market tonnage. 
In the early 1990's the main factor likely to reduce the 
economic benefits of opencast coal in the total delivered 
to the ThamesjMedway power stations is the closure of 
Whittle and Ashington collieries. On the assumption that 
the coal purchase from BCC will be 3.5 million tonnes, 
about 20%, 700,000 tonnes would be opencast. However, such 
~ figure is much higher than needed. Until recently, 15% 
was ~ perfectly acceptable level. The closure of the two 
collieries and the resultant removal of their dirty coal 
from the equation justifies a lower rather than a higher 
opencast input. Thus ~ legitimate figure of 15% minus the 
blending needs of the two defunct collieries emerges, 225, 
000-275,000 tonnes. (My emphasis) 
~ Gladstone, Durham County Council, Proof of Evidence, 
Marley Hills Public Inquiry, para. 6.6 
What has emerged is the maintenance of opencast in a declining market 
within the specification limits of the PGI. The avowed intention of 
British Coal was to hold the markets of a privatised PGI with the lowest 
cost coal as they see it. However, a privatised PGI is new and 
complicated ground for British Coal. And those proportions of opencast 
to deep mined coal may change as British Coal expand into East 
Northumberland, under pressure to maximise efficiency and minimise costs 
by closing deep mines. 
28~ 
~ North East Coal Markets and the Effects of Electricity Priyatisation 
Privatisation of the electricity industry will have a similar effect upon the markets for North 
East coal as the commercialisation of the steel industry ten years earlier. The lower cost of 
steam raising coal on the world markets has presented opportunities for the PGI in the form 
of imported coal supplanting a segment of the market supplied by North East production. 
The most vulnerable part of the North East coal market is that in the South East at 
Tharnes/Medway Estuary, because they are supplied by sea which also gives easy access to 
imported coal. Complicating the issue further carne EC Directives (88/609/EC) that 
affects the ability of British Coal to supply the right quality of coal. 
Saleable output from the North East to Thames/Medway Estuary stations in 1981/82 was 
6.18 million tonnes. By 1988/89 this had declined to 4.24 million tonnes. Since electricity 
privatisation National Power and Power Gen have already invited tenders from international 
coal merchants for large amounts of coal imports. Agreements have been signed; much of 
the imported coal is to be burned at Tharnes/Medway power stations, (International Coal 
Review (ICR), 230, 231, 25/8/89, 8/9/89) bringing downward pressure upon the tonnage and 
price of coal British Coal has to offer. As in the case of Scotland, one of the tactics by the 
PGI in forcing down the price of coal from British Coal has been the use of bargaining 
counters. Imports are the primary 'bargaining counters' in England and Wales. 
The two power companies want an initial import level of 
15 million tonnes (coal and heavy fuel oil combined) and 
the cutback of British Coal sales to National Power and 
Power Gen from 72mt to 60 mt a year. The two generators 
said they want these imports even if British Coal were 
to offer lower prices than those at which imported oil 
or coal could be obtained 
International Coal Report. 229. 11/8/89 
The desire for imports, regardless of the price offered by British Coal, 
is related to the desire for diversity of supply. The purpose is to maintain some downward 
pressure on the price of coal supplied by their international coal merchants as much as that 
from British Coal. In effect the PGI is playing one off against the other in terms of price. By 
January 1990 British Coal had secured a short term contract with National Power and 
PowerGen for three years from April 1990 to March 1993, but at a price: 
These contracts, taken together, mean that British Coal will 
be supplying in total at least 70 million tonnes in each of 
the financial years 1990/1 and 1991/92 and 65 million tonnes 
in 1992/93. 
The present average price will be broadly maintained over 
the contract period. This represents a continuing significant 
price reduction in real terms. 
Energy World. No. 174. Dec 1989/Jan 1990. p,& 
British Coal's Commercial Director, Malcolm Edwards was still adamant: 
We intend to find a way of settling with new electricity 
supply industry to hold on to our business without accepting 
prices that we cannot live with, whatever improvements in 
efficiency we can realistically make. 
Malcom Edwards. "British Coal and Electricity Privatisation". 
Energy World Yearbook 1990. P.124-5 
This graphically portrays the difficult situation British Coal have in 
'holding the markets' for coal and living with prices "that represent a continuing significant 
price reduction in real terms". This pressure upon the coal industry in tum activates the 
internal market within British Coal, bringing a greater need for lower priced 
coal. Inevitably, a greater proportion of this will be opencast coal. 
Both marketing managers in Scotland and the North East have outlined to 
me the basis of this internal market. However, it was earlier evidence 
from the national marketing manager which has given a more detailed 
insight into its workings where 'each production unit is responsible for 
the price and quality of its product'. 
We have a commercial arrangement with the CEGB, and we 
split the tonnage into what we call the base tonnage 
which is charged at a lower price. In fact it covers all 
the shipments to the south east, and we have rested the 
case for the continuation of Hawthorn(colliery) on what 
we call saleable proceeds, which is the average price 
we receive nationally for coal of that quality. 
and where the pricing of coal effects an internal competition by: 
a list price which is a legal price registered in Brussels, 
and that does two things. It is intended to show the 
relative value of coals, depending upon their inherent 
quality, from one colliery to the next and one coal to 
the next. Secondly, it is the basis on which we start 
our discounts, because 95 per cent of our coal is sold on 
discount. 
Malcolm Edwards, Independent Review Body into the Proposed 
Closure of Hawthorn Colliery, P.36, 4th March 1986. 
Further elaboration was given by him at a previous review meeting: 
The list price was ~35. It is for the standard analysis 
which is 19.92 GJ a tonne, which is the heat content, and 
25per cent ash. 
These price lists are published and lodged in Brussels. 
They have a legal position, a legal status. The first 
thing is that it sets relative prices between coals based 
on value in use. The other purpose of the list price is 
to provide the basis from which we calculate the discounts. 
Like any other organisation, most of our product is sold at 
a discount. These discounts are negotiated commercially, 
and they vary from the customer depending on competitive 
position, location and size ••..•• In this way we try and 
reflect as best we can in each pit's accounts the net price 
that the Board is truly receiving nationally for the coal 
of the quality that the pit produces. That is called the 
saleable proceeds. (my emphasis) 
Malcolm Edwards, Independent Review Body into the Proposed 
Closure of Bates Collliery, P.56 and 57, 21st January 1986 
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Since 1986, the internal re-organisation of British Coal has meant 
that each pit "stands alone" (Kerevan and Saville 1988, para. 3.2.5) 
within each region and is accountable for its own production, price and 
quality. Each Region is operated as a separate organisation with its 
own targets and responsibilities. 
The future nevertheless is not bright, a further increase in imports is 
imminent. An integral part of this process in the import of coal is the 
question of the EEC Directive 88/609 to the PGI on noxious emissions. 
This requires the PGI to reduce its emissions, especially of sulphur 
dioxide(S02) from 1993. With profit margins in mind the PGI are 
reluctant to invest in the large capital cost of installing Flue Gas 
Desulphurisation Plant at the power stations. Instead they have opted 
for the lower cost combination of importing low sulphur coal and retro-
modifications of the Electro-static Precipitators which control after-
burn material prior to entering the flue-stack. The four power stations 
that North East coal production relies upon are the very same power 
stations to be modified to take further supplies of imported low sulphur 
coal (Table 4.22). 
Table 4.22 
POWER STATIONS THAT ARE TO BE MODIFIED TO TAKE IMPORTED LOW SULPHUR COAL 
Power Station MWs Coal Burn P.A. (max) Major Supplier 
Tilbury 1344 3.0mt N.E. British Coal 
w. Thurrock 1240 2.7mt N.E. British Coal 
Kingsnorth 1920 5.2mt N.E. British Coal 
Blyth 1548 3.5mt N.E. British coal 
Source: CEGB Annual ReEorts 
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With costs being cut through the burning of lower cost coal the loading 
factor of the Thamesside power stations will rise, burning more coal. 
To some extent this may compensate North East pits for losing out to 
imports, for reasons of security of supply if nothing else. Or, British 
Coal may themselves engage in the import business. This was indicated 
in the personal notes of British Coal's Q.C. Jeremy Burford as part of 
his closing submission at Billingside Public Inquiry pertaining to 
"1 mtpa Australian o.C." imported by British Coal. 
The CEGB in their evidence to the House of Commons Select Committeton 
Energy in 1986 stated that because of security reasons the total 
possible coal burn of the Thames/Medway power stations was 10 million 
tonnes. We learned from Malcolm Edwards, now Commercial Director of 
British Coal, at the Independent Review into the Closure of Hawthorn 
Colliery, co. Durham that: 
the latest advice we have from the CEGB, for what it is 
worth, is that instead of buying 5 million tonnes from us 
on the Thames, they will want between 3 and 4 at most. 
That is the best guidance we have. (P.35) 
Consumption at Thamesside has been been static in recent years (Energy 
Trends, June 1991) and given the economic climate is unlikely to rise at 
all in the next two years. With 6 million tonnes of coal contracted for 
import and the 3-4 million tonnes from the North East, it will be 
extremely difficult for both to maintain those levels when the "total 
possible coal burn" is 10 million tonnes. For security reasons power 
stations never generate to maximum capacity. Indeed, the Thames 
stations have never gone beyond 8 million tonnes coal burn. While some 
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coal from each source will go for stocking purposes, this will give a 
possible ratio of 2 - 1 in favour of imported coal by 1993. That means 
about 3 million tonnes coal burn from the North East from 1991 at the 
best available prices of 61.20 G/J from British Coal. The 6 million 
tonnes of coal imports comes from evidence by the International Coal 
Report(ICR) of signed contracts for imported coal which will seriously 
affect the process and pattern of production in the North East. This is 
given in the Table 4.23. 
It has been reported that for British Coal to secure the last contract 
with the PGI up to 1993 meant: 
To absorb the effect of fixing prices, however, British Coal 
would have to raise its productivety by another 8 per cent a 
year, having already doubled it in the past four years. 
Financial Times 5/12/1989 
Inevitably this meant further cuts in the higher cost tail of British 
Coal's production - from the deep mines. And there are those who 
strongly agree that privatisation and coal imports will cost the 
British economy dearly (O'Shaughnessy, 1990). The burning of foreign 
coal will further increase the balance of payments crisis which in 
itself is self defeating for power generators, consumers and the 
economy. Nevertheless, the task of holding the market is uppermost in 
the minds of British Coal management and, to a large extent dependent 
upon the capacity of the deep mines to utilize their capital investment 
even further. Given the nature of the industry and as evidenced later 
there is little room for opencast to reduce its marginal costs. From 
examination of the evidence of the increasing dominance of the PGI and 
looking at Table 4.23 we can see such a strategy of coal imports points 
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Table 4.23 
STEAM COAL IMPORT CONTRACTS 1989 
contractor Tonnage Supplier/Merchant Port of Entry 
(OOO's t) (designated) 
CEGB 360 Shell London 
CEGB 360 SSM London 
Power Gen 240 Massey London 
Power Gen 700 BP London 
Power Gen 360 London 
Power Gen 1,000 Carbocoal London 
Power Gen 500 Drummond Liverpool 
Nat. Power 1,000 carbocoal London 
Nat. Power 300 Westmoreland London 
Nat. Power 300 Shell London 
Nat. Power 300 Peabody London 
Nat. Power 300 BP London 
Nat. Power 300 Ashland London 
Total 6,020 
Source: International Coal Report, 232, 10/10/89 
Table 4.24 
IMPORTED COAL INTO TEESPORT HARTLEPOOL AND SUNDERLAND 
Tee sport Hartlepool Sunderland Total 
1980 1,252,226 1,252,226 
1981 1,127,130 1,127,130 
1982 1,131,464 1,131,464 
1983 1,441,102 1,441,102 
1984 2,105,000 23,000 2,128,000 
1985 2,484,000 127,000 88,000 2,699,000 
1986 2,609,000 359,000 243,000 3,211,000 
1987 2,698,000 364,000 198,000 3,260,000 
1988 2,669,000 333,000 418,000 3,420,000 
1989 2,878,000 99,000 652,000 3,630,000 
Source: Tees and HartleEool Port Authorit::t:. Hansard Written Answers 
645L46, 22L2L1989 
to a wider strategy of achieving greater control in energy generation. 
This would be achieved through total tonnage 'at the right price', total 
diversity of supply and total concentration of supplies for power 
stations at that point of entry. But the threat of imports comes to 
North East coal not only in the market down south, but in the region 
itself (Table 4.24). Apart from British Steel at Redcar (Teesport) the 
destination of this imported coal is not clear. 
The reduction in tonnage from Hartlepool is part of a longer term move 
to use large bulk carriers into Teesport. Certainly the attempted 
privatisation of Teesport and the concrete intention of the PGI to 
extend inward coal handling facilities at Teesport does not bode well 
for the British coal industry. The other ominous factor for deep mines 
is the tremendous increase in imported coal through Sunderland docks, 
just down river from Wearmouth Colliery. Lorry loads of this coal have 
been traced into stockpiles in the west of Durham for later dispersal to 
the Disposal Point at Wardley, or part of the consignment to the 'rogue 
markets' in Yorkshire or Central region. The impending threat to the 
market for North East coal comes not only from imported coal but from 
the resultant internal budgeting which endeavours to give opencast coal 
a greater profile. The Research Department of the NUM discovered in 
January 1990 that in the North East Area: 
There is to be a reduced deep mines output budget to 9.3 
million tonnes. This represents a reduction of 1 million 
tonnes from the previous year. Within this global 9.3 m.t. 
0.5 m.t. is to be increased opencast and the area is 
required to hold stocks of at least 1 m.t. This reduces 
the active market for sales of deep mined coal to 7.8 m.t. 
NUM Proof of Evidence, Appendix ~ Marley Hill Public Inquiry. 
This decrease of nearly 25 per cent in tonnage in 1991/92 contrasts with 
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the simultaneous increase in opencast coal of 6 per cent. There is some 
doubt to be cast on this scenario. Firstly, according to George Hardy, 
the deputy Director of Environment at Durham County Council, British 
Coal have approached him with a programme for a reduced annual tonnage 
of opencast output from 1 million tonnes down to 800,000 tonnes from 
1992. This would be in keeping with the reduced demand for North East 
coal. Evidence we shall show later, suggests that reducing deep mine 
production also reduces the propensity to maximise opencast burn 
(different specification) at power stations because of the problem of 
alignment in coal and power station specifications. Moreover, the 
sulphur content of opencast coals tends to be too high and often has to 
be blended with low sulphur coal from North East deep mines to meet the 
'vend': a new and very real problem, though not for North East deep 
mines. If they close more deep mines, British Coal may even have to 
blend low sulphur imported coal with the opencast coal to make it a more 
marketable product. Alternatively, unless British Coal find low sulphur 
opencast coal, and presumably that is why they are prospecting in N.E. 
Northumberland, there would appear little room for further opencast coal 
expansion to go to the power station markets. There is of course the 
possibility of importing low sulphur coal from Scotland. 
It is difficult to untangle the direction of British Coal whilst the 
pressure from the PGI continues. The use of opencast coal will still be 
posed as a saviour for the industry but with increased performance from 
the deep mines one will be marginally no better than the other. As has 
been stated it doesn't matter what British Coal offer, the PGI still 
want a larger proportion of imported coal. Now that EEC Directives are 
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upon them this only serves to make the issue final. 
We have pointed to the longer term scenario where the loss of some of 
the Northern Ireland market to a Lignite fired station leaves surplus 
opencast in Scotland to challenge the deep mines in the North East for 
their share of the market. Also the recent changes by the state in 
planning legislation in England and Wales make it more difficult for 
opponents of opencast to stem the increase in the proportion of opencast 
coal in total production. This means that the deep mine sector will 
eventually be squeezed by opencast from both Scotland and the North East 
to a point where only deep mine production with the largest profit 
margins will survive. As we enter the 1990's the situation for the coal 
industry is changing through a cumulative process. This process 
contains expanded imports, financial regulation within the industry, 
financial directives from the State upon the industry, and not least, 
tighter specifications from the EEC Directives for coal that will be 
supplied to the PGI. Opencast coal production operating within an 
aggressive commercialised environment takes the risks out of coal 
production for capitalism, risks that can be turned into advantages 
which were identified at the dawn of the World War Two. The question 
remains whether people and their environment will be treated in a 
similar manner to that of miners and their communities in the North East 
in capital's quest to 'maximise'. The 'industrial clearances' are 
almost complete. Now a very different world lies ahead where control 
over national energy production is beyond the public domain and 
proceeding at a dramatic pace into unknown territory. 
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Part Four.: Profit Maximisation mll! !:.wli Oualjty m the North E..ui Coalfield 
i Coal Quality. Rankine and the Markets 
The quality, chemical make up and utilization of coals has an important bearing on how British 
Coal meets the specification of the P.G.I. and other markets. Understanding the approach of 
British Coal towards opencast and deep mine coal in supplying their markets sheds light on their 
future intent on the pattern of coal production in the North East. We know in Scotland for 
example, that coal from Seafield Colliery was used to improve the large amounts of poor quality 
opencast coal that went to Longannet power station. By contrast, the taken for granted 
assumption in the North East is that opencast coal is needed to improve the quality of coal from 
deep mines, making it more marketable in terms of quality and cost. The evidence available 
suggests that this assumption is worth much closer examination. If we know how they were 
holding the markets in Scotland for privatisation of the coal industry, then equally significant is 
the manner in which British Coal are holding the markets for North East production. 
Production of coal is technically ordered into a classification system (Appendix 2.) and can vary 
in 'Rank' considerably from coalfield to coalfield, as the CEGB have indicated (Appendix 2.). 
The only similarity between between coal produced in Scotland and North East England are the 
Rank 600-800 coals produced in North East Northumberland. Opencast coals currently produced 
in the west of the North East Region, with reserves consisting mainly of Rank 301-501 high 
volatile coals, in general terms limits British Coal's ability to directly supply this coal to meet the 
POI markets. This is in 
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marked contrast to the coastal output in Durham and Northumberland with 
coals predominately in Ranks 501 to 800 (Figs 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8). 
These coastal coals have suitable ranges for burning at power stations. 
However, that is not to say there isn't any Rank 301 in Durham coastal 
pits, given what we know from the Harden experience (WERU, 1987). 
Equally in Scotland, while the coals are mainly of Rank 700-800, there 
is some higher ranked coal of 201-301 across the coalfields • In most 
respects there can be good and bad quality coals within each ranking of 
coal and has special significance with E.C. Directives (EEC/88/609) on 
noxious emissions. 
Much debate had taken place over this issue at the Daisy Hills Public 
Inquiry where it became apparent that British Coal were 'economical' 
with their explanation of coal production processes. Most objectors 
believe that the expansion of opencast coal production is a direct 
replacement of deep mined output in the North East; it is a little more 
complex than that. Napier's evidence for the CPRE alerted me to the 
notion of a 'reverse theory' when he called British Coal's claims for 
the quality of opencast 'fallacious'. While he made the issue very 
clear he had some difficulty proving it. 
As far as Durham opencast coal is concerned much of it is 
of a quality too rich, ie. too high a calorific value, 
and of coking coal type to be burned direct by the CEGB(PGI).+ 
Therefore it has to be diluted, or reduced in quality to 
be acceptable for power stations, and not, as the OCE 
fallaciously claim, to make unsaleable deep mine coal 
acceptable and marketable. There is no Durham deep mine 
coal in that category, it is a fallacy. IT IS THE DURHAM 
OPENCAST COAL THAT HAS TO BE MIXED WITH (OR LOST IN) DEEP 
MINED COAL TO BE MARKETABLE.(Napier's emphasis) 
~ Napier CPRE, Proof of Evidence to the Daisy Hills Public 
Inquiry, Paragraph 9.17, 28/4/1987 
Major assumptions have to be challenged. Especially, the relationship 
between deep mine and opencast coal in qualitative terms with the 
relative costs of deep mine and opencast coal. We know an opencast 
expansion programme designed to meet the State's political and 
financial objectives is very real indeed. We need to contrast and 
compare evidence of the qualitative aspects of opencast and deep mine 
coal with the market requirements of the main customer, the PGI. From 
the CEGB stand-point the use of opencast coal is markedly different 
from that of British coal: 
Traditionally North East Opencast coals have been used by 
British Coal as 'sweeteners• in power station supplies: the 
opencast component, when mixed with the deep mine coals 
enhances the calorific value of some coals and improves the 
handleability of deep mine supplies. 
Letter from M.S. Rainbow, National Coal Supplies Manager, CEGB to 
A. Horsler Marketing Director, British Coal, 28/1/1987 
As he goes on we begin to understand the main reason for this: 
Thus, CEGB takes opencast coal to Blyth power station 
in order to build a good quality stock that can be recovered 
readily in winter ••••• and to the staithes for inclusion in 
shipment blends to Kingsnorth power station in the South East 
where there is a-requirement for higher cv supplies. 
Intentionally, the inclusion of higher Calorific Value opencast coal 
directly affects the total blend delivered to Thames power stations, 
but not by virtue of some special qualities or that the power station 
needs to burn coals of a higher Calorific Value than required by the 
specification; that is the British coal position. More accurately, 
higher calorific value coal, found readily in the west of the region 
where there are no more deep mines to mine it, is needed to compensate 
for 'weathering' of the stocks. For all their efforts to buttress 
British Coal's case at public inquiries with "the standard letter of 
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support" (Porton, DCC, Brusselton,1987), the CEGB see opencast coal as 
a "complementary" supplement in a specified task of their operations. 
The problems of handleability are caused by frozen conditions as much 
as the fines and moisture content of deep mine coal. Then again, the 
main value of opencast coal is clearly for stocking purposes. Being an 
organic material there is a certain degree of degradation of stocks. 
The higher Calorific Value of the majority of opencast coals, as much 
as Rank 301 coal from deep mines if they were available, enriches the 
stocks and blends that may degrade in shipment to Thames. The 
requirement for higher Calorific Value supplies at Kingsnorth came 
from experiencing the delivery of Ashington and Whittle supplies, but 
they are now gone and eo is that requirement. This 'supplement' of 
opencast coal is only a proportion of that delivered to the PGI, the 
remainder is delivered by British Coal more on grounds of cost and 
profit than on quality. For British Coal however, holding the PGI 
market is a commercial imperative. Certain myths over the use of 
opencast coal have grown up from this process, and often been too 
readily accepted; the main one is that deep mined coal needs large 
amounts of opencast coal. 
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ii Deep Mined Coal Quality and their Market Alignment 
Calculation of deep mine coal alignment, refuting the myth of the need 
for extensive use of opencast coal, is complex and challenging. The 
immediate objective was to analyse the information available so as to 
identify the mean average specification of different combinations of 
deep mine coal delivered to the CEGB and the ranges produced by those 
combinations. Firstly, the examination of deep mines in the North East 
and the specification from each colliery is presented in Tables 4.25 to 
4.27. It is important to note that sixty six per cent of Ellington 
Coal goes to the Alcan Smelter. Given the tonnage delivered to the 
PGI, 10% of overall deep mined total, this would not adversely affect 
the level of moisture or ash content in the average in Table 4.25. 
Indeed with a more accurate assessment of Ellington coal input we would 
find the average 'vend' would improve to be closer to the PGI's ideal 
requirement. 
Table 4.25 
AVERAGE COAL SPECIFICATIONS FROM NORTH EAST COLLIERIES 
Moisture Ash Calorific Value 
per cent per cent GJ/T 
Dawdon 10.0 14.0 22.26 
Easington 10.5 15.0 25.80 
Ellington 13.0 17.5 23.22 
Murton 11.5 15.0 25.54 
Vane Tempest 9.0 14.0 26.82 
Westoe 12.0 13.5 25.40 
Wearmouth 12.0 8.0 27.94 
Average 11.1 13.9 25.28 
Range 9.0-13.0 8.0-17.5 22.26-27.94 
Source: British Coal 
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Table 4.26 
DEEP MINE DISPOSALS TO THE CEGB AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL SALES 1987/88 
Saleable Output Delivered to CEGB Percentage of Total 
(OOO's tonnes) (OOO's tonnes) Delivered to CEGB 
Dawdon. 606 .497(82%). 16.7 
Easington. 656 .500(76%). 16.8 
Ellington. 938 • 313 (33%). 10.5 
Murton 575 . .555(97%). 18.6 
Vane Tempest. 384 . .195(51%). 6.5 
Westoe 736 .705(96%). 23.6 
Wearmouth. 572 . .219(38%). 7.3 
Totals 4467 2984(63%) 100 
Source: British Coal Submissions at Various Public Inquiries 1986-90 
Table 4.27 
COMBINATIONS OF WEIGHTED AVERAGE COAL SPECIFICATION 
FROM NORTH EAST COLLIERIES 
Moisture Ash Calorific Value 
per cent percent GJ/Tonne 
Combination A. 11.1 13.9 25.28 
Combination B. 11.0 14.6 24.84 
Combination c. 11.3 13.7 26.00 
Range 10.0 - 11.3 13.7 - 14.6 24.84 - 26.00 
Average 11.1 14.1 25.37 
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Again, it is at this point important to stress that British power 
stations were designed to burn around the 'ranges' of these coals as 
the major portion of coal sourced to them 15 to 20 years ago was from 
deep mined production. So we can state with confidence that the 
average specification that results in the table is that which is 
demanded by and applied more or less to the PGI. Calculations start 
with the data on deep mine specifications in Table 4.25 being weighted 
according to the disposals shown in Tables 4.26 and then presented into 
three different combinations in Table 4.27. 
The combined production of Vane Tempest with its low moisture content, 
and Wearmouth, with its low ash content is brought into balance by the 
tonnage from Ellington with its high moisture and high ash content 
(Combination C.). Their combined tonnage represents a quarter of the 
total sales to the CEGB. All other pits' specifications dominate the 
delivery by reason of their high percentage input (Combination B.). 
This gives an average dominant specification for these other pits of 
11.0 Moisture, 14.6 Ash and 24.84 calorific value GJjT. Ellington, 
Vane Tempest and Wearmouth delivering the smallest portion of output to 
the PGI, average out at 11.3 for moisture, 13.7 for Ash and 26.0 for 
C.V./GJ/tonne. The average of all the collieries is outlined in Table 
4.25 (Combination A.). 
British Coal may argue that the operation is not run on averages of all 
the collieries' outputs (Combination A.), and to some extent that is 
true. But equally, any one pit is not specific for any one power 
station. So to account for some of the best and worst scenarios it is 
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perhaps more realistic to provide a range to take account of the 
largest suppliers of coal (Combination B.) with some of the suppliers 
with the worst fluctuation in their specification (Combination C.). 
From this we produce a 'range' in specification and a weighted average 
of deep mine coal supplied to the CEGB. 
Having calculated some possible average specifications from North East 
collieries, and arrived at a weighted average which is strikingly 
similar to the PGI specification, we then go on to ascertain the 
specification of opencast coals from the North East. 
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~i· Opencast Specifications 
The vast majority of opencast coals go to disposal points where they 
are overlaid by coal from other opencast sites which all have a variety 
of seams with different qualities. Therefore, we can conceivably get a 
situation where there will be a predominant coal from one site low in 
ash but high in sulphur being lifted for delivery to the PGI. Equally 
we can get a situation where the average low moisture, low ash and high 
c.v. opencast coal is delivered for the PGI. That is where the "phone 
and truck" element of British Coal's marketing department comes into 
operation: to lift some deep mine coal from stocks to balance out the 
irregularities before they reach the market. According to Horsler's 
submission at the Daisy Hills public inquiry, this is usually done on 
the quayside, With the new 'franchising arrangement' between British 
Coal and the private sector opencast operators, the majority of private 
sector coal goes to the disposal points with British Coal's opencast 
output. 
The only exception to this will be opencast coal from East 
Northumberland which supplies an average of 1,200 tonnes per week to 
Blyth power station following the closure of Whittle and Ashington 
collieries in 1986/87. There is now the increasing awareness that the 
expanding levels of East Northumberland opencast coal through to the 
1990's, with its specification more closely aligned to the PGI 
specifiction than the west of the region, does threaten the existing 
markets for North East deep mine coal. Until 1991, apparently any 
anomalies were compensated by the burning of about 2 million tonnes per 
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annum of deep mine coal. Both tonnages may be in accord with the 
specification requirements of Blyth power station and mean that 
opencast was a direct replacement tonnage for Whittle and Ashington 
deep mines. We must point out however, that the Plenmellor site in 
the west of Northumberland, is an enigma with such a costly 
infrastructure and operation where we know that a journey of 14km adds 
a cost of ~2 per tonne; its large amount of Rank 301 coal increases 
the need for more deep mined coal to reduce down its very high 
calorific value. Moreover, the large Stobswood site contains a wide 
variety of coals which means that the situation in Northumberland does 
not affect my general argument. 
Opencast Coal of the order of 2142 thousand tonnes (Table 4.29) was 
delivered directly to the PGI for 'in-bunker' blending at the power 
stations in 1987/88 plus 66% of 'transfers' to collieries for blending. 
This is not surprising given the high sulphur content of some sites, 
including Chapmans Wells(4.15%) and the forthcoming Rye Hill (3.38%), 
and that the average sulphur content of opencast coal at Wardley 
opencast disposal point is 2.18%. The significance of all this is that 
the PGI charges a penalty against all coal with a sulphur content above 
1.8%. But the costs of transporting this high sulphur coal to be 
blended at the deep mines to meet the PGI specification, and the 
blending process cost itself, are not always borne by the opencast site 
but by the deep mine. 
As we can see from Table 4.28 the ash content and calorific value of 
opencast coal are substantially different from the deep mines and the 
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Table 4.28 
COAL SPECIFICATIONS FROM SOME NORTH EAST 
OPENCAST SITES IN THE EXPANSION PROGRAMME 
Moisture Ash 
per cent per cent 
Marley Hill 6.0 9.0 
Brusselton 6.0 9.4 
Billingside 6.0 6.8 
Daisy Hills 6.0 8.5 
Average 6.0 8.4 
Sulphur 
per cent 
1.7 
1. 76 
1.12 
2.11 
1.67 
Calorific Value 
GJ/tonne 
30.4 refused 
29.0 refused 
30.56 refused 
30.48 working 
30.11 
on appeal* 
on appeal* 
on appeal* 
site 
Source: British Coal Proofs of Evidence at various Public Inquiries 
Table 4.29 
N. E. OPENCAST DISPOSALS TO THE CEGB AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES 
Saleable output Delivered to CEGB Percentage of Overall 
Total Coal 
(OOO's tonnes) (OOO's tonnes) Delivered to CEGB 
Opencast 3769 2142(57%) 38.3 
Disposal Pts 
0/C Disposals 
to Pits 717(19%) 473(66%) 8.5 
for Blending 
Prior Delivery 
Totals 3769 2615 46.8 
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sulphur content is also at inferior levels. I have been told by Paul 
Kerry of British Coal's Marketing Department that "these specifications 
are about average for North East opencast mined coals". As most 
opencast coal goes to the disposal points, and from that point is 
integrated with other coals from other sites it then forms an average 
of those coals from other sites. To obtain a more accurate picture of 
the alignments to the ideal specification we require the percentages of 
total tonnages delivered to the CEGB and their individual 
specifications. This is outlined in Table 4.29. 
Looking at the disposal site at Wardley, coal from opencast sites are 
not placed in separate piles but layered over each other. Great 
importance has been attached to the poor handlebility of deep mine 
coal. British Coal argue that because of this they have to blend deep 
mine with opencast to reduce the moisture and fines content(fine coal). 
Yet from a visit to Blyth Power station you will learn readily that the 
CEGB staff there are happy with the current situation of receiving 
unblended deep mine coal. The major problem does not lie with deep 
mined coal, but with the high sulphur,/ low ash, higher c.v. coals from 
opencast sites unable to meet PGI specification and shifting blending 
costs to the balance sheets of deep mines. 
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iv. Coal Quality Specifications at Blyth Power Station 
Once the coal is at the power station it is then the State extracts 
surplus value into the private sector. Because of this British Coal 
try to maximise their lowest cost coal to the PGI to obtain some 
return on production. Blyth power station is different in some 
technical respects from Thames stations as we shall show later. But 
a pertinent difference also lies in the amount of opencast it burns. 
Further, now that all but one of the deep mines have gone in 
Northumberland, it has a readily available expanded source of "low cost 
opencast coal" close at hand that is near the power station's 
specification. But this still has to be brought into balance by 
deliveries of deep mine coal. 
An official source provides a clear indication that opencast coal has 
replaced deep mine markets and also casts doubt on its quality for 
increases of opencast coal burnt in power stations. H.M. Inspector 
reported in the 1980 Report of the Daisy Hills Public Inquiry that: 
Of the 3.37 million tonnes of coal delivered to Blyth 
(in 1978/79), approximately 440,000 tonnes was opencast coal. 
Yet, in 1986/87 British Coal sent 125000 tonnes of opencast 
into Blyth, an amount that clearly exceeded that required on 
quality grounds. By 1987/88 the total was 158000 tonnes, 
despite the closure of Ashington Colliery in 1986/87 and of 
Whittle a year earlier. 
H.M. Inspector's Report into Opencast Mining (Daisy Hills 1980) 
H.M. Inspector's Report into Opencast Mining at Daisy Hills 1980. 
This expansion is based upon the fact that opencast coal is a lower 
cost source" of coal, much of which is "Northumbrian East Coal" (NEC) 
which is similar in specification to the requirements of the PGI 
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specification at Blyth. Hence the ability to use a greater input of 
this coal than other opencast coals, say from the sites in Durham and 
west Northumberland. Largely for this reason, we have a situation 
where opencast coal delivered to Blyth is twice the percentage of 
opencast coal delivered to the Thames power stations.(See Table 4.34) 
Table 4.30 
BRITISH COAL OPENCAST DELIVERIES TO BLYTH POWER STATION 
Total Coal Opencast Percentage 
Delivered Delivered Opencast 
(OOO's tonnes) (OOO's tonnes) of Total 
1978/79 3370 440 13.1 
1986/87 2580 1250 48.5 
1987/88 3340 1580 46.7 
1988/89 3110 1180 38.0 
1989/90 3000 1100 36.7 
Source: British Coal, Various Public Inquiries into Opencast Mining 
1986-90 
From the year of closure of the two Northumberland pits, the maximum 
level of opencast that Blyth could sustain was 48 per cent. In 1987/88 
a slight reduction in this proportion to 46.7 per cent was due to 
uptake of stocks laid down which includes Ashington and Whittle coal. 
The effect of the deep mine closures upon opencast coal deliveries to 
Blyth is seen from 1987/88. The proportion is down to 38.0, continuing 
to 36.7 per cent in 1988/89 as the better quality deep mined coal 
replaced Whittle and Ashington and negated the traditional amount of 
opencast normally associated with the two Northumberland pits. 
With the closure of Ashington and Whittle in 1986, the opportunity 
for British Coal to expand this "lower cost coal" and replace this 
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deep mine production would have been an obvious choice for British Coal. But clearly one they 
did not choose to take. If they did you would expect the percentage level of opencast delivered to 
Blyth to rise. Far from rising we can see from Table 4.35 the reverse has happened. One reason 
being that DOUS(Durham Opencast Unwashed Smalls) previously used to balance out the high 
ash content of those two deep mines, with its low ash and high C.V., is technically inadmissable. 
Importantly also, the loss of Ashington and Whittle in 1986, raised the average quality input of 
deep mined coal and thereby the overall specification of inward deliveries. On specification 
grounds, the ability of Blyth power station to take previous percentage levels of opencast coal, 
or rather British Coal's ability to deliver at those levels, was clearly decreased. 
The Inspector at the Rosehill Public Inquiry took a particular interest in the changing situation in 
the markets for North East coal. In response to the continual evasions of British Coal people at 
the public inquiry he instructed them to specifically answer the Local Authorities'questions. 
Durham County Council: 
What is the ash and calorific range specified by the CEGB 
for coal delivered to Blyth Power station? 
Source: British Coal. Rosehills Public Inquiry 1986 
British Coal in their written reply said that: 
The ash range indicated to the Board as being required by 
the CEGB is 15-18 per cent. The calorific value sought is 
23.30-25.60 KJ/tonne. 
Source: British Coal. Rosehills Public Inquiry 1986 
This reply is significant for three reasons. Firstly, the calorific 
value of coal acceptable at Blyth power station is down to 23.30 
KJ/tonne, suitable for burning coal from deep mines. Secondly, the ash 
content below 15 per cent ash is undesirable, equally, it is suitable 
for coal from deep mines, but causes problems for burning opencast 
coal. Thirdly, this again verifies 'run of the mine' coal as 
acceptable and certain opencast coals as undesirable, the latter are 
well outwith the ranges shown in Table 4.31. 
Table 4.31 
COAL DELIVERY SPECIFICATION RANGES AT BLYTH POWER STATION 
Blyth 
Moisture 
per cent 
Ash 
per cent 
15 - 18 
Sulphur 
per cent 
1.8 max.* 
Source: British Coal and Blyth Power Station* 
Calorific Value 
per cent 
23.30 - 25.60 
Opponents at public inquiries(Gladstone, DCC, Marley Hills P.I.) may 
argue, with some justification, that on grounds of quality all the 
opencast that Blyth needs is that which it burned in 1978/79 plus extra 
for stocks and blending. But importantly, for British Coal's purposes 
as well as mine, the distinction has to be drawn between that 'quality' 
and 'need' and what Blyth will take in terms of maximising opencast and 
British Coal's profit margins, while at the same time keeping within 
the specification guideline of the power station. The argument is 
not so much about what Blyth needs but what it will take. This same 
tenet applies to other power stations such as those on the Thames. 
British Coal are in business to maximise profit more than quality, 
based upon the intent to privatise the industry. 
_v. Coal Quality Specifications at Thamesside Power Stations 
Having established that coal fired power stations were engineered to 
burn deep mined coal, and that most opencast coal is misaligned to be 
directly burned in power stations, we look at the Thamesside 
specification for further verification of the suitability of different 
coals. Evidence of market specification suitability was gleaned from 
several sources, not least from the directive of the Inspector at 
Rosehills Public Inquiry that British Coal should supply some answers 
to Durham County Council: 
Durham County Council: 
What are the specifications for coals acceptable at the 
3 Thamesside power stations? 
British Coal's written answer said: 
For Thamesside power stations these are as follows: 
Table 4.32 
North East Moisture Ash Sulphur Calorific Value 
Terminals per cent per cent per cent GJjtonne 
Blyth 11.5 14.5 1.8 25.36 
Tyne 10.0 12.0 1.8 27.08 
Harton 12.0 13.5 1.8 25.40 
Wear 11.0 13.0 1.8 26.30 
Average 11.1 13.25 1.8 26.35 
Source: British Coal, Submission, Rosehills Public Inquiry 1986 
With the Wear terminal no longer used for deliveries this makes the 
average ash content 13.3 per cent and the calorific value 25.94 
GJ/tonne. Verbal submission from A. Horsler BCC, at Daisy Hills 
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Public Inquiry reduces calorific value at the Tyne to 26.0 GJ/Tonne, 
diminishing further the average calorific value to 25.58 GJ/Tonne. 
Harton ships unblended, 'run of the mine', coal from Westoe Colliery 
which means Thamesside power stations can and do burn coal directly 
from deep mines. These coals, we are given to understand from the 
public inquiries, like the coals from Blyth and Tyne terminals, could 
end up at any one power station on the Thamesside. 
One argument projected by British Coal is that of the value of a low 
moisture content of opencast coal as opposed to deep mine coal in 
shipment to the Thames from the North East. They claim that without 
sufficient opencast coal the water in the coal might cause the cargo to 
shift thereby de-stabilising the cargo. There is no evidence of this 
because: 
Each year several million tonnes of coals in this category 
are loaded at United Kingdom ports for shipment coastwise 
or near to continental ports and there are no reports of ships 
lost or put at risk due to the cargo liquefying. 
Dept. of Trade Shipping Notice No. 1250, Paragraph 3.4 
In emphasizing the suitability of deep mined coal for the 
specifications at Thames power stations, the International Coal Report 
states that Power Gen was requiring importers of coal to Kingsnorth 
power station to supply coal with a maximum moisture of 12 per cent and 
maximum ash content of 15 per cent (ICR 230,231, 25/8/89,8/9/89). 
Therefore, using the Blyth ranges as indicators, with the Thamesside 
average calorific value at 25.58 GJ/tonne, and average ash content of 
13.3 per cent, the reasonable average minimum could be expected to be 
24.43 GJ/tonne calorific value, and 11.80 ash content. The average 
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maximum will be of the order of 26.73 GJ/tonne calorific value, and 
14.80 ash content. The penalty maximum for sulphur of 1.8 per cent as 
invoked by the PGI will be used. We now have the ranges for Thames 
power stations. These are set out in Table 4.33 
Table 4.33 
COAL DELIVERY SPECIFICATION AT THAMESSIDE POWER STATIONS 
Moisture Ash 
per cent per cent 
11.7 11.80 - 14.80 
Sulphur 
per cent 
1.8 
Calorific Value 
GJftonne 
24.43 - 26.73 
Source: Derived from British Coal's submissions at Various P.I's 
Table 4.34 
BRITISH COALS OPENCAST DELIVERIES TO THAMES POWER STATIONS 
Total Coal Opencast Percentage 
Delivered Delivered Opencast of 
(OOO's tonnes (OOO's tonnes) Total 
1982/83 6320 860 13.6 
1986/87 4600 880 19.1 
1987/88 4300 920 21.4 
1988/89 4240 834* 19.8* 
1989/90 3500 740 21.1 
Source: British Coal, submissions to Various Public Inquiries 
* Figures ~ to be verified 
The specification at Thamesside demands lower ash and higher CV than at 
Blyth. But we can deduce from the percentages in Table 4.34 that 
around 80 per cent of deep mined coal goes to Thamesside compared to 
around 57 per cent at Blyth, despite the tighter specification. If 
opencast coal had the mythical qualities that British Coal say it has 
then one would expect a larger quantity to go to Thamesside. It would 
3:l8 
appear in the maximisation of lower cost opencast, Northumbriam East 
Coast (NEC) opencast coals go to Blyth power station because they can 
accommodate that quantity. Wardley/Durham opencast coals being much 
less aligned to the PGI specification go to Thamesside with deep mined 
coal in lower proportions. Mainly, because of their inherent 
specification limits, any increase in opencast tonnage would go beyond 
the limits of the 'vend'. 
Before the 1984/85 strike the levels of opencast were between 13 - 15 
percent of total deliveries from British Coal. It would then appear 
that this is all that Thamesside power stations 'need' according to the 
opponents' arguments. What is ~ade clear from Table 4.34 is that 
British Coal have optimized opencast at about 21 per cent of total 
'vend' to Thames stations in recent years. Arguably, beyond that 
current opencast production would place the vend outside the 
specification. 
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vi The Proof of the Pudding - Coal Quality Alignments under Test. 
From Napier's assertion that 'opencast coal has to be reduced in 
quality and mixed with deep mine coal to be acceptable to the PGI', we 
are now in a position to provide the evidence for the main reasons for 
expanding opencast mining and how this is accommodated in the final 
product. Taking the specifications for Blyth and Thames and testing 
the coals produced by the deep mines and opencast mines against them we 
find which one is the more closely aligned to the PGI specifications. 
The results are graphically demonstrated in Table 4.35. Deep mined 
coal shows excellent compatibility with PGI specification at both Blyth 
and Thameside. In stark contrast, opencast coal falls well outside 
every single required range to the point where it would be rejected if 
it were sold for direct coal burn to the PGI. 
Table 4.35 
NORTH EAST COAL QUALITY ALIGNMENTS TO PGI SPECIFICATIONS 
Average Moisture Ash Calorific Value Sulphur 
Deep Mined 11.1 13.9 25.60 1.2 
Blyth 11.0 15.00 - 18.00 23.30 - 25.60 1.8** 
Thames side 11.7 11.80 - 14.80 24.43 - 26.73 1.8** 
o:eencast 6.0 8.4 30.11 2.18 ### 
Sources: Various Public Inquiries: ** Reduced to 1.5 max. from 1991 
### Out of range for direct and sole PGI :eurposes 
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From an engineering viewpoint, with scores such as those in Table 
4.35, opencast coal would cause greater problems for the PGI than if 
there was a reverse situation of burning deep mine coal with high 
moisture and ash content with a low calorific value at power stations. 
Equally, British Coal would incur greater penalties for sending it to 
the PGI. 
From Table 4.35 it can be seen that coal from Wardley disposal point 
has an average sulphur content of 2.18 per cent whereas the North East 
deep mines average is 1.2 per cent. However, the distinction between 
the two specifications is stark. On its own opencast coal is well 
outwith the ranges of the PGI specification. It is far too rich in 
calorific value, too low in moisture and ash as well as having doubtful 
properties in sulphur content. In contrast, deep mine production is 
very much aligned to the PGI specification and does not need copious 
tonnages of opencast coal to adjust or fine tune it to the 'ideal' 
specification. Therefore there is a clear conflict between over 
production of opencast coal particularly with unsuitable ranges of ash 
and calorific value, and, under production of deep mine with suitable 
value ranges. Consequently a situation exists where there is: 
1) Profitable deep mine production that meets the specification. 
2) Profitable opencast production that does not meet the 
specification. 
3) Profitable opencast production of minor but increasing 
proportions that meets the specification. 
4) Under-production of (1) 
5) over-production of (2) 
The results of such a process are hypothesized in Figures 4.9-4.11~ 
3 ')' . (,.,} 
Fig.4.9 
HYPOTHETICAL MODEL TO MAXIMISE OPENCAST COAL INPUT AND PROFIT 
TO A PGI SPECIFICATION FOR 15000 TONNES 
Excess Calorific Value Lower Cost Coal 
I I 
Opencast 10000 tonnes at 29 GJ/t 51.10-51.20 GJftonne 
I 
Reject Ash at 8.4 per cent 
I 
15000 tonnes at 25.00 - 27.00 GJftore I -------
Suitable Ash at 13.9 per cent 
PGI SPECIF.----
Deep Mined 10000 tonnes at 26 GJ/t 51.48-51.50 GJ/tonne 
Most Profitable Vend 
Disregarding PGI 
Specification 
Figure 4.10 
I I 
Suitable Calorific Value Profitable coal 
10,000 tonnes Opencast ~ 5,000 tonnes Deep Mine 
Gives ! Calorific Value of 28.00 GJ/torine and 
Ash Content of 9.6 per cent 
HYPOTHETICAL MODEL TO MAXIMISE OPENCAST COAL INPUT AND PROFIT 
TO A PGI SPECIFICATION FOR 15000 TONNES 
Excess Calorific Value Lower Cost Coal 
I I 
Opencast 10000 tonnes at 29 GJ/t 51.10-51.20 GJftonne 
I 
Reject Ash at 8.4 per cent 
I 
15000 tonnr at 25.00 = 27.00 GJftore 
Suitable Ash at 13.9 per cent 
PGI SPECIF.----
Deep Mined 10000 tonnes at 26 GJ/t 51.48-51.50 GJ/tonne 
Most Suitable Vend 
for PGI 
Specification 
I I 
Suitable Calorific Value Profitable Coal 
5,000 tonnes Opencast ~ 10,000 tonnes Deep Mine 
Gives ! Calorific Value of ~ GJ/tonne and 
Ash Content of 12.4 per cent 
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Figure 4.11 
HYPOTHETICAL MODEL TO MAXIMISE OPENCAST COAL INPUT AND PROFIT 
TO A PGI SPECIFICATION FOR 15000 TONNES 
Excess Calorific Value Lower Cost Coal 
I I 
Opencast 10000 tonnes at 29 GJ/t s1.10-s1.20 GJ/tonne 
I 
Reject Ash at 8.4 per cent 
I 
PGI SPECIF.---- 15000 tonnes at 25.00 - 27.00 GJftor· I ----
Suitable Ash at 13.9 per cent 
Deep Mined 10000 tonnes at 26 GJ/t s1.48-s1.50 GJ/tonne 
I I 
Suitable Calorific Value Profitable Coal 
Most Profitable Vend 8,000 tonnes Opencast ~ 7,000 tonnes Deep Mine 
Gives ~ Calorific Value of 27.50 GJ/tonne and 
Ash Content of 11.0 per cent 
Figs. 4.9-4.11 are a hypothetical models of balancing a relationship 
between suitable coals from opencast and deep mine sectors to meet 
certain competing criteria assuming each sector has just mined 10,000 
tonnes each, available for direct shipment to the power station. It 
verifies that opencast coal cannot be marketed to the PGI without being 
mixed/diluted with deep mined coal to meet the PGI specification. In 
this process British Coal maximise opencast output to the limits of the 
specification to maximise profit. 
In Fig. 4.9, maximisation of the 10,000 tonnes opencast coal to 
maximise profits scenario falls down as it will be rejected by the PGI 
on the grounds that it fails to meet the specification. The tonnage 
also may well incur penalties. Fig. 4.10 shows the most suitable 
tonnage to meet the PGI specification using the full 10,000 tonnes of 
deep mined coal. However, this is not the most profitable vend 
available that meets the specification; the most profitable vend 
available on a required tonnage/specification from the PGI is shown in 
Fig. 4.11. The model uses the figure from Table 4.35 and is weighted 
in favour of British Coal in terms of calorific value. Furthermore, 
the figures for moisture and sulphur content are taken as neutral and 
not included. Given that penalties would be incurred for the high 
average sulphur content of opencast coal the model is again weighted in 
British Coal's favour. From this we can indicate why British Coal use 
so much lower cost opencast and why the order could have been met by 
the vast majority of deep mined coal even without having the advantage 
of lower sulphur levels. 
At all power stations, there are upper and lower limits and coals 
delivered must 'perform' within these limits. In the model North East 
deep mine output specification, as delivered, aligns with this 
'internal' PGI specification adequately on its own. Opencast coals 
from the North East in the majority of cases do not: they are often too 
low in moisture and ash and too high in sulphur and calorific value. 
Precisely for this reason it would be inappropriate and unacceptable to 
the PGI for opencast coal output to be burned on its own. For opencast 
to be burned it has to be balanced or 'blended' down with deep mined 
coal. This is to bring it within the bottom end of the 'range' for 
moisture and ash content, where it is too low, and at the top end of 
the 'range' for sulphur and calorific value, where it is too high. 
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Ultimately, there is a limit to the input of these -rich' opencast 
coals at which point the costs/profit graph takes a downward trend from 
the necessary blending with the higher cost deep mined coal; but kept 
within profitable margins. As a result, there comes a point where 
there is an optimum level of opencast and deep mine coal mix in each 
vend sent to market, not for reasons of quality so much as for reasons 
of cost. The maxim appears to be: maximisation of opencast balanced to 
the outer limits of the PGI specification with the remaining amount of 
deep mine coal related to the tonnage required. 
Obviously, in the model the majority of deep mine coal could have 
adequately met the requirements of the PGI. This has been the claim of 
objectors at public inquiries. Yet the reality is that British Coal 
maximise their opencaat production at the expense of deep mine output. 
Deep Mine -disregard' is on the portion at the higher cost end. In 
this case it is 3,000 tonnes. Opencast 'disregard' is that output, 
which, because of high calorific value and low ash content cannot be 
accommodated in the final tonnage. In this case it represents 2,000 
tonnes. But this 2,000 tonnea is not lost, it merely goes into the 
next order with the lower coat suitably aligned deep mine coal. We can 
only say under current accounting conditions our lower value deep mined 
3,000 tonnes is stockpiled to await a suitable market, while our higher 
value opencaat commands a premium in the market. 
Expansion of profitable deep mine production reduces the necessity for 
the sourcing of inappropriate opencast coals to the PGI. Especially 
when that capacity, closely aligned to PGI specification, requires 
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little or no blending. Opencast coal, as British Coal have argued, may 
indeed beget wider profit margins than a small section of profitable 
deep mine capacity in the North East and this supports the bottom line 
profits of the industry. British coal should then answer as to how 
much extra cost is accrued when opencast needs to be blended down by 
deep mine coal?. This we do not know. Ultimately, it would appear 
they would wish to produce as much opencast as the PGI market 
specification requirement would allow. Inevitably, this would be at 
the expense of profitable but higher cost capacity. Taking British 
Coal logic further, it would seem that in a contracting market this 
section of less profitable deep mine capacity would be 'capped', 
'holding the market' for privatisation with maximised opencast coal, as 
in the Scottish case, may well happen. 
Research by Berry (1985) and Hopper et al. (1988) found more than 
inconsistencies in the accounting procedures of British Coal. Explicit 
in their analysis are the charges of an ideological and materialistic 
financial accounting practices by the State and British Coal: 
We suggest that financial management and accounting 
statements are mechanisms by which the state can unobtrusively 
manage the activities of the enterprise. We recognise, 
however, that the purpose and outcomes of this management 
may not result in a consistent strategy, except that of 
managing periodic crises(for which there may be an 
ideological and materialist explanation). We would suggest 
that our investigations of the NCB reinforce several recent 
arguments in the literature on the labour process, the state 
and the new middle classes. 
Hopper et. al., 1987 Management and Worker Resistance in the 
National Coal Board: Financial Controls in the Labour Process, 
P.43, Occasional Paper No. 8512, UMIST. 
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Given British Coal's accounting methods opencast coals are needed as a 
lower cost source of production. But against the popular conception 
that they are needed to blend with poor quality deep mined coal the 
evidence suggests the opposite occurs in the majority of situations. 
Opencast requires North East deep mine coals to reduce the overall 
product down to the level of PGI specification. This accords with the 
low investment strategy for deep mines enough to keep them 'ticking 
over' feeding the opencast production till privatisation. Maintaining 
profitable deep mine production levels to feed the out of range but 
more profitable opencast coal, while maximising its output is a complex 
affair. British Coal don't really hide the fact that 'it is not that 
which is justified, but what the market will take in terms of 
'supposedly' lower cost opencast coal' in the process of accumulation 
of capital towards the 'new era in coal'. To achieve this there is one 
other 'impediment' to which their endeavours are reluctantly subjected 
- the planning system and process. 
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vii Conclusion to Chapter Four 
The level of opencast in North East England exceeded the psychological 4 
million tonnes barrier for the first time in 1989 (Table 4.5). In an 
assessment of output, supplies and the market for those supplies serious 
discrepencies in supply and demand for coal in the North East have been 
found. Besides having an uncertain future, and despite a cumulative 
oversupply of some 10 million tonnes to 1994/95, some profitable deep 
mine production is being displaced by more profitable opencast output on 
a raft of spurious arguments over "customer preferences for opencast", • 
The truth of the matter lies in a more complex process formed out of a 
strategy involving inaccuracies over the technical use of coal and 
dubious accounting procedures in the maximisation of opencast to PGI 
markets. 
Examination of the competing costs of opencast coal and deep mined coal 
produced evidence which casts serious doubt on the credibility of 
British Coal's strategy of expanding the proportion of opencast coal in 
its total output at the expenee of the deep mines. As the average and 
incremental costs of opencast coal are now increasing with an increased 
share of total production the average and incremental costs of deep 
mined coal have been gradually decreasing. Because of the structural 
nature of these two coal industries the marginal cost of output from 
deep mines is now cheaper than the marginal cost of output from 
opencast mining (Table 4.13, Fig 4.3). While the gap is narrowing 
between average costs (Table 4,11, Fig 4.3), it will however remain a 
reason for British Coal to expand opencast's share of total production 
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and ignore the marginal costs of production in the respective sectors. 
In this way "every tonne of opencast produced would cost the nation 
57.29 more than it need" (Brocklesby, 1990, para. 5.3). The only way 
for British Coal to stop the rise in costs of opencast coal output is to 
increase the scale of their operation. They are now going for larger 
sites as they do not have the same capacity as deep mines to maximise 
intensive use of their capital investment. 
Serious doubts also remain over British Coal's accountancy procedures. 
Taken at face value, opencast is much cheaper than the most profitable 
pit in the North East and therefore ideallly desirable for a doubling to 
6 million tonnes per annum in the North East (Horsler, BCC, 1987). 
Commercial expediency dictates that expanding opencast output to this 
extent in a contracting market consigns even the most profitable deep 
mines to a restricted future. The future for deep mines is made worse 
from British Coal concentration upon opencast production of East 
Northumberland steam coals (Fig 4.1), away from rich West Durham coals, 
to compensate for the inbalances in rank and quality in coal blends, 
following deep mine closures, to meet PGI specifications. 
The two privatisations of steel and electricity generation have brought 
the maximisation of opencast coal mining to its current strategic 
prominence, in proportion to both the deep mines and net expansion 
itself. British Coal have argued that the maximisation of low cost 
coal, a pseudonym for opencast coal, is necessary in the fight against 
imported coal, but British Coal in collusion with the private sector 
have themselves been party to importing coal. The compounded outcome 
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of this has been the marked reduction in 'deliveries' of coal from deep 
mines over the past decade and the consolidation of opencast output 
delivered to the PGI. 
Looking at the two main power station markets we find that opencast coal 
deliveries to these have increased markedly during the 1980's. However, 
this increase was limited and aligned to PGI specification, the 
maximisation of opencast coal in the blend with deep mine coal. At 
Blyth opencast deliveries rose dramatically from 13 to 48 per cent in 
ten years fran 1978/79. For a very revealing reason the level declined 
to a plateau of 37 per cent. The telling factor which was to lay the 
myths of opencast coal to rest came when the level of opencast output 
delivered to Blyth was reduced at the same time as the closure of three 
pits in Northumberland whose coal also went directly to Blyth. Because 
the quantity of opencast coal was closely related to the quality levels 
of the deep mine blend for Blyth, opencast coal had to be cut back when 
these pits closed as the blend would be too rich. The reduced amount of 
deep mined coal that replaced the coal from the three pits limited the 
need for opencast coal on Rank and quality grounds with opencast being 
so high in Calorific Value, Sulphur and low in Ash. 
Further evidence of British Coal's strategy of maximising opencast 
output to the market specification comes from the Thamesside PGI market. 
Here, deep mined production is losing the market to opencast coals in a 
similar process to that of the steel markets. The threat once more is 
from imported coal being used by the PGI as a 'bargaining counter' to 
force down the price of coal, and once more the response from British 
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Coal has been more opencast coal, but again limited by the PGI 
specification. 
Reductions in deep mine tonnages have shadowed the decline in the Thames 
PGI market for coal. Opencast coal production to Thamesside power 
stations however, was maximised to around 21 percent in the 1980's from 
a base of about 13 per cent, against a background of a declining 
market. What was satisfactory levels of opencast in 1986 were 
increased by another 5 per cent a year later. Maintenance of opencast 
levels of 20-21 per cent delivered to Thamesside reflect both the 
maximisation of opencast coal in the blend as well as the limitations of 
the blend with that level of opencast coal in it allowed to meet the PGI 
specifications (Fig. 4.9-4.11). This has given British Coal greater 
opportunity to replace deep mine coal. Plenmellor site in West 
Northumberland remains an enigma. 
The strategy of 'maximising efficiency and minimising cost' using 
opencast coal conceals the difficulty of maximising opencast coals of a 
high calorific value which cannot be burned without being part of a 
suitable blend, usually deep mined coals. British Coal Opencast 
Executive tend to ignore this, striving to achieve a 'bank of sites' as 
part of the assets in the run up to privatisation. Despite the 
favourable production cost factor, using coking coals for power 
generation brings added engineering complications which are in 
themselves an 'end-user' cost and a mis-use of scarce resources. 
Because of this, much profitable production will be sterilised in a 
contrived ideological process where national energy production is nq 
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longer synonymous with producing energy within the public domain for 
the people of a nation but within the private framework of capital 
accumulation. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND STATE REGULATION OF OPENCAST COAL MINING 
Part One - Power, Control and Planning 
i The Political Context of Environmental Planning 
The political context of planning and its relationship with the public 
has never been more important for its contribution to the future of 
society. Its critical content is exemplified by the crisis created by 
the State's determination to succeed in the accumulation of capital 
through the expansion of opencast mining and economic development in 
general. Increasing negation of local democratic processes by the 
State raises questions over inbuilt assumptions of 'democracy•, of the 
exercise of power and 'control' over people, their environment and the 
planning process, including concepts of public participation (Darner and 
Hague 1971) and democratic elitism (Bachrach 1967). 
As a mode of industrial development, opencast mining is subject to the 
operation of the planning system and the process of planning law. 
Preceding evidence (Chpts. 3 and 4) found that the purpose of 
financial regulation of the coal industry was to effect 
commercialisation and rationalisation, leaving only the most profitable 
production including opencast production to expand under the guidance of 
the State. Expansion of opencast mining is reconciled by 'market 
demand' and invoking the 'national interest' (Mineral Planning Guidance 
3 [MPG3]) and continues to be achieved by the State regulating, where 
necessary, the supply of opencast coal through control of the planning 
system. The extent to which this is sustained and the effects upon the 
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public have been the subject of two surveys - one in North East 
England and the other in Scotland. 
Increasingly critical in the development of opencast mining is the 
relationship between central government and local authorities and their 
interpretation of planning policy and law. In Scotland this has led to 
an accommodation, through planning gains and the loss of employment in 
deep mines, in the expansion of opencast mining and without public 
inquiries (Scottish Survey (52]). By contrast and comparison, in North 
East England the State has been brought into a conflict situation since 
the middle of the 1980's, resulting in several public inquiries, because 
of the effect of opencast mining upon the public and their environment 
(Daisy Hills Survey [Sl], (52)). Broad opposition to opencast mining, 
policy and legislation has not been diminished by changes to Mineral 
Policy Guidelines tilting the balance in favour of opencast operators; 
expansion has taken place nevertheless, often through the Secretary of 
State overriding an Inspector's decision as in the case of Daisy Hills. 
The State's policy is expressed through the Department of Environment 
White Papers, legislation, statutory instruments (S.I.'s), Mineral Policy 
Guidelines and Circulars which are intended to disseminate policy to the 
public. In doing so the Department of Environment assesses the 'expert' 
opinions of professional organisations, namely the Royal Town Planning 
Institute (RTPI), the Countryside Commission and pressure groups such as 
the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE). The local 
authority interprets and enacts these policies to suit local needs. 
Planning applications are subject to these policies and the powers of 
the local authority (Town and Country Planning Act 1971). Should an 
appeal be raised following a refusal of an application, a public 
inquiry, heard by Department of Environment Inspectors and overseen by 
the local authority, may take place under rules of procedural conduct 
and fairness (S.I.1974 No. 419; S.I.1974 No. 420 ). However, 
reduction of local authority powers by central government does not augur 
well for planning. Planners are increasingly restricted by government 
changes to merely achieving a balance between opencast expansion and 
conservation of the landscape. In doing so they may fail to reveal the 
full problems and potential of environmental planning (S1], and by 
doing so allow their work to be undertaken by other groups including 
quangos (Klosterman 1985). 
Cloke (1987) has assessed environmental planning through the role of the 
State using four concepts. 
Pluralist - the state arbitrates independently of interest groups. 
Elitist - Some groups have more access to resources than others. 
Managerialist - Professionals act in the interests of the State as 
gatekeepers for law and policy making. 
Structuralist - Analysis of policy making, power structures and 
planning can only be viewed through the class 
structure. 
Using the latter concept he argued that increasingly the State has 
chosen to accommodate the interests of capital by reducing the 
levels of democratic control at local level. Power has been 
increasingly removed from local authorities by shifting control of 
finance away from local control; greater central control of local 
activity and by shifting accountability away from local control to 
quangos and quasi governmental bodies. From this Cloke suggests that: 
Planning action constitutes a search for consensus within 
prevailing arenas of power - a search which usually precludes 
any radical or progressive prescriptions 
P.J. Cloke, 1987, Rural Planning Policy into Action, ~ 222. 
Cloke and Little (1990) finally believe the role of the State in 
environmental planning is to service the needs of global corporate 
capital in their drive for capital accumulation. At the same time, the 
State accommodates various interest groups in society to maintain power 
providing their activities do not hinder the main process of capital 
accumulation. In reality, the State perpetuates a myth of pluralism 
whilst operating an elitist model of government and policy making 
(Miliband 1982, Richards 1988). Increasingly therefore, the political 
system is maintained in a mode so as not to extend participation beyond 
current levels; the ~establishment' within the system coming from a 
narrow class base continue to suppress and divert pressure for change 
(Miliband ibid.). 
Within this political context few planning schools relate land-use 
planning outside the realms of rational utilitarianism and the work of 
the systems school of planning (pace Keeble 1969, McLoughlin 1969, 
Chadwick 1971). Such a planning method had an eventual outcome which 
served the most powerful in society and failed to reveal social and 
environmental issues which impinged upon everyone (Hague 1985, Sillince 
1986, [Sl]). Planners often still appear to be ~trained as managers 
of decline or facilitators of change' in a situation where planning has 
been defined as the: 
•••• art and science of ordering the use of land and the character 
and siting of buildings and communication routes so as to secure 
the maximum practical degree of economy, convenience and beauty. 
Keeble, 1969, Principles and Practice of Town Planning, P.l. 
In further criticisms of the rational utilitarian model of planning, the 
planning process is viewed as a 'sponge' acting in the interest of the 
state. Blowers (1980) argues the planning system absorbs conflict while 
the law restricts freedom and its attendant professionals exercise power 
in an unequal manner. Paris (1982) in turn sees this as a symptom of 
the unfolding crisis in capitalism; the future of planning lies in the 
struggles between social classes and the stark choice between 
authoritarian statism and socialism. However, Healey (1988, 1989, 1990) 
in a thorough analysis of the politics of the planning has provided both 
a critique of the past two epochs of planning and proposals for a 
radical revision of the planning system based upon European zone 
planning. Healey (1988) suggests that radical forces of both left and 
right brought the end of the post-war consensus society rejecting both 
the 'blueprint model of planning (1947-1970)' and the 'rational 
utilitarian model of planning (1970-1990)' formulated in Regional and 
County structure plans. In promoting 'citizen responsiveness' and 
'environmental consciousness' Healey ( et al. 1988, 1989) argues that 
the context and process of planning need to change, and this to a 
great extent is borne out by the results of both surveys (S1, 82]. Her 
identification of four deficiencies in the planning process are 
synonymous with the conflict in opencast mining development in the North 
East. 
- Poor accountability 
- Institutional dispersal of power across three government 
departments 
- Central Government's increasing unfettered power 
- Inequity and Inability of people to influence policy and 
challenge decisions 
Following this she then examined 18 various proposals for the future, 
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including Mather (1988), Nuffield (1986) and RTPI (1986) and categorized 
them into four models based roughly on a right wing to left wing 
political spectrum: 
- Market Criteria Dominant 
[minimum rules for planning decisions] 
- Hierarchy, Coordination and Broadly Based Interest Mediation 
[heirarchical planning through market management and pluralism] 
- .Rights and Localism 
[local pluralism and strong participation) 
- Maximize Distributive Justice 
[community control of policy initiated by the State] 
Healey claimed that the contribution of the four models in alleviating 
the four deficiencies in the planning process were not wholly adequate. 
Despite the democratisation of the planning process, the rights of 
challenge for the individual and groups and the maintenance of policy 
principles, her penchant for Europeanisation of planning (Healey 1990) 
needs close examination in relation to opencast mining. It could be 
argued Strathclyde and Northumbria re-defined as 'zones' with opencast 
mining would mean little improvement in the burden of extraction without 
real political change in the regions (Hague 1985). 
In an extremely useful contribution, the Town and Country Planning 
Association (TCPA) do provide guidance in the practice of planning aimed 
at ironing out inequalities in society. Seventeen articles were 
published on the theme of 'Planning for the Environmental Decade' (Hardy 
et al. 1990). Within this there were five themes of visibility for 
planning, sustainability of the environment, quality of life, equal 
planning for all social classes and populist participation. As part of 
this increasing debate over the role and purpose of the planning process 
the Nuffield Committee (Nuffield Foundation 1986) made several important 
proposals underserving of the political categorization by Healey. 
Concisely, they proposed greater decentralisation of powers on social, 
economic and environmental issues to local authorities away from central 
government, and the introduction of an Annual White Paper on land and 
the environment to enable local bodies to coordinate their plans and 
decision-making with some consistency. Their proposals for conserving 
and managing the landscape have some significance for opencast mining as 
does the proposal for right of appeal by the public against the granting 
of planning permission. Both the TCPA and Nuffield approaches show a 
marked shift in thinking in the planning profession from the 1970's and 
1980's towards more democracy in planning. 
The Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) to its credit, having a 
coalition of members with variant views balanced with a need to maintain 
credibility with successive governments, appears to have gradually 
advanced its position towards that of Nuffield and TCPA (RTPI 1977, 
1988). The RTPI takes up a positive position on government planning for 
the regions and regional government and greater democracy in planning. 
In that the proposals would affect opencast mining, they propose public 
inquiry procedures should be subject to major reform involving a more 
democratic multiphase approach. Equally important is the disapproval of 
past practice whereby the Secretary of State has overridden a Planning 
Inspector's decision following a public inquiry; the RTPI propose that 
if action is taken by the Secretary of State the decision should be 
subject to the approval of parliament. 
Government intentions of removing impediments in planning contrast 
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sharply with the controlled approach of the RTPI. -Lifting the Burden' 
(Cmnd 9571) is a White Paper presented to Parliament which sought to 
diminish development control to accommodate the spirit of free 
enterprise and capital accumulation. The Town and Country Planning Act 
1971 defines development, including opencast mining as: 
•••• the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other 
operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any 
material change in the use of buildings or other land. 
Town and Country Planning Act 1971, section ~ 
In keeping with this, but with the industrial economy in mind, the RTPI 
has 3 policy aims for the environment which are difficult to reconcile: 
- To conserve and prevent waste and pollution of our natural and 
environmental resources. 
- To increase production of food, fuel and timber. 
- To provide opportunities for the physical, intellectual and 
emotional enrichment of people. 
The political contrast between the views of the RTPI, TCPA and Nuffield 
and those expressed in the White Paper -Lifting the Burden', serves to 
exemplify the current dilemma between a planning system essentially 
designed to service the public, and a government adapting it to 
accommodate the needs of capital. Expanding opencast mining development 
in this context has led inexorably to political conflict between the 
State and the public, especially south of the Scottish border. Brought 
more sharply into focus through the increasing exercise of -ultimate 
sanction' by the Secretary of State, government policy changes and 
attitude to local authority decisions on opencast mining (Scotland 
excepted) are not unrelated to the changing political nature of local 
authorities and the findings of the Widdicombe Report (Cmnd 9797). In 
1965, SO per cent of local authorities were controlled by one political 
party or a coalition of parties, by 1985 political parties in overall 
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control of local authorities had risen to 85 per cent. In the majority of cases the decisions 
against opencast mining have been made by Labour controlled councils. Overall, 
polarization of control means decisions on opencast have often conflicted with government 
policy. 
The sharpening of political intensity is reflected in relations 
between the parties and individual authorities, relations 
between councillors and officers, and relations between 
authorities and central government 
Widdicombe Report. 1985. The Conduct of Local Authority Business 
(Cnmd 9797) para. 2.45 
From the advent of 1985 New Strategy for Coal and the Widdicombe Report, 
planning for opencast mining development, and with it representative democracy, at local 
authority level has been circumvented either by policy guidelines, legislation or the Secretary 
of State's intervention. And judging by the Daisy Hills Survey [S 1] the experience of public 
participation has been made impotent since the planning process became 'nested' in the 
neo-classical political framework of the Tory government involving: 
intensive state control over every sphere of socio-economic 
life, combined with radical decline of the institutions of 
political democracy and with draconian and multiform 
curtailment of so-called "formal" liberties, whose reality is 
being discovered now they are going overboard. (my emphasis) 
N. Poulantzas. 1978. State. Power. Socialism. P. 203. 
Continuing evidence from the central and local government relationship confirms a loss of 
power at local level. And now the public appear even more marginal to the planning process 
from where it was once suggested that: 
planning takes place against a background of unequal 
distribution of political and economic power. . ..... where 
'political' issues and conflicts can be best solved by the 
elected politicians and their technical experts with mass 
involvement generally restricted to the act ofvoting.(sic) 
Hague and McCourt. 1974. II,p.143-155 
Clearly, Hague and MacCourt's concerns are over the political 
representatives forming the democratic elite, planning for the public. 
Schumpeter (1961), synthesized elitism and democracy (democratic 
elitism) so that democracy became a political method where, unlike a 
political philosophy, it had no overriding objectives or commitment to 
ideals but everything would be carried out "according to the rules of 
democratic procedure" (Becker, 1941 pp.26-27) through "government 
approved by the people" (representative democracy) rather than the ideal 
of "government by the people" (Schumpeter, 1961, p.246). Bachrach's 
critique of democratic elitism made it plain: 
The importance to the theory of democratic elitism of 
interpreting narrowly the integral and key concept "political" 
cannot be over-emphasized ••••• then it is understandable that 
the principle of equality of power, long identified as an 
ideal of democracy, must give way to the more realistic 
principle of equality of opportunity to obtain a position 
of power. 
~ Bachrach, 1967 The Theory of Democratic Elitism: ~ Critique P.97 
Past experience of the planning process and the trappings of democratic 
elitism already minimalise the meaning of politics and power and control 
for people at community level (Sl]. Following recent decisions on 
opencast applications by the Secretary of State, Poulantzas' prophetic 
statement rings true; local government representatives are made 
politically impotent as democracy is defeated at the door of the 
government department. 
Public participation has been a central feature of public inquiries into 
opencast mining with variations in activity. Skeffington Committee 
Report (1969) was one of the first to emphasized public participation 
in planning. Much of it was still-born, despite various measures such 
as the appointment of a Community Development Officer to stimulate 
participation and the establishment of Community Councils and Forums 
bringing the local councillor under local control. When it came to 
enact the proposals (Circular 52/1972) participation became tokenism. 
Darner and Hague (1971) have been highly critical of the Skeffington 
Report and subsequent approaches to planning. They argue that even 
Skeffington served only the planner's interests, concealing an 
ideological stance aimed at defending professional prerogatives where 
planning is a means not an end. Far from educating the planners to the 
local public's view, Skeffington and subsequent approaches to planning 
have attempted to educate the public to the planner's view. 
The response by Mineral Planning Authorities MPA's to the surge of 
opencast coal mining applications in Scotland and North East England in 
recent years has betrayed a difference between the two areas in planning 
philosophy. The conservative school believes that the planning process 
responds to the market and the state and that planners are mainly 
passive, accommodating initiatives from private developers with the 
state as an enabler removing impediments to the market. This approach, 
more closely tied with classical economics and the political theories of 
Schumpeter has found receptive conditions in the corporatist politics of 
planning for opencast mining in Scotland. The government in return have 
not indulged in introducing radical 'Circulars' in Scotland. 
Given the experience of public inquiries it does not follow that MPA's 
in North East England are seen to be that much more democratic (S1], 
343 
despite the influence upon councillors' decisions of a more radical NUM 
bringing the debate over opencast into the open. Having gone 'public' 
by refusing so many applications, effectively dispatching them to the 
public sphere, the process of public inquiries still does not allow full 
participation in the planning process. Effectively, MPA's in the North 
East follow the democratic elitist model as the environmental policies 
were devised as a technical fix for the county by "elected 
representatives and their technical experts" (Hague and McCourt,1974) to 
make a greener county attractive to new industries rather than planning 
with the public on the lines of the Skeffington Committee Report 
(HMS01969). Unlike Scotland, the opposition to opencast mining has 
resulted in the government bringing several radical 'Circular• and 
'Advice Notes• to bear on MPA's in England and Wales 
Nevertheless, Darner and Hague observe that: 
What the game is all about is public relations for the planning 
profession. The purpose of public participation is to make 
life easier for the planners. Proposals for more effective 
participation in planning without more participation in 
political life and a consequent redistribution of power means 
participation in planning alone is meaningless. 
s. Darner and ~ Hague, Public Participation in Planning: A Review 
in Town Planning Review 1971, 42, P.217-232 
This observation is reinforced by evidence from the survey of District 
Council MPA's in Scotland (S2]). Put simply: planners avoided the 
controversy of public inquiries wanting 'an easy life'. Ironically, in 
Scotland there is little evidence in opencast mining consents that 
planners have practised the philosophy of their elected representative 
the 1992 Chairman of the Scottish RTPI and leading exponent of the 
radical school, Cliff Hague (Edinburgh College of Art at Heriot-Watt 
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University). Despite combined action from interest groups, trade unions 
and local authorities in North East England, the level of participation 
at public inquiries has depended upon class and culture and the majority 
of the public have been marginal to the participation process. From 
the American experience of citizen planning Sherry Arnstein argues that: 
••• participation without redistribution of power is an empty 
and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the power 
holders to claim that all sides were considered but makes it 
possible for only some of these to benefit. It maintains the 
status quo. 
~ Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation; Journal of the 
American Institute of Planning, 129, July 1969. 216-224 
Control of their environment has evaded the public, they have not known 
power in planning for it has always rested with ~elites'. What is even 
more disturbing is that even these ~elites' are being marginalised by 
the new political framework. ~Lifting the Burden' (Cmnd 9571) pointed 
the way for the government and Widdicombe (Cmnd 9797) gave the political 
reason for doing so. With government financial and policy restrictions 
weakening the power of local authorities a degree of authoritarian 
statism now prevails over a planning system in political crisis. 
Increasing willingness by the State to use legislation as a strategic 
instrument in controlling this process of change is shown by the 
regulation of the supply of coal through the planning system. 
Table 5.1 
CONTRASTING LEGISLATION IN SCOTLAND AND NORTH EAST ENGLAND 
s. I. 975 ( 1982) 3(4)/1984 23(28)/1987 cmnd 9571 cmnd 9797 MPG3 
Scotland applied applied applied applies applies does not 
----~ 
England applied applied applied applies applies applied 
Source: Department of Environment, Scottish Office. 
Concern over the relationship of the public to the planning processs and 
the contrasting attitudes to opencast expansion in Scotland from that in 
North East England led to two important surveys. The first survey [S1], 
known as the 'Daisy Hills Survey', entitled an Independent Survey of the 
Public's Knowledge of, and Attitude to Public Inquiries into Opwencast 
Mining was undertaken shortly before the Daisy Hills Public Inquiry 
(April 1987). It took the form of a 300 household .. postal survey and 
follow up unstructured interview. The second survey [S2], known as the 
'Scottish Survey', entitled 'Opencast Coal Mining in Scotland: A brief 
survey of policy and approaches in District Councils' was undertaken in 
May 1989. It took the unusual form of a twin comparative postal survey 
to tease out the different approaches and attitudes of councillors and 
planners to opencast mining policy in Scotland. 
There are clear conclusions arising from the two surveys with 
implications for the public, environmental planning and opencast mining. 
The main conclusions from the Daisy Hills survey [S1] are: 
1. People felt marginal to the planning process, having little direct 
power and control over the decisions made about themselves and their 
environment. 
2. People placed themselves, their community and environment well 
above the profitability of British Coal and national energy needs 
(referred to in both Circular 3/1984 and MPG3). 
3. People believed that they themselves should control decisions on the 
environment in their community. A substantial percentage of people 
believed that they should have more and better information on 
planning procedures and practice concerning opencast coal mining. 
The survey found people in the communities surrounding the site deeply 
affected by industrial and social change. Their responses reflect the 
continuing blight upon their lives from opencast mining and desire for 
control, in the face of State policy regulation, of the planning system. 
The Scottish Survey (S2] of District Councils, found the following 
factors which marginalise public participation in the planning process 
and accomodate the expansion of opencast coal mining in Scotland. 
1. Economic communication of the practice of current legislation on 
opencast mining is given by planners to council members. Even when 
both council members and planners give substantial priority 
to the environment, Planners do not communicate or contemplate 
invoking refusals based upon Para.lS of Circular 23/87, because they 
accomodate British Coal's programme, or they believe, as do some 
council members, that they would lose the decision through the 
Secretary of State for Scotland. This has not been tested. 
2. The main opposition to opencast in Scotland comes from residents 
who object to the impact upon their lives and to the timescale 
of the projects. Yet these concerns are not fully met by the 
planning process because the issues are avoided, not communicated 
for debate and subsumed beneath the ~technological imperatives of 
economic development and employment at any cost•. 
3. The evidence suggests that Planners in Scotland appear to have 
little knowledge of the major issues in the application of 
planning law and opencast mining, preferring to .service the 
financial needs of British Coal in the belief that the industry 
knows best. 
Anticipating being overturned at a public inquiry does not give the MPA 
the right to deny the public recourse to a public inquiry. Overall, 
the evidence suggests that planners in Scotland may have neglected their 
public responsibilty by not transmitting the necessary knowledge and 
information to the elected representatives on the planning committees 
for them to make informed decisions. If they had, some applications 
such as Coalburn and Francis, would have gone to public inquiry. One 
common theme from both surveys was that the aspirations of the public 
were pitted against the imperatives of British Coal, aided by State 
regulation and the accomodation of British Coal by MPA's in Scotland. 
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ii Planning Law and The State. 
The relationship between people and land has been recognised as having 
important meanings across populations since earliest times. Equally, 
land has been an important source of political power for those who have 
secured ownership of land, increasing their wealth and control over 
those same populations. Consequently, political conflicts have been 
ever present and have continually induced changes in land-use affecting 
the condition of people and their relationship with the land (Berger 
1978). Excesses of capitalism across the centuries, invoking the 
concept and practice of law, have destroyed that relationship, 
marginalising and incorporating people into new processes (Pace -
Hunter 1976; Alivi & Shanin 1982). Despite this, it would appear these 
changes have never washed away the meaning of land for people and the 
importance of the freedoms they once enjoyed and lost (Richards 1983, 
Too often in the past the State has appeared to invoke the concept of 
law to act as defender of private rights. However, the State, even 
under duress, has upheld the public interest against private gain when 
intervening in the process of land, capital and labour relationships. 
The use and meaning of law is important to which interest and for what 
purpose it serves, more especially now in the context of opencast 
mining where conflicts exist between private capital accumulation and 
the public's environment and amenity. It is within this arena the 
existence of planning legislation has an important bearing not only on 
the outcome of opencast development but in the balance of power between 
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the interests of capital and those of the public. Planning law has 
ensured some measure of reconciliation, recall and accountability 
between people, land-use and ownership. The most comprehensive is 
contained within the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971 (TCPA 1971) 
and TCPA (Scotland) 1972 where section 22 is of considerable importance 
in defining the undertaking of an operation or the making of a material 
change of use (Telling 1986). Following this the Town and Country 
Planning General Development Order 1977, (SI 1977 No 289) gave further 
control to the local planning authority over planning development. 
From the early 1980's however, the State has altered the balance of 
power between the public need and the interests of capital. It has 
achieved this by blending secondary planning policy and legislation 
with energy policy as part of a strategy towards the privatisation of 
the coal industry. Planning processes and procedures embedded in 
democratic elitism of local government have been utilized and 
circumvented, shifting control of opencast production away from the 
public domain. 
As an industrial development, the opencast mining process is not only a 
physical intrusion upon the environment, the public and their amenity 
but also on the public's symbolic relationship with land. Starkly, not 
only are the features of the land transformed but in some cases the 
ownership and rights of access are transferred. The pattern and trend 
in the 1990's is for larger sites lasting for much longer periods than 
the average three years of a few years ago. Besides the disturbance 
from noise and dirt, the public are excluded from large tracts of land 
for longer periods. 
This was made apparent at the Rosehills public inquiry when even 
British Coal managers were 'touched' by the testimony of an unemployed 
man, Mr. Kenny Barker, whose only pleasure in life was 'walking the 
dog' around the proposed site. In the same context, British Coal and 
private operators would argue that the shifting pattern and changes in 
land use and ownership is a centuries-old process and the changes they 
make are only temporary. Furthermore, compensations by way of land 
improvement is often made possible by opencast coal mining operations 
restoring 'pitfallen' sites (British Coal submission No.52., Daisy 
Hills Public Inquiry 1986 [Fig. 5.1]). Yet, such simple conflict of 
need and economic interest masks a wider policy issue which the State 
has sought to overcome. The remit of planning legislation and 
procedures is limited to the relationship of land-use and people. 
Capital accumulation related to the benefit of a company are not a 
legitimate nor legal planning consideration, however much British Coal 
would wish them to be so. This fact was reinforced by a letter from 
the Department of Environment to the Association of County Councils 
which said 
A company's profitability is not a relevant planning 
consideration 
Dept. of Environment, Letter to the Association of County 
Councils, 30th September 1988 
Since the State changed the reason for development, from one of a 
production supplement to capital accumulation, opencast mining 
therefore has become both an enigma and a contradiction to the norms 
and ideals of the planning process. Put in simple planning terms, the 
priority of planning is the conservation and best use of land for 
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people, while the priority of opencast operators is maximisation of 
profit. From this contradiction, ensuing conflicts have been 
channelled through the public inquiry process in a climate of legal 
change. 
Any approach to planning law involves morality and justice and a sense 
of both has been central to debates about opencast mining in recent 
times. The idea of 'natural law' carries with it an underlying 
objective morality supported by an acceptance that the State which 
made the law carries moral authority. For many people justice is a 
consensus derived in the democratic processes of balancing public 
interests with private rights (McAuslan 1980). For others justice 
serves the interest of the dominant class of the day (Fryer et al. 
1981). Planners are generally conservative, and take a positivist 
approach to law as an institution in itself with its own rules and 
methods of enforcement. However, recent creations of the legislators 
regarding opencast mining have engendered strong opposition arguing 
that the government have devised Circulars which have moved the balance 
in favour of opencast operators. For example, Chief Planners Offord of 
Northumberland County Council (NCC) and Hardy of Durham County Council 
(DCC) have publicly claimed bias in policy guide-lines in favour of 
opencast operators. Because of the increase in ad hoc legal and policy 
impositions to cope with the strength of opposition south of the 
border, the State has not been consistent with planning law between 
Scotland, and England and Wales. And there is evidence to suggest that 
the phraseology in the Circulars is similar to that in the proofs of 
evidence of British Coal at public inquiries (Pace - MPG3 and New 
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Strategy for Coal 1985). This gives the appearance that the purpose of 
the Circulars are for planning law to facilitate the political and 
ideological aims of the State and British Coal. However, what should 
prevail is a situation where: 
The law exists to and should be used to advance the cause 
of public participation against both the orthodox public 
administration and planning approach to the public interest 
and the common law approach to the overriding importance of 
private property. 
McAuslan, ~ (1980) The Ideologies of Planning Law, Pergamon, 
Oxford, P.2 
With little evidence of legislation empowering public participation 
and control over planning matters since the return to power of the 
Conservative government. With a concerted shift towards authoritarian 
statism (Poulantzas 1978) a more accurate reflection the process of 
planning law and public inquiries perhaps is observed by Fryer et al. 
as the 'triumph of bourgeois jurisprudence' where: 
The focus is on the manner in which the law and 
the legal institutions reflect the interests of the dominant 
class and how those institutions are changed as a new social 
class gradually replaces its predecessor. 
Fryer et al., 1981 Law, Capital and Class, P. ix 
Fryer sees the changes in the relationship of people and land as 
directly related to the needs of capital. The extent to which planning 
law balances the demands of private interests and public needs is 
dependent upon the State, and the rigour of the MPA's Structure Plan. 
The approaches of the present government can be characterised by the 
short term flexible response to opencast mining to counter opposition 
in North East England using secondary legislation to facilitate 
political and ideological objectives. Opposition and challenges to the 
expansion of opencast mining on the scale of that in North East England 
are nonexistent in Scotland. Consequently, the State has seen fit not 
to undertake any of the radical changes in planning law and procedure 
over opencast mining that occurred south of the border. Such political 
action, as shall be revealed, leaves disparities in planning law, 
policy guidance and control over opencast mining between Scottish and 
English Mineral Planning Authorities (MPA's) where previously there 
were none. Consequently, the platitudes from British Coal and the 
State regarding the market preference for opencast coal ring hollow 
when that market is related to secondary planning legislation and 
policy guidance contrived in favour of opencast production and supply. 
Changing the planning process in that manner has a tendency to 
undermine a sense of justice and morality and with it what little 
participation that does exist. 
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iii Secondary Legislation - State Regulation of 
Opencast Coal Mining Production 
Until 1979, the use of legislation, both primary and secondary, in 
relation to opencast mining was applied in an objective and 
uncontroversial manner. Being fairly representative of the State's 
post war approach, the history of the legislation almost parallels the 
development of mining since nationalisation. Legislation was applied 
in consistent and similar form to Scotland as in England and Wales, 
despite the fact that the process of land use and land law in Scotland 
departs in some respects from that south of the border. From the early 
1980's however, this consensus ceased. The financial regulation of 
coal arising from the 1976 IMF impositions (Chpt.2.) and the 1985 New 
Strategy for Coal, the reduction of political control of local 
authorities following The White Paper 'Lifting the Burden' (Cmnd 9571) 
and the 'Widdicombe Report' (Cmnd 9797) was paralleled by the selective 
introduction and operation of secondary policy legislation in the 
planning system; in plain terms - State regulation. 
Much of the 'disparities' in planning law and control that now exist 
between England and Scotland have been induced through the use of 
'Circulars' by the State as a swift and reactive response over 
challenges to opencast development. 'Circulars' are a means of 
exercising control over the use of powers by local authorities 
distributed in the form of duplicated advice letters from the 
appropriate government department. They are in the case of opencast 
mining policy statements, the fact that they are not, strictly 
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speaking, legally binding does not mean they do not have legal 
implications. Any statement in a Circular which indicates the manner 
in which the law should be applied will be taken by the courts as a 
matter of law (Young 1978, Harte 1985,). In the context of opencast 
coal mining, 'Circulars•, having been treated as legislation rather 
than guidance are regarded as a mis-use of power, and as such, are not 
always welcome. 
Whereas ordinary legislation, by passing through both Houses 
of Parliament or, at least, lying on the table of both Houses 
is thus twiced blessed, this type of so-called legislation is 
at least four times cursed. First it has seen neither House 
of Parliament; secondly it is unpublished and is inaccessible 
; thirdly it is a jumble of provisions, legislative, 
administrative or directive in character; fourthly, it is 
expressed not in the precise language of an Act of Parliament 
or an Order in Council but in the more colloquial language of 
correspondence. 
Patchett ~ Leatham(1949) 65 T.L.R. 69 at P.70. 
In stark contrast to years previous, the 1980's have witnessed a 
political change from consistent and complementary planning law that 
had existed between Scotland and England/Wales, even though their legal 
processes are different, to one that provides for contradictions and 
inconsistencies in approaches in planning for opencast mining. Put 
simply, much of this arises from conflict which is the product of 
strong and sustained challenges in North East England upon the logic of 
the State and British Coal's objectives to maximise opencast coal 
production as part of the agenda to privatise the coal industry. 
It is widely known that Scotland has its own legal system. Therefore 
an understanding of the making of planning law and especially the 
operation of this within the planning system is important for our 
purposes. While Scotland utilizes the British Parliament with the rest 
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of the United Kingdom, in most instances separate legislation and 
Circulars are prescribed and laid down for Scotland. Special 
legislative arrangements on mattters of principle are dealt with by the 
Scottish Grand Committee, with matters of detail debated in the 
Scottish Standing Committee in the House of Commons. The Scottish 
Office, with powers residing with the Secretary of State for Scotland, 
is the operational centre of government; based in Edinburgh, it has 
five departments. For our purposes, the major ones are the Economic 
Planning Department (EPD), responsible for the transmission of 
electricity, but significantly not for coal production; the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFFS) and the Scottish 
Development Department (SDD) which is responsible for planning and 
planning law; its counterpart in England is the Department of 
Environment. Important in terms of decision-making on planning 
committees, the Mineral Planning Authorities (MPA) in Scotland, 
unlike England, are at District Council level. The exception to this 
are the lower density areas of Dumfries and Galloway, Borders and 
Highland where the regional councils are both MPA's and strategic 
planning bodies. The Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 created 
these and six other regions together with fifty three district 
councils, and six island councils as self contained authorities. Of 
these, twenty two Scottish district councils and two self contained 
regional councils had a record of opencast mining at the end of 1989 
(Scottish Survey [S2]). 
Most coal reserves were, as 'property', vested in the National Coal 
Board under the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 after they were 
first acquired by the State under the 1938 Coal Act. From 1947 until 
1984 the Secretary of State for Energy controlled opencast developments 
with the newly formed Opencast Executive of the National Coal 
Board(NCB). Only the private sector applications were controlled by 
the local planning authorities. This came from one of the most 
important pieces of legislation the 1958 Opencast Coal Act which 
restricted the size and ouput of these sites. Private operators, under 
license from the NCB, were able to produce and sell coal in return for 
a 'tonnage royalty'. Importantly also, the Opencast Coal Mines Act 
also gave powers to: 
i Planning Authorities as a statutory objector and formalised the 
process whereby any opencast proposal had to be presented to the 
local planning authority. 
ii The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) in England 
and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF) in 
Scotland as a statutory authority to supervise the removal and 
aftercare processes of the land in opencast mining. 
iii Planning Authorities to effectively safeguard the environment and 
amenity value of the land to the public by the: 
need to take into account the effects of the proposals on 
the natural beauty of the countryside, of any such flora, 
farms, features, buildings or objects of agricultural or 
historic interest. 
Opencast Coal Act 1958, Section ~ 
But what the 1958 Act did not do was divest control of decisions 
about appeals in public inquiries from the same department that 
controlled the production of coal - the Department of Energy. This 
situation of the land-use planning and coal production aspects of 
opencast mining being controlled by one department engendered 
suspicions of bias. 
A more objective assessment would be that the situation was an 
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organisational hangover from a wartime necessity to increase coal 
production. It was not until 1981 that we saw the first change 
ostensibly towards decentralised control mineral planning. The TCPA 
(Minerals) Act 1981 provided the formal title of 'Mineral Planning 
Authority'(MPA) together with other provisions to the TCPA 1971. 
These empowered councils with the monitoring of sites (section 264), 
prohibition of working and restoration of sites (section 51A), and 
detailed aftercare conditions (section 30A). Continuing concern for 
the environemt and control over opencast mining also yielded a Royal 
commission on Energy and the Environment(CENE), commonly known as the 
Flowers Commission after its chairman. In its report it recommended 
the transfer of control over mineral planning decisions to 
county(England) and district(Scotland) councils with final 
responsibility lying with the Secretary of State for the Environment. 
This independent body's report was commissioned by the government and 
such is its influence throughout the country that it has been quoted at 
length in public inquiries, not least its most telling observation: 
•.•• even if the greatest care is taken in both extraction 
of opencast coal and the subsequent restoration of the 
land •••••• opencast mining has a severe impact on the 
environment in both the short and long term. 
The report also recognised a very real relationship between the extent 
of opencast mining output and future deep mine production: 
We strongly recommend that as older, more unprofitable and 
less environmentally acceptable deep mines are closed and 
more efficient and profitable operations take their place, 
the volume of opencast mining should be allowed to decline. 
In the meantime there should be no increase in the target of 
15 million tonnes per year. 
Coal and the Environment CENE (The Flowers Report), Paragraph 
22-73, 8-9, July 1981, Department of Environment. 
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Guidelines set out by the Flowers report made specific reference to ~a 
demonstratable need for certain grades of coal', ~the avoidance of 
sterilisation by other development' and the justification of the 'need 
to fulfill short term increases in demand'. While adoption of these 
issues into 'Circulars' would shift greater control of opencast mining 
to the MPA's, it was also to bring the operation of the planning system 
into conflict with British Coal's policy to expand opencast production. 
The first political response to the Flowers report came from the 
government in the form of a White Paper. It rejected any 'interference 
in the market for coal' 
The Government judge that the most important contribution 
they can make at the present time is through removing 
obstacles to the free operation of market forces. 
Where the: 
•••• appropriate level of opencasting should be determined 
by the market •••••• (and) for the NCB to decide the level of 
output which they wish to aim for •••• 
Coal and the Environment, The Government's Response to the CENE 
Report, Para.? and Para.74, (Cmnd 8877), May 1983. 
Governmental haste to redress the political balance has meant that the 
White Paper never appeared in final legislative form as an Act of 
Parliament. Instead the government resorted to a more authoritarian 
attempt at regulating opencast coal supply by producing Circular 
(3/1984) and Circular (4/1984)(Scotland). These Circulars were said to 
be of a 'transitional' nature until the appropriate Act came into 
force. In fact they were in any event a government test bed of public 
opinion and the objectors' social networks. Several public inquiries 
involving intrigue and acrimony in the North East compelled the 
government to respond by redresssing the balance in favour of British 
Coal through the production of further ~Circulars'. The introduction 
of this new secondary legislation by the Secretary of State for the 
Environment was not complementary to or consistent with past practice. 
In England Circular (3/1984) was amended by Circular (28/1987) but 
subsequently withdrawn and replaced completely by a ~suitable 
alternative' - Mineral Planning Guidance Note 3 (MPG3) which will be 
expanded upon shortly. 
Most significantly, past practice of installing complementary 
legislation in Scotland was ignored. Circular (4/1984) followed its 
English counterpart with the complementary Circular (23/1987) 
[(28/1987) (England)]. That was as far as the process went. On the 
one hand, Planners are still waiting for a similar MPG in Scotland to 
replace Circular(4/1984) to afford them continuity and consistency in 
their deliberations over opencast mining. The State's silence on the 
matter can be likened to a Sunday morning in Ardnamurchan! On the 
other hand control of the operation of the planning system in Scotland 
is not needed as there are few impediments to opencast production 
(Scottish Survey [S2]). 
Circulars (3/1984) and (4/1984)(Scotland) confirmed the new position of 
the government as exemplified in the White Paper 1983 (Cmnd 8877); 
their terms of reference were at first sight uncontroversial: 
This Circular explains the transitional arrangements for 
determining opencast coal applications made by the National 
Coal Board (NCB) which are to be introduced on the let March 
1984. The Circular also provides guidance to planning 
authorities and the industry on the issues they should 
consider in drawing up opencast policies and programmes, 
and in handling particular cases whether submitted by the 
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NCB or the licensed operators. 
Circulars (3/1984) Dept. of Environment and (4/1984), SOD, Paras.1 
Yet the content of the document proved otherwise, most especially in 
the North East. Paragraphs 5 and 15 became the most contentious 
paragraphs in these Circulars at public inquiries 
Where the NCB wish to work a site they will be expected to 
consult all interested parties ••••• before submitting a 
planning application to the planning authority in the normal 
way ••••• supported by such details as the planning authority 
would normally require of any mineral applicant. These would 
include the need for the coal, an estimate of annua~ 
production, details of any other minerals to be worked, a 
programme for working and restoring the site, and the 
necessary environmental safeguards.(my emphasis) 
Circulars(3/1984), Dept of Environment and (4/1984), SOD, Paras.5 
This taken together with paragraph 15 which talked of the 'market 
requirement', was meant to incorporate what essentially was market 
regulation of the supply of opencast coal into the planning system. It 
even managed to co-ordinate polemic from British Coal's proofs of 
evidence and press statements into the beginning of the paragraph. 
Cost, as we have been reminded, is not a planning consideration. 
Opencast coal is an important national resource which can 
often be produced cheaply and profitably ••••••• But as the 
White Paper made clear, the Government see no case for 
continuing to endorse a target for opencast output. Each 
project should therefore be considered in terms of the 
market requirement for its planned output, (taking into 
account the alternative sources of supply, including deep 
mine coal). 
Circulars(3/1984), Dept of Environment and (4/1984), SDD, Paras.l5 
At public inquiries, paragraphs 5 and 15 formed the focal point over 
which the 'objectors' developed their case against opencast mining in 
North East England. Corporatism in Scotland has seen that this type of 
contest remains distant from the doors of MPA's and British Coal north 
of the border. However, the reaction of the State to the continued 
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assertive challenge to opencast in North East England to Circulars 
(1984) was the production, in May 1988, of a new Guidance Note MPG3 for 
England and Wales. 
Circular 23/1987 (Scotland) set its terms of reference in a similar 
manner to Circular (28/1987) in England and Wales. What was 
irregular about these changes was that they were brought in on the back 
of legislation unrelated to opencast mining. The logic of the State's 
reasoning for bringing the opencast coal industry within the operation 
of the planning system partly lay with the successful private sector 
'sand and gravel business' which also operates within the planning 
system. The 'Circulars': 
explain the effect of prov~s~ons in the Housing and 
Planning Act 1986, which were brought into force on 11th 
December 1987 by the Housing and Planning Act 1986 and 
(commencement No.9) Order 1987 (SI 1987/1939), to amend 
the Opencast Coal Act 1958 and complete arrangements for 
bringing British Coal within the normal planning system. 
Circular 23/1987 Scottish Development Department (SDD), para.l 
It also went on to explain in paragraph 4. the consequential changes 
made necessary by the 1986 Housing and Planning Act regarding 
'compulsory Rights and Rights of Way•. As in England these are now 
embodied in the Opencast Coal(Authorisation and Compulsory Rights of 
Way)(Forms) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/1915). What is not immmediately 
obvious from the terms of reference was the cancellation and retention 
of paragraphs in Circular (4/1984). 
this Circular amends 4/1984 to the extent that paragraphs 
1 to 13 and 21 to 23 of that Circular are hereby cancelled. 
Circular 23/1987, SDD, Para.6. 
Paragraph 5. _concerning 'the need for coal' was even regarded as too 
contentious for Scotland and was therefore cancelled. However, Trevor 
Whittley, senior planner in the Scottish Office, believed that this was 
adequately catered for in paragraph 16., when, "assessing 'the need for 
coal' •••••• proposals should be examined against (certain) 
considerations". In effect, from a Scottish planning law viewpoint 
there was no material or significant change because together with 
paragraph 15: 
Paragraphs 14 to 20 of Circular on the exercise of planning 
over opencast operations remain in force. The issuing of 
further guidance on opencast coal working is being considered. 
Circular (23/1987), SDD, Para.6. 
Then, south of the border, MPG3 became the State's key instrument in 
the operation of the planning system to accomodate the expansion of 
opencast coal supply. Critically, we now had a situation where 
opencast coal mining in Britain was being assessed under two different 
and incompatible pieces of secondary legislation to ensure one single 
political outcome. Planners in the North East were asked under the 
'Guidelines' of MPG3 to examine a whole series of 'National Policy 
Considerations' which talk of 'the national interest', 'the lower 
resource cost of opencast coal' and the financial health of British 
Coal. Whilst in Scotland, they still operated under the different 
agenda of Circulars(4/1984) and (23/1987), where opencast operators 
were still required to prove a 'need' and the market requirement for 
the coal; and most definitely not under 'national policy 
considerations' or in the 'national interest•. 
The inherent bias of MPG3 means that it dis-arms the ability by 
planners to call for justification of need for the coal in the site 
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upon application by British Coal. Starkly, the guidelines ~discard' 
~the need for coal' concept, creating a new agenda almost alien to 
planning. The general tenor of the document is prescriptive in its 
attempt to change land-use planning into economic planning, 
accommodating the cost and market priorities of opencast operators: 
The Government's role in relation to energy supply is 
therefore to help create the conditions necessary for the 
free operation of the market. 
MPG3, Opencast Coal Mining, Dept of Environment, May 1988, Para.4. 
Then again we are told for what purpose: 
because opencast coal is one of the cheapest forms of 
energy available to this country, it is in the national 
interest to maximise production where that can be done in an 
environmentally acceptable way. 
MPG3, para. 5. 
Furthermore, 
the mineral planning authority should consider any material 
arguments which might outweigh the objections to the proposed 
development ••••• such as the low resource cost of the coal. 
MPG3, para. 10. 
Again, elevating opencast coal beyond the public domain, invoking the 
~national interest' it states: 
there is a strong case in the national interest for allowing 
these resources to be developed unless there are overriding 
environmental considerations. 
MPG3, para. 6. 
Previously ~the mineral applicant' was under obligation to prove the 
~need for the coal'. Now policy decrees that the ~need' for the coal 
is axiomatic. De facto, the document transfers part of that previous 
planning process to the industry. By doing so, it diminishes any 
contest over the ~need' for the coal in a site and attempts to 
re-distribute power and control over the operation of the industry 
further away from the public domain. 
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It is for the industry to make commercial decisions about 
the sites they wish to work and the level of output they 
wish to aim for in any period in the light of market conditions 
MPG3, para. 7. 
Planners therefore, under the 'national policy considerations' of 
MPG3, (para.28), have to take into account the 'material arguments' of 
'the low resource cost of the coal' (para. 10). The document then 
suggests, and no doubt the intention was, that MPA's are denied the 
right to refuse an application on economic grounds because: 
Reasons for refusal must always be based ~ sound 
environmental considerations or other planning grounds. 
MPG3, para. 11.(my emphasis) 
Planners in Scotland, although not contending with MPG3, have made 
their thoughts on that document very clear in writing: 
I've read through your copy and I feel it is stacked in 
favour of the coal industry. It alarms me a bit, that there 
is no apparent difference between the guidance for British 
Coal and the private sector. This suggests to me that 
either a sell off of British Coal Opencast, or a very big 
liberalisation of the licencing controls, is on the way. 
My concern is that MPG3 weakens a lot of planning control 
matters ••••• I can't think of any legislation(in Scotland) 
which refers to National Energy considerations. 
Letter, 20th June 1988, from Jim Henry, Geologist/Planner, 
Lothian Regional Council, to Jim Ellison 
From this statement the legitimacy of MPG3 is be brought into 
question especially when: 
Mineral planning authorities will need to have regard to 
all material considerations when determining applications 
including the national policy considerations outlined above. 
MPG3, para. 28. 
'National policy considerations' on opencast mining, by any meaning of 
the phrase from the State, encompass opencast mining in Scotland. Thus 
MPA's in the North East are asked to have regard to the opencast output 
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in Scotland as well as the rest of Britain. But how can that be when 
Scottish opencast output is supplied and considered under very 
different secondary legislation? MPG3 is not valid in Scotland and, 
therefore it cannot take into account opencast production north of the 
border. The 'national policy considerations' embodied in MPG3 are a 
misnomer and valid only in England and Wales. MPA's cannot have regard 
to 'national policy considerations' when opencast applications are 
being considered by differing approaches to planning. And, more 
importantly, determined by conflicting and contradictory legislation in 
a different country and region. Therefore I would suggest, that the 
validity of the whole document is in doubt, a great attempt at 
regulation of supply though it is. 
The State has sought to accomodate the financial ambitions of British 
Coal as detailed in the 1985 New Strategy for Coal not only by 
financial regulation but through the operation of the planning system. 
It is precisely because of the relationship between opencast 
production, the planning system and the financial directives of 
government upon British Coal that we come to understand a prescriptive 
policy exists for the coal industry. 
But the most significant and telling reaction from government to 
opencast coal mining has been in their willingness to regulate the 
operation of the planning system in response to the contrasting 
political attitudes in Scotland and North East England so as to meet an 
ideological imperitive of maximising opencast production. Allied to 
this, in the North East, a policy was developed to meet the imperative 
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of maximising opencast revenue to the output limits that the market 
specification requirement will allow. And in Scotland, besides holding 
the markets, whilst investment is hibernated in three pits, opencast 
output has been maximised to the output limits of the market for 
Scottish coal. In the Scottish case the State has seen no reason to 
alter legislation with opencast production virtually unimpeded. 
Opencast expansion in Scotland, as we shall make plain, comes as much from 
internal manipulation of the planning system as accomodation from the 
corporate body politic towards the production of opencast coal. 
These dissimilar processes have one common aim and result for the State 
and British Coal. By adapting legislation to the demands of regional 
situations it clearly suggests that planning law is being utilized in 
the interests of the State's objectives for the coal industry and 
private capital. Yet there are contradictions arising from and within 
the current legislation in Scotland and North East England that should 
give cause for concern to both opponents and proponents of opencast and 
'authoritarian statism'. It is to these contrasting and different 
situations we now turn, following both Surveys (Sl, S2] and through the 
public inquiries to the effect of opencast mining upon the public. 
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Part Two Opencast Mining, Public Interest and Private Gain: 
Contrasting Processes in Scotland and North East England 
i The Political Context of Opencast Coal and Environmental Policy 
As the surveys [Sl, S2) indicated, the public interest is not always 
served when negotiation and consultation is contained at a 
'professional' level between Mineral Planning Authorities, district 
councils and opencast operators. However, so great is the State's 
intention to ensure private accumulation by regulating the supply of 
opencast coal through the operation of the planning system, the 
alternatives for the public are indeed limited and dependent upon local 
authorities acting in their interest. In Scotland the outcomes from a 
corporatist approach to opencast mining have been somewhat different to 
those of the conflict approach in North East England. Arguably, the 
public interest has been bartered for private gain in Scotland, by 
comparison, south of the border the public interest has, to a great 
extent, been overidden by the hand of the State. Human and 
environmental problems resulting from the impacts of these two different 
situations are, nevertheless, fundamentally similar. British Coal 
consciously minimise the effects of opencast mining on peoples lives and 
the environment, yet they would not dispute that as an extractive 
industry it does exact a toll on the environment and people alike. 
Scotland excepted, it is for these and other political reasons that many 
opencast applications are taken beyond the refusal/consent stage to 
public inquiries. 
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Public Inquiries provide an opportunity to the public to express 
opinions on the proposed development in the context of a legally 
regulated procedure. This level of public participation is meant to be 
an essential part of the public inquiry process. However, there are 
indications that in determining the amount of influence exerted upon the 
proceedings of a public inquiry some people are as much marginalised by 
their class as by the political nature of the inquiry process, "ensuring 
only the powerful benefit" (Arnstein 1969). Despite its limitations, 
the public inquiry process is the most democratic forum available for 
people to exercise some constraint over opencast development other than 
through the ballot box. In Scotland people's concerns over opencast 
mining have only rarely been allowed to proceed to the level of a public 
inquiry [52]. Of course, the extent of participation in the planning 
process will also vary from region to region and council to council, but 
that does not wholly account for the stark contrast in approaches to 
opencast applications between Scotland and North East England. 
North East mineral planning authorities (MPA's) have found it difficult 
to comply with the State's endeavours to create the conditions for the 
free operation of the market and defend the public and environmental 
interest. Restrictions upon the power and control of MPA's are clearly 
laid out in MPG3, regulating opencast output "for the industry to make 
commercial decisions about the sites they wish to work and the level of 
output for which they wish to aim" (Para. 2.1· "There is always a 
presumption in favour of development" (Para. ~ but British Coal do 
have a duty to have regard to the preservation of amenity when 
formulating proposals for opencast working (Housing and Planning Act 
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1986, Schedule ~ Although not stated this makes it incumbent for 
both bodies to arrive at Section 52 agreements on planning gains (1971 
TCPA, Circular 22/83). However, "opencast coal extraction need not be 
incompatible with Green Belt objectives" (Para. !21 and "the fact that a 
site lies in a National Park is not sufficient reason- in itself for 
rejecting the proposal" (Para. ~· However, any proposed intrusion 
upon such environments cannot discount Circular 4/76 where MPA's 
undertake a rigourous assessment to determine the need for the proposed 
development and whether it could be justified in the public interest 
(Hansard, H.C., 9th April 1987, Cola 393, 394). A process of further 
regulation occurs from the State tightening the relationship between 
MPG3 and its method in acceptance of development plans, moving 
control further away from local authorities to the opencast industry 
(Para. ~ Where long term programmes (for opencasting) have been 
agreed between industry and local authorities "the Secretary of State 
will have regard to them in approving development plans and deciding 
opencast appeals" (Para. ~· The process is reinforced by the 
Planning and Compensation Act 1991 which redefined the purpose of the 
development plan in making decisions on opencast mining. Allied with 
Circular 14/91 stating "the plan should be followed unless the weight of 
other considerations tell against it", makes it almost obligatory for 
local authorities to give beneficial treatment to opencast programmes in 
their development plan. This process regulates the development of 
opencast in favour of the industry and against the public and 
environmental interest by giving more weight to opencast development 
programmes in development plans than ever before. 
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However British Coal have recognised the need to calm the rising 
environmental concerns and impact on the quality of life in local 
communities affected by opencast mining. In their "Framework Policy on 
the Environment" (British Coal Jan. 1991) they mark out a framework of 
environmental policies and objectives to balance the need to achieve its 
business aims and those of the public concern and interest using 
Environmental Assessments (E.A.). Using E.A. ls not a concession; 
Circular 15/88 following E.C. Directive 85/337 demands that in most 
situations an E.A. should be undertaken anyway. 
In the North East, Northumberland County Council (NCC) following over 40 
years of continued opencast activity have renewed their Structure Plan. 
Summary Policy C4 mirrors those concerns stating that mineral workings 
will be determined in the light of certain criteria: 
# the need for the mineral. 
# the employment prospects. 
# the effect on agriculture. 
# the impact on the landscape 
# the effect on features of archaeological, architectural, 
historic or natural interest. 
# transport considerations. 
# the effect on residents and local communities. 
# the cumulative effect on the environment 
and the local community. 
The operational focus in the North East is shifting to North East 
Northumberland to accommodate PGI specifications and because south of 
the River Coquet, where there is a presumption in favour of opencast 
mining, there are few sites available for extraction. With their Coast 
Management Plan and Landscape Enhancement and Forestry (LEAF) Programme 
supporting the policies laid out in the structure Plan placing the 
emphasis upon people and their environment and history (NCC, Planning 
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for the Past 1991) the stage is set for more conflict in Northumberland. 
The Countryside Commission designated the coastline from Cresswell 
northwards as a 'Heritage Coast' and places an obligation on NCC to 
conserve for the enjoyment of the public. However, British coal have 
already extracted and prospected behind Druridge Bay (Fig. 4.4) and in 
Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) at Plenmeller (Fig 5.2). As 
we know they are also prospecting in the Allerdene and Unthank areas 
south of Berwick (Fig. 4.1). For the Countryside Commission the record 
of British Coal in the past has not been a good one: 
since December 1985 the Commission has been consulted on five 
applications. All comments have been copied to the NCB, but 
unfortunately there is no indication that any of our comments 
are being taken into account. Indeed, instead of improving the 
situation has become worse. We are now concerned that the NCB 
are not taking adequate measures to minimise environmental 
effects of new opencast mines. 
Caroline Brewster, Countryside Commission, to Mr.T. Vitagliano 
Dept of Environment, Letter 15/9/1986. 
One major concern has been repeated in statements by North East planning 
authorities not least Durham County Council (DCC) in their Structure 
Plan Policy 91 and summarized by NCC: 
that the cumulative effect of sites working or under restoration 
at the same time do not result in unacceptable environmental and 
social problems. 
NCC, The Coal Industry in Northumberland 10/12/1991, para. 5.26 
Certainly mineral extraction within 250 metres, or operations involving 
blasting within 500 metres of any group of 10 dwellings or more will not 
be tolerated (DCC. Policy 88). Contrast this regulation of operations 
with the corporatist approach in Scotland from Graham Uren, Director of 
Technical and Planning Services, Clydesdale District Council, in his 
Report to Planning Committee, 18th September 1986: 
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Impact on Coalburn - The direct effects of operations on the 
application site can be very largely the subject of planning 
conditions. On the other hand the interpretation of condition 
and the measurement of any disturbance from noise, dust etc. 
can present complex problems for enforcement at later stages. 
It is unrealistic to ~ conditions which will prevent severe 
operating problems for British Coal as head-on enforcement may 
not readily be achieved. 
para. 6.7 ~emphasis). 
the applicant proposed that the absolute minimum distance between 
the edge of the excavation area and inhabited dwelling houses 
should be 65 metres but, after following representations by the 
District Council, the applicant doubled this minimum distance to 
130 metres. 
para. 4.6 
By comparison, adherence to strict limits in the North East using 
British Standards 5228 and 4142, Circular 10/73 and the Control of 
Pollution Act 1974 contrasts with the select references by Graham Uren 
to noise levels at the Coalburn site. 
Maximum noise levels are in excess of those recommended by the 
Environmental Health Department of the District Council. The 
applicants proposals on noise levels cannot be regarded as 
unreasonable although the continuation of the higher noise 
levels (up to 65 dB(A) until 10 p.m. each weekday is 
unacceptable. 
para. 5.11 
From these examples we can see that two contrasting standards of 
environmental planning are in operation in Scotland and North East 
England. These seem very much related to the political approaches of 
the local authorities and the labour movement to the State's respective 
policy in each region in the expansion of opencast coal. Corporatist 
approaches to opencast mining show environmental planning standards are 
relaxed in favour of opencast development. The State does not apply 
the same degree of regulation that is prevalent in a situation where 
resistance to opencast expansion prevails and is synonymous with strict 
application of environmental standards. It means that residents in 
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Coalburn are not receiving the same approach to quality of life issues 
and environmental planning to that delivered in North East England. The 
outcome for the public and the environment are made clear by the 
statements from those living in Scotland and the North East. 
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ii Human Issues Arising from Public Inquiries 
The issues opencast mining has raised by its intrusion upon people's 
lives and their environment have deepened dramatically from the small 
scale disturbance during the 1950's to problems in the 1990's of health, 
quality of life and conflict over control of their environment (S1]. 
Environmental Assessments (Circular 15/1988) may well look after the 
environment but not the people in the community and it is time for a 
Social Impact Assessment as long as there is: 
always a presumption for allowing applications for development, 
having regard to all material considerations, unless that 
development would cause demonstrable harm to interests of 
acknowledged importance. 
DOE Circular 14/1985 
That 'acknowledged importance' has rarely included the health and well 
being of people in communities and results from the framing of 
legislation and policy which prioritise opencast mining development 
above the interests of the public and the environment. Despite the 
platitudinous overtures on the environment, opencast mining development 
in certain communities, as the residents' survey found (S1.], becomes 
more than an persistent intrusion upon peoples lives. At the Brusselton 
Hill Top public inquiry loss of amenity was a major issue for the 
residents. Great consternation was shown from British Coal's proposal 
that 10 public rights of way be suspended as well as the parts of three 
others during the operation of the site (Stevenson, NCB, Proof, 
Brusselton, para. 12.1) Questions over the loss of liberty as well as 
amenity were raised, and for good reason. Some of these paths, being of 
great antiquity, are still used for access and communication from one 
village to another rather than pure leisure; in return for the loss of 
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access British Coal offered two alternative paths. 
The impact of opencast mining in the area, in terms of loss of amenity 
and the future well being of the public, was not lost on the Inspector: 
Opencast workings have been present around Shildon throughout 
living memory. Fields and footpaths are lost and restoration 
is bare and featureless ••••• the area should be left in peace. 
Inspector Jenkins Report of the Brusselton Hill Top Public 
Inquiry to the Secretary of State Para. 351, 24/8/1987 
and that Fred Wright, a local Training Officer with: 
an interest in Ornithology had noted several uncommon species 
of bird at Brusselton Reservoir. The disturbance would have a 
direct effect on these birds. Of particular interest and 
concern is the likely effect of interference on expensive 
amateur radio equipment installed at Brusselton Cottages, the 
12 metre high baffle banks would blank off a considerable area 
from radio signals. Many hours of study and much expense could 
be completely wasted. The offer by the NCB to raise the mast 
would be some help. 
Para. 354 
And in an unusual departure for an H.M. Inspector there came a highly 
subjective but compassionate gesture: 
His elderly parents live in the Cottages and are at a stage in 
life where the peace that they have earned would be shattered by 
the proposed site. Both are unwell and deserve to be left in 
peace ••••• In my opinion the effect of an opencast site, so 
close to the town, would have a severe impact on the life, 
employment and surroundings of Shildon. 
Mr. ~ ~ Jenkins, Inspectors Report to the Minister at the 
Department of Environment 24/8/1987, Paras. 355 and 380. 
Even so, the presence of an opencast site has driven some people out of 
communities they have lived in most of their lives (Joyce, DCC, Proof, 
Billingside, para. 10.75) and has upset newcomers to the community who 
thought they had an idyllic environment (Poulson, Proof, Daisy Hills). 
Similar concerns have been voiced in Scotland, where in a departure from 
the direction and approach taken by North East MPA's and opposition 
groups, the concept of amelioration and planning gain is used. The 
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Scottish survey [S2] showed that planners chose not to fully utilize the 
available legislation and policy preferring to accommodate the needs of 
British Coal, pressures for supplying employment and bargaining for 
improvement in amenities. One major concern for the Strathclyde 
Regional Council, their District Councils, the political parties and 
Alisdair Hutton MEP was over the numerous grants available for the 
provision of new infrastructure to support the development and the form 
this would take by way of new road and rail networks (Appendix ~i· 
While they were embroiled in this debate British Coal got on with its 
need to develop opencast mining on a large scale in strathclyde. 
Though the approach by Scottish planners denies certain democratic 
avenues and scope for public opposition, it did not prevent anger and 
cynicism at a meeting of Clydesdale District Council to determine 
approval of the Coalburn site. 
The Region went behind the District Council's back to hold 
their own talks with British Coal over the transport problem 
Councillor Edward Wright J.P. 
Nothing short of a dual carriageway and a by-pass at Rigside 
will appease the people. 
Councillor Malcolm Wardlaw 
It would bring 200 jobs to an area with the highest male 
unemployment in West Clydesdale •••.• we either flunk it and 
leave it to the Scottish Office to do our dirty work for us, 
or approve it today 
Vice Convenor David Smart 
What are British Coal giving back to the community in Coalburn? 
Councillor Irene Logan 
The life of a child in Rigside is worth more to me than all the 
bloody coal in Coalburn 
Councillor Jimmy Hood (ex NUM Scottish Area Executive) 
.••• and what of the ~400,000 given by British Coal for road 
improvements (to the Region) 
Councillor Tom Prentice 
Clydesdale District Council, Minutes of Meeting 6/11/1986 
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Previously, the Coalburn Action Group sent a letter to Mr Uren, the 
Director of Planning (7/10/1986). The letter is most telling for being 
more concerned to maximise environmental improvement and minimise 
intrusion in return for 'putting up with the site' than stopping the 
development. Examples of this included provision of double glazing on 
all houses, reduction in rates for all residents, and setting up a 
benefit fund for residents. British Coal replied in kind and following 
~ 
the request for a new community hall: 
British Coal representatives agreed that they would approach 
CISWO and the Scottish Development Agency with a view to putting 
together an appropriate financial package. British Coal do not 
lose any opportunity to prompt contractors to invest in the 
community. 
Confidential Statement of the Planning Sub-Committee: 
Proposed Opencast Development at Dalquhandy following a Meeting 
with Representatives of British Coal, lOth October 1986. 
Unlike the North East, no Miners Support Group existed to make 
representation as it had folded shortly after the miner's strike. 
However, more than 450 individuals objected to the Coalburn application 
and were supported by 'Communities against Opencast•, the Scenic Trust 
for Scotland and SCRAM, the Scottish anti-nuclear group. Yet without 
the formal support of the MPA, fully utilizing the legislation and 
policy, their opposition was relatively diminished and eventually 
fruitless. However, councils in the North East are also not averse to 
securing benefits for the community: 
It is the County Council's intention to seek wherever possible 
community or environmental benefits in association with 
granting permission for opencast coal operations. 
Northumberland County council (NCC), The Coal Industry in 
Northumberland Consultation Document, 10/12/1991 
By contrast and comparison, the difference in NCC's approach to the 
issue of opencast mining and lies in their attitude and ability to 
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defend the public interest. Harry Collinson gives us a vivid insight 
into the relationship between land and community and its importance to 
people within those communities: 
At Lofthouse, Medomsley, Whittonstall, Woodhead and in the 
Derwent Valley and at Daisy Hill (first inquiry) the case was 
again and again successfully made that opencast mining on this 
scale is incompatible with the intimate small-scale attractive 
historical rural landscape of this part of Britain. A good 
landscape made more vital by the contribution it can make to 
the mostly deprived lives of the people living close to it. 
And they do live close. Pit village, fields, pit village is 
the close knit pattern of the old coalfield. The miners trod 
the footpaths across these fields for fresh air; their 
descendants do it often from enforced idleness resulting from 
unemployment. Escape from unemployment will not come through 
the temporary transient and few jobs created by opencasting. 
Harry Collinson, Deputy Chief Planning Officer, Proof of Evidence 
to the Rosehills Public Inquiry 28/10/1986, P.l3 
Apart from opposition to Coalburn and deputations to the Francis Project 
in Fife there has been little concerted activity against opencast mining 
in Scotland, mainly for the reasons already outlined in Chapter 3. Yet 
a typical private sector approach as outlined by BMC Mining Ltd., if 
allowed in Scotland, possibly could change the public's perception and 
attitude towards opencast mining: 
Objects to presumption against opencast coal in Green Belt 
areas: Conservation Areas; Areas of Nature Conservation; Areas 
of Great Landscape Value; Areas of Good Agricultural Land; and 
Areas of Special Scientific Interest. Considers the whole 
coalfield areas should be designated as presumption for areas and 
each site considered on its merits. 
BMC Mining Ltd, Consultee Comments on the Alteration No.1 
Opencast Coal to Lothian Region Structure Plan, January 1988 
The public should take note that a process of areas of presumption 
. 
similar to that proposed by BMC Mining has taken place in Strathclyde, 
making it the opencast economy of Scotland. However, it is quite 
revealing that since the deep mines have closed and despite the huge 
expansion of opencast mining unemployment remains a major problem in the 
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old coalfield areas of Strathclyde Region. Despite a high and 
continuing presence of opencasting in the Motherwell area unemployment 
has remained consistently higher than the Regional or Sottish national 
averages (Motherwell District Council, District Economic Profile, 1990). 
Councillor Adam Lawson from the Douglas Valley has persistently reminded 
the Regional Council that his area has the highest unemployment in 
Strathclyde Region and that in 1991 31% of long term unemployed were 
under 25 years of age. Health of the population has also become an 
issue with morbidity rates increasing along with chest and heart 
disease. To compound the situation the former sense of community and 
social cohesion was disappearing with many of the original families 
drifting out of the area and the Council adopting a policy of 'dumping', 
unsocial families from other areas. Just over the border it is 
interesting to note that a similar process was found by the residents 
survey [S1]) in the North East but not to the extent of Douglas Valley. 
Still, the approach to opencast mining is markedly different despite the 
advent of MPG3. 
Opencast coal mining presents a narrow unrewarding choice for the 
majority of residents. It is often a balance between maintaining the 
quality of life in rural area and survival in a low-waged economy, often 
in a single industry (Midwinter et al. 1988), or allowing open 
development to flush temporary capital into the area, as in the case of 
opencast mining. The argument for British Coal and other opencast 
operators then becomes one of offering alternative higher waged 
short-term employment balanced against maintaining the quality of life 
and the environment towards a more integrated (Association of District 
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Councils 1989) or holistic approach. Direct employment in the North 
East opencast sector at the point of production accounts for 1000 jobs, 
in Scotland it is approximately twice that amount. 
Martin Joyce, of Durham County Council argued: 
set against this, the creation of temporary jobs, many of 
which are likely to be merely "transfers" from other sites 
that have finished working elsewhere, or seasonal workers, 
does not bear comparison with the long term secure employment 
which the County Council and other agencies are promoting in 
this area. 
Martin Joyce, Chief Planning Assistant, Proof of Evidence to the 
Billingside Public Inquiry, para. 12.10, 23/6/1987 
British Coal play down the environmental impact upon employment. Their 
performance in the environment has improved over time beyond that of the 
private sector. Working hard at improving their environmental image in 
the community has brought rewards in terms of securing planning 
permissions and contributing to the local economy. 
I think you have got to set the Flowers report in its context. 
It was set up in 1978 which was 13 years ago when it reported 
in 1981. Certainly our methods have improved tremendously 
over the last 11 years, the environmental hassle isn't directly 
related to the tonnage a site produces. Many sites with big 
tonnages have low environmental hassles. 
Ray Proctor, Director, British Coal Opencast Executive, April 1992 
It is accepted knowledge that British Coal, having the best resources 
and technical knowledge from MAFFs and DAFF (Scotland), lay claim to the 
better record of site working and restoration than the smaller private 
operators such as Banks, Youngs or McKeag in Scotland. However, the 
smaller operators lay claim to 'commonality•, living in the same area 
they also share the intrusion and disruption with the residents but are 
providing the benefits of employment. 
Justification for opencast mining is the satisfaction of 
economic need. The key to mining a site is to mine it in 
an environmentally acceptable way. Economic gain needs to be 
balanced against the environmental disturbance of that site. 
It is we that have to design schemes that are environmentally 
acceptable to that site. Why should the local planners be 
any better than the industry to determine what is best for 
the environment. We are all part of the coalfield community. 
It is our environment as well as theirs. 
Harry Banks, Managing Director of H.J. Banks Ltd, March 1992 
Alarmed at the development of opencast mining in the Scremerston area 
John Picking Chief Executive of Berwick Town Council argues that the 
industry is unsuited to economic development in the area. There is an 
estimated 20 million tonnes of coal between Scremerston and Etal and 
Ford. "We view potential development of that scale with utter dismay." 
He goes on to argue that far from increasing employment opencast mining 
will act as a deterrent for jobs in tourist development, the district's 
main employment. The Ford and Etal estates of Lord Joicey employ more 
people on tourism than in administration and agriculture, whether these 
jobs meet recommended E.C. criteria on minimum wages is another issue. 
Both Northumberland and Durham (DCC, Charter for the Environment) have 
set their stalls out to green the county to attract high-tech clean 
industry, offering "a modern working environment consistent with the 
best environmental expectations". 
Ken Flaherty, chairman of Northumberland County Council's Environment 
and Economic Development Committee, has a long involvement with the 
intrusion of opencast mining into the Northumbrian countryside. In 
terms of MPG3 he was asked why they moved their stance from one of 
opposition to conciliation on opencast mining, he said: 
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We see ourselves as helpless victims. The law is so framed 
it is so one one-sided in favour of opencast operators that 
local councils are finding it increasingly difficult to 
strike a happy balance 
Kevin Flaherty, Northumberland County Council, Interview March 1992 
In County Durham George Hardy, who has endured a central role in the 
'greening of the North East', is scathing over the hypocrisy of the 
Department of Environment who bury their heads in the sand over the 
outcome of their: 
MPG3 which is meant to protect the environment but contradicts 
the reality that 17 of the last 19 refusals by the County were 
overruled by that same government department. 
George Hardy, Deputy Director of Environment, Durham 
County Council, Conversation, March 1992 
Concentration or intensity of opencast workings raises the spectre of 
its impact upon public health. Very few studies have been done but 
circumstantial evidence from public inquiries (Headmaster Nettlesworth 
School, Daisy Hills P.I.) suggests that cases of respiratory affliction 
have increased in communities down-wind of opencast sites. 
Dust and Noise are certainly deleterious to the human body, and obvious 
to any coal-face worker. But to live with it for 24 hours a day, six 
days a week, can be extremely harmful in the long term. Evidence is 
coming to light from the series of public inquiries of the public health 
effects of opencast mining, especially in the long term. From previous 
experiences residents at public inquiries feared the dust and noise 
levels, water and lagoon safety, blasting, hours of working and the 
speed of lorries. At Daisy Hills the playgroup leader expressed alarm 
at the effect the dust from the site would have on an already high 
incidence of asthma in children in the area. South West Durham Health 
Authority area (Annual Report 1991) has reported some of the worst 
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health in Britain. Morbidity rates are high for Ischaemic Heart 
Disease, Cancer of the Lung, and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
(Emphysema and Bronchitis) and related to the high incidence of smoking 
and a poor diet. The Authority are also showing concern for the effect 
of industry on the environment through a new research study of asthma in 
the community in association with Newcastle University. Arguably, 
account should also be taken of the dust distributed by the continuing 
incidence of opencast mining with its high concentration of opencast 
sites in the last 30 years and spanning over the last 50 years, 
Noise from opencast sites has been one of the most important issues at 
any public inquiry. The long term effects from opencast sites are not 
fully known and types of noise from a site may have a different effect 
from that of being under an airport flight-path. In respect of opencast 
mining, the Inspector at the Rosehills public inquiry concluded in his 
report: 
Although technically measures to ameliorate the effects of 
· noise and blasting could be provided, they are subjective 
issues ••••• I am satisfied that these would lead to a serious 
diminution in the quality of life presently enjoyed by local 
residents. 
H.M. Inspector's Report to the Secretary of State, Rosehills 
P.I., para. 9.2, 1986. 
It is however recognised that noise can have psychological effects on 
the human personality. Circular 10/73 Planning and Noise covers all 
industrial usage and urges "Local Planning Authorities to base their own 
policies on the recommended national standard of site levels of 
75dB(A)(Day) and 65dB9A)(Night) and of maximum dB(A) noise levels within 
dwellings with windows closed of 55(Night) and 45(Day). The latter two 
figures correspond to the level of human conversation and measurements 
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of opencast site noise should be taken from 'noise sensitive dwellings" 
(Learning, Chester-le-Street D.C., Proof, Daisy Hills P.I. 1987) 
Evidence from general practitioner, R. Graham at the Horsegate P.I. 
(1976) stated that 18 out of his 39 patients in Whittonstall made 
specific complaints about noise and dust from the local opencast site 
and some were suffering from an anxiety state (Learning, ibid.). Again, 
evidence of the effects of blasting from residents living near to the 
Tanners Hall site was given by Martin Joyce to the Billingside public 
inquiry. 
I was seated in the complainant's house at the time of the 
blast, and it felt like a distant rumble of thunder to me. 
I was not unduly perturbed but the complainant, and his wife in 
particular, were visibly distressed by the blast and could not 
be reassured either by me or British Coal officials. 
And a former resident wrote to the County Planning Officer to say 
Since I have moved from Wooley Grange I am not going to suffer 
from the affects of blasting. I can assure you, however, that 
these affects can be diliterious (sic) physically, mentally, and 
to property ••• 
Martin Joyce, Chief Planning Assistant, Proof of Evidence to the 
Billingside Public Inquiry, paras. 10.76 and 1077, 23/6/1987 
At Quaking Houses residents in the shadow of opencast mining have stated 
how powerless they feel and this tends to underline the findings of the 
residents survey surrounding the Daisy Hills site (S1.). Yvonne Hilland 
resides next door to the extension to Chapmans Wells opencast site at 
Quaking Houses: 
Two draglines work on the site. One minute your room is 
very dark and the next minute its like Blackpool Illuminations. 
Yvonne Hilland, Resident, Quaking Houses, March 1992 
Across the road Diane Richardson has become a seasoned campaigner in 
opposing opencast mining in the area. Forming the Quaking Houses 
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Environmental Trust, she petitioned villages in the area and produced 
newsletters informing the residents of the developing situation, 
following a capacity meeting in the village hall. 
Durham County Council can't give us a time when all this will 
finish. We will have to look to our so-called representatives 
to make the decisions for us. In the case of Quaking Houses 
we have never been considered for many many years here. It's 
always been money that's been put before people in our 
situation 
Diane Richardson, Quaking Houses Environmental Trust, March 1992 
From the map of the area indicating British Coal's prospecting areas 
there are three other large sites targeted for development acquired 
when Chapmans Wells is finished. Residents further north in the -high 
country' at Greenside not far from the -Little Moscow' of Chopwell felt 
very indignant over more opencast development not least because: 
People have had to fight twice because they were against it 
30 years ago. 
Frankie Williams, resident, Greenside Public Inquiry 
Tony McGhee, his compatriot against Coal Contractors application to mine 
58,000 tonnes of coal from the 45 acre site at Greenside, complained 
bitterly over the intrusion of opencast mining back to 1920: 
It doesn't matter what direction you leave this village you 
will see an extraction or a coal site. Now we hev' hed enough, 
we cen gan back to the 1920's here. We hev' only 51% of Green 
Belt left here. 
Tony McGhee, resident, Greenside Public Inquiry 
Critically, the compilation of legislation and policy regulation between 
1988 and 1991 redefined the parameters of planning for opencast mining, 
maintaining coal supply. Consequently, the focus at public inquiries 
has been shifted in importance for the people in opencast coal 
communities from -the market for coal' to the environment, public health 
and the quality of life. Increasing evidence suggests that continuous, 
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concentrated and intensive coal extraction is mentally and physically 
harmful to public health. Starkly, it can be no different in Scotland, 
with or without the extra State regulation to secure the supply of 
opencast coal through the planning system. Adopting a more 
confrontationist approach however, may bring stricter adherence to 
environmental planning and health standards. 
Ultimately, the fight has become one between the imperatives of the 
state facilitating economic freedom of the energy industry through 
secondary planning legislation, failing to recognise the place of people 
and their community in the environment and, the right of people to 
maintain control over their political, economic and spiritual 
relationship with 'the land'. It is all very well having Environmental 
Impact Assessments but this does not fully measure the impact of 
opencast upon people, their culture and communities. As long as power 
and control of the coal economy and environmental planning remain 
distant from public accountability, facilitated by hand of the State, a 
Social Impact Assessment will be needed before an opencast application 
can be legitimately accepted. 
Increasingly, residents are seen as an impediment to the workings of the 
coal economy, where the state institutes planning legislation for 
opencast coal only for the public and their institutions to process it 
through public inquiries back to an almost inevitable overruling by the 
state. The whole exercise will continue to disenfranchise the public 
and neuters the MPA's as long as legislation written for the industry by 
the industry masquerades as an instrument of democracy. The issues of 
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power and control over land is embedded in the history of capitalist 
relations with the people who are most close to it. At the other end of 
the current spectrum one of the Diggers in the 17th Century argued: 
And if the earth be not peculiar to any one branch or branches 
of mankind, but the inheritance of all, then it is free and 
common for all to work together, and eat together. And truly, 
you counsellors and powers of the earth, know this, that 
wheresoever there is people, thus united by common community of 
livlihood into oneness, it will become the strongest land in the 
world; for then they will be as one man to defend their 
inheritance, and salvation (which is liberty and peace) is the 
walls and bulwarks of that land or city. 
Gerrard Winstanley, 1649, The True Levellers Standard Advanced 
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iii Class and Alignments at Public Inquiries into Opencast Mining 
Public Inquiries into opencast mining provide one of the few stages 
where the public can view open conflict between an instrument of the 
State and the representatives of the public interest over the 
accumulation of capital. For the most part, it is an open contest: 
between British Coal attempting to enforce its policy of expansion, 
assisted by the State's legislation and MPA's representing a public 
whose powers are increasingly fettered by that regulation. 
Unfortunately for British Coal, persistent opposition has often 
prevailed over the States game plan. Each public inquiry raises 
standard and individual issues but the industrial and demographic 
history and class composition of the area affects the quality and level 
of opposition (Sl]. This was evident from the four main public 
inquiries fully covered by me as well as visits to others such as Marley 
Hill. Mining as an occupational status of people once saturated the 
areas affected by the proposed sites but the political consciousness 
varied across the coalfield. 
North East MPA's took 23 decisions to refuse opencast applications 
between 1981 and 1988 which then went to public inquiry. Of these 
refusals, the Department of Environment upheld 15 and overruled 8 
others. However, since the introduction of tighter planning regulation 
(e.g. MPG3) the Department of Environment have upheld only 8 of 27 
appeals that went to public inquiry. Telling testimony to the State's 
application of new planning regulation is also provided through 17 of 
the last 19 public inquiries being lost by Durham County Council. 
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Table 5.2 
SOME PUBLIC INQUIRIES INTO OPENCAST MINING HELD UNDER CIRCULAR 3/1984 
GENERAL CLASS AND COMMUNITY COMPOSITION AND OPPOSITION 
Site Date of P. I. 
Rose Hills 28/10/86 
Brusselton 3/2/87 
Daisy Hills 28/4/87 
Billings ide 23/6/87 
Marley Hill 
Class and Community 
strong ex-mining community 
still proud of their history 
Outcome 
well motivated and organised Refused 
politically including women. Consent 
Locals dominated incomers. 
NUM CPRE Academic co-ordination 
Apathy, high unemployment, poor 
cohesion since loss of rail Refused 
works. Mining links now weak. Consent 
Articulate individuals 
defending own corner. 
CPRE, NUM etc. 
Paternalism in indigenous Refused 
community. Commuter belt now Consent 
mines have gone. Great age Overturned 
gaps. Contrasts in class by Secy. 
composition. Local opposition of 
dominated by incomers. State 
NUM CPRE co-ordination 
Socially stable, mixed 
economic community. Mining Refused 
still meaningful memory. Consent 
Active environmental work by 
individuals and council. 
Articulate middle class 
locals and incomers 
co-ordinate with CPRE 
Sparsely populated site area 
Working class periphery. 
Opposition organised by NUM Refused 
Poor P.r. attendance due to Consent 
isolated location. P.I. 
dominated by organised 
bodies CPRE, NUM etc. 
Source: Ethnographic Notes (Jim Ellison), Durham County Council. 
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Table 5.2 shows the well publicised public inquiries upon which the 
public's attention focused at the intensity of the struggle between 
British Coal and public opposition to opencast coal expansion. The 
table indicates articulate individuals or bodies dominated the 
opposition. Input by indigenous people depended on the level of 
political consciousness and class composition and this is confirmed by 
the Daisy Hills Survey [Sl]. The greater the political consciousness, 
the greater input and control the working class have over organisation 
of opposition and proceedings at public inquiries. Networking with 
organised bodies (CPRE, NUM etc.) in opposition to opencast mining 
depends upon the level of that political consciousness. If it is 
distinctly lacking, then it is left to middle class individuals and 
organised bodies to articulate the opposition's case; and that raises 
questions of its own purpose. 
Rosehills and Daisy Hills public inquiries stood out for me from the 
rest through my personal involvement with protagonists from both sides 
and my past involvement with the people in the communities. Close 
involvement with the groups was a necessary part of my work but in the 
case of Rosehills I chaired a meeting of the residents who opposed the 
opencast mine application to disseminate information. Having worked and 
grown up with a number of the residents in earlier years ~living the 
situation' achieved some unique insights for the research. The ability 
to do so came through a mutual trust present from the network of 
relations socialised in mine and community that still prevailed in a 
consolidation of class interests arising from industrial and social 
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change. Behaviour patterns in the way people interacted remained 
relatively unchanged from 25 years ago. Each day the residents 
enthusiastically grouped for material and moral briefings before passing 
the information into the community; this seemed to reinforce solidarity 
and bring determination to their opposition. 
None of the residents had public inquiry experience apart from the local 
councillors, but the eagerness shown by the residents to engage in the 
process was extraordinary. The background to this may be explained by 
the opposition to British Coal arising from the 1984-85 miners strike. 
And most especially the raised consciousness of the women's group in the 
village which operated during that strike. While the men spoke at the 
inquiry, it was the daughters of miners who organised the opposition. 
All the pits in the district having closed in the 1960's, many miners in 
the Pelton and Beamish district which included the Rosehills site still 
travelled 25 miles each day to work at the coastal collieries; for most 
miners it would be their third or even fourth colliery. In these 
situations problems caused by closure, felt mostly at the level of the 
family, enlarge the stress of everyday life. Opencast mining proposals 
on a miner's doorstep, in competition with deep mines, becomes 
disturbing in the extreme even for the less ambivalent. Feelings of 
distrust over displacement and disruption have been present from the 
1960's and the 'mining clearances' when miners were transferred as 
'industrial gypsy's' to Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and even Somerset. 
The 1984-85 strike only served to concentrate and channel them in a 
united direction in a way that the strikes of 1972 and 1974 never did, 
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underpined by the political consciousness raising in the late 1970's by 
the Durham Area Broad Left. 
For some residents the issue was one of maintaining a quality of life in 
the district following the landscaping of the despoilation in the 
1960's. The local parish priest, resident for three years, in evidence 
at the inquiry made little mention of the indigenous population and 
clearly had in mind representing the minority middle class perspective. 
He first gave a summary of the last twenty years: 
The parish has a population of some 1500-2000. The same 
size of population as the Falklands who were considered 
important enough to spend millions of pounds on to 
preserve their way and quality of life. This parish at 
one time contained six collieries within its boundaries. 
These pits were responsible for the formation of the 
villages and their social and economic continuance. Over the 
last twenty years these villages have moved from industrial 
communities to pleasant semi-rural dormitory communities. 
Parish Priest, Evidence to Rosehills Public Inquiry 28/11/86 
It is at this point that the priest's comment diverges from the pastoral 
care of all in the community to pastoral care of the few. With the vast 
majority of housing provided by the council serving the indigenous 
population, he concentrates on the needs of the middle classes in his 
evidence. 
And with this transformation new people have been drawn 
into the area. The villages being justifiably popular 
for a number of reasons; 
1. Good access to work and shopping 
2. Good quality housing 
3. Situated in a rural pleasant environment 
4. Houses going at reasonable prices 
5. A desire to be part of a recognisable and definable 
community. 
This process, the blending of newcomers in the area has not been 
without friction. 
ibid. 
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Of course it is not without friction as the community is the "product of 
past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions." 
JM~~~ 1976, p. 273). The inability to recognise that what took decades 
of labour is held precious and not always tangible or consciously shown, 
and then desire it all as an immediate material commodity is perceived 
to be disturbing to the point of being insulting. Insensitivity to the 
issue of employment does not help when the majority have lost their 
employment and have had to settle for lower-paid work or no work at all. 
Patently, the priest's concern was more for employed newcomers and their 
quality of life than the local people who had already created the 
social/environmental networks where their "value of labour power 
contained a historical and moral element." (Mar~ 19J?, ~· 275\. His 
views, it can be argued, stand in stark contrast to the employment needs 
of the local people in an area where unemployment is higher than the 
county average since the closure of the 6 pits in the area. Sighs of 
disbelief could be heard from the opposition group after his following 
statement. 
It is my contention that the quality of life in the 
villages will be affected by the proposed opencast because 
it will put the clock back. Part of their attraction is the 
absence of industry (my emphasis). 
Parish Priest, Rosehills Public Inquiry, 28/11/86 
He clearly needed reminding that without industry the~would not have 
been any villages. In a different perspective local councillor Potts, 
himself a miner, and once involved on the fringes of the Durham Miners 
Broad Left, spelled out the importance for his class of their 
relationship with land past, present and future. He argued that for 
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many years local people have traditionally walked the fields as an 
antidote to working down the pit, but now in the "absence of industry"; 
there is a high proportion of retired and unemployed 
people in the community •.• We haven't got very much 
going for us. We feel to take this land away from the 
people is unacceptable. 
ibid. 
---
Clearly, both claim to represent the community in different contexts. 
One pastoral, the other political. Both oppose opencast to maintain 
continuity of the environment, but there the similarity ends. To some 
extent, the priest articulates the material interests of ~possessive 
individuals' (Macpherson 1977) and the politician the interests of the 
~indigenous dispossessed'. Nevertheless this did not stop them 
combining in common cause and presenting a successful opposition. 
Talking to Potts privately he complained that the incomers want the best 
of both worlds without giving much in return. They have jobs, but if 
they thought fit would deny the local people the right to bring new 
industry into the area to preserve their rural idyll. These tensions 
and conflict were subsumed under the common aim of thwarting the threat 
common to all - British Coal's appeal to opencast land to mine 600,000 
tonnes of coal. 
That opposition was plain to see - the stern men in the grey suits -
sombre, purposeful and all twelve or so strategically placed around the 
hall measuring the opposition. They contrasted with the relaxed but 
studious approach of the opposition, and gave you the impression that 
for all the intimidation of the occasion, they still retained a sense of 
balance in their lives~ Contrasting with this the National Coal Board 
men in their grey suits always carried a sense of urgency incongruous 
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with everything else in the hall. 
Nevertheless, the men in the grey suits came and went daily, seemingly 
impervious to the presence of the local residents. Many of them would 
sit in the hall all day and not utter a word to any but their own kind; 
and then only at lunchtimes or at the end of the day. For some of the 
women's group they were the butt of jokes about boring men. But perhaps 
the truth was that the job is boring if you don't wholly believe in what 
you are doing. Some didn't, before re-organisation of the opencast 
executive it was clear that they came from similar backgrounds with 
heavy family commitments too. 
Later, writing an ethnographic account of Daisy Hills Public Inquiry I 
found that little had changed between the protagonists in terms of 
class, alignments and "professional conduct". I noted that; 
The appearance of all assembled gives off the impression 
that the 'war has intensified'. The seating of the opposition 
seems positioned like a set of toy soldiers in a war game: 
ranked in importance. Behind them come a collection of 
local objectors led by Brian Poulson, a settler, whose 
defensive space marks out certain differences between the 
indigenous population and the objectors, most of whom arrived 
in the area within the last five years and are, as the survey 
indicates, from the middle classes. 
This is certainly evident from the addresses of the objectors and my 
visits during the survey. None were from the council estates. Brian 
Poulson for the Nettlesworth Action Group however did gain substantial 
support in his petition against the opencast mine from council tenants. 
But the point is that even within this common alignment against the plan 
for opencasting at Daisy Hills there were class cleavages. The further 
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you went up the hall to the inspector, the more pronounced the class 
differences: working class at the back to middle class towards the 
front. On Day Six of the inquiry, the objectors and residents gave 
their evidence to H.M. Inspector MacDonald. Again I wrote; 
From observations made collecting my survey papers I find 
the hall is made up mainly of professional and skilled classes 
from private households. The objectors, apart, from three 
who are seated on one side of the hall. However the Action 
Group appears to centre around the interests of residents 
of Woodlands Terrace which according to the estate agents 
has "commanding views over the countryside". 
Why weren't some of the thousand householders petitioned from the 
council estates on the committee of the action group? That question was 
asked when I met the Action Group in their homes, but never 
satisfactorily answered. It also raises the question of the role of the 
Parish Council. - why didn't they draw up the thousand household 
petition?. The answer to both questions is rather complex and lies in 
the evidence from the-survey (Sl]. Briefly, it is deferentialism and 
relative deprivation historical to many mining communities that have 
undergone change, based on class differences between the indigenous 
population and the new settlers, many from professional non-mining 
backgrounds. 
The fact that the professional classes often articulate the feelings of 
the communities is not uncommon. But whether they organise opposition 
to opencast in the interest of all or mainly in their own interests is 
very much open to question. That there are common and deliberate 
alignments between classes in opposition to opencast there is no doubt. 
However, if only the middle class in the community were petitioned 
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little weight would be carried by such a petition with few signatures. 
That is why Brian Poulson, realising the social geography of the 
community, embarked upon the task of collecting signatures from the 
working class housing estates which dominate the area. A measure of 
their dependence upon these signatures comes in the form of a letter I 
received from the Action Group indicating their frustration in achieving 
their aims. 
Unfortunately your questionnaire has proved to be quite 
a distraction to our work ••••••• 
Letter, 14/4/1987 to Jim Ellison from Jan Race, Nettlesworth 
Action Group. 
In this situation the middle class, who see their investment threatened 
perhaps more than council tenants, need the larger majority of the 
working class to realise their interests are protected. But, where 
would the working class interests be without the middle class to 
articulate the opposition to opencast mining?. Then again, do the 
working class only benefit when the middle class interests are 
threatened?. Cynically, in the case of winning five out of six public 
inquiries , all that may matter is that class divisions are subsumed by 
common opposition to a threat to their common interest - the environment 
and the quality of life. But after the common fight, the challenge to 
the middle class is will they then support a cause to bring industry and 
employment back into the area they so covert? 
Such combined opposition between the councils, residents and 
anti-opencast groups were having an effect upon British Coal. Over time 
marked changes occurred in British Coal's approach to Public Inquiries 
into opencast. Few of these changes were unconnected to this powerful 
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and successful opposition. The first indication that some departure was 
taking place from the attitudes shown at the Rosehills Public Inquiry 
came at the Daisy Hills Public Inquiry on 28th of April 1987. The 
arrival at the inquiry of Ray Proctor, Managing Director of British Coal 
Opencast Executive was unprecedented. In an interview on the steps of 
the old miners hall his open manner was reflected in the attitude of 
other members of British Coal. The major concern became apparent when 
Brian Timms, eventually to be a Commercial Manager British Coal Opencast 
in the North East, asked what they could do to strike up better 
relations with communities. "Show greater concern for the public, do 
Public Relations before, not during public inquiries", was my reply. 
This they were eventually to do with fervour. 
During a period when there were six public inquiries into opencast 
mining, British Coal's public relations was very poor, low key and 
almost site specific during an inquiry. Having lost five of those 
inquiries they turned in 1989 to a sharper and higher pre-inquiry 
profile. This was most evident prior to their application for the 
Whitelea site, near Crook in Co. Durham (Fig. 5.3). The purpose was 
to influence the public over the application before it was placed before 
the planning authority by going right into the heart of the community. 
Three exhibitions were held at key centres, ironically using council and 
community property whose history was very much tied up with that of 
local miners. Peases West, Sunniside and Roddymoor are synonymous with 
mining high quality coals in low seam mining of the West Durham 
coalfield. Roddymoor drift mine closed in 1986. Shortly after, British 
Coal began prospecting the adjacent Whitelea opencast site for the 
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remaining Roddymoor take. While this shift in the pattern of mining has 
been commonplace in the west of Durham it was never synonymous with any 
public relations exercise. The change in attitude from British Coal is 
striking in several respects: 
1. The determination to secure opencast production can be 
measured by the investment of a public relations exercise 
run by sharp, well groomed young people imported into the 
area from down south. (Fig 5.3) 
2. Conversation with them yielded the view that they held 
strong commercial values which promoted the new image of 
a marketed orientated British Coal. 
3. They came well trained in communication of rehearsed facts 
and figures. Special attention had been paid to graphics 
and photography in the exhibition and they were the 
verbal extension of the graphics. 
Yet, their individualism contrasted starkly with the more genuine warmth 
of local people and they were conscious that there well groomed image 
appeared incongruous in the small tin shed of Roddymoor Miners Welfare. 
Self-consciousness aside, the whole exercise conveyed serious endeavour 
to the point of urgency by British Coal to overcome inbuilt opposition 
to further development of opencast mining. And from 1989 this new 
approach to public relations coincided with the States on-going increase 
of regulation in the planning system and a low point for MPA's losing a 
large proportion of public inquiries. Apart from Marley Hill in 
Durham/Tyne & Wear, British Coal's 'public relations train' has been 
most evident in the logical and successful drive for more suitable coals 
in East Northumberland. 
British Coal have needed this new approach allied to policy legislation 
from the State, to regulate and overcome the dogged determinism of 
people to preserve their existing environment and against the 
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substitution of deep-mined coal by opencast coal output. Here, class 
differences are often subsumed under the immediate common interest of 
opposition to the commercial interest of British Coal. In this respect, 
the difference between the North East and Scotland has been marked by 
the attitude of the planning profession, the NUM and council members in 
their approach to British Coal. 
4.04 
iv Conclusion to Chapter Five: The Public Interest in Contrast 
i. Bartering the Public Interest for Private Gain in Scotland 
MPA's in Scotland have had a long 'working relationship' with British 
Coal. And taken with the benefits of the corporatist relationships 
previously detailed (Chpt. 3.) it makes more clear why British Coal 
have enjoyed a trouble free operation in Scotland. In Scotland, the 
applications to mine coal by opencast methods at Coalburn (10 m.t.) and 
Frances Project (2 m.t.) were two outstanding examples of British Coal's 
successes that were not tested under the scrutiny of a public inquiry. 
However, despite the fact that many people had reservations over these 
and other applications, such as the Blindwells site, both the public 
understanding and pressure against the developments have been 
insufficient to force a public inquiry into opencast applications 
against such a strong corporatist amalgamation. This situation stands 
in stark contrast to the many public inquiries in the North East which 
provided the public with some redress on opencast proposals; yet while 
the difference is derived from the historical relationships in the two 
regions it raises a more fundamental question concerning the exercise of 
power and control over the use of legislation. 
A comparative approach raises the central issue of the use and 
conditions of planning law under which these applications were 
considered. Arguably, when Coalburn was given permission on November 
6th 1986 it has not been fully considered by Clydesdale District Council 
under Circular 4/1984 with proper interpretations of paragraphs 5, 15, 
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and 16. Fife Region -called in' the Francis application from the 
Districts, only to ignore in its report to the council (Sept. 1988), 
the market requirement for the coal and use -English secondary 
legislation' to legitimate the acceptance of the application. 
Contrast this process with the singularly consistent approach in the 
North East, despite changing legislation from Circular 3/1984 to its 
successor MPG3, for applications at Daisy Hill and Marley Hill 
respectively. Here, the NUM and the County Councils joined forces with 
interest groups in a common policy of opposition to opencast 
development. British Coal's market requirement for the coal was debated 
and tested to the full in public and weighed against the environmental 
and economic concerns of the residents, the County planning department 
and objectors' interests. Despite the inherent advantage of MPG3 for 
British Coal, the Marley Hill application was examined in view of "the 
possibility of supplying the market from less damaging alternative sites 
or secure sources of supply" (Para. 11) and the balance between the 
economic benefit and the environment that may be gained from working the 
site (Para. 10). In contrast to North East England much of the debate 
in Scotland has been either in council chambers or behind locked doors 
and debate in public has been marked very much by the absence of public 
inquiries into opencast mining. The major points brought into sharp 
focus by the Scottish survey (52) confirm this approach to opencast 
applications, especially those from British Coal. 
However, it would be wrong to state there has never been public concern 
over opencast applications in Scotland. The problem is that it has 
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rarely been allowed to surface beyond the council chamber. The clamour 
for a public inquiry into Coalburn was real enough in some quarters of 
the public to warrant the Labour Leader, Councillor Edward Wright J.P. 
travelling from Glasgow to see me an Edinburgh hotel where the following 
day I was giving a seminar to Lothian Regional Council on opencast 
mining (Nov. 1986). Disturbed at the manner in which the Coalburn 
application was being implemented he asked for help on public inquiry 
procedures, outlined the concerns of the public and provided some 
voluminous reports and correspondence. One of these reports was from 
the Director of Planning at Clydesdale District Council, Mr. Uren who 
was instrumental in regulating the conditions for permission to opencast 
coal at Coalburn. This was very apparent in the Report to the Planning 
Committee on the 18th of September 1986 where he set the application in 
the context that: 
for a number of years the council has been in active 
discussion with the National Coal Board about the 
potential for open cast coal development in the Douglas 
Basin (para 1.1) •••••• It could be said that the Douglas 
Valley, with the current prospect of a major opencast 
development almost 15 years after coal was last produced, 
epitomises many of the facets of the Campaign (to revitalise 
the area) - dereliction, social deprivation, economic 
inertia and unemployment, as a legacy from the past. 
Mr. Uren, Director of Planning, Report to the Planning Committee 
of Clydesdale District Council 18/9/1986, para. 1.5. 
The decision to give consent to the application was made in the full 
knowledge of the: 
sensitive issues of environmental effects of opencasting in 
prospect in the context of considerable expansion of 
opencasting in Scotland at the time of job losses in deep 
mines. Mr. Uren, para. ~ 
With this in mind it is pertinent to draw attention to Circular 4/1984 
where it states: 
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Each project should be considered in terms of the market 
requirement for its planned output (taking into account the 
alternative sources of supply, including deep-mine coal) as 
well as the environmental, agricultural and other planning 
considerations. 
Circular 4/1984, Para. 15 ~emphasis). 
Arguably, no serious consideration was given to deep mined coal as an 
alternative source of supply (and its associated jobs) when Uren 
assessed the ~market requirement for the coal'. From the language it is 
clear the market requirement for the coal and British Coal's need for 
the coal from Coalburn were assessed in British Coal's terms where: 
A major factor is the exporting opportunity from the West. 
Although Kilroot power station in Northern Ireland is the 
stated market at present, the latest marketing context for British 
Coal, responding to crises in recent years which 
have brought imports of coal into the country, creates a 
world-wide dimension in exporting opportunity - and associated 
pressures on prices and development costs. 
Mr. Uren Para. 1.8. 
Given the size of the site it is not surprising to find extensive effort 
and consideration given to the environmental impact, and considerable 
liaison and cooperation with British Coal to effect a common 
understanding on environmental issues. The political expediency of this 
can be measured by the concerns of the Coalburn Action Group. Despite 
placing numerous objections to both Clydesdale District Council and 
British Coal none of these focused upon paragraphs 5, and 15 of Circular 
4/1984. It must have been some relief to British Coal, and equally 
intriguing to me, that no direct challenge was made regarding the ~need 
for this coal' and its ~market requirement'. Even upon representation 
to a Parliamentary level the debate continued to assume an inherent 
acceptance of the application, the only issues are personal ones 
concerned with the environmental and traffic re-routing issues: 
Thank you for your letter. Dame Judith Hart and I have 
already intervened on behalf of Glespin. Now this is 
a change of route •••••••••••••• 
I will write to Mr. Uren, but before I do so how would 
the residents view a road between their houses and the 
Douglas Water? 
Lord Home of the Hirsel, letter to A. Holbrook, Rigside 
September 24th 1986. 
It became clear that had the public and its servants had sufficient 
knowledge of planning legislation, its implementation and the political 
economy of energy markets, the debate and agenda of the Coalburn 
application would have been very different. Equally clear from his 
report, in respect of these factors, was the reluctance of Mr Uren to 
disseminate adequate information; he thereby provided a favourable 
outcome to British Coal. 
While Policy 20 in Clydesdale states that: 
The District Council shall be prepared to give favourable 
consideration to proposals for opencast mining activity in 
the preferred areas. 
Lesmahagow and Douglas Valley Local Plan. 
It is incumbent upon MPA's to act in the public interest and by way of 
Circular 4/1984 (Paras. 5 and 15) consolidated by Policy 86 in 
Clydesdale: 
.... that applications for opencast mineral extraction shall 
be supported with sufficient technical information as the 
Council may determine. 
Lesmahagow and Douglas Valley Local Plan. 
Unfortunate!~, the MPA chose not to go beyond British Coal for technical 
information, and sparse as it was in terms of the standards required in 
North East England this was accepted without question. In assessing the 
market and the need for the coal, in terms of other sources of coal, the 
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deep mine contribution was virtually ignored. Taking account of the 
recent investment in infrastructure to accommodate the expansion of 
opencast in the west of Scotland (Chpt. 3) perhaps the die was already 
cast and was the reason for the focus upon the narrow issue of 
concentrating upon: 
A major factor is the exporting opportunity to Northern 
Ireland and the stated market at present~ 
Mr. Uren, Report to the Planning Committee, para. 1.8. 
Extensive research and analysis of the energy market in Northern Ireland 
(Chpt. 3) finds no justification for any optimism about likely 
continued levels of coal-fired generation in that region. Instead of 
accepting British Coal's statements at face value, an assessment of the 
Northern Ireland market would find that the strategy of NIES is heading 
towards self sufficiency through a 'balanced one third fuel option'. As 
long as the language of the document maintains that: 
the applicant considers a strong long-term market for coal 
from this site in that Province and elsewhere. 
Mr. Uren, para. 5.8. 
When there patently isn't one, attention is re-focused elsewhere. 
Accommodation of British Coal's application without a proper assessment 
of the market and need for the coal, thereby putting sites and tonnages 
in the bank, indicated a hidden agenda for Scottish Opencast. Taken 
with the planned infrastructure investment all this served to indicate 
that the planned expansion of opencast and decline of deep mines in 
Scotland was well laid before the 1984/85 miners strike and the 1985 New 
Strategy for Coal, which was meant to be the harbinger of change. By 
giving consent for the Coalburn opencast site under the narrowest of 
definitions, led by Mr. Uren, Clydesdale District Council they have 
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accommodated British Coal's interests which have been recently defined 
for them by the State and for the State, rather than the interests of 
the public. With control exerted within the MPA's over the flow and 
control of pertinent information, the need for the State to institute 
regulation of the planning system as it did south of the border is 
avoided. 
A lot of this misuse of information in planning originates from the 
often inadequate responses in Local Plans (Healey, 1983) to deal with 
the expansion of opencast mining and the technical demands from current 
legislation. Equally, as the Scottish Survey (S2) showed, many planners 
do not have a grasp of the essential demands of opencaat legislation. 
In the Clydesdale and Francis cases there have been those who do have 
this necessary understanding but chose not to implement it! 
One aspect of the Francis development previously examined in Chapter 3. 
is particularly disturbing. Again the MPA took as its argument British 
Coal's agenda for accepting the application and then backed it up with 
secondary legislation which was legally inapplicable in Scotland. It 
suffices to let the Report of the Fife Regional Director of Planning in 
September 1988 speak for itself: 
British Coal have advised that the overall quality and 
quantity of reserves is not in doubt (para. 2.2c). 
Regard should be also be had to (new) Department of 
Environment guidance on opencast coal workings in May of 
this year. (MPG3, para. 5.1.3) 
Once again planning officers appeared to be controlling the flow of 
information avoiding the for assessing the market requirement in light 
of Circular 4/1984. Then again, we have the startling situation of 
planners asking councillors in Scotland to have regard to secondary 
planning legislation that is enforceable only in England and Wales. 
Advice is then given, which is taken directly from MPG3 on the market 
need to work the coal as a commercial decision for British Coal. This 
sets the tenor for the rest of the document, most of which remains an 
avoidance of the issue of an assessment of the need for the coal and the 
accommodation of British Coal in working the site. 
Within the planning of Scottish opencast coal developments there is a 
clear approach to large site applications such as Coalburn and Francis. 
The concentration on environment and employment issues masks the 
reluctance to deal with more complex issues in Circular 4/1984. Indeed 
this and the willingness to accommodate British Coal, by regulating the 
control and flow of information, is denying the public access to the 
right to debate such critical points. In turn this tends to mystify the 
real motives for opencast expansion in Scotland that are distinct from 
those in North East England which are as much technical as economic. It 
is clear from the North East experience, and the visit of Ed Bush of 
Strathclyde Regional Planning Department to Daisy Hill public inquiry, 
that legislation demands that planners undertake a full assessment of 
'the market requirement for the coal' and 'the need for the coal' in the 
site. Keeping information and knowledge out of the public domain and 
within the confines of a debate between British Coal and the MPA, 
essentially denies the public the right to exercise some power and 
control over public planning and energy supply. It is a matter of 
regulation of the planning system without the need for more planning 
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legislation and constitutes a breach of planning protocol - public 
interest bartered for private gain. While this may have led to a 
satisfactory outcome for the State and British Coal it falls outwith the 
expectations of the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI). 
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1-f. The Public Interest and the Hand of the State in North East England 
Deficiencies in the democratic processes in planning outlined earlier in 
this chapter are reinforced by experiences of State regulation and 
interference in opencast public inquiries in North East England. 
Processing an opencast application needs an open forum where both sides 
exchange information to the benefit of the public and the operator. For 
the public to have faith in the public inquiry process the whole 
exercise has to be seen to be just, balanced and without interference. 
It is well to remember that, in contrast to Scotland, British Coal could 
not get close to the MPA's and the NUM in the North East, thus the State 
used alternative sanctions and policy regulation. Combined knowledge 
and information gained by the public ensures some control over the 
outcome of opencast applications. However, two cases show democracy was 
only on loan and power and control over opencast coal supply was 
realigned by the State. 
The standard type of economic/technical information used at a public 
inquiry assists the democratic process and is exemplified from the 
Marley Hill public inquiry. British Coal had thought the public inquiry 
losses and traumas over Circular 3/1984 had gone but that was not to be 
the case. MPG3 was introduced to reverse the fortunes of the 
protagonists at public inquiries into opencast mining, though not as 
straightforward as British Coal would have wished. The objectors' 
network had disembowelled MPG3 and come up with the familiar arguments 
of Circular 3/1984 in a different guise, but the context of argument was 
still the same- The ~need for the coal' and ~the market for the coal': 
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Economic benefit is explained in para 10 of MPG3 with the 
help of a number of illustrations: 
1. Low resource cost of the coal 
2. The need for the coal due to some special qualities 
3. The need for coal for blending with other coals 
4. Local employment benefits 
5. The need to avoid sterilization of reserves 
6. To assist in the efficient extraction of other 
minerals in the site 
This proof will di~cuss the following points with respect to 
economic benefit: 
1. the economic benefit of Marley Hill coal as a special 
product in its own right 
2. the economic benefit of Marley Hill coal as a blending coal 
to make saleable deep mine coal 
And most importantly: 
3. the general economic benefit of Marley Hill coal to the 
overall market position of British Coal in the region 
taking into account "the possibility of supplying the 
market from less damaging alternative sites or secure 
sources of supply" 
4. the "resource cost" of Marley Hill coal and the delivered 
cost of alternative sources of supply. 
The economic and other benefits arising from an opencast 
operation must somehow be balanced against the environmental 
damage arising from it. 
Gladstone B., Durham County Council, 
to Marley Hill Public Inquiry, Para. 
Proof of Evidence 
2.7 
In contrast and comparison to Scotland this approach forms the basis on 
which North East Councils defend the public interest at public 
inquiries. Combined knowledge and information from mineral planners, 
academics, councillors, miners and environmentalists have made a 
formidable contribution to the dissemination of information. From these 
strands, often coming together .under one umbrella, opencast applications 
a forcible challenged to opencast applications has been made resulting 
in a public inquiry. In turn, British Coal have responded with 
increased technology, data sourcing and intelligence gathering from the 
experience of many public inquiries across the country. Reverses in 
results from public inquiries since increased regulation of the planning 
system have not vanquished the opposition to opencast. Public inquiries 
may be fewer in number as councils' financial constraints make them 
selective in their targets but the weight of the opposition has not 
diminished. Here again, we see the effect of the 'authoritarian State' 
this time in the use of financial constraints becoming an instrument of 
political regulation of the planning system and of the public's right to 
a public inquiry. 
Even prior to the implementation of MPG3, two public inquiries brought 
into true perspective the real nature of power and control over the 
supply of opencast coal through the operation of the planning system, 
removing any illusions over the democratic process of public inquiries. 
The first concerns the site at Plenmeller in the wild heart of the 
Northumbrian countryside. A straight question of why the State were so 
keen to secure this site demands a straight answer to the long term 
future of this area. After all it needed over three million pounds 
worth of infrastructure (conveyor, road and railhead) before a nut of 
coal could be mined and that is without transport costs which are 
sensitively avoided. As we have noted in Chapter 4. it was remarkable 
how British Coal chose to disregard its stated metallurgical coal 
market. This was revealed at the public inquiry when British Steel's 
specification for the coal was compared to the specification of 
Plenmeller coking coal and found wanting. 
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The State's hand in this public inquiry was revealed in a most unusual 
practice when they appointed the Chief Crown Mineral Agent, Mr. A. 
Grierson "as an assessor to assist the Inspector, Mr. R. Pierce" (my 
emphasis) at Plenmeller. Equally unusual is the production of a report 
by that person who is meant to be an assistant to the Inspector and in 
such a bias fashion so as to influence the Secretary of State's decision 
on the application. The Plenmeller decision in favour of British Coal 
was considered so deplorable by Council Officers and opponents such as 
CPRE that they took it to the High Court but found that although their 
case was sound the Secretary of State's decision would stand. 
CPRE intervention in this matter raises a further question over the 
application. When they asked British Coal for geological and technical 
information on the following: 
i The names of the coal seams on the site 
ii The Geological report of the seams 
iii The information about the number and extent of any previous 
workings on the site (which could have led to oxidisation of 
the coking coal thus rendering it unsuitable or less suitable) 
iv Sulphur content of the coals 
v Ash content of the coals 
vi Dry Mineral Matter Free Data 
vii Volatile figure on basis of (vi) 
Mr. Collier of the Opencast Executive provided names of coal 
seams and some information about item (iii) but, after referring 
to his superiors refused any information on items (ii), (iv), (v), 
(vi) and (vii) ••.••• 
It is our fear that this secrecy could indicate that the data 
would not stand up to the form of scrutiny applied to NCB data 
put forward for the Whittonstall and Woodhead sites. (erroneous 
and deliberately misleading) 
Jill Boyd, Secretary, Northumberland and Newcastle Society (CPRE) 
Letter to John Lodge, County Planning Officer, Northumberland 
County Council, 6/6/1985 
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Items (i) and (iii) would be public knowledge and British Coal would 
have nothing to fear from releasing this data, as the names and number 
of seams continue to exist long after they are worked out. What is in 
question and can be revealed from the rest of the items, especially item 
(ii), is the geological condition of the site and the extent of the 
reserves. British Coal may well have stood to make 5 times the profit 
by selling the coal to the PGI rather than sell it to British Steel but 
why was the State so keen to secure this site? 
The second site at Daisy Hills extends to around 250 acres of mainly 
agricultural land and was subject of my survey of residents in 
surrounding villages (Sl). Being subject to two public inquiries the 
site is in itself a rarity and unique for two other contrasting reasons. 
Firstly, the ability of the public to influence a Council policy 
sufficiently to force a public inquiry and have that policy decision 
overturned. At the first public inquiry into Daisy Hills in 1979 Durham 
County Council's acceptance of the appeal site was overruled by the 
Inspector. At the second public inquiry some seven years later Durham 
County Council were able to argue that: 
Similar planning issues now as were determined by the 1979 
Inspector and accepted by Secretary of state for Energy. 
There should be and is reasonable expectation of, 
consistency of decisions. 
The Secretary of State should therefore dismiss this appeal 
unless, on comparison with the 1979 case; 
the environmental/amenity impact 
has been significantly reduced 
and/or the need for the coal has become stronger ...•..... (P.5) 
BCC have advanced a need case that relies essentially on BCC 
being the only arbiter of market requirement. It is a self 
.·..t,~,~R §!_A_~\ 'JJ· 
serving case. (P. 18) 
Durham County Council, Closing Submissions, Daisy Hills Public 
Inquiry, 1986 
Inspector MacDonald rejected British coal's case to mine coal at Daisy 
Hills. Yet in an unprecedented action by Nicholas Ridley, the 
authoritarian hand of the State was used to overturn the Inspector's 
decision. The context of this decision reveals the reason for not 
adhering to accepted protocol. This was at a time before MPG3, when 
every site in the North East was being placed before a public inquiry. 
With 5 out of the last 6 applications for opencast sites at that stage 
being lost by British Coal, performance was not matching the 'New 
Strategy For Coal', itself only 2 years old. Starkly, the State holds 
the ultimate sanction. 
Arguably, in North East England the State was saying the public and the 
planning process were on leash, to be hauled in when they had 
overstretched their mark. Basically, the public were gaining too much 
control over the outcome of coal supply from opencast mines and the 
State in both cases, for different reasons, decided it would control the 
final outcome. The fact that at Plenmeller and Daisy Hills the 
applications had gone through the due process of a Public Inquiry, yet 
with a predictable outcome as far as the State was concerned, is most 
disturbing. Equally disturbing is the use of further regulation and 
policy legislation regulating the planning system making a predictable 
outcome for opencast applications in the majority of cases. It serves 
as a constant reminder of the 'authoritarian statism' of the current 
period when even the public participatory process in planning can be 
undermined at will. 
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CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS 
The coal industry has been in long decline since the first world war, a 
decline marked by conflict with labour over the control of the 
production process and the accumulation of capital. The role and 
development of opencast coal mining in this process has had a critical 
impact on the form and condition of the coal industry in its twilight 
years. Opencast coal mining may well have been used as a supplement in 
coal production in two world wars, but its commercial value was 
recognised in infancy and has increased markedly over the past two 
decades. Its impact has been no more dramatic than in Scotland and 
North East England. Though presented with very different political, 
cultural, economic, geological/chemical and geographical factors in each 
region, related to the production and burning of coal in power stations, 
British Coal pursued the common aim of the commercial development of the 
coal industry in both coal regions. Opencast coal production is now the 
dominant mode of coal production in both coal regions. Once 
nationalisation withers and dies the civil engineering industry, being 
the sole operator on behalf of British Coal, is in the unique position 
of possibly having not only its industrial inheritance returned but the 
bonus of huge assets with it in what is an insecure market for the coal. 
The principal aim of this thesis was to analyse, explore, explain and 
challenge, where appropriate, the reasons for the expansion of opencast 
mining in Scotland and North East England, within the declining market 
for coal. Such an aim has been predicated upon the advancement of the 
thesis that the -instruments of the state' have regulated, assisted and 
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facilitated the expansion of opencast coal, through a dual approach of 
positive discrimination of opencast coal in the operation of the 
planning system and the arbitrary financial regulation of British Coal 
operations. 
The work was made necessarily complex by the interaction of technical, 
financial, political, economic and legal processes in the production, 
sourcing and generation of coal. The thesis has established some key 
findings concerning its origins and motives, financial and legislative 
regulation and the need at all for opencast coal, much of which 
generally confirms the main thesis of the work. 
The first of these is that to a great extent the commercial origins of 
opencast mining followed the 1930 Coal Act which formalised the 
commercial usage of opencast coal resulting in profitable workings 
during the latter half of the 1930's. Both the State and the private 
sector had similar motives for its development and in 1943 combined in 
dual control of the opencast sector. Opencast coal was cast as a 
supplement to overall coal production, but in reality the State 
recognised that there was always a strategic alternative to deep mine 
output and manpower. 
The Treasury's response to the 1976 IMF impositions following the 
critical period of the early seventies created the conditions for 
production of coal based purely on commercial criteria. The institution 
of a political shift in coal production through this financial 
regulation of the coal industry ensured an element of competition 
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between opencast and deep mined production. With the advent of an 
monetarist government in 1979, opencast sector was expanded and 
consolidated while the deep mines were run down. Following this came a 
whole raft of policy regulation in which the ideological rationale was 
made clear, preparing the industry to operate in the private sector. 
While opencast already operates profitably, under dual control with the 
private sector, it is of no cost to the State. Alas deep mining is, and 
the State has no economic or ideological desire to support deep mines 
that cannot compete in the 'market place'. 
Financial regulation of the coal industry has taken several forms. The 
thesis shows an overall generalised sweetening operation of the coal 
industry at the taxpayers expense. British Coal's financial coatings of 
opencast and deep mine coal and their accounting procedures are 
arbitrary and flawed. 'Shadow pricing' mechanisms devised by British 
Coal discriminated in favour of opencast coal and against deep mined 
coal. Moreover, despite the marginal cost of opencast coal being higher 
than the marginal cost of deep mine coal, British Coal arbitrary choose 
to quote the average cost of deep mined coal which is higher than 
opencast coal. This tends to mask capital, transport, environmental and 
social costs which are not taken into account when assessing the 
comparative price of coal production from each sector. 
British Coal have hibernated investment in the three super pits of 
Longannet, Frances and Monktonhall towards a new era in coal. While 
opencast coal was 'holding the markets for coal' deep mined production 
was phased out with substantial amounts of investment hibernating in and 
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around the super pits. Furthermore, in the west of Scotland the State 
chose to 'rig' the market for opencast coal against lignite in Northern 
Ireland to meet its immediate privatisation objectives for Scottish Coal 
and NIES. The report produced by a government quango Northern Ireland 
Economic Development Council (NIEDC) was flawed. By favouring coal 
against lignite, so as to bring on stream the second coal-fired power 
station at Kilroot, it chose to ignore certain vital evidence. By doing 
so brought to bear a political outcome chosen by government based upon 
ideological imperatives of privatisation of NIES and British Coal. 
In the North East we have established that there is little or no 
technical need for opencast coal to be supplied to PGI markets as the 
power stations were built with a specification to burn deep mine coal 
and much of the opencast coal is too rich to burn. Far from their claim 
that deep mined coal needs opencast to improve the blend, the opposite 
is the case: opencast coal often needs deep mined coal to dilute it down 
to a suitable specification. In a complex matrix of technical quality, 
cost and specification matching, British Coal maximise opencast coal to 
the limits of the PGI specification to extract maximum financial gain. 
Combined, these two major factors of coal production, namely the 
financial regulation of coal production and the technical strategy of 
maximising opencast coal, supplant deep mined output in the North East 
to meet British Coal's commercial expedient of remaining in the market 
to provide low cost coal to the power generation industry (PGI). 
Finally, this thesis also shows that the State has intervened in the 
supply of opencast coal in North East England through the operation of 
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the planning system, but in contrast, found it unnecessary to do so in 
Scotland. There are now legal contradictions in the operation of the 
planning system with regard to opencast coal. In Scotland, corporatism 
avoided the need for more planning legislation as planners regulated the 
planning process in the interests of British Coal themselves. This 
stands in contrast to North East England where a combative approach to 
opencast development needed the legislative intervention of the State to 
maintain the supply of opencast coal. In both cases planning law, 
policy legislation and procedures have been (mis)used to regulate the 
supply of opencast coal to consolidate its position in energy 
production. Surveys [Sl,S2] confirmed the wider public tend to be 
marginal in the opencast mining planning process. 
Overall, a prescriptive policy existed for the coal industry to turn it 
into a commercial business for operation in the private sector. The 
State's task has been to set a framework so that a market (contrived or 
otherwise) in energy generation was created and coal traded as a 
commodity in the energy sector. The outcome has been most profound. 
One in which the State has discriminated in favour of opencast coal 
mining, and where in the North East there has been no technical need for 
opencast coal and only a contrived one in Scotland. All of which has 
been beyond the public and environmental interest and disastrous to 
those working in the deep mines. 
The human cost of all this has been immeasurable. With "bloody 
opencast everywhere", one view from a visit to West Lothian makes the 
final poignant point: 
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Necessary suffering is everybody's birthright. Unnecessary 
suffering, suffering that is socially engineered for profit, 
is an obscenity for which our society has always had too much 
tolerance. 
W. Macilvanney, 1991, Surviving the Shipwreck 
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Methodology 
Introduction 
The research work in the thesis involved oral and documentary historical reconstruction, two 
attitude surveys overlaid with participant observation. Concentrating upon the coherence of 
the thesis has been a complex task not least because of the nature of the subject matter. The 
work has multi-focused across methodologies 'articulating qualitative and quantitative 
methods' (Fielding and Fielding 1986) using relevant implementation and application of those 
methods sensitive to the specific focus of the work, 
The purpose of method as a tool in this work has been to emancipate and illuminate the 
underlying reasons and 'structural mechanisms' (Sayer 1992) behind the process of the 
expansion of opencast mining and the displacement of deep mined output and employment. 
An understanding of the place of this perspective in the research process assisted the 
decisions upon appropriate methods and approaches in the work, conscious that values, 
beliefs and 'background assumptions' ( Gouldner 1971) affect thinking, behaviour and social 
relations. In tum, behaviour is affected by the knowledge people have of their social world 
which itself does not exist independently of this knowledge. At base, the philosophical 
approach to the work recognises the fundamental'guiding thread' to Marx's political 
economy: 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage 
of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rise 
legal and political superstructure and to which corresponds definite forms of social 
conciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and 
intellectual life process in general. It is not the conciousness of man that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their conciousness. At a 
certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of production, ... 
Man K. Preface, A Contribution to the Critique of Political J4:conomy 1859 
Strenuous effort was made to maintain and prevail the ideal of the realist approach of Sayer 
( 1992) across the research; here observation is taken to be conceptually mediated with 
knowledge embedded in the social action of events and objects which are complexly 
differentiated and structured (Sayer 1992: 45-84). Sayer, combines the theoretical and the 
empirical in a step by step move from the abstract to the concrete by using a hierarchy of 
types of concepts, from the foundations of historical materialism to concrete social 
experiences. He argues the purpose of combining theoretical claims with empirical research 
using an interpretative understanding are to unearth the objects, forms and conditions of 
capitalist processes in a more reasoned and transparent manner. Past approaches to gaining 
knowledge and information were often based upon the 'objective' accumulation of facts 
speaking for themselves turned into data without any philosophical grounding. Given the 
controversial nature of the research and the lack of 'openness' of some organisations, the 
' multi-access' approach to the retrieval of information and data attempts to avoid a naive 
objectivist approach and recognises knowledge is embedded in the social action of events 
Documentary Research 
Historical documents provided a context of past trends and practices, initiating the 
construction of the nature of the present social and political process (Burgess 1990). How 
you collect and use documents is important (Platt 1981) and the judicious and appropriate 
mix of historical, private and public, legal, gov~mment records combined with solicited and 
unsolicited documents such as that from the Earl ofWeymess outlining the' corporate nature' 
of the coal industry in Fife (p.91). The purpose was to compare the themes and patterns of 
th~ past to current trends and practices to verify and justify certain positions For example 
planning policy documents from all mineral planning authorities involved in opencast mining 
were examined and compared for consistency and contradiction with legislation. Cognisance 
was taken where possible of the social context of document production in this process Full 
utilisation of official documentation and primary documentation "not on public account" was 
made to validate social and political events and situations. For it is as much as that which is 
lacking in documentation as which its contains that focuses the mind. Scott, who given the 
experience of this research, justifiably divides documents into four categories of accessibility, 
provides a broad definition of documentary research as ' physically embodied texts, where 
the containment ofthe text is the primary purpose ofthe physical medium' which 
'recognises its diversity as a valuable feature of social research' (Scott 1990, p 12-13). He 
approaches documentary research at three levels of interpretation; intentend meaning, 
received meaning and internal meaning all of which I was mindful of in this "contested 
terrain" of energy and the community environment Documentary "attempts at persuasion" 
(Sparks 1992) have been at the centre of public inquiries and public relations work of 
British Coal. While not taken at face value, the documents and oral evidence given at public 
inquiries have proved valuable in measuring the anxiety of the State to maintain the opencast 
agenda and complete its privatisation task and the range of emotions of their opponents to 
secure culture, community environment and a social dividend out of any intrusion that may 
occur. 
Public Inquiries (P.I's) into opencast coal mining in the North East ofEngland were 
identified as a storehouse of documentation and as a gateway to more intensive examination 
and evaluation of the issues, key players and the public in this conflict Access to 
documents both official and unofficial were identified as a variable factor but clearly to be 
gained through a variation of methods and approaches. Primary documentation from the 
parties involved in theses P. I's provided the foundation and a major source of information for 
interpretation and identification of important questions relating to energy provision and 
public policy. Multiple evaluation approaches to monitor events and situations as 
proceedings of the PI's and the energy strategy unfolded , intense though this became, clearly 
had its rewards. Transcripted evidence from cross-examination compared to the verbatim 
transcripts of the parties involved and especially British Coal was crucial in identifying fact 
from fiction and policy from practice. However, a continuous process of participant 
observation also played an extensive part in information retrieval. 
Participant Observation 
Participant observation in meetings of the Opencast Action Groups and the Scottish Mineral 
Officers Group (SMOG) and at least 5 public inquiries supported by their taped proceedings 
together with active group involvement prior to the Rosehills public inquiry produced 
valuable results to support documentary evidence. Extensive notes were taken on my 
observations in assessing the various positions of the parties involved and the cleavages 
within the opponents to opencast mining. Here I was as much concerned with the power 
relationships as the marginalisation of the public in the planning process. Of course 
presentation of findings are important, the line between subjectivity and objectivity is a thin 
one and awareness that the interpretations of lay understandings (Hutton 1986) were 
conveyed through my own frame of reference was a conscious exercise. 
Participant Observation was used at various opportunities to assess in both familiar and 
unfamiliar social settings to make transparent various behaviour and biographies. Intensive 
involvement prior to, and during four major public inquiries and loose involvement at two 
others gave continuity and consistency in understanding the social setting, position, behaviour 
and retrieval of information of interested parties and individuals. The situation was where: 
The process in which an investigator establishes a many-sided and relatively long-term 
relationship with a human association in its natural setting, for the purposes of 
developing a scientific understanding of that association. 
Lofland and Lofland (1984), Analysing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative 
Observation and Analysis, P .12 
In entering the field of public inquiries that rely as much on data as they do on oral statement, 
bargained encounters and perceptions, meant that you could not avoid the linking of 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Fielding and Fielding 1986). Participation in the 
planning policy formation of Lothian Region's plans for opencast meant taking on a different 
'persona' with using a refined approach where: 
Qualitative and quantitative methodology are not mutually exclusive. Differences 
between the two approaches are located in the overall form, focus and emphasis of 
study. 
VanMaanen (1979) Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organisational 
Research: A Preface', Administrative Science Quarterly (P520) 
However, the nature of social discourse at public inquiries means that there is no linear flow 
for one particular approach. Often judicious adoption of various approaches at different 
intervals became appropriate, sometimes taking it into the realm of triangulation (Burgess 
1984, 144- t 45). In the main, this took the form of the description of events and behaviour 
concentrating upon primary oral information from participants in focus, whilst often 
objectively excluding myself from those conversations and events Foil owing Van Maanan 
( 1988}, at other times 'impressionist tales' of the interplay between narratives are highlighted 
to reinforce the point of issue. 'Confessionist tales' of personal involvement in the research 
such as at the Scottish Mineral Officers Group (SMOG) seminar remind us of the traumas of 
participant observation to achieve satisfactory results and data. In all situations efforts to 
maintain a reflexive conciousness prevW,ed in the analytical process in relations between and 
among investigator and among research· participants ( Gergan and Gergan 1991; 93) . There 
were however, problems of 'persona' in the process ofwhat Gold (1969) describes as being 
a 'complete participant', ·participant as observer' whilst 'gaining access' and 'utilising 
flexibility' which affected my perception and recall of events in entering and exiting different 
context settings (see Polsky 1985, Hobbs 1988) across the whole series of public inquiries. 
The degree of access to various groups and people depended upon cultural attachment and 
reciprocal familiarity (See also Bruyn 1966, Hughes 1976) as in the case of'complete 
observation' of the Rosehills residents group. Interpretation and comparison of the 
·significance of observation' (Whyte 1984: 96) was then achieved, through unstructured 
interviews with some of the residents over the time of living the experience with the 
residents. The concept of cultural attachment and reciprocal familiarity paid dividends on 
an individual level even with key personnel in British Coal who invariably entered the domain 
of the group. Less conventional methods included "covert participation" (See Humphreys 
1970 ) undertaken within Surtees Haulage Company, while ostensibly employed as a planning 
consultant, to identify the shipment/transhipment of opencast and imported coal and their 
associated costs. Again, Fielding ( 1981) saw himself in a similar position between core of the 
organisation and good of society. The exercise assisted in understanding how a myriad of 
small-time private operators 'interlocked' with larger bodies and individuals in support of the 
economic agenda of the State in what they called "the coal business"-
Analysis and revision of analysis, comparing acquired documentation and data with 
observations (Fielding and Fielding 1986) continued during the fieldwork but the in-depth 
analysis did not come until the fieldwork ceased. Then reflection took place having fuller 
vision across the range of contested terrain between the State, British Coal and the public at 
these public inquiries before writing up (see Wolcott 1990). 
From the beginning there was always a problem of gaining the truth in a real sense and in a 
theoretical sense where it was a matter of practical adequacy. Interpretation of contested 
ideas and material circumstances of the opponents and proponents in the conflict became an 
important part of arriving explanations of various processes. However, moving in and out of 
situations in a multi-access approach was not without its problems. It was difficult to remain 
a detached and independent observer at public inquiries. Participating in pressure-group 
activity while maintaining long-standing relationships with British Coal marketing people and 
still holding the confidence of the local NUM proved to be testing but succesful. My 
intentions were clearly stated to every contact and in every situation so that peoples 
perception were relatively uniform and that lay expectations were not raised. Evidence of 
my acceptability and the degree of my objectivity and independence came from H.M. 
Inspectors at the public inquiries I attended. After consulting all the contesting parties found 
me to be independent and as a consequence raised no objection to my taped recording of the 
proceedings. Helpful this may have been in legitimating my independence to ' significant 
others' I endeavoured to secure greater objectivity during public inquiries by remaining 
distant from all parties during research activity at public inquiries and conduct any interviews 
away from the proceedings. 
In a gradual manner, from interpretation of the material, I was able to focus upon the main 
issues and key players in this conflict and develop and identify the processes and practices 
that were shaping energy and coal production in Britain. Material from proofs of evidence 
laid out the arguments of persuasion which were then interpreted and tested through 
documentation from historical and current sources. Taped proceedings ofthe 
cross-examination of the parties at P. • I's threw up as many questions as verifications to my 
interpretations. For this reason unstructured and semi-structured interviews with key people 
were undertaken, partly for verification and clarification, but also for opening up channels of 
information both formal and informal. 
Interviews 
Interviews across the research were extensive, ranging from informal , unstructured, 
semi-structured of the lay participants to structure taped interviews of the most senior 
protagonists in government and British Coal. The structured interviews were appropriate to 
the situation where impersonal relations were held with key people in British Coal and the 
local government and so Oakley ( 1981) and W akefords ( 1981) criticism of putting the 
interview in an unnatural relationship with the interviewee is void as the relationship was cold 
already. In general unstructured interviews, often tape recorded (see Burgess 1984, p120), 
predominated always aware of over-rapport. Acceptance within the resident's action group 
opposing opencast mining prior to the Rosehills P. I. was gained from trust developed 
between us in the community many years previous. The ties engendered in the Scottish 
coalfield in the late 1970's equally played a similar role in getting to the emotional heart of 
matters in Scotland's beleaguered mining communities. The value of this was that they 
"opened up" more to me than an "outsider" and consequently participation provided an 
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avenue to develop a more accurate description of the way a "less articulate majority" felt 
over the impact of opencast mining. This allowed an additional and unique insight into the 
contrasting approaches to coal production in Scotland and North East England. To gain 
further evidence of these different approaches and to identify the apparent disparities in the 
planning system as well as the perceived" impact of opencast mining upon the former mining 
communities in a more quantitative manner two surveys were undertaken both sides of the 
border. 
Social Surveys 
First a 300 household survey (S 1) in North East England of 4 villages surrounding an area 
subject to a public inquiry into opencast coal mining. The purpose of this survey was to 
examine the public's responses and attitudes in its relationship with British Coal and the 
Local Authority in the context of the planning system and public inquiries. While this became 
a huge task and given the overall social condition of the people the one third response rate 
has to be seen as a successful outcome. The combination of the result of this survey and the 
documentary and oral evidence as well as the transcribed proceedings of the P. I's provided 
qualitative and quantitative material of great value. The proceedings of public inquiries, 
highlighting power and class constructions which re-inforced the interpretation that the 
planning framework tended to marginalise the majority of the community. Stemming from 
this came the additional reason to undertake a survey of Scottish local authorities. 
The survey of District Councils as Mineral Planning Authorities in Scotland which had 
opencast mining in their district. The survey's purpose was to analyse why there was no 
opposition to opencast mining in Scotland by examining the policy and approach of Planners 
and Council Member and to evaluate to what extent marginalisation of the majority of the 
public were to the development of opencast mining and planning process. The aim common 
to both surveys (S 1 )(S2) was to determine the level, perceived or otherwise, of public 
control over the expansion of opencast mining. 
The wording of questions in the surveys; followed the work of Moser and Kalton ( 1971, 
pp318-31) in terms of keeping the questions as specific and unambiguous as possible, using 
simple language and without any presumptuous or leading questions. That is not to say that 
in the Scottish survey (S2) the overall tenor did not test the political sensitivity of the 
respondents in asking of their attitudes to policy and practice in mineral planning. The two 
surveys also provided the inevitable problem in what Mackie ( 197 4) has called 'the cement of 
the universe - 'adequacy at the level of cause', aware that multiple causality can have multiple 
effects and those can change over time. The standard approach has been to adopt a model 
but given the nature of the research this was felt to be inappropriate. Indeed, Tukey ( 1977) 
has argued that although adoption of a model is the ideal approach to gain corroborative 
evidence from survey data no single model has ever shown to be the only good fit to survey 
data. Marsh ( 1982, p 124) argues that extensive piloting and trial analysis of the results 
before proceeding with the questionnaire is the only solution to accuracy: this is not doubted 
but often overlooked or limited by resources and situational constraint. 
The procedure for the two surveys (S 1, S2) both involved the collection of quantitative and 
qualitative data through voluntary written responses to the main issue of the questionnaires 
and through follow-up interviews. The value of such an approach has been recognised by 
Marsh ( 1982, p. 1 17) who placed great emphasis on follow up to social surveys to gain the 
reasons and interpretations for peoples actions. Besides taking it beyond 'statements of 
statistical probability, providing adequacy at the level of meaning (Runciman 1978) the 
follow-up interview lends validity to the form and quality of the survey. 
Individual Networks 
Feeding in to the various methodological approaches carne evidence in different forms 
through a network of individual sources often on a personal basis. As an additional 
methodological approach it should be given greater form, for in many instances it is the 
totality and strength of the data and information given that adds quality to the research. 
Marketing managers in British Coal in Scotland and North East England were prepared to 
discuss commercially confidential matters. The Planning Officers in the Regional Councils 
were more forthright than their counterparts in the District Councils (Mineral Planning 
Authorities) in Scotland. North East Mineral Planning Authorities (MPA), and Durham 
MP A in particular, through their collation of statistics have provided vital information 
relating to opencast applications, their sites and their performance. A stint on a harbour 
management board gave me immediate access to information from various port authorities in 
Scotland and the North of England on the import/export of coal. Close individual 
associations in state, energy and local authorities, beyond normal networking, became an 
essential part ofthe research for key strategic information "not on public account". Valuable 
information on energy, the workings of the State and its Ministers was given under 
increasingly difficult conditions in a working relationship with ·Brian Buroo' in the Scottish 
Office. Ultimately my own employment background in mining was of great assistance in 
understanding opencast mining and energy production. 
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Summation 
I believe my methods and approaches of data collection were of necessity both conventional 
and less conventional, but nonetheless rigorous in facticity, producing a qualitative and 
original account of the different means used by the State/British Coal in pursuing parallel 
objectives of increasing opencast coal production in Scotland and North East England 
towards a new era in energy production. Behind which lay complex political alignments 
susceptible to pressure from dominant forces such as the State, financial interests, the power 
generation industry, and not least the opencast operators. The reasons are political, 
economic, social and historical. The research methods employed assisted greatly in 
determining that the common issue is who is to control production in Britain and maximise 
surplus value from that production. 
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APPENDIX.....,.2. Coal Classification System 
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COAL CLASSIFICATION ::> l;:, I 1:1"'1 \JjL.- ..... I 
GIO 
G9 
GB 
G7 
GE 
GS 
G4 
G3 
G2 
Gl 
G 
F 
E 
D 
c 
B 
A 
I. 
2. 
(Revision of 1964) 
I ~ 100 200 300 400 to 900 ~ I 
I 
I 
I 
2.0 
101 
I 
I 
I 
I 
400 I 
401 402 I 
301 I I 
301 301 : 
a b I 
I 
500 I 
SOl 502 I I 
I 
204 I 
I 
I 
I 
600 I I 
-· -· 
-· 302 6'1Jr - 602 ; 
I 
!203 I I 
... 
I 
I 
701 700 
I 
702 I 
202 I 
I 
303 800 ; I 
I 
801 802 I 201 I 
201 b 900 I 
201 I 
a 
102 901 902 I 
I 
6.0 9.0 11.5 13.515.0 17.0 19.5 27.5 32.0 36.0 44.0 47.0. 
VOLATILE MATTER ON DRY, MINERAL • MATTER • FREE BASIS 
(per cent.) 
Defines a general limit as found 1n practice, although not a boundary for classification purposes. 
Defines a classification !Joundary. 
NOTES 
Coals that have been affected by igneous intrusions ('heat-altered' coals) occur mainly ih classes 
100, 200 and 300, and when recognized should be distinguished by adding the suffix H to the coal 
rank code, e.g. 102H, 201bH. 
Coals that have been oxidized by weathering may occur in any class, and when recognized should be 
distinguished by adding the suffix W to the coal rank code, e.g. BOIW. 47Q 
THE COAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM USED BY THE NATIONAL COAL BOARD 
(Revision of 1964) 
Coals with ash of over 10 per cent. must be cleaned before analysis for classification to give a maximum yield 
of coal with ash of 10 per cent. or less. 
Coal Rank Code Volatile Matter 
(d.m.m.f.) Gray-King Coke Type* General Description 
Main Class(es) Class Sub-class (per cent.) 
100 Under9.1 A 
} Anthracites 101 t Under6.1 }A 102t 6.1-9.0 
200 9.1-19.5 A-G8 Low-volatile steam coals 
201 9.1-13.5 A-C 
} Dry steam coals 201a 9.1-11.5 A-B 
201b 11.6-13.5 B-C 
202 13.6-15.0 B-G 
} Coking steam coals 203 15.1-17.0 E-G4 
204 17.1-19.5 GI-GS 
300 19.6-32.0 A-G9 and over Medium-volatile coals 
301 19.6-32.0 G4 andover 
.f Prime coking coals 301a 19.6-27.5 }G4 and 
301b 27.6-32.0 over 
302 19.6-32.0 G-G3 Medium-volatile, 
medium-caking or 
303 19.6-32.0 A-F 
weakly caking coals 
Medium-volatile, 
weakly caking to 
non-caking coals 
400 to900:- Over 32.0 A-G9 and over High-volatile coals 
400 Over 32.0 G9 arid over } High-volatile, very strongly 401 32.1-36.0 }G9 and over caking coals 402 Over 36.0 
500 Over 32.0 G5- G8 } High-volatile, strongly 501 32.1-36.0 }G5-G8 502 Over 36.(} caking coals 
600 Over 32.0 GI-G4 } High-volatile, medium-601 32.1-36.0 }GI-G4 602 Over 36.0 caking coals 
700 Over 32.0 E-G } High-volatile, weakly 701 32.1-36.0 }E-G caking coals 702 Over 36.0 
800 Over 32.0 C-D } High-volatile, very weakly 801 32.1-36.0 }c-o caking coals 802 Over 36.0 
900 Over 32.0 A-B } High-volatile, non-caking 901 32.1-36.0 }A-B coals 902 Over 36.0 
•Coals with volatile matter of under 19.6 per cent. are classified by using the parameter of volatile matter alone; the Gray-King coke types 
quoted for these coals indicate the general ranges found in practice, and are not criteria for classification. 
tin order to divide anthracites into two classes, it is sometimes convenient to use a hydrogen content of 3.35 per cent. {d.m.m.f.) instead of 
a volatile matter of 6.0 per cent. as the limiting criterion. In the original Coal Survey rank coding system the anthracites were divided into four 
classes then designated 101, 102, 103 and 104. Although the present division into two classes satisfies most requirements it may sometimes be 
necessary to recognize more than two classes. 
NOTES 
I. Coals that have been affected by igneous intrusions ('heat-altered' coals) occur mainly in classes 100, 200 and 300, and when 
recognized should be distinguished by adding the suffix H to the coal rank code, e.g. 102H; 201bH. 
2. Coals that have been oxidized by weathering may occur in any class, and when recognized should be distinguished by adding 
the suffix W to the coal rank code, e.g. 801 W. 
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Scotland 
Clea.!l Coals: 
Thou. tonoes delivered 
-
Moisture % 
-
Ash % -
Volatile Matter % -
·~ cv kJ/kg -
Ash (dry basis) % -
Sulpl:ur % -
Chlorine % -
Geoe:-al Coals: 
Thou. tonnes delivered 114 
Jo!oisture % 15.0 
Ash % 13,1 
Volatile Matter % 28.9 
"Net CV kJ/kg 23,039 
Ash ( ery basis) % 15,4 
Sulph·"r % 1,0 
Chlorine % 
-
Dirty Coals: 
Thou. tonoes delivered 
-
KoistiJre % -
Ash % 
-
Vola-:ile Matter % -
:rltit cv kJ/kg -
Ash (dry basis) % -
Sulpc"'r % -
Chlo:-i~e % -
; Fice Coals: 
1 Thou. too .. ;•1es delivered 
-
Hoisture % 
-
Ash % 
-
Yolati!e ¥-alter % 
-
<liet CV kJ/kg 
-
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Chlcrir.e % -
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"! 1~ 
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/iet Cl' kJ/~g 23,039 
Ash (~ry basis) % 15.4 
Sulpi-.u;- % 1,0 
Chlori::~e 
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AVERAGE QUAUTY OF NCi> Kim:D COAL 1.5 I!WOICOt BY NCB AREA.5 
1982-82 
NCB Area 
North Eazstern Yorkshire North Midlands South Midlands Western 
856 32 '105 369 613 
9.2 1, .o 18.8 10.9 9.3 
4.8 10.0 9.8 9-3 3.9 
31.9 29.9 29.7 21.3 31.3 
28,986 26,247 ?1,€28 27,617 27,531 
5-2 11.2 1.?,0 ·10.5 9.8 
1.1 1.5 1,1 1.1 1.4 
0.26 0.25 o.}E 0.06 0.34 
5,683 21.275 20,737 5.937 8.362 
10.0 10,8 
' 
12.2 14.8 11,4 
15.2 17.2 16.5 14.9 14,9 
z8.4 27.9 28.1 28.5 28.9 
24,445 23,294 .?3,001 21,668 .?3,683 
16.8 19.3 18.8 17.5 16.9 
1,7 1. 7 1 .. 5 1.6 1.6 
0.20 0.25 0.36 0.18 0.48 
1,465 2,348 8o5 
- -
12.9 9.2 10,8 
- -
22.8 21.9 23.0 
- -
26.5 ?5.2 25.7 
- -
20,328 22,424 21,257 
- -
26.2 24.1 25.8 
- -
1.3 1. 7 1, 7 
- -
0.22 o. 14 0.24 
- -
- 305 143 1 -
-
22.0 22.•) 19.0 -
-
20.5 27.6 11,-9 -
-
18,4 17.6 
- -
-
17,392 14 ,02.3 20,013 -
-
26.4 35-·< 18.4 -
-
1, 4 1.t) 
- -
-
0.12 0. ,, 
- -
e.oo4 2: .• 96J ~1. 79:l 6,;t-7 8,975 
10.4 10.8 12.) 14.6 11.3 
15.5 17.7 16. c 14,4 14.6 
28.4 27.5 27.? 28.0 29.; 
24. 177 23.138 ?2,f;?·, 22,043 23.943 
. 17.3 19.8 19 •• , . 16.9 16.5 
1.6 1. 7 1 ' 1.6 1.5 .,. 
0.21 0.24 0. 35· 0.17 0.47 
South \/ales i 
213 
10.9 
9.~ 
21.3 
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10,5 
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<.971 
9.8 
17.1 
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25,027 
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1, 2 
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-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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9.? 
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2;,. 20J 
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:).05 
Unlulown 
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27,660 
8.3 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
A strategy for major opencast coal extraction has been prepared jointly 
by Strathclyde Region and District Councils, British Coal and British 
Rail. This strategy has been prepared within the context of Strathclyde 
Regional Council's Approved Planning Strategy which directs open-
cast coal extraction to clearly defined 'Preferred Areas' within the 
Region. The elements of this strategy are set out in Diagram 1 and its 
accompanying Schedule. It is recognised that its implementation de-
pends upon the rate at which the necessary resources can be committed 
by the various parties. It is, however, considered that the following 
recommendations be adopted to ensure that maximum benefit is 
achieved through a concerted programme of action and so that any 
necessary additional resources can be justified and secured. 
GENERAL- TO ALL PARTIES 
It is recommended that all parties re-affirm their current and continued 
commitment to the primary objectives of the strategy: 
(a) to develop the opencastable coal reserves in the 'Preferred Areas' 
of Ayrshire and Lanarkshire; 
(b) to restore related degraded or derelict land; 
(c) to maximise transportation of coal resources by rail rather than by 
road; 
(d) to minimise associated environmental intrusion during both ex-
traction and transportation. 
SPECIFIC - TO BRITISH COAL 
It is recommended that British Coal adhere to the overall strategy and 
its centr.al concept of 'Preferred Areas' extraction in the development 
of their rolling six year coaling programme. 
It is recommended that British Coal continue to invest in relevant rail 
and, where necessary, road infrastructure linking extraction areas, 
disposal plants and related markets as per the terms of the strategy and 
the central 'Preferred Areas' concept. 
It is recommended that British Coal, as part of the environmental 
benefits associated with 'Preferred Areas' extraction, rehabilitate 
degraded land adjacent to, or contained within, the boundaries of the 
programmed sites in their rolling six-year programme. 
SPECIFIC - TO BRITISH RAIL 
It is recommended that British Rail continue their joint working with 
British Coal to develop the necessary rail linkages within the terms of 
the strategy. 
It is recommended that British Rail continue their strategy of pursuing 
a shift from road to rail of all relevant opencast coals. 
4ic» 
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It is recommended that British Rail accord priority to any necessary 
procedeures required to implement the strategy, including Parlimen-
tary Orders. 
SPECIFIC- TO STRATHCLYDE REGIONAL COUNCIL 
It is recommended that Strathclyde Regional Council give immediate 
priority to detailed investigation of the road schemes listed under the 
strategy with a view to their earliest incorporation in the TPP evalu-
ation procedure and potential placement in the TPP programme. 
SPECIFIC-
TO THE SCOTTISH DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT 
It is recommended that the Scottish Development Department adhere 
to their current Trunk Road investment programme in respect of the 
A 76(T) by-passes and the replacement of Hyndford Bridge (A 73(T}) 
so as to dovetail with the infrastructure investment elements of the 
strategy. 
SPECIFIC-
TO RELEVANT AYRSHIRE AND LANARKSHIRE 
DISTRICT COUNCILS 
It is recommended to District Councils that, within the terms of their 
Development Control and Local Planning functions, that priority be 
accorded to enabling the development of the 'Preferred Areas' re-
serves whilst ensuring that necessary local environmental and design 
safeguards are integral to this planping process. In particular, it is 
recommended that consideration be given to the pre-planning of 
environmental action which might ameliorate the impact of coal 
extraction (e.g. pre-planting) or result in more effective restoration 
programme (e.g. concurrent land renewal). 
SPECIFIC- TO ALL PARTIES 
It is recommended that all parties recognise the evolutionary process 
of the strategy and its ongoing nature and re-affirm their commitment 
to a monitoring process which will allow the future dynamics of the 
opencast industry to be identified and the strategy to be ad jus ted to take 
account. In particular, it is considered that the implications for this 
strategy and its implementation of this and any change in the licensing 
arrangements for private operations will require to be assessed. This 
could involve an annual meeting of the Strategy Liaison Steering 
Group in addition to the regular technical meeting of officers. 
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SUMMARY 
1 There are five major component types in this strategy - see 
accompanying strategy diagram. (Diagram 1) 
A- Qpen-Cast Extraction Sites 
B- Coal Disposal Plants 
C - Coal Transhipment Facilities 
D - Rail Infrastructure 
E - Road Infrastructure 
A- OPEN-CAST EXTRACTION SITES 
In the period to 1995, thirteen separate open-cast sites will be opera-
tional under the umbrella of British Coal. 
Number on Location Site Status 
Diagram 
l Doon Valley Chalmers ton Operational 
2 New Cumnock Basin Roughhill Operational 
3 New Cumnock Basin House of Water 1993-94 start 
4 New Cumnock Basin Librymoor Operational 
5 Skares Basin Piperhill 1991-92 start 
6 Cumnock Valley Damconner Operational 
7 Cumnock Valley Ponesk Operational 
8 Cumnock Valley Airdsgreen/Spireslack 1989-90 start 
9 Cumnock Valley Powhamal/Gasswater 1991-93 Start 
10 Douglas Valley Dalquhandy Operational 
II Douglas Valley Broken Cross 1995-96 Start 
12 Motherwell Basin Dams ide 1989-90 Start 
13 Monklands Basin Drumshangie 1992-93 start 
The life cycle of these sites vary considerably from two or three years 
to twenty years. Within the period to 1995, only the Drumshangie site 
in the Monklands basin is subject to real uncertainty as to its develop-
ment and as such, the question of its linkage and treatment infrastruc-
ture cannot yet be resolved, although steps have been taken to protect 
the full range of potential transportation solutions. Outwith the period 
to 1995, it is anticipated that the focus of further new development will 
be the Douglas Valley. However, it should be noted that this extraction 
strategy will be subject to two primary constraints - one, that British 
Coal satisfy the requirements of the Local Planning Authority when 
submitting relevant planning applications and, two, that external 
market conditions allow British Coal to maintain its current and pro-
posed extraction policy. 
B- COAL DISPOSAL PLANTS 
In order to service this geographical distribution of sites, five Disposal 
or Coal Treatment Plants will be operational under the British Coal 
umbrella. At each of these Plants, raw coal will be received, processed 
through washing, crushing and blending and output to the client 
market as a finished product. 
4-82 .,,, .. 
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Number on Lomtion Facility Status /989 
Diagram 
14 Killoch Wet-dry processing Operational 
15 Knockshinnoch Dry processing only Operational 
16 Dalquhandy Dry, limited wet Operational 
17 Powharnal Dry processing only 1992-93 start 
18 Climpy Dry processing only 1989-90 start 
C- COAL TRANSHIPMENT FACILITIES 
In order to facilitate distribution of the finished product to market in 
bulk or to facilitate transportation of raw coals in bulk to Disposal 
Plants for processing, four transhipment facilities will be operational. 
Number on Location Nature of Opera~ing Status 1989 
Diagram Transhipment AgenCies 
19 Ravenstruther Road to Rail BC/BR Operational 
20 Ayr Harbour Rail to Ship BC/BR/BP Operational 
21 Cronberry Internal Road to Rail BC/BR 1992-93 start 
22 Chalmerston Internal Road to Rail BC/BR Operational 
D - RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
In order to facilitate maximum movement of materials by rail rather 
than by road traffic there will be five major investments in rail 
infrastructure. 
Number on Location Nature of Operating Status /989 
Diagram lm•estment Agencies 
14 Killoch Rail Load/Unload BC Operational 
Infrastructure 
20 Ayr Harbour New sidings and BR/BC/BP Operational 
remodelling of layout 
22 Doon Valley Re-open rail link BR/BC Operational 
24 Mauchline- Re-open rail link BR/BC Operational 
Ann bank 
25 Cronberry- New rail link BR/BC In preparation 
Auchinleck 
E- ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
In order to minimise the impact upon those Communities located 
astride or adjacent to main road routes utilised by coal traffic, eleven 
major investments in new road infrastructure will be required. 
Number on Community Rollle Nature of Agency Status /989 
Diagram Investment 
26 Cumnock A76(T) Bypass SDD 1990-91 start 
27 New Cumnock A76(T) Bypass SOD 1991-92 start 
28 New Cumnock B741 Relief Road SRC No date 
study 
(Colllinued ol'er) 
(Continued) 
Number on Community Route 
Diagram 
Nature of Agency Status 1989 
Investment 
29 Cumnock A70 Inner relief SRC 1990 
road study programme 
30 Coylton A70 Bypass study SRC 1989-90 start 
31 Ochiltree A70 Bypass study SRC 1989-90 start 
32 Muirkirk A70 Traffic SRC No date 
rationalisation 
33 Douglas A70 Road SRC No date 
realignment 
34 Rigside A70 Road SRC 1991 start 
realignment 
35 (Hyndford) A73(T) Bridge SOD 1992-93 start 
replacement 
36 New Cumnock/ Unclassified Road upgradeSRC Ongoing 
Cumnock (Knockshinnoch to Killoch) 
Whilst the priority for scarce resources must lie with direct action to 
relieve communities where impact affects concentrations of popula-
tion, additional resources will be required for general improvement of 
road linkages outwith nucleated settlements, including those minor 
routings accessing the main arterial network where these are utilised 
by coal traffic. 
EXPLANATION 
The principle underlying this strategy of investment in open-cast coal 
extraction and related transportation infrastructure, is a desire to 
enable the maximum economic and environmental benefits of exploit-
ing these r~sources to accrue to Strathclyde at minimum impact to 
communities within Strathclyde. To this end, the emphasis is upon 
maximising rail transportation of raw extracted coals and finished coal 
products and minimising road-borne transportation. 
The essence of this approach is to ensure that the movement of 
materials from point of extraction to point of treatment to point of 
disposal or transhipment is effected by rail in all instances where this 
is both feasible and economic. The construction therefore of new 
disposal facilities at Dalquhandy and Powharnal and new tranship-
ment facilities at Ravenstruther and Chalmerston reflects a require-
ment to minimise the distances travelled and communities affected. 
Similarly, the new rail linkages between the Doon Valley and its 
primary disposal facility at Killoch and its external markets and 
between the Cumnock Valley and Killoch and the national rail 
network reflect the need to link areas of major production to the pri-
mary processing facility in the Region and to their markets by rail to 
minimise road-borne transportation. The substantial investment in rail 
'load' and 'un-load' infrastructure at Killoch is also part of this same 
objective. 
Mil; IFF 
S.chedule 1- The Proposed Strategy Components (See also Diagram 1) 
Item Component Nature sf: A.~ency Status at !9R9 Numher Action/ lfe 
I Chalmerston, Doon Valley Extraction Site British Coal Current - Expiry 1996 
2 Roughhill, New Cumnock Extraction Site British Coal Current - Expiry 1994 
3 House of Water, Extraction Site British Coal 1993- 1994 Start 
New Cumnock 
4 Librymoor, New Cumnock Extraction Site British Coal Current- Expiry 1995 
5 Piperhill, Skares Basin Extraction Site British Coal 1991 - 1992 Start 
6 Damconner, Cumnock Valley Extraction Site British Coal/Private Current- Expiry 1992 
7 Ponesk, Cumnock Valley Extraction Site British Coal Current - Expiry 1989 
8 Airdsgreen/Spireslack, Extraction Site British Coal 1989 - 1990 Start 
Cumnock Valley 
9 Powhamai/Gasswater. Extraction Site British Coal 1992 - 1993 Start 
Cumnock Valley 
10 Dalquhandy, Douglas Valley Extraction Site British Coal Current - Expiry 2009 
II Broken Cross, Douglas Valley Extraction Site British Coal 1995- 1996 Start 
12 Damside, Motherwell Extraction Site British Coal 1989 - 1990 Start 
13 Drumshangie, Monklands Extraction Site British Coal 1992 - 1993 Start 
14 Killoch Disposal Plant Rail Off-load/ British Coal 1989 - 1990 Commissioning 
Load Infrastructure 
15 Knockshinnoch Disposal Coal Disposal British Coal Current Plant 
Plant 
16 Dalquhandy Disposal Plant Coal Disposal British Coal 1989 - 90 Commissioning 
17 Powhamal Disposal Plant Coal Disposal British Coal 1992 - 1993 Construction 
18 Climpy Disposal Plant Relocate at Damside British Coal 1989 - 1990 Re-commissioning 
19 Ravenstruther Transhipment Road to Rail Load British Coal/ 1989 Commissioning 
Plant Infrastructure British Rail 
20 Ayr Harbour Transhipment Coal Storage and British Ports/ 1989 Commissioning 
Plant New Rail British Rail 
Infrastructure 
21 Cranberry Transhipment Rail Load British Colli/ 1992- 1993 Constru<.:tion 
Plant Infrastructure British Rail 
22 Chalmerston Transhipment Rail Load British Coal/ 1988 - 1989 Commissioning 
Plant Infrastructure British Rail 
23 Chalmerston - Killoch Link Re-open Rail Line British Rail/ 1989 Re-commissioning 
British Coal 
24 Mauchline- Annbank Link Re-open Rail Line British Rail 1989 Re-commissioning 
25 Cranberry - Auchinleck Link New Rail Link British Rail 1992 - 1993 Commissioning 
26 Cumnock - Auchinleck A 76 New Road Bypass Scottish Development 1990-1991 Start 
Department 
27 New Cumnock A 76 New Road Bypass Scottish Development J991-1992Start 
Department 1991 -1992 Start 
28 New Cumnock B741 - A 76 Relief Road Strathclyde Region Feasibility Evaluation 
Options Proposed 
29 Cumnock A 70 - A 76 Inner Relief Road Strathclyde Region Detailed Study 1990 
Options 
30 Coylton A70 Road Bypass Strathclyde Region Feasibility Evaluation 
Options in Progress 
31 Ochiltree A 70 Road Bypass Strathclyde Region Feasibility Evaluation 
Options in Progress 
32 Muirkirk A 70 Traffic/Parking Strathclyde Region Feasibility Evaluation 
Rationalisation Proposed 
33 Douglas A70 Road Realignment Strathclyde Region Feasibility Evaluation 
Proposed 
34 Rigside A70 Road Realignment Strathclyde Region 1989 - 1990 Start 
35 Hyndford Bridge A73(T)/A70 Bridge Replacement Scottish Development 1992 - 1993 Start 
Department 
36 Knockshinnoch - Killoch Road Upgrade Strathclyde Region 1988 - 1989 Start 
Unclassified Road Link 
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14. A number of other factors also dictate the level of traffic into and 
out from disposal and transhipment plants and hence the level of 
current and future impacts on communities: 
(a) Coal extraction current and future planning and programming 
(b) Geographical relationship of disposal and transhipment points 
to their sources and their markets. 
(c) Nature of external transportation linkages at disposal and tran-
shipment points. 
(d) Size and nature of contracts negotiated by British Coal in respect 
of their consumers. 
STRATEGY FORMULATION 
Strategy Objective . 
15. The basic objective of the strategy is to enable the industry to 
deliver the longer-term economic and environmental benefits of open-
casting the 'Preferred Area' coal resources whilst minimising the as-
sociated wider environmental conflicts, particularly linked to the 
transportation of the coals. In effect, this revolves upon maximising 
rail-borne movements and minimising road-borne movements, with 
necessary investment programmes in infrastructure to accommodate 
this shift in mode of transportation. 
Coal Extraction Plans and Programmes 
16. The primary determinant of a strategy must be the location, the 
actual source of the extracted coals, as this determines volumes and 
directions of all consequent flows. British Coal's forward planning 
entails a six year development plan aimed essentially at a three-fold 
policy of: 
(a) maintaining current production by phasing in new sites for those 
nearing exhaustion 
(b) servicing newly won markets 
(c) creating the potential to service further markets 
17. Table 1 has set out the basic geographical distribution of the coal 
resources and sites currently operating under British Coal's current 
programme. The table also indicates the likely life expectancy of these 
sites and it can be seen that four of the seven sites will be phased out 
during the time of the current programme. In order to maintain its 
policy as described above, the future extraction programme will phase 
in replacements and open up new sites to accommodate market 
de~and. Table 4 and Map 2 set out the anticipated extraction pro-
gramme. 
Table 4 British Coal Extraction Programme 1989 - 95 
Basin Name Operating Site Category Expiry Date 
I Doon Valley Chalmers ton Existing 1996 
2 New Cumnock Rough hill Existing 1994 
Librymoor* Existing 1995 
House of Water Replacement 
3 Skares Piperhill New 
4 Cumnock Valley Damconner Existing 1992 
Ponesk Existing 1990 
Airdsgreen/Spireslack Replacement 
Powhamai/Gasswater New 
5 Douglas Valley Dalquhandy Existing 2009 
Broken Cross New 
6 Motherwell Dams ide Replacement 1998 
7 Monklands Drumshangie New 1998 
*Site lies outwith Strathclyde hut coal is processed at Knockshinnoch 
18. The basic geographical pattern remains unchanged with the ex-
isting operation in each basin being maintained with replacement as 
necessary eg Airdsgreen/Spireslack being the replacement for Ponesk 
in the Cumnock Valley, Dams ide the replacement for Headless Cross 
in the Motherwell Valley. Additionally, a new presence in the Skares 
and Monklands basins is anticipated, with an expansion of capacity in 
the Cumnock basin at Powhamal-Gasswater and in the Douglas 
Valley at Broken Cross to meet known or anticipated market demand. 
19. It is important to stress that this concept of a six year programme 
means that the new and replacement sites will commence develop-
ment within the six years of the programme but that their working lives 
may run for up to twenty years. The fonnulation of a strategy must 
therefore recognise that this form of development is long-term in 
nature and the associated conflicts are therefore of a long-term nature. 
20. The strategy has been formulated to date upon the extraction 
plans and programmes of British Coal as the major source in the ex-
traction industry. However, the possibility has arisen of a change in 
private sector licensing arrangements; in consequence this sector of 
the industry may in the future assume increased importance. This 
potential shift in focus within the industry will constitute an important 
element in the monitoring of the Strategy and its context. 
Disposal and Transhipment Plants 
21. The geographical relationship between the programmed extrac-
tion sites and their associated disposal plants is the second factor de-
termining the direction and volume of coal movements. British Coal 
intend to maintain the current geographical relationship with new in-
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frastructure only coming on-stream where market demands dictate 
expansion of the extraction programme. As a result, the current 
disposal plants and transhipment facilities will continue to form the 
basis of the system. The relationships outlined on Table 3 will 
therefore remain unchanged. Killoch will continue to function as the 
fulcrum of preparation and disposal in Ayrshire because of its capacity 
both for 'wet processing' and its ability to supply a wide range of 
products. The only anticipated increase in disposal plant infrastructure 
relates to the inclusion in the extraction programme of the Powharnal-
Gasswater site in the Cumnock Valley. The coal reserves at this site 
are of appreciable scale with a long though undefined working life. 
British Coal would therefore anticipate a new disposaf plant in that 
location, though restricted to 'dry' processing only with any necessary 
'wet' treatment being conducted at Killoch. 
22. Amongst other new reserves anticipated in the extraction pro-
gramme are those of the Skares basin. No new disposal plant facility 
will be required to service this-development due to the close proximity 
ofKilloch, a few miles north of the basin. Similarly, the reserves in the 
Douglas Valley scheduled for the end of the current six year pro-
gramme, will be treated at the new disposal plant at adjacent Dalquhandy 
before being transhipped to market from the new transhipment plant 
at Ravenstruther, constructed to handle demand from Dalquhandy. 
23. In effect, the evolving strategy for disposal and transhipment 
facilities is one which seeks to establish a processing capacity in 
virtually each operating area, with the exception of the Doon Valley, 
to handle the majority of coals extracted in that area whilst acknowl-
edging that interchange between extraction areas will continue to 
occur either for' wet' treatment at Killoch or for blending purposes to 
produce the required specification of products at the various Plants. 
The basic pattern of interchange between plants and sites will there-
fore remain substantially unchanged. The one new movement which 
may be anticipated is between the Cumnock Valley, and Killoch as 
coals from the Powharnal-Gasswater site may require washing before 
disposal. 
24. An additional and critical element in the Strathclyde context is the 
role of Ayr Harbour transhipment facility in servicing external mar-
kets. Handling and storage capacity has to date been limited, necessi-
tating frequent lorry traffic through Ayr to the harbour forenshipment. 
As part of the evolving strategy, enhancement of this facility has been 
the subject of recent investment by British Rail and British Ports. 
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Transportation Linkages 
25. The chird determinant of traffic volumes and coal flows is che 
nature of the linkages between extraction sites and their Disposal 
Plants and between the Disposal Plants and their Transhipment Points 
and markets. Tables 5 and 6 set out in summary the nature of these 
linkages, as anticipated during the 1989-95 period. 
Table 5- Transportation Linkages- Extraction Sites and Disposal Plants 1989-1995 
Coal Basin 
Doon Valley 
New Cumnock 
Skares 
Cumnock Valley 
Douglas Valley 
Motherwell 
Monk lands 
Extraction Site 
Chalmers ton 
Roughhill 
Librymoor 
Piperhill 
Damconner 
Ponesk/ Airdsgreen 
Pow hamal/ 
Gasswater 
Dalquhandy 
Dam side 
Drumshangie 
Tran~.rnrt Own ·site Related Disposal Plant 
Rail Killoch 
Road Knockshinnoch 
Road Killoch 
Road Knockshinnoch 
Road Killoch 
Road Killoch 
Road Knockshinnoch 
Road Knockshinnoch 
Rail Killoch 
Haul Road Powhamal 
Road Dalquhandy 
Haul Road Climpy 
? ? 
Table 6 - Transportation Linkages - Pisposal Plants and 
Transhipment Points 1989-95 
Tran.YJ.ort 
Into /ant 
Rail 
Haul Road 
Road 
Road 
Road 
Road 
Road 
Road 
Rail 
Haul Road 
Road 
Haul Road 
? 
Transhipment TranfPcort Transport Related Transport Out 
Point Into oilll Out from Disposal from Plant 
Point Plant 
Ravenstruther Road Rail Dalquhandy Road 
Ayr Harbour Rail Ship Dalquhandy Road 
Killoch Rail 
Knockshinnoch Rail 
Powhamal Rail 
Cranberry Haul Road Rail Killoch Rail 
Pow hamal Rail 
Chalmerston Haul Road Rail Killoch Rail 
26. In tenns of extraction sites (Table 5), transport of extracted coals 
to the disposal plants is and will continue to be road-borne, whether by 
internal haul-road or external public road. Few sites occur near 
existing rail infrastructure or have an economic capability of being 
linkedto such infrastructure. Two exceptions to this rule feature -
(a) at Chalmerston in the Doon Valley where, as part of the evolving 
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Tranfll." Outfrom /01 
Raii/Roa. 
Rai 
Raii/Roa< 
Rai. 
Rail/Road 
Rail/Road 
Rail 
Rail 
Rail/Road 
Rail 
Road 
Road 
? 
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strategy, British Coal and British Rail have invested in a direct linkage 
to the existing but disused rail infrastructure in the area to allow direct 
rail access to Killoch Disposal Plant and to Ayr Harbour; and 
(b) the planned extraction at Powhamal-Gasswater with a rail con-
nection from Cranberry to Killoch and to Ayr Harbour. Because of the 
bulk-haul implications of this site, in disposal and in market terms, a 
transhipment facility for rail-borne movement is proposed for an 
adjacent location at Cranberry to enable transport by rail to both 
Killoch and direct to market. 
Additionally, as part of the context of this category, it should be noted 
that British Rail have retained the solum of the former rail-line 
between Drumgelloch, Airdrie and Bathgate with a view, where eco-
nomically feasible, to direct rail linkages and transhipment facilities 
for any future development of the Monklands Basin and reserves 
further east in Central Scotland. In Strathclyde, this pertains directly 
to the development of the Drumshangie site east of Airdrie. There 
remain considerable difficulties a'"ssociated with this site which require 
to be resolved before the question of its linkages can be decided upon. 
27. In terms of disposal plants (Table 5), the picture is dominated by 
road linkages into the disposal plants and rail linkages from the 
disposal plants. A major element in this has been heavy investment by 
British Coal, as part of the strategy, in rail-orientated unloading and 
loading infrastructure at Killoch and in re-opening formerly closed 
railway lines from the Doon Valley and also from the main Dumfries 
line via the Mauchline-Annbank line. As part of the future develop-
ment of Powhamai-Gasswater, British Coal and British Rail are to 
promote a new line from the Cranberry area to Auchinleck to join with 
the main Dumfries line. 
28. In terms of transhipment points (Table 6), the picture is domi-
nated by direct rail linkages with the exception ofRavenstruther where 
the A 70 is and will be utilised to transport coals from the Douglas 
Valley sites to the transhipment point on the rail line south of Lanark. 
Influence of Market Requirements 
29. The fourth influence over the number of lorry trips generated by 
the opencast industry in Strathclyde is the nature and size of coal 
contracts won by British Coal to supply its customers. The primary 
consideration is the actual volume of coal contracted to supply and the 
frequency of deli very. There are basically two forms of contract -large 
voh.ime bulk orders eg industrial and power station and low volume, 
frequent delivery eg domestic and small industry users. In most cases, 
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HISTORY AND PRESENT POSITION 
Monktonhall Mine was designed in the 1950's to produce in excess of 1 
million tonnes of coal annually from the deep Carboniferous Limestone seams. 
The productive Coal Measure seams which lie about 460 metres above the 
shallowest workable coal seam (Parrot Seam) in the Limestone Group had been 
exploited previously from the numerous ancient shallow mines in this area. 
Two vertical shafts were sunk between 1955 and 1961 to depths of 930 and 
921 metres. Horizon tunnels were driven to the north and south at a depth of 
about 890 metres and intersected the Great, Stairhead and Gillespie Seams. The 
Great Seam is the thickest and most consistent of these and was successfully 
exploited from 1965 and during the 1970's in the central area close to the shafts. 
Further working took place in the 1980's through faulting to the north of this 
area together with limited extraction in the central area in the thinner Stairhead 
and Gillespie seams. 
It had always been accepted that the coal reserves to the south of the 
Sheriffhall Fault would be .worked from the Lady Victoria and Bilston Glen mines. 
In the late 1970s however, the main horizon tunnels at Monktonhall were 
extended to the south through this fault and reserves immediately south of it 
were re-allocated to this mine. One panel of coal, was extracted between 1981 
and 1985 in the Corbiecraig Seam and new access tunnels intersected the Parrot 
Seam in this area At the same time access tunnels were driven to intersect the 
Peacock Seam in the central area of the mine. 
Up to 1980-81, Monktonhall Mine operated successfully with profits in 1979-
80 reaching £2.20/tonne. Since that year the operational performance of the 
mine has been less satisfactory, viz: 
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Monktonhall: 1980-1987 
Year OMS tonnes Cost Proceeds Profit {loss) £/tonne £/tonne £/tonne 
1980/81 (7.6) 
1981/82 2.31 38.3 30.1 (8.2) 
1982/83 2.50 36.0 32.2 (3.8) 
1983/84 2.52 44.5 34.4 ( 10.1) 
1984185 
·---·-------------. NATIONAL STRIKE .......... --·-----------·· 
1985/86 2.43 50.3 39.1 ( 11. 2) 
1986187 2.12 68.8 39.4 (29.4) 
Because of these continuing unsatisfactory financial results the Corporation 
decided in 1987 to suspend the masn production activitses of the mine. The 
central area development drivages in the Peacock Seam and the southern area 
developments in the Parrot Seam were completed during 1988.The Peacock 
Seam developments were driven 1,100 metres from the bottom of the access 
tunnels and the Parrot Seara headings now extend about 700 metres from the 
masn south horszon tunnels. 
Since 1988 the mane has not produced any coal and has been preserved on 
an I!SSenual c.Jre and maantenance basas wath natur.JI ~tentllauon. Dams have 
been comtructed on the tunnels to the north and \Outh Some of the 
underground workings an the Great. Staarhead and Gille~pae Seams .Jre now 
flooded and water flows from the dam \ates to the pat bottom lodgement. The 
currently accessable roadways an the mane are those an the 11acmaty of the pat 
bottom and the development dravages in the Peacock Seam as shown on Plate 3. 
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/ Peacock Seam Reserves 
ril In ~itu 
Averaqeln situ 
In situ Reserves (mtl 
Area teal thi,kness 
Total (ml Proved Probable Demonstrated 
PI 1 25 2.33 233 
P2 , 25 , &6 1 &6 
P3 , 20 1.76 1 76 
P4 1 20 3.14 
PS 1 15 2.32 
Total 5. 75 5.46 11.21 
( 
[jj) W01 kabl@ Jnd R@COV@rabl@ 
Averaqe Workable Reserves (mtJ Re,overable Reserves (mtl 
Workable EatrattiOn Area Coal Toul Total 
Thi,knett Proved Probable Demonst ~ Proved Probable Demons 
(ml rated trated 
P1 1 10 2.05 . 2.05 85 1 74 , 74 
P2 1 10 1 46 1.46 75 1.10 . 1 10 
P3 1 05 I 1 54 154 75 1 1& 1 16 
P4 1 OS 2 75 2. 75 70 , 93 1 93 
P'j 1 00 2 02 2 02 7'5 1 52 : 52 
Total S JS 477 ·3 d2 4 00 3 .:s ; .:s 
C· (iii) Recoverable ~e~~rve~ wlth·addltiOn.li ~urtace protection 1n ~reas P1. ?2 and P3 
(at 60°-o ~"tract1on max1mum) 
~veraqe Workable Reserves (mil RetO'wer.Jble Reserves (mtl 
Workaole Eatra(tlon Area Coal Total 
"' 
Total 
Th•tknen Proved Probable Demonst 
.. 
Proved Prob.tble Demons 
(m) rated trated 
PI 1 10 2 0'5 ;: OS 60 123 1 :3 
P2 1 10 1 -16 1 .:6 60 0 d8 ) 88 
P3 1 OS 1 54 1 54 60 \) 92 J 92 
?4 1 OS .us ~ 71) 70 1 93 I 93 
?'j : co 2 02 ~ 02 75 1 52 . ~2 
TOIJI sus -177 } :11 J 03 3 .:s .,..;g 
' Oemonnrated Reserves in the Peacock Jnd Parrot Seams .ue .u follow~: 
(i) In SitU 
In tttu Oemontuatea Aeserves (mtl 
S•am In SitU nu<11ness (ml 
P'rovea Proaaale Total 
Peacock 1. IS· I .25 5 75 5 ~6 11 21 
~o1rrot I 20 2 68 0 67 3 JS 
Total II 46 !i I J 14 59 
rii\ 'Nni"L• .. hla 
Workable n.ickness 
OemonstratectWorllaale Aesentes (ml) 
Seam (ml Pfovod P'robable Total 
Peacocrc 1.00. 1. 1 a 5.05 477 9.82 
Po1rrot I 20 2.68 0 67 lJS 
Total I 773 5 ~.a 13.17 
(jjil qfiC"r!VPr:lbf,_ 
Oemonttrattcl Aecoveraale Aesentes (md 
Seam ... eatr"tJon l P'rov•a P'roaaate Total 
P•acOCil I 70·115 ~ \}Q I J .1'5 7 45 
c· P:urol I 70 - I I /38 I J .11 ~ 35 Total I s d8 I J 12 I '} 80 
fivl ~~.,.~\,.rJ.bl,a ~,ac,arv,acwatn ~dr"•••f'lnJl '•·•'K" M ..... ,.,....,.,n 
Ot!mO"\Iroltea Re<Ovll!rolDte ~esen.es (mtl 
S.tam ... eacractron 
I I Olrovea i'•oao~are roc;~r 
"~.)(Q(k I !iO · d5 I J 0] I J .; '.i l ') ~I! 
i':uroc I 70 I • ~8 I ) .. .. , I ~ j 5 
Total I I ~'}I I . ,, I :l :H ... IJ .. 
•..; 
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Uur Ref: PO 89/10 
~0 tn Anri 1 19A9 
Thank yau for your further letter of L7th M3rcn Jbout mar?in~l cost~. 
[n that letter yau ask for rigures relatin9 to the marqin~l cost of ~n 
additional tanne af output at a long-life coll1ery obt~in~d through higher 
caat face performance. The ~arqinal cos: of output will of cour1e be sgec1f1c 
to 4 part1c~lar colliery. For examole. we Investigate the ~ar,inal cost of 
fncrementa 1 out;lut when ~ cJpi tal projec-:. Is put for...1r:j far cons ioer3t ion • 
. tf I may ~fer you to Table 4.5. page;~ of_ ~ho l98g Monopolies and 
Mergers Cammiss1on reQort on the inv~stme~t p~grJmme of ~he Brit~sh CJal 
CaqJor~t~on, you -.;11 see that. the! ouer.n:ng .:as:. •H :n~:"'ement.ll tonnaoe far 
three ~DJ!c1f1c projec~s .tt three c~lli"!r~~o; wdo; ... e!i :P.:ow f:L'Ii.l, and !:11~ ~~ 
reasonaoly typfcal of the cost of out;:ut octained by c.1aitai invest.-::ent. 
In your letter you :nentian that t!1e ~onapol~t!! ~nd "'~!"~er~ Co11111i~:>icn 
rnoor~ on the Coal Indust~y In 1983 ~~nage~ to quantify ~arg1nal cost 
f1~ur~s. I believe you :ni9ht ~ave In ~ind a graph sho~inq ope!'ltinq 
cas.~/!~nnu aq~ f;;J.t cu=u 1 a:: iv4 ooot.iJlOt tl;cat olur:e::-;:~ c,,, ~·.a~~ 3&: oi t.~.1: 
reoo,-... However, the oper3tin9 cost/tonne figures used '" :!'!at qr3pl1 
fncar;arate fhed casts and so the 7raph 1s not ,Jn 1nd~cJtion of :nar"1J1naJ 
casts in the sense you refer ta. 
[ think t!te~ might. be so::e :ni=~ndero;!Jndinq ·..,1~!1 reQilrtl to your cent~:1l 
point. The ma~1oa! cost of addft~onal lnc~ementai ~utput from our cont~nuing 
ccllle!'~es wil , Indeed, ~ene!'Jl~i :e ~cfter thun :~~ 1y~~1ge c~st from new 
openc.1s: sltas • althou9h nol ~Yo~ :.sr~t: :nc.r•Jin. 
/The Jr~ume~t ... 
I 
I 
•'' ~ . ' ·' . .....·~'· ,. ·. . . . 
.. z . 
The argument J was wishing to stress In my previous letter is that we see 
no conflict tn pur!uing a policy both of ~a~imising output at our best 
lonq-ttfe collieries. and at thl! same time, seeicing to dettelop as much 
low-cast apencast output as possible. Both these sources are. by any 
standards, highly competitiv~ agafnst alterndtive energy sources. 
You also asked tn your lettar for certain fac~ual Information on 
productivity and related matter'S, which is perhaps best set out fn the Anne.x 
attachei1. 
( hope thf~ l'lelps to clarify our pasit~on. 
-~oc 
APPENDIX_1. Corporatist Opencast Meeting 
Minutes (5/87) (Scotland). 
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l. Mr. uird opened the :neetiag, explaining the history of the r-egion's 
concern for opeacast coal wor~ing, which had led to the request for a 
meetinK with British Coal Scortish Area Opencast. He explained that 
while the tnd1v1dual re~ions had differing views on what the 
signif1c:mr Issues were, thera was rec~n1sed eo be .:m area of cOCDaaon 
Laterest which it was considered could be best pursued by a joint 
a~proach to Br1.tish Coal. Those lssues of COIIImon concern gave rise 
to .1 number of quest!o.,s on the way tn which the opencast OPI!'f.ltion~; 
.lrl! conducted, and these were forvAr1ed to Brittsh Coal bv lP.ttP!" at 
:7th January, 1987. S.O.O. Clrcul.u 4/1984 .tlso suggested there . .,,,:> 
.1 :1ce1 for reR1ons to approach Brtrtsh Coal to discuss such !Darters 
as ;Jrogr.:ammes for worl<ing. ror these re.:1sons the 1nter-regt.onal 
working ~roup had consi~ererl 1t appropriate to request .1 :neetin~ w1t~ 
British Coal. The Questions put to !\.C. by letter were accepte1 as 
an .t~enda for the meet1n~. 
2. Bri t!sn Coa 1 shared the concern of toea 1 .1uthor1t l.es over the future 
of the coal tndust:'Y aad tndtc.:ated .1 :Jestre for r'I!Rul.Jr l1.1ison on 
the sub1ect. The need for both riePp and opencast coal to be prorluctad 
at pr!ces co:npet~tive wit~ coal on the world ~arket w~s ~r~esse~. 
3. In :-esponse to •Juest!on ~ ot the :t.!tter', 3C outl!oed the ;l:-ese~t .1nd 
11\c.elv futur'e !ntent!ons for' .ieeo .1nd openc.1st WOf'K~n~ tn Scoc~.1nc!. 
~C r-efer:-e•i to .tn .1rea sc :-.Jte~y. wh~c!'l tlthou~h not l::1 the for:~ ·Jt .1 
puol~shed .Joc:u:nent, h.td been eodot<sed bv BC, the STt.:C. the unions .1a-:i 
thl! Labour Group of 'iPs. ;'he pt<eseat level of out';'ut was ~1ven as 
3.6 "lllltoo ronnes Jeep lltned 1nd J :11itl1on tonnes oi)enc.lst ..:o.1l 
l&l4F 
(600,000 tonnes Ot wnl.c!'l COllies fr'OIII ::ne iH1V:Jte !ieCtor). 9C's =~·Je 
ve.Jr business ;JL.ln .. nvt:;a~e-1 chat t!'lis aopt<oximace ~al.Jnce woul.! ~e 
oatnt.Jioed over the :1e:-<r :'!vP. vear's. It was ~cr-essed.nowever t!'lat .11: 
presPnt .1 ''buver'S oar'Ket" ;Jrev.1t.ls 1nd JS .1 result. pr'!ces had to ~e 
l..l.!pt verv low. 'The !'le.1vv iepen':iencta on SSEB, .1ad to .1 lesser elttenc, 
cne ~ot<thern !t<el.1nd :::zar'Ket '•1.15 .Ilso 1 ~eacure. SSEB will taKe .0.2.. 
:~illlon tonaes ot coal lathe cut<reot vear. :Oe ronn.:1~e t.JI(e~ ~v 
SSEB ts partly depen1eac on t!XPOr't ot electrtc1tv to·cne C.E.C.3. 
The distribution link ~as 1 c.:tpac~tv ot s0111e l :nilUon cannes coal 
equivalent, the ~~)~~··st :,_.v,.l J~ :Jse ~o !.He be1::1{ ~00.000 toao..-s 
coal ~qulvalcnc .1nri ::~l'~P ..... •rl' no ~1porcs l.1st vear' '· 1986). 
·~~~!~!"!'·@ 14 4%i!Niltlli!l.41!.$2£;!4&'-'· 
2 
4. There was sald co be no publlshed bac:lcJlrouad paper oa the Ukel.y 
rtarlcet ranges. 
5. !a o~nswer to questloa 2, BC dld aot accept that there was a Kaaeral. 
trend cowards higher levels of opencast output. Output fraa opeacasc 
~lees woul1 ontv be lacreased to 111eet spec1.f1c aav contracts. For 
ex:&lllpte, the Dalquehandy s1te in Stratttc:lyde Ls being developed to 
cater for the ~orthem Irel..Jnd Power Statton ~arkee. Other si.tes to 
be <lpened up .Jrc l!ssentlally repl.lc:elllents for e:c1st1ng sltes nearing 
t!"le end of chelr productive Ufe. The foltovtng tlst of current and 
pl~nned sites was ~lven (BC sltes onLy). 
6. Dalqu~handv (Scr:lthclvde) (co produce 200,000 cannes 1.988/89 possible 1111-l..r 
tnc:rease to 600,000 1.991/92. 
~lh. rL· 
-Chal~erseon (~~~~~~~ replace Benbane wU:h same lave l of 
ou c" u c. 4. R.C" ... OC,.CUc' c:, IC..J-
• H vtt.l -fA.'-C 
,.D.taside (~~C(i~~ repl.1ces Headless Cross. 
C:. -.--r c~ 
,Slladwells Exteaslon (tochlan) Production to fall co JOO,OO tonnes. 
l..~•·=-·or 
.. Dru:::sshangle (Straenc:t~~· Replaces !Hl11dwells. 
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LJ. On question 6, 3C confl.r:1Ded that there was currently .1 very high 
level of private sector l.aterellt in opeac:.1sting .1od .10 loc:reaae La 
output. BC outLined the regulations governing the lsaue of 
l1c:encea. A Uc ~nee ls nor:1Da lly on tv granted where the .1ppl1c:ant has 
obtained rlghts to the laad :and full pl.:aooia& coosoat. Section SO 
consents are not aor:1Dally acceptable. Sixty per ceat of appllc:atioas 
for licences are rejected but BC have beea takea to the European 
court ln the past for attempting to refuse a lic:eac:e to protect ehelr 
market. !n c:e rt.1L a c i rc:umstanc:es, British Coal may be wi ttl ng tor 
support local authorLties La appeals agalnst the refusal of planning 
consent for openc:ast wor~ing. 
14. The Assoc:L&t1.oo of ttceaced Opeoc.1st Operators ls presslag for .1 
reduction La rov:alitLes paid to BC from the preseat E.l6 tonne to 
tll. ~,_tt.rnd- eo-lowecc~CA&~avel.-eo•U·J. SO. 
l'· BC confirmed that La cart.Jin special c:lrcwutances the SO,OOO toaoe 
llmlt for llc:eaces ls exceeded. For example .1fter working commences, 
the deposit of coal may be found eo coot.1ia aaore thaa SO, 000 eonaes 
.1nd seams aaay be thicker than .Jntlc:lpated. 
16. :1~av of the pd.vaee ai.eea are Ni1=£~upply eae d011cas&:1c unec (60: 
af...pd vace oucpuc.) and douee1c: coal baa·-co-be-1mpoRed at pnaeuc, 
Uli.~••P•ce of eb-. .. z:~&a~cioe..aor...ccoacer-a.-BC. There ls s0111e 
caapet1t1on from th~ private sector ln the ladustri~l ~~arket. 
17. BC .lten~pt to l1mite privati! oper:1tors to t·o~o worKl.n!J sites .Jt .1ny 
time.. Thera ls lnc:reasint~ ;lressure to ~:-.lnt ~ore U.:ences, but thls 
ls beLnt~ resisted bv Brtt!.:tn CoaL. 
~9. 7he out;:tut of openc.:~st coal :or t!'le Scottish Area. ·o~as given .1s 
follows: 
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[t ~s cL~L~ed that the ~r~vate sector Jces ~ot ~ffect 3C ~ar~et!ng to 
.1nv ~reat t!J:tent but t!'lat 3C would not ·J"ish to see conttnuat!on of 
the t:-end toward:~ ~Lghe:- lt!vets of ;lr!•tate sector outi)ut. SC' :J 
.Jbtl~tv to :-est:-.1Ln t:~ls ::-ead throu~h ::~e Ucence :~vsttl!m ts, 
~owever, U::slted. The ~ala :-easons for t~e tac:-ease ;Jrtvate sector 
<JUt';'ut !o :-eceot vears ~.1ve :et!n the t!ffect of the ~Lners strike on 
3C <Jut;lut 1nd the ~.1r~e :1u~b~r <Jt .:!·ttl e~!.ntl!er!ng coat:-.Jct:Jrs 
~et!~ln~ wor~ ~v t!X;l.lndi~g :hel:- .JCt!vlt~t!S ~nto openc.lst~ng. 
20. 
4 
On Question 7 8C clalased eo have re~ard for envtron~~~ental factors Ln 
ulda~ decisions on stees eo be worked, but stressed that attention 
had also eo be paid eo conaider.:u:tons of coat and coal quality. BC 
advised that '~c:oettah _Area.-t.._operated oa tbe basis of three. 
~tflt.t~s, and the dll 1a to apl1t output evenly becveen tbe 
sui::a~•• The sub-:ueaa aad anun&«uqaw:&of eacb _are, Nortb of 
t:Ae-Portb .. (0.8 aa1ll1oa c:onaeal. Soucb of tbe Porc:b, (0.6 aailltoa)-;and 
Ay~blre (t.O aa1ll1oa~. 
21. There was Lasuff1c1ent tlllle for a full exchange of vtews on the 
envtronlllental factors to be considered in dealing with opencasc 
developlllenc. The loc.1l .1uthort.ty represent.ttives :zaa:ie reference to .1 
asap prepared to show the rel.tt:lonship between shallow coal deposits 
.&ad .1reas where there were policy constraints which could influence 
the worktag of these deposits. Further discussion was .tLso 
considered necessary on the Likely response of Sritish Coal to 
'"Preferred Areas" for extraction defined ln Local authority 
development plana. 
22. Quesc:ton 9 on c011parutve production coats aad tO oa Sritt.sh Coals 
land ~cquts1t1oa policy wore not discussed. 
23. [t was a~reed that the local authority representatives would give 
further consider:ac:ton to the Lnfo~atton gained froca the aseetiag .1nd 
write to British Coal highLishttng those issues raised in the 
originaL letter which required further discusst.on. There "J:ts 
.&&r••=ent that regular :zaeettags of tht.s nature wouLd be of :zautual 
~neflt. On behalf of the Off!.cers Ct"oup, ~r. t.li:'d thanked Brtt!:lh 
Coal ~or their co-oper;u:ton. 
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APPENDIX_§. Letter Etherington..J;9 
Ellison. 
• 
I 
All <:.Jmmunn::auont lo he ao.Jdreued lo l'be (jENERAL .SECRETARY. 
Nationul U nioa of Mioeworkers 
Durham Mechanics 
Central Office : N.U.M. (North East Area), P.O. Box No. 6. Red Hill. Durham. DHl 4BB 
Oalce hours: ~onday lo Fndav. 9 a.m.-1 ~.JO p.m .. J.JO p.m.-S p.m. 
11 June 1990 
WE/JW 
Mr. J. Ellison 
univer~ity of Durham 
Dear Jimmy, 
Tel.: Durham (091) 384 3515 
Thank you for your letter dated Jlst May, 1990 asking for two 
visitor's tickets for this year's N.U.M. Conference. I have 
arranged this with Cave Hopper and as soon as the tickets are 
available I will see that you are furnished with them. 
On another note, concerning the new National Mining Museum 
proposed for Monktonhall with an annexe at the Francis Pit, quite 
by chance since our conversation on the subject of investment 
in collieries I have had reason to speak to Adam Smith who is the 
Mining Engineer for the Scottish area of the N.U.M. I questioned 
him about the position at both Monktonhall and Francis and the 
position is as follows:-
1) Monktonhall: The workings that were in operation in 
conjunction with Bilston Glen have been physically sealed off. 
However, the driveages towards the Musselbrough basia are intac~ 
and all that is required to begin operations is for equipment tc 
be placed on a face line. These roadways are all being 
maintain~d. t~e ~i~e beinq kep~ ~ree c~ ~~ter and bo~~ ~haf~s a~e 
in proper working order. This would possibly explain the light 
that we saw on our way home when were at the c.c. Conference t~c 
years ago. 
2) The Francis Mine: All the old workings at the Francis Mine 
have been sealed off, as has the connection with the Se~field 
Mine. There are driveaqes out into new rese~~es somewhat similar 
to Monktonhall but there is no actual face line constructed. It 
would be necessary to drive face lines but the roadways are being 
kept ~a1ntained as are the shafts, and it is also envisaged, as 
you were qu1te correctly informed, that a drift is to be put in 
intercepting wtth the shaft area to gain direc~ access to these 
development roadways. 
It would seem that the information you had was somewhere near 
beinq correct and it is obvious that these two units are in fact 
beinq properly mothballed so that they can start production 
within a relatively short time. 
. . . 
Yours sincare).y, 
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OPENCAST COAL MINING: THE NORTH EAST [Sl] AND SCOTTISH SURVEYS [52] 
i Introduction 
From an early stage it was realised that the debate and action over 
opencast coal mining was conducted through a process whereby the public 
affected by it appeared marginal to decisions on ita development. For 
this basic reason the two surveys were executed. The first one, a 
survey of residents affected by opencaat(Sl), is unique in that it 
afforded an opportunity to assess the responses of residents in a number 
of settlements affected and surrounding one site over the proposal to 
operate a site close to them and principally to assess their powers and 
capability to handle a public inquiry. It was the first survey of such 
a size undertaken and consumed an inordinate amount of time. The second 
survey(S2) came late in the research and arose out of the questions 
answered in the North East but not in Scotland. Why was opencast being 
allowed to expand apparently unhindered in Scotland?. An examination 
of why there was little or no opposition from the Mineral Planning 
Authorities in the District Councils was necessary. 
The first survey(Sl.) entitled an 'Independent Survey of the Public's 
Knowledge of, and Attitude to Public Inquiries into Opencast Mining' 
was a JOO household postal survey undertaken in April and May 1987 and 
the first survey of it's kind known to the author. It went beyond the 
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remit of the survey title and attempted to indicate the level of 
inequality and disparity between the major protagonists at public 
inquiries into opencast mining and members of the public. The areas the 
survey covered were designed to answer some questions raised at the 
first public inquiry I examined over people's relationship with the 
planning process, British Coal and the Mineral Planning Authority. The 
questionaires were distributed by hand and each household was visited to 
reclaim the questionnaires and to undertake a brief informal interview 
regarding the questionnaire and people's feelings on the issue of 
opencast. While the survey brought answers to the main questions, it 
raised many other questions of social and political importance whose 
answers can best be ventured at another time. 
The survey was opportune in that it took place before and during what 
was the second public inquiry into the Daisy Hills opencast site. 
People with some experience of previous engagements at public 
inquiries may be more informed than most others to make judgement and 
comment over their position. While it was undertaken the survey exacted 
comment from all sides concerned over the outcome of its findings. Some 
pressured for these to be released, others wanted them withheld for a 
period of time. 
The first page (Questions 1-16) of the questionnaire covered 
respondents' political and economic history, especially in relation to 
the coal industry which once dominated the local economy. The second 
page (Questions 17-28) extracted people's knowledge and information of 
the public inquiry process and what they would and could contribute to 
5W 
that process. Page three (~uestions 29-36) elicited people's views on 
power and control over their lives in relation to the impact of opencast 
mining. 
The second survey(S.2) entitled ~Opencast ~ Mining in Scotland: ! 
brief survey of policy and approaches in District councils', undertaken 
in May 1989, was in fact a twin comparative postal survey. Two 
questionnaires were sent to each district council in Scotland affected 
by opencast; one to the chairperson of the planning committee and one to 
the chief planning officer. The questionnaire to the Planners 
cross-referenced the questionnaire responded to by the chairperson of 
the planning committee. Each one covered their understanding of the 
application of planning legislation and currant council policy on 
opencast. Furthermore, the exercise examined the communication of 
policy and legislation between planners and council members 
The survey was followed up by visits to several key district councils. 
The purpose was to ensure a good response and speak to key respondents 
to verify the general overall approach to opencast mining in Scotland. 
Despite the geographical area that had to be covered and the limited 
time available to planning departments and council members they were 
extremely co-operative and the response was almost 100 per cent. 
The survey served its purpose and gave the answer to the main underlying 
questions: Why was there little or no opposition to opencast coal 
mining and why no public inquiries on the scala of those in North East 
England had taken place in Scotland?. Again, it raised other questions 
of political importance that cannot be pursued hare. 
Both surveys involved a substantial workload but the results made it all 
worthwhile. They form the necessary buttress to the knowledge and 
information gleaned from attending public inquiries and in affect 
provide balance to the overall work. 
5 ·t 2.. 
THE DAISY HILLS SURVEY 
SURVEY 2! ~ PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE OF, AND ATTIDUDE 
TO PUBLIC INQUIRIES INTO OPENCAST COAL MINING 
AT THE TIME OF 
THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO BRITISH COAL'S APPLICATION !2 MINE 
COAL BY OPENCAST METHODS AT DAISY HILLS, SACRISTON, ~ DURHAM 
JAMES M. ELLISON 
5l:l 
The Daisy Hills opencast site lies surrounded by small villages each of 
which had its own colliery up until the 1960's employing a total of 
over 2,000 men. The last colliery to close was at Sacristan in 
December 1985. These villages which also encompass Waldridge Fell 
Country Park, a Site of Spacial Scientific Intarast(SSSI), are situated 
just wast of the main Durham to Chaster-le-Street road about 3 mile 
from Chester-la-Streat and 5 miles from Durham. The vast majority of 
dwellings are under the management of the Housing Department of 
Cheatar-la-Streat District Council. The Mineral Planning Authority is 
Durham county council. The Electoral Registers at County Hall were 
used to select an equal percentage of households in each village for 
the survey. 
The survey was done against the background of the Public Inquiry into 
opencast coal mining at Daisy Hills which opened on April 28th 1987. 
The present application by British Coal was a revamped version of a 
previous application which went to Public Inquiry in 1979 and was 
refused by H.M. Inspector on that occasion. 
The Survey's practical and foremost aim was to assess people's 
knowledge and attitude to public inquiries into opencast coal mining. 
Underlying these aims however is an assessment of the disparities 
between perceived and real power and control by people over their lives 
in the community. The survey also assesses the social condition of the 
people in the surrounding villages. The villages covered in the survey 
were Nettlesworth, Sacristan, Daisy Hill, Edmondsley and Chester Moor, 
all of which would have bean directly affected by the working of the 
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site if permission ware granted. 
The procedure followed was that 339 questionnaires were posted after a 
pilot survey was taken of 10 houses in the village of Waldridge • 
Personal door to door recovery was thought necessary for a number of 
reasons. In the widest sanae I wanted to aaaeaa, through unstructured 
interviews and participant observation, the general political and 
social condition of people and what bearing this would have, if any, 
upon their attitude and approach to opencaat mining and public 
inquiries. However the main reason, suspecting apathy and fatalism 
from the pilot survey, was the determination to achieve the beat 
possible response rata to aaaeaa the extant of the subject title of the 
survey and verify how this affects the level of people's need to 
participate in the power and control of decisions made over their 
environment and community. 
Each questionnaire is implicitly in three sections, the first a 
personal and social profile: the second, knowledge and the 
dissemination of information and procedure at public inquiries: 
finally, an assessment of the extent of change desired by people in 
level of power and control over decisions made relating to community 
and environment. The recovery rates were categorized in Table 1. to 
reflect in the latter section some indication of the political and 
social condition of the people: 
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Tabla 1. 
THE CATEGORIES, RECOVERY RATES AND THEIR DEFIINITIONS 
339 QUESTIONNAIRES POSTED 
285 HOUSEHOLDERS RECEIVED A QUESTIONNAIRE 
107 HOUSEHOLDERS RESPONDED TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
119 FAILED TO RESPOND FOR REASONS RELATING TO THEIR SOCIAL CONDITION 
59 HOUSEHOLDERS FAILED TO RESPOND 
32 DEAD ADDRESSES: Non - existing houses, such as the street in 
Chaster Moor which has no odd numbers evan though this is 
not at all clear in the Electoral Register. 
22 UNINHABITED HOUSEHOLDS: Empty and boarded-up houses, including 
those at Sacriston•s "Parades" housing estate which could become 
habitable. Includes also those which are in a state of 
renovation. 
59 FAILED TO RESPOND: Those households which after calling twice 
for the return of the quastionairra gave no reply at the door. 
Also includes 8 householders which refused to participate in the 
exercise who objected for privata reasons. 
57 DISINTERESTED/INDIFFERENT: Those who did not place any value or 
purpose in completing the questionnaire by clearly stating so. 
31 EXPRESSED APATHY AND FATALISM: Those who, upon probing expressed 
a value or an opinion which met the subjective criterion of 
'where the future appeared blocked and expectations are so 
narrowed that life itself becomes a matter of some indifference•. 
26 INFIRM UNABLE TO RESPOND 
5 CASES OF PEOPLE IN DISTRESSED STATES IN NEED OF HELP AND SUPPORT 
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Table 2. 
NUMBER OF PERSONS 
AGED 
18 - 30 
10 
AGE GROUP TABLE 
AGED 
31 - 45 
24 
AGED 
46 - 64 
33 
AGED 
65 - 100 TOTAL 
40 107 
Table 2 highlights the demographic imbalance towards an aged population 
in the "Fell" communities. It is interesting to note that 66 
householders had relatives in neighbouring villages on the 'Fell'. The 
high proportion of people retired together with the figure of 33 in the 
46-65 age group is more meaningful when cross-tabulated with other 
tables. The significance of the low figure in the 18 - 30 age group 
lias either in the fact that relatively few young people are settling 
in the "Fell" community, or there is a distinct lack of opportunity for 
the young to become householders. 
Table 3. 
OCCUPATIONS 
RETIRED UNEMPLOYED UNSKILLED S/SKILLED SKILLED PROFESSIONAL 
Number 
of 
Parsons 
41 8 7 20 11 20 
5fJ 
From Table 3. we are given a view of the occupational make-up of the 
area. The high proportion of retired people correlates with the 
demographic make-up of the population. As there is little or no 
professional work available in the community, the relatively high 
proportion of responses from professional people indicates two factors. 
Firstly, a shift in the class and occupational structure in the 
communities from thirty years ago. Most professionals originate from 
areas outside the indigenous population of the "Fell" communities. 
Secondly, they tend to use the community as a commuter belt. Their 
places of work lie in the neighbouring towns of Sunderland, Durham, and 
Newcastle. During the two Public Inquiries at Daisy Hills it was found 
that these people maintain an influence and a high profile in community 
life, sitting on local committees and organising petitions against 
opencast. 
The figures for the skilled and semi-skilled of 11, and 20 respectively 
reflect the shape of the local labour market. Light Engineering, 
service sector, distributive trades, and motor repair trade, form the 
main avenues of employment for these people. The low demand for 
unskilled labour through the loss in agriculture and in construction 
allied to increased technology has forced a shift to adapt and re-train 
for semi-skilled work. It is difficult to account for the low figure 
for the unemployed. It may in part, as the age group table has 
indicated, be due to government training measures or an exodus from the 
community of young people looking for work, that they are not settling 
in the villages. From analysis of the questionnaires, both the vast 
majority of skilled and semi-skilled workers and the 8 unemployed 
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householders came from the 31 to 65 age group. 
The years of residency depicted by Table 4 indicates the degree of 
social change, drifting from mining community to disparate economic 
community. We know from the nature of the mining industry that 
mobility out of the community was not a great factor 40 years or more 
ago. What was a factor was stability, and the category of "over 40" 
includes those who had been in the community SO and 60 years. Equally 
the table can tell us how diffuse the process of settlement became over 
the period of a generation. These factors coming from the tables can 
then be compared and correlated to "Age Groups" and "Occupation" so as 
to throw some light on class, power and status groups at a later date. 
They may also indicate changes in attitudes to work and mobility over 
time for the inhabitants in the community. 
TABLE 4 
----- -
YEARS OF RESIDENCY IN THE COMMUNITY TO 1987 
UP TO UP TO UP TO UP ~0 UP TO UP TO OVER 
5 YEARS 10 YEARS 15 YEARS 20 YEARS 30 YEARS 40 YEARS 40 YEARS 
NUMBER 
OF 
PEOPLE 
7 10 10 12 16 5 47 
Table 5 expresses the formal mining and political activity in the 
community. The table shows the strength of mining that prevailed in 
the community. Often trade union positions were both formal and 
informal carrying status and power at the pit and in the community. In 
the column "Those who held position on councils", it carries a clear 
formal title with position, power, and status recognised by all 
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sections of community. Despite a proportion of people involved in 
trade union and political activity there has been little or no 
industrial or political action stemming from the community during its 
history of industrial closure. 
Table 5 
MINING TRADE UNION AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE COMMUNITY 
THOSE WHO THOSE WHO THOSE WHO HELD 
WORKED IN HELD POSITION POSITION ON 
MINING IN THE NUM. COUNCILS 
NUMBER 
OF 41(81) 11(24) 8(9) 
PEOPLE 
NB. The figures in brackets refer to those whose relatives: 
1. worked in mining ~ held position in NUM, 
~ held position on the Parish or District Council. 
The figures of 41 and 81, while expected, are also indicative of 
dependence upon the single industry of deep mining once employing 
around the "Fall". Now that is gone there is little else but opencast 
mining and service industry in the community with vastly reduced 
employment of leas than 200. Taken with Table 6 which represents the 
environmentally and politically active we have a measure of political 
commitment Only 10\ said they were members of a political party, 8 of 
whom held a position in the councils representing a population only 
half of whom had any interest in politics. Remarkably however, it 
follows that we find 88\ Having such deep concern with the environment 
few must have seen it as a political question despite this clearly 
being the case with the Daisy Hills opencast site. 24 respondents 
having relatives that held trade union positions and little recorded 
industrial /political activity indicate an instrumental approach to 
trade union activity. This is reflected, too, in the poor political 
responses and low attendance at a public meeting with Arthur Scargill 
arranged by the Durham 'broad left'at Kimblasworth working mans• club 
in 1979. 
Tabla 6 
NUMBER 
OF 
PEOPLE 
ENVIRONMENTALLY AND POLITICALLY ACTIVE 
INTERESTED 
IN 
POLITICS 
55(51\) 
INTERESTED 
IN 
ENVIRONMENT 
94(88\) 
MEMBER OF 
PARTY OR 
GROUP 
11(10\) 
Taking the 11 respondents who ware members of a party and comparing 
that with the 8 "who held a position on the council", Table 5 reveals 
several points. Firstly, low political activity and the concentration 
of power in a few hands in the local party means little opportunity for 
change in or challenge to those holding office as council members. A 
low participation in politics by the remainder of the community also 
tends to reinforce the view that paternalism, the dependence upon 
others, prevails. Further, measured against the figures in Table 5 for 
trade union involvement, the participation rate underlines the view 
that trade union participation does not necessarily lead to 
politicisation and political participation. From personal experience 
in the NUM, 'Keeping politics out of other affairs' was actively 
pursued by some senior trade unionists in Durham, with the result that 
power remained in the hands of the few. But as interviews have shown 
this was given legitimacy by the people, even activists such as Pheobe 
(Webster) Hodson of Nettlesworth one of the founders of the Adult 
School Movement, who believed that the Labour and Trade Union 
leadership would deliver a form of socialism. The problem has always 
been a distinct lack and avoidance of political education and agitation 
at the grass-roots level. 
Table 7. 
FORMAL EDUCATION PERIOD 
NUMBER 
OF 
PEOPLE 
THOSE 
FINISHED 
AT 14 YEARS 
42 
THOSE 
FINISHED 
AT 15 YEARS 
29 
THOSE 
FINISHED 
AT 16 to 18 
YEARS 
20 
THOSE 
FINISHED 
AT 21+ 
YEARS 
7 
The figure of 42 for "those who finished at 14" is closely related to 
the age and residency figures. If one suggests the education system is 
structured to meet the needs of industry then a case can be made out 
that mining needed people educated to the level necessary to promote 
the interests of the industry and capital accumulation. It would be 
cynical to say that the corollary exists today with Tees, Lees, amd 
Stees and people end up the same way as industrial wrecks. 
Only 20 out of 107 "stayed on" to take certificated courses amd starkly 
only 7 continued through to higher or further education. From a 
cursory look at the occupations given such as pharmacist and lecturer 
we can suggest that these people may be 'incomers• to the community. 
All this suggests a poor process of education for people in these 
communities leading to low achievement levels not unrelated to 
industrial demand. This is confirmed to some extent by Bob Davidson of 
Sacristan (NCB Senior Surveyor) who suggested that the pits in the west 
of the county were kept open to maintain a reserve skilled labour force 
for the coastal pits. 
The table for formal education, especially when allied to that of 
extended education in Table 7. assess further the extent of educational 
achievement in the community. Bearing in mind the ageing population 
and those who finished their formal education by the age of fifteen, 
the figures certainly indicate a capacity for education outside the 
demands of education for the traditional industrial labour market. 
Table 7. 
Number 
of People 
EXTENDED EDUCATION 
THOSE WHO UNDERTOOK 
EDUCATION COURSES 
39 
THOSE WHO UNDERTOOK 
FURTHER OR HIGHER 
EDUCATION EDUCATION 
28 
Clearly many undertook education courses after their formal education 
had failed them. The figure of 39 for "Those who undertook educational 
courses" may be indicative of people's desire for wider learning as 
much as it may be a response to the changed needs of industry 
identified in the occupations table. What is perhaps equally telling 
is the figure of 28 for those who undertook further and higher 
education. Despite the drawbacks for many of a low level of education 
for people mainly educated before the advent of comprehensives, it 
would appear some sought greater levels of knowledge. A more in depth 
social survey may substantiate the evidence from this personal and 
social profile. Basically inequalities persist in the community of a 
social, educational and economic nature. Arguably, this is not 
unrelated to a dependence in the past upon a single industry and an 
education system geared to supporting industry and not meeting the 
emancipation of the people in it. Table 9 marks the beginning of the 
section specifically dealing with opencast mining and graphically 
illustrates the durations which people have experienced of opencast 
operations in the community. 
Table 9. 
THOSE WITH 
EXPERIENCE OF 
0/CAST 
OPERATIONS NEAR 
HOME 
NUMBER 
OF 
PEOPLE 
OPENCAST OPERATIONS 
IN THEIR DURING LAST DURING LAST DURING LAST 
LIFETIME 5 YEARS 10 YEARS 20 YEARS 
31(29\) 28(26\) 12(10\) 17(15\) 
What Table 9 initially reveals is a fairly constant presence of 
opencast mining across peoples lives. Despite recent opposition, there 
has been a marked increase of people with experience of opencast mining 
near their homes during the last five years to 1987 of 16 per cent. 
Given the genuine concern for the environment however, and, the high 
degree of opposition to the opencast application(Table 10), it becomes 
obvious that such an opencast industry has been imposed from above with 
little regard for the indigenous population. It also means that the 
councillors representing the people have not always converted their 
concerns into policy decisions. If anyone is in doubt over opposition 
to opencast mining then Table 10 indicates people's knowledge, approval 
and disapproval of the application to extract coal by opencast methods. 
Table 10 
NUMBER 
OF 
PEOPLE 
BRITISH COAL'S APPLICATION TO MINE COAL BY 
OPENCAST METHODS AT DAISY HILLS 
KNOWLEDGE 
OF 
APPLICATION 
90(84\) 
APPROVED 
OF 
APPLICATION 
18 < 17\ I 
DISAPPROVED 
OF 
APPLICATION 
75(70\) 
Emphatically, seventy per cent of respondents disapproved of British 
Coal's application to mine coal by opencast methods at Daisy Hills. 
Even so 17 per cent approved the application mainly on the grounds of 
the anticipated employment opencast mining may bring to the area, 
despite their overriding concern for the environment. 
Table 11 reinforces the findings in Table 10 with results that shed 
greater light upon their considered preferences. The weighting of 
respondents' preferences are heavily in favour of the environment and 
the community and the views of local people taking more importance than 
national energy needs and the profitability of British Coal. It 
follows, that if people count more than the economics of energy then, 
people and their environment should take priority when making decisions 
that affect their cultural and environmental well-being. 
Tabla 11 
P'IRST 
PREFERENCE 
SECOND 
PREFERENCE 
THIRD 
PREFERENCE 
FOURTH 
PREFERENCE 
ENVIRONMENT 
AND 
COMMUNITY 
62 (58\) 
30 (28\) 
4 
1 
NOT CONSIDERED 2 
AS A PREFERENCE 
PREFERENCE OF IMPORTANCE 
(ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY) 
VIEWS OF 
LOCAL 
PEOPLE 
30 (28\) 
57 (53\) 
8 
4 
4 
NATIONAL 
ENERGY 
NEEDS 
10 ( 9\) 
5 
78 (73\) 
2 
5 
PROFITABILITY 
OF BRITISH 
COAL 
2 ( 2\) 
5 
7 
62 (58\) 
25 (23\) 
The first and second preferences of 58 per cent and 53 percent for 
environment and community and the views of local people respectively, 
are diametrically weighted against national energy needs(73 per cent) 
and the profitability of British Coal(58 per cent) as third and last 
preferences. Although 90 people had knowledge of British Coal's 
application to extract coal by opencast methods it still meant that 17 
did not. This is surprising in close communities considering the high 
profile given by the opposition group and the media. 
Dissemination and value to the public of information regarding the 
Public Inquiry is outlined in Tables 12 and 13. They indicate the 
problem of serving people's "right to know" and assesses how good the 
quality and volume of that information is, bearing in mind that 
management of information is directly related to power and control 
over those who receive it. 
Table 12 
MODE OF INFORMATION REGARDING APPLICATION 
PEOPLE WHO 
RECEIVED 
NOTICE BY POST 
47 (44') 
Table 13 
PEOPLE WHO 
RECEIVED 
INFORMATIOM 
BY PUBLIC NOTICE 
23 (21\) 
PEOPLE WHO 
RECEIVED 
INFORMATION 
FROM PRESS 
56 (52\) 
VALUE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED ON PROCESS AND RIGHTS AT PUBLIC INQUIRIES 
INFORMATION INFORMATION INFORMATION [MORE AND BETTER INFORMATION FROM) 
ON RIGHTS ON RIGHTS ON RIGHTS COUNTY BRITISH BOTH SATISFA-
VERY USEFUL USEFUL NO USE COUNCIL COAL BODIES TORY 
10 27 10 7 8 71 ( 66\) 23 
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Twenty three had seen the statutory public notices posted by the County 
Council. The biggest mode of information was the press which considers 
the issue important as news because of the inherent conflicts of the 
public inquiry. As 56 people received information through the press it 
is an extremely useful mode of dissemination. However, the bias should 
be taken into account and treated as a secondary source. 
With 47 receiving notice by post from the County Council and when 
aligned to the figure of 37, though rather low for those who thought 
that information useful or very useful means it may possibly be the 
most objective and useful form of information for use within the Public 
Inquiry. Patently, the public should receive more and better 
information from both the County council and British Coal(66\). In 
addition they should be allowed the ability and education to 
distinguish between news and formal information on rights and 
responsibilities at Public Inquiries. 
The purpose of Table 14 is to correlate any need for knowledge and 
information, substantiated in Tables 12 and 13, with people's actual 
knowledge of the Public Inquiry process. 
Table 14 
NUMBER 
OF 
PERSONS 
KNOWLEDGE OF PUBLIC INQUIRY PROCESS 
THOSE WITH A 
GREAT DEAL 
4 ( 3\) 
THOSE WITH A THOSE WITH NO 
LITTLE KNOWLEDGE KNOWLEDGE 
36 (33\) 
11** 
65 (61\) 
** 11 people said they had attended a previous public inquiry. 
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With only ll people indicating they had attended an enquiry and just 4 
stating they had a "great deal of knowledge" it makes the findings in 
Table 13 all that more salutary. Those 36 people with a little 
knowledge may have experienced Public Inquiries in the past. However, 
with only 1l people stating they have actually attended one we must 
acknowledge an uncertainty regarding the quantity and quality of their 
knowledge of the Public Inquiry process. Despite 65 people "with no 
knowledge" only 27 people found the information received useful with 
even less (10) finding it very useful. 
People need more and better information because they have little or no 
knowledge of the public inquiry process. It is obvious from the 
findings that people require knowledge and information, but do not 
possess it, dissemination exists, but not in quality or quantity, and 
that control of knowledge and information rests with the bureaucracy. 
This supports the view that there is a tendency for people to be 
distinctly marginalised from the formal centres of power and control. 
Following from the previous findings Table 15. serves to identify basic 
knowledge of action at Public Inquiries. The figures at first appear 
surprisingly high given the findings in Table 14. for those with some 
knowledge of the public inquiry process. From this it is clear that 
people have some knowledge of their basic rights, and this may have 
come about because some people were notified by the County Council. 
However there is some distance between knowledge of laws to object/ 
agree than having information and knowledge of substance so that a 
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person can pursue their rights and endeavours with confidence. This 
suggests a degree of marginalisation requiring education and training 
and is supported by observations at public inquiries and from the 
results in Table 13 that actual participation by the public is very 
limited. 
Table 15 
NUMBER 
OP 
PERSONS 
KNOWLEDGE OF ACTION TO OBJECT/AGREE 
AT PUBLIC INQUIRIES 
BY REGISTERING 
OBJECTIONS/AGREEMENTS 
IN WRITING 
so 
BY SPEAKING AS 
AN OBJECTOR OR 
IN AGREEMENT 
60 
Graphically, a further indicator of marginalisation, at County Hall 
only 22 individuals actually registered their objections in addition to 
one large petition. Another registration from the T.G.W.U. was the 
only one in favour of the application. This is set against the figures 
for Table 10 of 18 who approved of the application and 75 who 
disapproved, as well as the evidence of those who know how to object 
but require more and better information but lack the ability and 
information to set their actions in motion should they so wish. 
Table 16 allowed people to state their preference for the method of 
advice and instruction that they may need to be given to allow them to 
participate more fully in the public inquiry. 
Table 16 
METHODS OF ADVICE AND INSTRUCTION FOR PEOPLE 
WISHING TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC INQUIRIES 
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC LEFT TO THE BY POST ALL OF 
PERSONAL MEETINGS OFFICIALS/ THESE 
INSTRUCTION PROFESSIONALS METHODS 
NUMBER 
OF 8 13 19 24 44 
PERSONS 
The scaling of these responses is interesting from a sociological point 
of view, going from a low for personal instruction to the more 
anonymous advice by post. The key response is the 24 who preferred 
advice privately by post. From an educational point of view, an 
element of reliance upon the professionals exists because having little 
knowledge of public inquiries few seem confident enough to cope in a 
public situation. However, the distinct preference is a combination of 
all of these methods with 44 people responding in the positive. The 
distinct impression is left that people require the need to know and 
certainly should not be denied the opportunity. 
Table 17 confirms this to a great extent. The inordinate reliance upon 
the council and councillors betrays a distinct lack of knowledge and 
information and confidence to take action at a public inquiry. It can 
be associated with the high degree of paternalism that has prevailed in 
the North East for many years. Graphically, a combined number of 77 
people stated that they would leave any action to the wisdom of the 
county council and its councillors. In comparison low scores of 10 
prevailed for people taking individual action at the public inquiry. 
The reliance upon 'experts' is evident with the higher figure of 19. 
People would at first sight appear content with letting the council 
'get on with' but requiring the right to be advised and informed if 
they wish to participate in public inquiries. 
Arguably this is only part of the equation of power and control. For 
this does not indicate whether people are desirous of gaining more 
knowledge, and with it responsibility and control over the decision 
whether opencast mining should intrude upon their lives. Table 18 
points to this issue of power, control and public decision making. The 
results are moat telling. 
Tabla 18 
POWER CONTROL AND PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 
DO PEOPLE 
HAVE 
ENOUGH SAY 
YES IN 
BRITISH 
COAL 
13 
SHOULD PEOPLE 
IN COMMUNITY 
CONTROL DECISIONS 
ON THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
YES IN 
COUNTY 
COUNCIL 
32 
NO IN NO IN 
BRITISH COUNTY 
YES 
CONTROL 
YES 
CONTROL 
COAL COUNCIL DECISIONS DECISIONS 
86 70 
83 20 
In totality these figures tell us that people feel they do not have 
enough input into the decisions made by the County Council and even 
less into those made by British Coal. Moreover, they make clear who 
should control decisions over their environment. While it is not 
surprising that 86 people felt that they have no control in British 
Coal's decision-making, what is remarkable is that 70 people believed 
that they do not have sufficient input into decisions made inside the 
council chamber at County Hall. Unmistakeably the categorical figure 
in Table 18. is that 83 people stated that they wish to control 
decisions over their environment and community. Table 18 clears up any 
doubts over the desires of people in the community and their 
relationship with opencast mining, the dissemination of information and 
the idea that all power and control over decision made by other bodies 
over their quality of life and environment should rest almost 
completely in the hands of the people in the community. If this took 
place opencast mining in this instance would be as much history as the 
deep mining that once took place in the ·Fall' communities. 
The way people perceive the intentions of Durham county council and 
British Coal to pursue the public interest is indicated in 
Tabla 19. The public are quite clear that their interest are not 
served by British Coal's application to extract coal by opencast 
methods at Daisy Hills; quite contrary they believe that British Coal 
are serving their own interests. It could be expected that Durham 
County Council be shown in a favourable light and British Coal in a 
less so favourable one, given the communities' past relationships with 
these organisations. Yet, in one sense the responses are not that 
straight forward. Even though the response for the county Council(45) 
is favourable, the concerns over power and control relayed in Tables 
11, 13 and 18 may be reflected in this returns. What is clear is that 
it is not as unequivocal in the positive as the negative response to 
British Coal. 
Table 19 
VERY MUCH SO 
MAINLY YES 
ONLY PARTIALLY 
NOT AT ALL 
REPRESENTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
(HAVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST AT HEART) 
BRITISH COAL NEED 
TO EXTRACT COAL 
5 
6 
24 
71 
DURHAM COUNTY COUNCIL 
OPPOSITION TO EXTRACTION 
45 
25 
26 
9 
Despite 45 people stating that the council have the public interest at 
heart there are clear reservations from the responses of 26 "only 
partially" and 9 "not at all". Starkly, the honest intentions of the 
peoples' representatives may, at other levels, be diluted in the 
process of bureaucracy. Again, the people may see the seat of 
decision-making as remote from their sphere of influence and thus their 
reservations show in their response. Finally and importantly, it 
re-inforces the belief that people are dissatisfied with the lack of 
power and control over their lives, community and environment. 
Table 20. poses the question for householders to suggest where young 
people will find employment in the future. The logic of the question 
is that if there is to be employment away from traditional industry 
where do they believe it will be found? It is question about hope and 
the level of aspirations. The findings though of lesser use than the 
main question posed by the survey can be used as a measurement along 
with other social factors from the survey to contrast and determine 
patterns of perceived social and economic change across the community 
from past years. The highest scoring areas were in the following: 
1. Reliance upon the County Council to bring jobs into the area 
2. Jobs in Shops and Offices 
3. Government Training Schemes 
4. Jobs in the Public Sector 
5. Moving to another area 
6. Further Education 
Despite being in the top six the latter three categories make quite low 
scores. The lowest scoring areas were in the following: 
1. Working for British Coal 
2. Moving to another country 
3. A Return to Drift coal Mining 
4. Self-Help Community Ventures 
s. Jobs in Manufacturing Industries 
6. Other Employment 
The perceived future depends upon a heavy dose of paternalism and low 
aspirations of working in shops and offices, gaining the qualification 
to do so through government training schemes 
Taking the latter two categories in each section we can make another 
section up which have medium scores but represents a disappointing 
approach if it is accepted that the beat careers lie through further 
education towards working in a manufacturing industry. Clearly people 
see manufacturing as a past industry and training as taking the place 
of further education. Working for British Coal or mining coal is not 
considered a viable option. Where then does opencast mining take the 
community in terms of employment,_ quality of life and social 
cohesiveness, so important in times of recession? 
OPENCAST COAL MINING AND PLANNING IN SCOTLAND: 
A Brief Survey ot Policy and Approach•• in Diserice Councils 
The purpo•• ot thia survey was to provide an underseandinq of why 
there was an apparently unoppoaed expansion ot opencase mining in 
scot. land. 
Scoeeish MPA's ware prasaneed with similar laqislaeion as that in North 
!aae !nqland. Ourinq this period such laqislaeion was used aqainse 
opencase expansion by objectors' 'neeworka' (Melucci 1988). The 
queaeion was, why there waa an inability or reluceanca of Scoetish 
KPA'a to embark upon stmilar aceion to thoaa MPA's in North Ease 
England, it they so desired. Furthermore what underaeandinq did the 
councillors in Scottiah planning committ .. a have ot currant laqialaeion 
to make proper reaaoned decisions upon applicaeions tor opencaae 
mining? Moreover did the planning officers undarseand the laqislaeion 
themaelvaa, and did they transmit this undarseandinq adequaealy to 
the councillors? These were issues incorporated ineo the survey in the 
hope of providing some answers to underpin the lengthy research into 
the axpans~on of opancast m~ning and dem~ae of deep m~n~ng ~n Scotland. 
However it would be helpful to take into cons~deration again that there 
were soma sim~lar and disa~m~lar variables imp~nging upon the process 
of opposition and co-operaeion to opancase mining applications in 
Scoeland. in conerase with North East England. 
(1) Boeh coalfield areas ware undergoing rat~onalisat~ons to meet 
government financ~al diract~vas. 
(2) Boeh had a history of a strong labour movement controlling 
councils. 
(3) Both, •~nee 1981. had left wing controlled area m~ners un~ona. 
(4) The structure and process of control of opencaat applicat~ona 
- .,£.. 
~ .)~ 
is d~fferant between the two areas. In the England M.P.A. is at 
County level, in Scotland it is spread diversely to District 
levels. 
(5) In Scotland there are extremely few recognised positions in Council 
Planning Departments of a 'Mineral Planner• at either Regional or 
District laval. In the North East each such County has a 'Mineral 
Planner'. 
(6) The history of cooperation prevalent during the' Watson era' 
of the NUM. leadership diminished in the North East from 1981 but 
has remained relatively unaltered in Scotland. 
(7) Indications of union solidarity waning in Scotland and waxing in 
the North East became apparent towards the end of the 1984 - 1985 
Miners strike. 'New realism• of the Scottish NUM is directly 
related to the corporatism in the body politic. 
(8) There is evidence of a closer association of miners, councillors, 
planning officers and British Coal management through 'closed 
orders' such as freemasonary in Scotland than in the North East. 
One reason for this is that freemasonary appears to be mora 
accessible to the working class in Scotland. As a result, lass 
conflict of interest will occur through their shared values and 
beliefs. Equally so, the propensity for compromise will be the 
norm rather than the exception. 
These are important contrasting variables affecting the control of the 
management of mineral planning, balancing the public good against the 
privata gain. It has also been argued that geological differences 
affected costs and this has been partially blamed for the demise of 
Scottish deep mine pits. But then soma of the best geologically sound 
pits in the North East were also closed. However the political change 
in the NUM Scottish area leadership that became apparent during the and 
of the strike had a particular and striking influence upon the process 
of opencast expansion in Scotland. As one of its leaders, Eric Clarke 
remarked in Edinburgh 1988, "opencast coal is a necessary evil", and we 
all now know why! 
The survey was sent to Planning Officers and Conveners of Planning 
Committees in the scottish District Councils which had a record of 
opencast coal mining. The surveys were not dissimilar in appearance 
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but subtle and distinct enough to produce comparative and contrasting 
views on policy and approaches to opencast mining. While they also 
give some indications about the state of the democratic process in 
local government, the sole purpose was to provide some indications or 
answers as to why opencast mining in Scotland has continued actively 
unopposed at the planning stage. 
One distinct strength of Planning Officers and the 'objectors network' 
at public inquiries in the North East is their understanding of 
planning law relating to opencast mining . This demands a necessary 
understanding of 'the market requirement for the coal', 'the need for 
the coal', and the financial organisation of British Coal to conduct an 
assessment of an application on a level plane. I have searched in vain 
for anyone in Scotland willing to admit to real understanding of these 
issues which are an essential part of paragraph 15 and 16 Circular 
4/1984. Having questioned planning officers at the Coalfield 
Communities Conference in Edinburgh 1988 if they understand the issue, 
they are not committed to utilizing it. From the survey we can see 
five variables which are repeated for each question, apart from 
questions one and five. Each one has been codified as follows: 
(!)Environment (2)Local Employment (J)Economic Development (4)Market 
Requirement for the Coal (5)The Financial Need of British Coal. All of 
these factors bear a strong association to Circular 4/1984 and Para. 
15 and 16 in particular and Para 5 before 1987 and Circular 23/1987. 
Figure 5.1 
TABLE OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
Q.1 Q.2 Q.J Q.4 Q.5 
53& 
Figure 5.1 
Clackmannan 
Clydesdale 
TABLE OP QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
Q.1 
P. C. 
+ 
+ 
Q.2 
P. C. 
1,2 1,2 
1,2 
Q.3 
P. C. 
4,5 5,4 
1.2 
Q.4 
P. C. 
1,3 5,4 
1,2 
Q. 5 
P. C. 
3 1 
3 
Cumbernauld & ################################################ 
Kilsyth 
Cumnock + + 2,1 3,1 5,3 5,4 2,1 5,4 0 0 
Cunninghame 1,2 1,2 4,5 5,4 1,2 5,4 2 2 
Dunfermline + + 2,1 1,2 4,5 4,5 1,2 5,4 1,3 1 
East Kilbride + 1,2 4,5 1,2 4 
Falkirk + + 1,2 1,2 5,4 1,2 3 * 
Hamilton 3,2 3,1 5,4 4,5 3,2 4,5 0 5 
Kilmarnock 1,2 1,2 4,3 5,4 1,4 5,4 3 2* 
Kirkaldy 1,2 4,5 4,5 1,2 4,5 3 0* 
Kyle and Carrick 1,2 1,2 5,4 3,1 1,2 4,3 1 1 
Midlothian + 1,2 1,2 4,5 1,2 3 1 
Monk lands + 1,3 4,5 1,3 3 @ 
Motherwell + 1,2 1,3 4,5 5,4 1,2 5,4 3,1 1 
Perth & Kinross 1,2 1,2 5,4 4,5 1,3 4,5 3,1 1 
Stirling 3,1 1,2 5,4 5,4 1,3 4,3 3,1 2 
Strathkelvin 1,2 4,5 1,2 0 
Renfrew no experience of opencast development in district. 
West Lothian 1,2 1,2 4,5 4,5 1,2 4,5 5 5 
Codes for Questions: P s Planners, C • Chair of Planning Committee 
Question 5>> 0 = No opposition, 1 = Environment Concern/ Opposition 
2 = Political Opposition, 3 = Opposition from residents in 
surounding area, 4 = opposition from Environmental Quangos, 
5 = Pro - opencast on employment 
Some of the missing figures are most telling of the the way opencast 
applications are handled; these are marked with an asterisk. Firstly, 
Falkirk has incurred the wrath of Central Region for its handling of 
opencast applications for "having too cosy relationships" with opencast 
operators. Councillors do not consider the ~market requirement' and 
the ~financial need of British Coal' as planning matters, "we do not 
ask for any reports on these items". Cumbernauld and Kilsyth returned 
forms blank though opencast is prevalent in the District. In contrast 
there are soma more conscientious district councils. 
Kilmarnock planning department does not consider the financial need of 
British Coal a planning matter but places a high priority in assessing 
the market requirement of British Coal. This is reflected in the 
response of councillors as one of the few councils who oppose opencast 
on a political basis. Conversely, Kirkaldy council planning committee 
chairman - Robert Taylor admits 
"there is no policy. Each case is considered on its merits". 
In affirming the dominance of planning officers in opencast decisions 
in Scotland and the dependence of councillors upon them, the Monklands 
planning committe convenor sent the Questionaire to the planning 
officer requesting that the reply be made on his behalf!. Monklands 
and Perth and Kinross planning officers did not know whether revenue 
from Scottish opencast coal directly subsidizes deep mine production in 
Scotland, though in paragraph 15 of Circular 4/1984 this is inherently 
required. Stirling District Council carries out word and deed. 
Councillors state "We are opposed to these developments and support 
deep mining". Graphically, evidence of the hand of the state at play 
is given by Councillor Peter Hoey of Hotherwell district council. 
If we refuse them they are granted by the Scottish Office 
so we give as much protection of environment as possible 
under planning conditions 
Councillor Peter Hoey, Written Comment on his Questionairre 
The first question is based upon the common misconception propagated by 
British Coal that Opencast coal directly subsidizes the deep mines of 
that same area. As we now know each production unit 'stands alone' and 
there is no cross subsidization. To believe the subsidization argument 
by design or default, allows the expansion of opencast coal per sa and 
reduces the higher cost tail of the deep mines. Table 1, shows the 
response of Planning Officers and Councillors to this issue. 
Table 1. 
DOES YOUR DEPARTMENT/COMMITTEE 
OPENCAST COAL HINES DIRECTLY 
SCOTLAND? 
HPA's(l7) 
(Planners) 
MPA's(l4) 
Councillors 
YES PER CENT 
9 (53) 
3 (21) 
BELIEVE THAT REVENUE 
SUBSIDIZES DEEP MINE 
NO PER CENT 
5 (29) 
10 (71) 
FROM SCOTTISH 
PRODUCTION IN 
DON'T KNOW 
3 
l 
Three MPA's had conflicts of opinion between planners and councillors 
over this important issue. Clackmannan, Midlothian and Hotherwell who 
have some of the largest opencast sites in Scotland, have witnessed the 
demise of deep mining in their district over the past decade. 
Polmaise, Bilston Glen/Monktonhall, and Polkemmet respectively, not 
small pits by any stretch of the imagination, have all been closed. 
Planners in these Districts believed direct subsidization took place 
while the councillors on the planning committe did not. 
From the following tables there is no obvious reason for the disparity. 
The ~market requirement' and the ~financial need of British Coal' is 
the least understood by Councillors and the least communication to them 
by Planners. The difference could be in the levels of consciousness of 
Planners and Councillors. The experience of pit closures would take on 
a greater political meaning to these Labour Councillors than most 
Planners operating within their bureaucratic frameworks. Quite 
possibly the closure of these pita against a background of expansion in 
opencast mining may have raised doubt in the minds of the Councillors. 
But clearly, this has not been translated into outright refusal of 
opencast applications on the scale of North East England •. 
Also, there is unanimity on the subsidization issue from cumnock, 
Dumfermline and Falkirk. All agree that there is a direct 
subsidization of deep mine production by opencast coal revenue. There 
are extremely high levels of unemployment in Cumnock and the Coon 
Valley. Many therefore, are dependant upon opencast for employment 
opportunities. But the same cannot be said fo~ the ~eastern' district 
councils whose proximity to chemicals and high tech industry lessens 
the burden of unemployment. 
We find from Table 1. that there is agreement between councillors and 
planning officers within six MPA's who disbelieve the subsidization 
argument. These are at Cunningham& and Kilmarnock, geographically 
! 
close together, and Stirling who oppose it on political grounds. 
Hamilton, who allow opencast on employment grounds. Kirkaldy, who have 
no policy. West Lothian, who have a pro opencast policy, mainly 
attached to employment grounds. So, inconsistency in opencast 
applications can be seen at this early stage. 
The majority of Planning Officers believe in the subsidization 
argument. Some 53\ accepted British Coal's argument against some 29\ 
who replied in the negative. Significantly 3 M.P.A's planning officers 
did not know or understand the issue. Clearly, planning officers in 
M.P.A.'s in Scottish District Councils, because they believe in the 
subsidization argument, and from the power resulting from their status 
and position, have a major influence on the outcome of opencast 
planning applications. This to some extent may account for very few 
applications being rejected by M.P.A. 's even though 71\ of District 
Council Planning Convenors do not believe in the subsidization 
argument. The evidence from Monklands certainly points to this 
phenomenon. 
One of the most important roles of a planning officer is to take 
cognisance of the concerns of district councillors and advise them 
accordingly on policy development. The neutrality of planning officers 
and objectivety of advice is an important element of their professional 
organisation, the Royal Town Planning Institute (R.T.P.I.). 
Table 2. 
ISSUES IN OPENCAST COAL APPLICATIONS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE PLANNING 
OFFICERS THAT WOULD BE THE MOST IMPORTANT TO COUNCILLORS IN SCOTTISH 
DISTRICT COUNCILS MPA'S 
Ist Choice 
2nd Choice 
Environment Local 
Employ't 
14(78%) 2 ( ll\) 
3(17\) 14 (78\) 
Economic 
Developt 
2 ( 11\) 
1(5\) 
Market Financial Need 
Requiremt of British Coal 
for Coal 
0 0 
0 0 
NB. Percentage of the total response of 18 in brackets 
Seventy eight par cent of Planning Officers consider the environment 
and local employment as the issues most important to councillors. No 
weighting is given to the matter of para 5/4, 1984, considered 
essential at public inquiries in the North East. Yet 71\ of 
councillors who do not believe in the subsidization argument would need 
information and understanding on the market requirement, the need for 
the coal and the financial imperatives of British Coal. In Table 3., 
85\ of council members placed the environment as the highest priority 
above employment in the community when assessing applications. 
Table 3. 
ISSUES IN OPENCAST COAL APPLICATIONS GIVEN THE MOST PRIORITY BY 
COUNCILLORS IN SCOTTISH DISTRICT COUNCILS MPA'S 
Environment Local 
Employmt 
1st Choice 11(85\) 0 
2nd Choice 2(15\) 10 (77\) 
Economic 
Developt 
2(15\) 
1(8\) 
Market Financial Need 
Requiremt of British Coal 
for Coal 
0 0 
0 0 
NB. Percentage of the total response of 13 in brackets 
Comparing Table 2 with Table 3 we can also verify that councillors 
place greater emphases on the environment than the planning officers 
believe they do but are in unison over employment as the second largest 
priority when considering opencast applications. Table 4. gives an 
indication of how well Para. 15 and 16 of Circulars 4/1984 and 23/1987 
are understood by councillors from the planners point of view. 
Table 4. 
ISSUES IN OPENCAST COAL APPLICATIONS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PLANNING 
OFFICERS THAT ARE LEAST UNDERSTOOD BY COUNCILLORS IN SCOTTISH DISTRICT 
COUNCILS MPA'S 
Environment 
1st Choice 0 
2nd Choice 0 
Local 
Employmt 
0 
0 
Economic Market 
Developt Requiremt 
for Coal 
0 12(67') 
2(11\) 5(28,) 
NB. Percentage of the total response of 18 in brackets 
Financial Need 
of British coal 
6(33') 
11(61\) 
Councillors give no weight in Table 2. to the issues inherent in 
paragraph 15 and 16 of Circular 4/1984. However, when this is 
considered in the light of Table 4. where planners state clearly that 
these are the two major issues least understood by councillors there is 
an implicit suggestion that planning officers are failing in their 
"considered opinion" to convey the nature of the issue of Para. 15 to 
the councillors to make an informed decision. Conversely, as 
Councillors place great emphasis on the environment it is encumbent 
upon the Planners to give great weight to this by providing them with 
the knowledge and information to oppose the development if they so 
desire. More significantly when we assess Table 5, we begin to 
understand why Councillors place no importance on these matters because 
Planning Officers do not communicate the issues to them. Indeed the 
configuration in the response of 38\ and 46\ and inversely 46\ and 38\ 
suggests an avoidance of the issues by planning officers. Importantly, 
planning officers should see that the market requirement for coal and 
the financial need of British Coal would be of major concern to 
councillors in the light of their extreme doubt over the cross 
subsidisation of revenue. Planning Officers fail to relate and 
communicate the interaction of two issues to Councillors. 
The responses in Table 5. indicate the extent to which planning law 
on opencaat mining is communicated to the council members for them to 
make informed decisions. Besides in addition not communicating the 
real issues, either the planners do not fully understand Circular 
4/1984 or they choose not to elaborate it to the councillors. 
Table 5 
ISSUES IN OPENCAST COAL MINING FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE COUNCILLORS 
THAT ARE LEAST COMMUNICATED WELL TO THEM BY THE PLANNING OFFICERS 
Environment Local 
Employmt 
lst Choice a a 
2nd Choice 1(8%) a 
Economic Market Financial Need 
Developt Requiremt of British Coal 
for Coal 
1(8\) 5(38%) 6(46\) 
a 6(46\) 5(38\) 
NB. Percentage of total response of 13 in brackets 
Table 6. 
ISSUES IN OPENCAST COAL APPLICATIONS GIVEN THE MOST PRIORITY BY 
PLANNING OFFICERS IN SCOTTISH DISTRICT COUNCILS MPA'S 
Environment 
1st Choice 16(89%) 
2nd Choice 1(5%) 
Local 
Employmt 
1(5%) 
12(67\) 
Economic 
Developt 
1(5%) 
4(22\) 
Market 
Requiremt 
for Coal 
0 
0 
NB. Percentage of total response of 13 in brackets 
Financial Need 
of British Coal 
0 
0 
But, it is clear that if Planners do not fully understand the document 
Circular 4/1984 given that the majority believe in the cross 
subsidization argument, they give no priority to the essentials of 
paragraph 15 and 16. in the survey, but emphasise the Environment and 
Employment as the major priorities (Table 6.). The Planners 
pre-occupation with the environment to the exclusion of the 'Market' 
factors of British Coal is very much paralleled by the response of the 
Councillors. With both the Planners' and Council members• emphasis on 
the Environment in Tables 3 and 6. it would appear natural for them to 
have a tendency to oppose opencast coal mining. It would appear that 
Planning Officers in the main fail to act on paragraph 15. themselves 
and fail to convey the necessary information to Councillors for "their 
considered decision". The responses from Table 6. combined with those 
in Table 7. mean that Circular 4/1984 and Circular 23/1987 are the 
least communicated to, and least understood by council members. 
Opencast operators have nothing to fear from planning legislation in 
this respect. 
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Table 7. 
ISSUES IN OPENCAST COAL APPLICATIONS THAT ARE LEAST UNDERSTOOD BY 
COUNCILLORS IN SCOTTISH DISTRICT COUNCILS MPA'S 
Environment 
let Choice 0 
2nd Choice 0 
Local 
Employmt 
0 
0 
Economic 
Developt 
Market Financial Need 
Requiremt of British Coal 
for Coal 
0 6(46\) 6(46\) 
2(15\) 6(46\) 4(30\) 
NB. Percentage of the total response of 18 in brackets 
The transmission of information, or the lack of it in terms of para 15, 
Circular 4/1984 reflected across the wider public domain is depicted in 
Table 8. Environmental impact and concerns by residents dominate the 
main flow of opposition to opencaat in Scotland. While there is some 
indication of political awareness to the issues in opencaat mining, 
compared to that in North East England it is minor in dimension. 
Table 9. is moat telling. Opposition as a policy on opencast is not 
reflected in the refusal rate of applications. One answer is depicted 
in the high priority given to employment by Planners and Councillors in 
Tables 2 and 3 respectively. 
Tabla 8. 
MAIN OPPOSITION TO OPENCAST COAL MINING IN SCOTTISH DISTRICTS FROM THE 
PLANNING OFFICERS VIEWPOINT 
Regional 
Council 
1 
Residents 
to impact 
Timescale 
12 
Environmental 
Amenity/ 
Groups 
5 
Little/No Pro-Opencast Political 
Opposition on Employment Opposition 
to Opencast Grounds to Opencast 
3 1 2 
** Planning Officers gave mora than one answer to the question and all 
their responses are included in the table 
Table 9. 
COUNCILLORS - "WHAT IS THE POLICY OF YOUR COUNCIL ON OPENCAST MINING" 
No Policy 
on Opancast 
Mining 
l 
not 
Stated 
Policy Opposed 
to Opencast 
Mining a Priority 
4 1 
**Mora than one answer reflected in tabla. 
Environmental 
conditions 
Grounds 
6 
Accepted on 
Employment 
4 
Planning Officers appear to have little or no knowledge of the major 
issue in Circular 4/1984. Starkly, the survey suggests that the reason 
why councillors are not seeing their disbelief in cross subsidization 
and opposition to opancast translated into a meaningful form and 
process is that Planners are not transmitting the necessary information 
to them. Indeed, Planners may be avoiding the issue altogether. There 
has been a heavy reliance on environmental matters and a neglect of the 
issues of markets and financial need arguments which are the essentials 
of Paragraph 15 and 16, and, paragraph 5. before March 1987. But to be 
fair to planners, councillors have a responsibility to learn 
appropriate legislation, and it is in the public interest that they 
do. Soma may have an understanding, and I have mat those who do have a 
grasp of the essentials of Paragraph 15. By default they may choose or 
instruct the planners not to become involved with such matters. Then 
there is the first party in this, the State and British Coal. We have 
evidence of the seemingly pointless exercise of refusing applications 
from Motherwell councillors. Such is the corporate process in Scotland 
this may just be the case. In any event however, the 'market 
requirement for coal' and the 'financial need of British Coal' is 
not an issue in Scotland, but by law and in the public interest should 
be. The withholding of knowledge and information to favour an 
industrial body against the wider public interest would be an abuse of 
power. In Scotland it is the corporate will for opencast development 
to expand, and not necessarily in the public interest. 
IHDEPDIDEN'r SURVBY OP TBB PUBLIC'S 
KNOtiLBDGB OP, AND A'r"rii'UDE '1'0 
PUBLIC INQUIRIES INTO OPENCAST 
COAL MINING 
NOULD YOU BE KIND ENOUGH '1'0 DO THE FOLLOWING 
WBBN ANSWERING THE I}UESTIONS 
(l) Please write "Yes" or "No" to 
questions 
(2) Please "Tick" in the appropriate 
box for all questions other than 
29 and 35 and "Yes"/"~.o·• questior1s 
(3) Please answer questions 29 and 35 
placing a 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, against 
your choices in the order you 
prefer 
·~,-:.,.~ ·~·":.;·;(,I 
..... ,- --'·-r-;·. _; :..: __ .,.._..._,_, ..:.~ ·. 
'111IS IS ter A TEST. AIL INRR:fATION !'RCNimD WILL BE USED IN 'mE S'lRI~ 
c:xM'Imla. 
UHIVBRSI'l'Y 01" DURBAM 
IHDEPBNDEN'l' SURVEY 01" TBB PVBLIC' S 
ICNOWLBDGE OP I AND A'l"i'I'l'UDB '1't) 
PUBLIC INQUIRIES INTO OPBNCAST 
COAL MINING 
l. What was/is your occupation? 
-,---.-;, .1'l. "-:~ 
,.. ~·t.\.~ ,;;.: . ~~ 
- .· _: .. '..:.~ .... _~- .. ~:~-.. 
2. How long have you lived in the area? Years •.•••••••••••••••• 
3. Do you, outside your own family, have 
relations living in Waldridge, Sacristan, 
Nettlesworth, Daisy Rill or Edmonsley 
Villages? 
4. Have you worked in the mining industry? 
5. Rave you had a close relative working in 
the Mining Industry? 
6. Rave you held a position in the Miners 
Unions? 
7. Have you had a close relative who has 
held a position in the Miners Unions? 
a. Have you held a position on the Local 
Parish or District Council? 
9. Have you had a close relative who has 
held a posit~n on the Local Parish or 
District Council? 
LO. At what age did you finish your full-
time Education? 
Ll. Have you taken any Education Courses 
since then? 
.2. Have you undertaken Further or Higher 
Education, Part~ime or Full-Time? 
.3. Do you take an interest in Politics? 
.4. Do you take an interest in the 
Environment? 
5. Are you a member of a Political Party 
or Pressure Group? 
6. Have you had experience of Opencast 
Coal Mining near your hoMe in:-
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
.. Yes/No 
Parish/District/None 
Parish/District/None 
Years ..•••••••••••.••••• 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
(1) Last 5 Years 
(2) Last 10 years 
(3) Last 20 years 
(4) Your lifetime 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
cont/ .•• 
,I 
~3-
27. Did you know that you can speak as an 
objector or in agreement with a subject 
at a Public: Inquiry? 
28. Do you think that advice and instruction 
should be given to people wishing to 
participate in the Public: Inquiry by:-
PLBASE TICK 
29. Place in order of preference (1,2,3, etc:) 
'1 what you think is 1110re important 
30. Do you think you have enough say in 
decision-making made by British Coal 
With regard to Opencast Coal Mining? 
31. Do you think you have enough say in 
decision-making made by Durham county 
Council with regard to Opencast COal 
llining? 
32. Do you believe that people in the 
community should control decisions 
about the way the environment is used 
rather than leaving it to officials 
and councillors? 
33. British Coal say there is a need for 
the coal at the Daisy Hill site - Do 
you think that British Coal have the 
Public interest at heart by extraction 
of this coal at Daisy Rill? 
·' 34. 
Pc.EAS£ TrC.I( 
The County Council argue there is no 
market need for this coal - Do you 
35. 
think that Durham County Council have 
the public interest at heart by opposing 
the extraction of coal at Daisy Rill? 
Pr.LA~ -r,ct< 
Where do you believe your children and/ 
or other young people will find employment 
in the future. 
Please select the 1110st likely possibility 
in order of preference (1,2,3,4,5, etc) 
Yes/No 
(l) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Po at 
Public Meetings 
Indepenc!ent Personal 
Instruction 
All of these methods 
Left to the Officials and 
Professionals. 
(a) National Energy Needs 
(b) Views of Local People 
(c) Profitability of British 
COal . 
(d) The Environment and 
COIIIIIlWlity 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yea/No 
(a) very much so 
(b) mainly yes 
(c) only partially 
(d) not at all 
(a) very much so 
(b) mainly yes 
(c) only partially 
(d) not at all 
(a) S*lf help Community Ventures 
(b) Government Training Schemes 
(c) Jobs in Shops, Offices or 
other services 
(d) Further Education Qualificatior~ 
(e) Reliance upon the County 
Council to bring industry into 
the area 
(f) A return to Drift Coal Mininq 
for the remaining coal under 
COIIIIIlWlity and council control 
(q) Jobs in the Public Sector 
CDHSS, Civil Service, County 
Hall, Inland Revenue 
UIIVIISITY ,. DUIJWI 
OPiliiCAST CQIL ••z• AitD PI.A*B• z• SCt/II.AIID 
A brief aurvey of policy and approecbee ln District Councila 
E£C Q.l 12.'3 
-
DOES YOUR DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT REVENUE FROM o¥1!& 
SCOTTISH OPENCAST COAL MINES DIRECTLY SUBSIDIZES NO 
DEEP MINE PRODUCTION IN SCOTLAND ? 
Q.2 
WHICH ISSUES WOULD BE THE tllST IMPORTANT TO YOUR a> THE ENVIRONMENT \ 
COUNCIL MEMEBERS WHEN CONSIDERING OPENCAST COAL b) LOCAL EMPLOYMENT '2. 
DEVELOPMENT APPLICATIONS c> ECONOMIC 
'3 Please list in order of 1mportanco DEVELOPMENT 
d) MARKET REQUIREMENT 
FOR THE COAL 
•> THE FINANCIAL NEED .. 
OF BRITISH COAL 
' Q.3 
WHICH OF THE ISSUES DO YOU FEEL IS LEAST a> THE ENVIRONMENT 
UNDERSTOOD BY YOUR MBNBERS WHEif CONSIDERIIIG b> LOCAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPENCAST COAL DEVBJ.OPMBHT APPLICATIONS ? C) ECONOMIC 
Please ltat 1,2,3 DEVELOPMENT 
d) MARKET REQUIREMENT 
FOR THE COAL I 
e) THE FINANCIAL NEED 2. OF BRITISH COAL 
Q.4 
GIVEN COUNCIL POLICY ON OPENCAST DEVELOPMENT a> THE ENVIRONMENT I 
WHICH 3 ISSUES DO YOU GIVE THE MOST PRIORITY b) LOCAL EMPLOYMENT 1. 
IN ANY APPLICATION -- REGARDLESS OF THE C) ECONOMIC l INDIVIDUAL MERITS OF THE SITE OR THE DEVELOPMENT 
APPLICATION ? d) MARKET REQUIREMENT 
Please list 1,2,3 FOR THE COAL 
a> THE FINANCIAL NEED 
OF BRITISH COAL 
Q.5 
GENERALLY SPEAKING WHERE WOULD YOU SAY THE 
MAIN OPPOSITION, IF ANY, HAS COME FROM ? 
Your comments are welcome 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TINE AND CONSIDERATION 
~J:S~ 
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
OPENCAST COM. III/liNG AND PLAII/11/IG IN SCaTI.AifD 
A brief survey of policy and approechas in District Councils 
Q. 1 
DOES YOUR ~~~'~ELIEVE THAT REVENUE FROM 
SCOTTISH OPENCAST COAL MINES DIRECTLY SUBSIDIZES 
DEEP MINE PRODUCTION IN SCOTLAND ? 
Q. 2 
GIVEN COUNCIL POLICY ON OPENCAST DEVELOPMENT 
WHICH 3 ISSUES DO YOU GIVE THE MOST PRIORITY 
IN ANY APPLICATION -- REGARDLESS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL MERITS OF THE SITE OR THE 
APPLICATION ? 
Please list 1,2,3 
Q. 3 
WHICH OF THE ISSUES DO YOU FEEL IS LEAST 
COMMUNICATED WELL BY YOUR OFFICERS 
WHEN 'ONSIDERING 
OPENCAST COAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Please list 1,2,3 
Q.4 
WHICH OF THE ISSUES DO YOU FEEL IS LEAST 
UNDERSTOOD BY YOUR MEMBERS WHEN CONSIDERING 
OPENCASi CvAL ~EVELOPMENTS 
Please list 1,2,3 
Q. 5 
a> 
b) 
c> 
d> 
e> 
a> 
b) 
c> 
d) 
e> 
a> 
b) 
.._} 
d) 
e> 
~ 
NO 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
LOCAL EMPLOYMENT 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
MARKET REQUIREMENT 
FOR THE COAL 
THE FINANCIAL NEED 
OF BRITISH COAL 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
LOCAL EMPLOYMENT 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
MARKET REQUIREMENT 
FOR THE COAL 
THE FINANCIAL NEED 
OF BRITISH COAL 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
LOCAL EMPLOYMENT 
ECONCMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
MARKET REQUIREMENT 
FOR THE COAL 
THE FINANCIAL NEED 
OF BRITISH COAL 
WHAT IS THE POLICY OF YOUR COUNCIL ON OPENCAST COAL ~INING ? 
Please co~~~~~~ent: 
Thank you for your time and consideration Counclllor 
' 2. 
3 
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